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ABSTRACT 
The ability to achieve resilience to extreme events requires a shift away from the 
traditional risk management approach and a progression towards understanding 
resilience as a dynamic process operating within a complex socio-ecological-
technical emergency management system.  Taking a systems based approach 
this research applied quantitative and qualitative methods to explore how 
resilience to water supply failure is achieved within the UK emergency 
management system.  This was supported through the application of the Safe 
and SuRe intervention framework.  Semi-structured interviews with emergency 
management professionals revealed that the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004 is not 
aligned with current operational practices to enable effective collaboration 
between Category 1 and Category 2 responders.  This is further constrained by 
a lack of government funding and a lack of understanding with regard to 
organisational culture and how this influences the operational delivery of multi-
agency emergency response.  The attitudes and perceptions of individuals to 
water supply failure was examined through individual householder questionnaires 
and the analysis of Facebook comments during the ‘Beast from the East’.  
Individuals expressed a high level of confidence in the ability of Water Service 
Provider’s to provide a reliable, continuous and safe supply of water.  While the 
majority of individuals do not prepare for a failure of the water supply they actively 
respond during an incident to achieve resilience by purchasing water from the 
supermarkets, staying with relatives or attending water distribution stations.  
However, the ability to achieve resilience requires the provision of accurate, 
timely and consistent information from the Water Service Providers.  Resilience 
to emergencies can also be strengthened at the local level through the 
development of collaborative working partnerships.  The integration of community 
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groups within the emergency management system enables resilience through the 
sharing and exchange of information to understand capabilities available for 
effective emergency response. 
 
This research demonstrates how the application of a systems based approach 
enables a greater understanding of the complex interdependencies between 
different parts of the emergency management system.  These were explored and 
developed into recommendations identifying where resilient based strategies and 
interventions are required at the government, inter-organisational and community 
level. 
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1 CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
With heightened media interest in any form of disastrous situation, the world is 
held in suspense as every detail of the emergency is revealed in real time, minute 
by minute.  Whether the incident is a result of a natural disaster, industrial 
accident or terrorism, every aspect of the emergency situation is analysed and 
the world is left in wonder as to why it was not prevented from happening in the 
first place.  Emotive images of people struggling to cope in an extreme situation 
dominate every form of media and serve as a reminder of our vulnerability or 
resilience. 
 
Extreme events are characterised as low probability, high impact events in terms 
of their magnitude, spatial scale and destructive potential (Alexander 2002a; 
Stephenson, 2008; Comfort et al, 2010).  In a world that is constantly changing 
and evolving, these events present many challenges for emergency management 
(Gow and Paton, 2008).  With a heavy reliance on critical infrastructure and the 
complex interdependence between society, economics, politics and the natural 
environment, there is a constant challenge to reduce the impact of extraneous 
threats in an effort to become more resilient.  However, what does resilience 
really mean and how can it be operationalised through effective emergency 
management in a complex interdependent world? 
 
The concept of resilience has been widely applied within many different 
disciplines including ecology (Holling, 1973; Holling 1996), psychology 
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(Vanderbilt-Adriance and Shaw, 2008; Luthar, 2006), engineering (McDaniels et 
al, 2008; Hollnagel et al, 2007; Butler et al, 2016) and disaster management (De 
Bruijne et al, 2010; DFID, 2011; Alexander, 2013).  Each discipline defines 
resilience within the specific context according to what is being investigated.  This 
has resulted in hundreds of definitions of resilience within the academic literature 
(Patel et al, 2017).  While a universal definition is constantly being sought (Wright 
et al, 2012), it has also been considered that resilience should be contextualised 
(Carpenter et al, 2001), in order to understand its true meaning and how this can 
applied within different situations (Vanderbilt-Adriance and Shaw, 2008; Gow and 
Paton, 2008; DFID, 2011; Alexander, 2013).   This requires an understanding of 
the system or process that needs to be made resilient and the threat or hazard 
that it needs to be resilient to (Carpenter et al, 2001; DFID, 2011; Butler et al, 
2016).   
 
A failure of foresight and the inability to determine a ‘worst case’ scenario is a 
recurring theme within ‘lessons learned’ reports following extreme events 
(Turner, 1975; Crichton et al, 2009; Paltrinieri et al, 2011; Constantinides, 2013; 
Turoff et al, 2013).  Whilst the anticipation of threats and hazards and the 
assessment of risk is considered to be a primary stage in the emergency planning 
process (Ferrier and Emdad Haque, 2003; Smith, 2013), it is extremely difficult 
to determine with any certainty (Meyer, 2005; Boin and Hart, 2010; Paltrinieri et 
al, 2011), particularly regarding low probability, high consequence extreme 
events.  These are typically characterised by a rapidly changing dynamic situation 
(Vespignani, 2010; Park et al, 2013; Linkov et al, 2014) where many of the threats 
and hazards are largely unknown (Park et al, 2013; Linkov et al, 2014; Butler et 
al, 2014) making the assessment of potential risk an impossible task.  For those 
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that are known, there is the potential for them to escalate into a series of 
cascading events (Boin and McConnell, 2007; Crichton et al, 2009; Vespignani, 
2010) where again the threats and hazards may be unknown. 
 
Highly publicised events such as Hurricane Katrina and the Great East Japan 
Earthquake (McCallum and Heming, 2006; Hollnagel and Fujita, 2012; 
Constantinides, 2013) demonstrate how a reliance on a risk based approach to 
emergency management is not adequate for extreme events, particularly 
considering the complex independencies between society and critical 
infrastructure (Luiijf and Klaver, 2005) and the ability of events to cascade.  It has 
been recognised that in order to prepare for low probability, high consequence 
events requires the application of a resilient based approach (DFID, 2011; 
Comfort et al, 2010; Boin and McConnell, 2007). With emergency planning 
becoming increasingly focussed on reducing risk and increasing resilience to 
emergencies, this research will explore what these terms actually mean in 
practice and how they can be applied within a framework of emergency 
management.   
 
The main principles of emergency management are to reduce the magnitude of 
a given event through adequate preparedness and mitigation and to minimise the 
event duration through effective emergency response and recovery (Figure 1.1).  
However, events such as Hurricane Katrina and the Great East Japan 
Earthquake (McCallum and Heming, 2006; Hollnagel and Fujita, 2012; 
Constantinides, 2013) demonstrate how a lack of preparation for the failure of 
critical infrastructure can have disastrous consequences for society (Luiijf and 
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Klaver, 2005; Boin and McConnell, 2007).  These events also serve as a reminder 
that our reliance on technology to enable the prediction and warning of natural 
hazards is necessary but not sufficient in terms of building a resilient approach to 
emergency response and recovery for extreme events (Huppert and Sparks, 
2006; McCallum and Heming, 2006; Comfort et al, 2013).   
 
 
Figure 1.1:  System performance relating to emergency planning.  Adapted from 
McDaniels et al, 2002 and Mugame et al, 2015.  
 
It could be argued that these and many other events can be predicted and should 
therefore be adequately prepared for (Turner, 1975; Turoff et al, 2013). However, 
it is the extreme nature of these events in terms of magnitude, spatial scale and 
destructive potential that result in the exceedance of available resources and 
capabilities for effective emergency management and the protection of critical 
infrastructure.  The inevitability of human error in the prediction, response and 
recovery of an extreme event (Perrow, 2011), whether this is the result of 
complacency, inadequate planning, preparation, lack of inter-agency cooperation 
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(Pitt, 2008), or poor communication (Kapucu, 2005), can also lead to a long 
process of recovery.  This demonstrates the importance of performing a rigorous 
assessment of the impact and consequences of threats and hazards (Butler et 
al, 2016; Comfort et al, 2013; Huppert and Sparks, 2006; McCallum and Heming, 
2006), particularly with respect to the continuation of services provided by critical 
infrastructure following an extreme event (Butler et al, 2016; Butler  et al, 2014).   
 
Within the UK, statutory duties of civil protection are assigned to emergency 
responder organisations and delivered through Local Resilience Forums (LRF’s).  
These were established following the introduction of the Civil Contingencies Act, 
2004 (CCA, 2004) and aimed to encourage greater collaboration between 
responder organisations to ensure an effective emergency response at a local 
level (Cabinet Office, 2013a).  Within England and Wales there are 42 LRF’s 
located within Police operational boundaries and consisting of Category 1 and 
Category 2 responders. 
 
Category 1 responders include the emergency services, Local Authorities, Health 
Authorities and the Environment Agency (Cabinet Office, 2012).  These 
organisations have statutory duties under the CCA, 2004 to cooperate, share 
information, assess risk, maintain emergency and business continuity plans, 
communicate to the public and promote business continuity (Cabinet Office, 
2012).  Category 2 responders include Utility, Telecommunications and Transport 
companies and although they do not have any statutory duties defined within the 
Act they are expected to support the Category 1 responders in their duties 
(Cabinet Office, 2012).  Built within a framework of integrated emergency 
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management, the introduction of the CCA, 2004 sought to provide the flexibility 
required to respond to changing dynamic emergency situations through a multi-
agency collaborative approach at a local level (CCA, 2004; Cabinet Office, 
2013b).   
 
However, the 2007 summer flood event in Gloucestershire highlighted a 
significant problem with this approach when Mythe Water Treatment works 
became inundated with floodwater resulting in over 350,000 people left without a 
centralised water supply for 17 days (Pitt, 2008; Environment Agency, 2010; 
Ofwat, 2010).  The Gloucestershire Resilience Forum had prepared what they 
considered to be an adequate assessment of the threats and hazards within their 
local area however, the potential failure of critical infrastructure had not been 
anticipated.  This was further exemplified when Waltham Electricity Sub Station 
became at risk of inundation.   This would have resulted in over 500,000 people 
without electricity for up to three weeks (Pitt, 2008).  The scale of this event was 
unprecedented for the UK water sector leading to a series of unpredictable events 
that had to be managed within a complex, chaotic and uncertain environment.   
 
An inadequate level of understanding regarding the potential consequences of 
critical infrastructure failure was largely attributed to the lack of participation of 
Category 2 responders in the risk assessment process.  It was argued that by not 
placing a statutory duty on them to perform an assessment of the potential 
hazards it allowed them to dissociate themselves from the risk assessment 
process (Pitt, 2008; McMaster and Baber, 2012).   
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This was not just an issue within Gloucestershire.  Throughout the country rising 
flood waters affected 5 water treatment works, over 300 sewage treatment works 
and seriously threatened the electricity supply in Gloucestershire, Yorkshire and 
Humberside (Pitt, 2008). This event provided the first real test of the effectiveness 
of the multi-agency approach to emergency management following the 
introduction of the CCA, 2004.  A lack of collaboration and sharing information by 
Category 2 responders regarding the vulnerability of critical infrastructure assets 
demonstrated a weakness in this approach and the ability to achieve resilience 
of critical infrastructure failure to flooding (Pitt, 2008).  
 
Following the 2007 severe flood event, the UK Government initiated a series of 
reviews to build resilience of critical infrastructure to natural hazards (HM 
Government, 2010; HM Government, 2011; Cabinet Office, 2011b; UKRN, 2015; 
UKRN, 2016; HM Government, 2016; National Infrastructure Commission, 2018).  
Many of these reviews also encouraged collaboration and the sharing of 
information by Category 2 responders regarding the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructure assets to ensure effective emergency response.  However, lessons 
learned from recent incidents and multi-agency exercises (Watermark, 2011; 
Environment Agency, 2016; HM Government 2016; Ofwat 2018) demonstrate 
these difficulties continue to persist despite numerous recommendations for 
improvement.  This raises the question as to whether there is a fundamental 
problem within the system of emergency management allowing the same failures 
to occur time and time again.   
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1.2  Research perspective 
This PhD forms part of the EPSRC-funded Safe and SuRe research fellowship 
project (EP/K006924/1) undertaken at the Centre for Water Systems, University 
of Exeter. Safe and SuRe represents an integrated socio-ecological-technical 
approach to resilience within the Urban Water Management Sector (Butler et al, 
2016; Butler et al, 2014).  It has long been realised that the threat of climate 
change and increasing urbanisation as a result of population growth has put a 
significant strain on the existing water service systems and their effective future 
provision.  The ability to continually provide a safe (reliable) provision of service 
is constantly being challenged and requires the development of new and 
innovative strategies to achieve resilience within the water sector to extreme 
events.  However, in order to be effective the strategies must also be sustainable 
in response to a dynamic and changing environment.   
 
The Safe and SuRe approach defines resilience as the “degree to which the 
system minimises level of service failure magnitude and duration over its design 
life when subject to exceptional conditions.”  In the context of emergency 
planning, the system is representative of the emergency management system.  
Failure magnitude is synonymous with incident severity (Figure 1.1) and can be 
reduced in a number of different ways.  These could include the incorporation of 
lessons learned within operational procedures, preparedness through the 
development of emergency plans, training and regular exercising of standard 
operational procedures.  This also includes the ability to develop accurate 
situational awareness to respond quickly and effectively to emergency situations. 
The event duration, the time taken for the system to recover is also considered 
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as a determinant of resilience.  However, social systems differ from engineered 
systems and do not always have the potential to “bounce back” to the original 
state or level of functioning (DFID, 2011).  For instance, it may be difficult for 
individuals and communities to recover from an extreme event due to a poor 
infrastructure, a lack of governance and economic instability.  These social 
systems can fail or even collapse following an extreme event (Lindell, 2010; 
Carpenter, 2008).   
 
Figure 1.2: Safe and SuRe Intervention Framework, taken from  
Butler et al, 2016. 
 
The Safe and SuRe Intervention Framework is comprised of 4 elements, threat, 
system, impact and consequences (Figure 1.2).  Threats are defined as “any 
event with the potential to reduce the degree to which the system delivers a 
defined level of service”.  Within the context of Safe and SuRe, there is no 
differentiation between threats, hazards, disturbances or crisis.  Threats have the 
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potential to cause failure within the system and the resulting impact may have 
consequences for society, economic stability or damage to the environment.  
Within the UK emergency management system threats are defined as ‘malicious 
attacks’ and hazards are defined as ‘non malicious events’ which may contribute 
to an emergency (Cabinet Office, 2012). An emergency is defined as “an event 
or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the 
United Kingdom, an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the 
environment of a place in the United Kingdom, or war, or terrorism, which 
threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom” (Cabinet Office, 
2012).  Within this research, hazards will be considered as per the Safe and SuRe 
methodology and referred to as threats. 
 
At the intersection of each element are intervention measures of mitigation, 
adaptation, coping and learning.  These provide the opportunity to build resilience 
and sustainability in the system.  The framework can be evaluated by taking a 
top down, bottom up, middle based or circular approach to analysis (Figure 1.3). 
 
The top down analysis is representative of the traditional risk management 
approach to emergency planning.  This is based on the identification and 
anticipation of known threats and hazards and the implementation of mitigation 
and preparedness mechanisms to ensure effective emergency response and 
recovery.  However, there are difficulties with this approach because this 
assumes that all threats are known and their impact and consequence can be 
predicted.  As demonstrated within Section 1.1, the complex interdependencies 
that exist between infrastructure, society, the economy and the environment, 
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combined with the potential for an emergency situation to escalate or cascade 
may result in a series of unknown threats. 
 
Figure 1.3: Different approaches to the evaluation of the Safe and SuRe 
framework, taken from Butler et al, 2016. 
 
In response to the shift towards encouraging greater resilience within the 
emergency management system, there is also evidence of a bottom up approach 
concentrating on consequence based analysis.  This is evident within the field of 
flood risk management where Local Authorities and responder organisations 
work together with local communities to develop flood mitigation measures and 
ensure the local community is able to cope during a flood.  
 
The Safe and SuRe approach is primarily focussed on the middle-based analysis 
and recognises that it is impossible to identify every possible threat to the system, 
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the resultant impact or the socio-ecological-technical consequences. Instead this 
approach focuses on failure modes and how they impact the system while 
acknowledging different threats may result in the same failure of the system.  This 
approach is not currently being applied within the field of emergency 
management and will be explored in greater detail throughout this research. 
 
Finally, the circular approach considers all of the elements within the system and 
how a greater understanding of applying intervention measures contributes to a 
cycle of continual improvement through the process of learning.  Within the field 
of emergency management, lessons learned are identified from the analysis of 
an emergency situation and are incorporated as actions within operational 
procedures.  These are developed within training programmes and their 
effectiveness is assessed through exercising and responding to a future event.  
However, the emphasis is placed on improving individual or multi-agency 
response and neglects other aspects of the emergency management system 
where failure may have occurred or contributed to the original failure.  Taking a 
systems based approach would allow a greater understanding of the connections 
and relationships between different parts of the system and allow for the 
identification of where potential failure modes exist.   Once these have been 
identified, it will be possible to understand how resilience can be achieved 
through the application of intervention measures.  The example provided within 
the following section (Section 1.3) demonstrates the importance of applying a 
systems based approach. 
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1.3 The requirement for a systems based approach to water supply 
failure 
The flooding of Mythe Water Treatment works during the summer 2007 floods, 
seriously challenged the ability of individuals to cope and adapt to the loss of their 
centralised water supply (Severn Trent Water, 2007; BBC Gloucestershire, 2007; 
CCWater, 2007; Environment Agency, 2007).  This event also presented the 
Water Service Provider (WSP) with the logistical challenge of supplying over 
350,000 people with an alternative supply of water (Severn Trent Water, 2007; 
BBC Gloucestershire, 2007; CCWater, 2007).  The lessons learned reports 
(Severn Trent Water, 2007; Ofwat, 2007; CCWater, 2007; Environment Agency, 
2007) focussed on the need for adequate flood defences, resilience of assets, 
adequate training, collaborative working partnerships and the effect of water 
supply failure on the customer.  However, none of these reports explored how 
individual (customer) perceptions, attitudes and behaviour influenced the 
emerging situation and how this could affect the ability to achieve resilience to 
this event. 
 
While it is difficult to infer individual perceptions to water supply failure from this 
event, individual behaviour provided an indication of attitudes to water supply 
failure.  When Mythe water treatment works was shut down on Sunday 22nd July, 
2007 there were two service reservoirs that were still operational (Severn Trent, 
2007).  The Hewletts service reservoir and the Churchdown service reservoir.  
According to Severn Trent the reservoirs were 84% full and 64% full respectively 
which would provide the equivalent of ’36 hours supply of water in normal 
circumstances’ (Severn Trent, 2007).  However, as soon as the WSP issued a 
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statement to the media informing customers there would be a loss of their water 
supply, ‘water usage doubled, resulting in a more rapid depletion of water 
supplies’ (Severn Trent, 2007).   
 
The individual response in this situation was to immediately store water within 
pots, pans and the bath (BBC Radio Gloucestershire, 2007; CC Water, 2007) to 
ensure there would be water available throughout the emergency.  However, this 
also resulted in depletion of the service reservoirs that potentially could have 
supplied water for a further 36 hours if everyone had used water wisely.  There 
were also reports within the media of individuals ‘panic buying’ water at local 
supermarkets and shops becoming depleted of their normal supplies of bottled 
water (Guardian, 2007; BBC News, 2007).   While this behaviour demonstrated 
resilience at the individual level of the customer, the act of storing water and 
‘panic buying’ also contributed to a loss of resilience for customers unable to 
source an alternative supply of water.  This behaviour also contributed to a loss 
of resilience in the ability of the WSP to provide an alternative supply of water to 
all of those affected. 
 
The Security and Emergency Measures Directive (SEMD, 2009) places a 
responsibility on a WSP to ensure an alternative supply of water to their 
customers in the event of a failure of the water supply.  At the time of the 2007 
incident, WSP’s were expected to provide a minimum of 10 litres of drinking water 
per day, per person.  However, this is not consistent with the average amount of 
water an individual will use during a 24 hour period for drinking, washing, 
preparing food and flushing the toilet.  The average water consumption per 
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person, per day is considered to be approximately 135 litres (Severn Trent, 2007).  
There existed a discrepancy between the expectation of the WSP as to how much 
water should be provided and the expectation of the customer to be provided with 
enough water to continue as normal.  This also included the expectation that 
normal services would resume as soon as possible.   
 
The WSP was presented with the logistical challenge of providing an alternative 
supply of water to over 350,000 people.  The flooding of main arterial routes 
prevented the delivery of water using large industrial tankers because they were 
unable to travel through small, narrow roads (Pitt, 2008).  This resulted in a delay 
providing customers with water because the water had to be transferred to 
smaller tankers and delivered as bowsers to the affected locations.  However, as 
soon as the bowsers were delivered they were rapidly depleted because 
customers were taking more water than had been anticipated by the WSP.   
 
The WSP was criticised for not providing customers with enough information 
regarding the location of bowsers and the amount of time it would take before the 
centralised water supply was reinstated.  A lack of situational awareness and an 
increased level of uncertainty regarding the availability of future water supplies 
may have prompted individuals to collect more water than required to ensure they 
were able to cope should the situation persist.  However as they increased their 
individual level of resilience, other customers were deprived of water reducing 
their ability to cope, decreasing their resilience and the WSP was not able to 
provide enough water to satisfy the demand, resulting in a negative reinforcing 
feedback loop (Figure 1.4). 
42 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Causal loop diagram of water supply failure in Gloucestershire, 
2007. 
 
From a systems perspective, this event provided an example of a ‘learning 
disability’ (Senge, 2006) where individual customers were not aware they were 
part of a wider system and the consequences of their actions could have the 
potential to create a failure at another point in the system.  It could be argued that 
if this information had been provided to customers, it may have influenced 
customer attitudes and behaviour and reduced stress on the WSP’s ability to 
provide an alternative supply of water.  This event highlighted the importance of 
understanding the concept of resilience in the context of the wider system of 
which it is being assessed.   
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This event also demonstrated that resilience was not solely dependent on the 
operational functioning of physical assets but existed as part of a complex and 
integrated socio-ecological-technical system (Pitt, 2008).  Category 2 responders 
are responsible for the provision of essential services such as water, electricity 
and transport networks (Cabinet Office, 2012).  The consequences of critical 
infrastructure failure have the potential to impact quality of life, economic stability 
and contribute to civil unrest (Boin and McConnell, 2007).  While lessons learned 
reports are used to identify where failures have occurred, it is also necessary to 
explore interdependencies within the wider socio-ecological-technical system.  
This will enable a more accurate assessment of whether these failures have the 
potential to happen again. 
 
Systems thinking and systems dynamic modelling is increasingly being used to 
identify where resilience measures need to be applied within the emergency 
management system.  These will be explored in greater detail within Chapter 2 
(Section 2.3).  Many of these models take a high level approach to identify 
interdependencies between different sectors (HM Government, 2010), determine 
the physical structure of the system (Franchin, 2018; Pagano et al, 2017), or seek 
to develop methods to measure resilience in terms of system performance 
(Bruneau  et al, 2003; Franchin, 2018).  Models have also been developed to 
explore how resilience can be enhanced within one particular element of the 
system (O’Sullivan et al, 2015; Kim et al, 2012).  However, the concept of 
resilience is a complex and dynamic process that operates on many different 
levels within society from the resilience of the individual (Paton et al, 2006; Luthar 
et al, 2000), community resilience (Patel et al, 2017; Gilchrist, 2009), inter-
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organisational resilience (Boin and McConnell, 2007; Smith and Dowell, 2000), 
and institutional resilience at the level of government (Djalante, 2012; Aoki, 2016).   
 
These models are very useful to understand how the system is structurally 
connected, where interdependencies exist and identify where resilience 
measures need to be applied at specific points of the system.  For instance, it is 
possible to identify where collaboration and coordination may be required 
between different organisations at a specific part of the system (Pagano et al, 
2017), or identifying the need for greater community awareness and engagement 
(O’Sullivan et al, 2015; Kim et al, 2012).  However, in the context of UK 
emergency management, many of these have already been identified as 
persistent problems within lessons learned reports and exercises (Section 11).  
This demonstrates a gap in the research between the application of a systems 
based approach to understand the structural elements of the emergency 
management system and social research to explore how resilience operates as 
a complex dynamic process within the system.   
 
To understand the influence of social interactions and how resilience to water 
supply failure can be achieved across different levels of society requires taking a 
pragmatic and applied approach to the research design.  Action research 
combined with social research methods can be used to explore, examine and 
analyse the social interactions between different organisations, individuals and 
communities within the emergency management system.  This enables the 
system to be understood from the perspective of the practitioner, the individual 
and the community, providing a more realistic interpretation of how the system 
45 
 
actually operates in practice and how the ability to achieve resilience is influenced 
by these interactions (Pagano et al, 2017; O’Sullivan et al; Kim et al, 2012).  This 
also provides an opportunity for the researcher to become immersed within the 
process of data collection which enhances the development of practical solutions 
and recommendations for improvement (Bernard, 2006; Robson, 2011).  This 
approach will be applied as a grounding for the overall research design and is 
explained in greater detail with Chapter 3 (Section 3.1).  However, it is also 
necessary to identify the main structural elements of the UK emergency 
management system and how these will be used to develop the research design 
and the sequence of study. 
 
The UK emergency management system operates on the principle of subsidiarity. 
Strategic direction is provided at a national level by government and supported 
through the delivery of the CCA 2004, government guidance, the National Risk 
Register (NRR) and the National Capability Survey.  These provide a framework 
and structure to the application of resilience within the emergency management 
system at an institutional level.  Although the legislation is driven by government, 
it is focussed on the delivery of emergency management at the local level through 
the development of LRF’s.  These comprise a multi-agency approach to the 
anticipation and assessment of risk through the process of emergency planning, 
response and recovery and represent the operational element of the emergency 
management system.  At this level resilience is applied within (organisational 
resilience) and between organisations (inter-organisational resilience) to ensure 
the daily operational delivery of each individual organisation.  The final element 
of the system is represented by the individuals and communities affected by a 
particular emergency.  At this level, resilience is applied at the individual 
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householder level but may also be supported through the development of 
community resilience. 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Simplified system of emergency management in the UK and the 
relationship to resilience.  (The colour scheme will also be applied within 
Chapter 9, Section 9.3: Recommendations) 
 
Although this represents a simplified approach to the UK emergency 
management system, it allows the identification of three main structural elements 
contributing to the operational delivery of the system (Figure 1.5). These 
comprise an institutional element identified at the national level of government, 
an operational multi-agency element represented by the organisations that 
comprise the LRF at the local level and the individuals and communities affected 
by an emergency (Figure 1.3).  The elements are connected at three different 
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points in the system.  The institutional element is connected to both the 
operational element and the individual householder and community element and 
a connection exists between the operational element and the individual 
householder and community element.  Each element is defined at the level of 
operation within the system and characterised by a specific application of 
resilience.  While a greater understanding of the influence of organisational 
resilience and institutional resilience are beyond the scope of this research, they 
have been included for added clarity.    
 
This research will explore how improved resilience to water supply failure can be 
achieved within the context of the UK emergency management system.  The 
simplified structure of the UK emergency management system (Figure 1.5) 
provides a foundation for the research design and a direction for the sequence of 
study.  This will start with an examination of the institutional element to 
understand the legislative framework of emergency management in the UK and 
how this is achieved through the development of LRF’s within the operational 
multi-agency element.  Action research and social research methods will be used 
to explore and understand how resilience to water supply failure operates within 
and between each structural element of the system using a series of specific 
objectives that will be discussed within the following section. 
 
1.4  Aim and Objectives  
The aim of this research is to explore how improved resilience to water supply 
failure can be achieved through effective emergency management.  This will be 
achieved through the following objectives: 
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Objective 1: Critically analyse the traditional risk based approach to 
emergency   management and its application towards achieving resilience. 
 
Within the system of UK emergency management, Objective 1 explores the ‘top 
down’ approach to explore the relationship between risk and resilience within the 
context of the UK emergency management system.  Although risk assessment is 
important to help identify known threats and hazards it is not adequate in the 
context of extreme emergency situations where the threats and hazards may be 
unknown (Butler et al, 2016; Boin and Hart, 2010; Park et al, 2013).  As 
demonstrated throughout the discussion within Section 1.1, it is impossible to 
anticipate every threat to a system (Vespignani, 2010; Part et al, 2013; Linkov, et 
al, 2014), resilience assessment and resilience strategies must also be applied 
to be able to prepare for unknown situations (Butler et al, 2016; Comfort et al, 
2010).  This objective explores whether this can be achieved within an emergency 
management framework that has always been centred on the traditional risk 
management approach.  
 
Objective 2: Investigate the multi-agency approach to emergency 
management. 
 
Lessons learned reports (Pitt, 2008; Watermark, 2011; Environment Agency, 
2016; HM Government 2016; Ofwat 2018) academic and empirical research (Kim 
et al, 2012: Crichton et al, 2009; Perry and Lindall, 2004; Boin and McConnell, 
2007) have identified that effective emergency response occurs where strong 
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partnerships have been formed during the emergency planning process.  The 
CCA, 2004 actively promotes the multi-agency approach through the 
development of LRF’s.  However, lessons learned from recent incidents in the UK 
(Watermark, 2011; Environment Agency, 2016; HM Government 2016; Ofwat 
2018) have also demonstrated that difficulties persist in the collaboration and 
sharing of information regarding the impact of critical infrastructure failure during 
planning, preparing and emergency response.  While systems thinking and 
system dynamic modelling (Pagano et al, 2017) have been applied to specific 
case studies to explore the emergency management system (O’Sullivan et al; 
Kim et al, 2012), these models do not explore resilience as a process operating 
within a complex dynamic system of interconnecting elements that may include 
legislation and different operational practices between responder organisations. 
 
This requires a more pragmatic approach using social research methods to 
explore and understand how practitioners from different organisations work 
together in a multi-agency approach before, during and after an emergency.  This 
may enable the identification of the causative factors creating difficulties in the 
ability to achieve multi-agency collaboration and the sharing of information.  This 
objective applies the principles of action research by seeking to explore the 
operational element of the system (Figure 1.5) through the process of active 
listening at practitioner conferences, conducting semi-structured interviews with 
practitioners and through analysing the multi-agency approach during an actual 
emergency.  The following research questions aim to explore how resilience is 
achieved within the operational element of the UK emergency management 
system; 
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RQ1 – Does the CCA, 2004 support the multi-agency approach to emergency 
management?  As already discussed within this Chapter, the system of 
emergency management in the UK is legislatively driven by the CCA, 2004.  This 
research question aims to develop a greater understanding of the practitioner 
perspective of how the CCA, 2004 contributes to an effective multi-agency 
approach to emergency management in the UK and to identify where the 
legislation may contribute to difficulties regarding the collaboration and sharing of 
information.  
 
RQ2 – How do the Cat 1 responders and the WSP’s perceive the multi-agency 
approach?  This research questions specifically explores how Cat 1 responders 
and the WSP’s work together during the process of emergency planning and 
response.  This is to explore and understand what factors practitioners perceive 
to be important to develop greater collaboration and encourage the sharing of 
information during multi-agency emergency management.   
 
RQ3 – How do LRF’s and the WSP’s collaborate with local community groups in 
the multi-agency approach to emergency management?  This research question 
explores the link connecting the operational element and the community element 
within the emergency management system (Figure 1.5) to understand what this 
connection means in terms of contributing to building resilience between local 
communities and the responder organisations. 
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Objective 3: Understand individual attitudes and perceptions of water 
supply failure. 
 
Objective 3, focuses on the ‘bottom up’ approach to emergency management.  
Since the introduction of the CCA, 2004, there has been a paradigm shift in 
emergency management from a focus on emergency response to encouraging 
greater resilience (CCA, 2004).  However, in order to develop effective resilience 
based strategies that engage and encourage individuals to achieve resilience, a 
greater understanding of individual attitudes and perceptions of water supply 
failure is required.  It has been recognised in the approach taken to develop 
system dynamic models of the emergency management system that there is a 
lack of understanding regarding water use and how individual behaviour may 
influence the dynamical behaviour of the wider system (Pagano et al, 2017; 
O’Sullivan et al; Kim et al, 2012).  This objective aims to explore individual 
attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure to understand how this may 
influence individual behaviour during an emergency situation to achieve 
resilience.  This explores how resilience operates within the individual element of 
the emergency management system (Figure 1.5). 
 
There are two elements to achieving this objective.  Initially attitudes and 
perceptions to water supply failure were explored using the results of a postal 
questionnaire sent to individual householders (Chapter 5).  However, while this 
research was being conducted, a severe weather event during March 2018, 
resulted in the failure of the centralised water supply to over 200,000 people.  This 
added another dimension to this research and provided an opportunity to observe 
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individual behaviour during an emergency situation.  Social media is increasingly 
being used to disseminate emergency information to the general public.  It was 
considered that analysing the interaction between WSP’s and their customers in 
real time on the social media platform Facebook may provide an insight into 
attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure during an emergency (Chapter 
6).    
 
The following research questions were used to explore general attitudes and 
perceptions to water supply failure (Chapter 5); 
 
RQ1 – How do individuals perceive water supply failure compared to other 
hazards?  This research question was included to understand attitudes and 
perceptions to water supply failure in the context of other hazards.  Do individuals 
perceive water supply failure to be high or low risk compared with other hazards 
identified within the national risk register? (National Risk Register, 2015).   
 
RQ2 – What are the general attitudes and perceptions of water supply failure?  
This research question specifically explores the factors that contribute to the 
perceived risk of water supply failure.  This is conducted through a series of Likert 
scale questions to understand whether individuals have experience of water 
supply failure, do they perceive it necessary to prepare and is this influenced by 
attitudes and perceptions of the WSP? 
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RQ3 – Where do individuals obtain information regarding hazards within their 
local area and if there is a failure of the water supply?  Emergency management 
at the local level is informed through the risk assessment process and the 
development of the NRR and the Community Risk Register (CRR) at both a 
national level within government and a local level through the LRF.  This research 
question explores where individuals obtain information regarding hazards in their 
local area.  Is there awareness of the NRR, the CRR and information regarding 
how to prepare for emergencies on the Government website?  This question also 
explores the use of social media by the WSP to disseminate information during 
an emergency. 
 
Individual attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure during an emergency 
(Chapter 6) was explored using the following research questions: 
 
RQ1 – What are the attitudes and perceptions of individuals to water supply 
failure during an extreme event as observed on the social media platform 
Facebook?  Analysis of Facebook comments was conducted to develop a greater 
understanding of how individuals react and respond to water supply failure.  This 
will enable the identification of factors that enhance or inhibit the ability of 
individuals to achieve resilience to water supply failure. 
 
RQ2 – How is information shared through the social media platform Facebook 
between WSP’s and customers during an extreme event?  This research question 
seeks to identify whether the information provided by WSP’s enables customers 
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to achieve resilience to water supply failure and whether the information provided 
by customers can be used to strengthen the WSP emergency response. 
 
RQ3 – What information is required by customers and WSP’s to enable resilience 
during an extreme event?  This research question seeks to explore whether 
customers take active steps to achieve resilience to water supply failure during 
an emergency and what information can be provided by the WSP to support this.  
This research question also provides the opportunity to understand the 
connection between the individual and community element of the emergency 
management system and the operational element (Figure 1.5). 
 
Objective 4: Investigate how the bottom up approach to emergency 
management can help to achieve resilience to extreme events through 
collaborative working partnerships  
 
The Pathfinder Project (Twigger-Ross et al, 2015) highlighted the importance of 
working with community groups to achieve a greater resilience to the threat of 
flooding.  Working collaboratively with local community groups strengthens local 
emergency response and provides access to greater resources and expertise 
(O’Sullivan et al, 2015; Coles and Buckle, 2004).  However, are community 
groups being effectively integrated within the wider emergency management 
system?   This is explored within Chapter 7, using a case study of a community 
that has developed strong links with responder organisations to ensure they are 
actively involved in the flood risk management system.  This objective analyses 
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how resilience can be achieved within the community element of the emergency 
management system and whether community led schemes could be developed 
to achieve resilience to other hazards such as water supply failure incidents.  This 
was explored using the following research questions; 
 
RQ1 – What approach was taken to develop and establish a relationship with the 
LA within the case study example?  Using participatory action research, this 
question seeks to identify how resilience can be achieved within the community 
element of the emergency management system (Figure 1.5) through the 
development of an extended network. 
 
RQ2 – How does the process of building collaborative working partnerships 
contribute to improving resilience for the community, LA’s and the WSP’s?  This 
research question explores the difficulties encountered in the process of 
developing strong working partnerships between local communities and 
responder organisations and what this means in terms of achieving resilience.  
 
RQ3 – What are the challenges integrating the community into the emergency 
management process?  This research question aims to provide a greater 
understanding of the connection between the individual and community element 
of the emergency management system and the operational element (Figure 1.5).  
What does this connection mean in terms of achieving resilience to extreme 
events and how can this be strengthened? 
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Objective 5: Taking a systems based approach, investigate the impact of 
the failure state to assess where vulnerabilities exist within the socio-
ecological-technical system and how resilience can be achieved through 
effective emergency management. 
 
Systems thinking and systems dynamic modelling are often used to develop a 
greater understanding of the structural aspects of the emergency management 
system (Franchin, 2018; Pagano, et al, 2017).  However, emergency 
management systems are strongly influenced by social interactions between 
responder organisations and individual and communities affected by an 
emergency. As discussed within Section 1.3, these models do not necessarily 
explore these interactions within or across the wider system and this indicates a 
gap in the research between the systems based approach and the application of 
social research to understand how resilience operates within and across the 
wider system of emergency management (Franchin, 2018).  This research 
incorporates social research within a systems based model to develop a greater 
understanding of the processes the drive the emergency management system to 
achieve resilience to water supply failure. 
 
This objective takes a systems based approach to explore and understand how 
resilience to water supply failure is interpreted, applied and operationalised within 
and across each structural element of the emergency management system 
(Section 1.3, Figure 1.5).  Each element of the system will be explored using 
qualitative and quantitative research methods as defined within Chapter 3 to 
achieve Objectives 1,2,3 and 4 (Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7).  The results of each 
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analysis will be synthesised through the process of triangulation (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.8) to determine how resilience operates within the emergency 
management system and will be discussed within Chapter 8. 
 
The emergency management system will be applied to the Safe and SuRe 
intervention framework as defined within Section 1.2 (Figure 1.2).  This will enable 
the identification of the main threats to the system and how the impact and 
consequences of these threats may affect the ability to achieve resilience to water 
supply failure.  The use of intervention measures including mitigation, adaptation, 
coping and learning will also be explored to understand how these can be applied 
within the system of emergency management to achieve system resilience to 
water supply failure (Chapter 8).  This will be presented as a series of 
recommendations within Chapter 9. 
 
1.5 Thesis plan  
The thesis plan demonstrates how a strucutured and methodical approach was 
taken to explore the UK emergency management system using the objectives 
discussed in Section 1.4 and demonstrates how the thesis will proceed. 
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Figure 1.6: Plan of how the thesis will progress. 
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1.6 Originality and contribution to knowledge 
This research takes a pragmatic and applied approach using quantitative and 
qualitative social research methodologies to explore how resilience to water 
supply failure can be achieved within the UK emergency management system.  
As demonstrated within Section 1.3 (Figure 1.4), in order to achieve resilience to 
an extreme event, effective collaboration and cooperation is required between 
emergency responders, infrastructure owners and operators and the individuals 
and communities affected.  Systems thinking and systems dynamic modelling 
have been used to develop a greater understanding of the structural elements of 
emergency management systems.  However, these models are limited with 
regard to understanding how social interactions influence the dynamical 
processes operating within and across the system (Pagano et al, 2017; O’Sullivan 
et al; Kim et al, 2012).  The concept of resilience is a complex and dynamic 
process operating within and between different levels of society.  However, it is 
often categorised within the contextual confines of one particular element of 
society and the relationship between different elements is rarely explored (Kimhi, 
2016).  
 
 
This research will apply a systems based approach to understand the structural 
elements of the system with social research methods to understand how 
resilience operates within and across the UK emergency management system.  
It is also the intention to demonstrate that future research should seek to explore 
and understand resilience as a dynamic process operating within a complex 
socio-ecological-technical system. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 demonstrated how applying a risk based approach to preparing for 
extreme events may seriously challenge the ability of governments, emergency 
responders and society to provide effective emergency management with regard 
to the failure of critical infrastructure and the loss of essential services (Boin and 
McConnell, 2007).  These events require the re-establishment of essential 
services within an environment that is complex, uncertain, chaotic and 
unpredictable in terms of the ability to determine the resources and capabilities 
required for effective emergency response (McMaster and Baber, 2012).  These 
rapidly changing emergency situations have the potential to exceed the 
resources and capabilities required for a single organisation to respond 
effectively and require a multi-agency approach built around a framework of 
resilience (Boin and McConnell, 2007; Kapucu, 2006; McConnell and Drennan, 
2006).   
 
This research seeks to explore how improved resilience to water supply failure 
can be achieved through effective emergency management.  One approach that 
can be used to identify where resilience measures are required is through the 
application of the Safe and SuRe Intervention Framework.  However, the effective 
application of this framework requires a greater understanding of how the UK 
emergency management system operates with regard to water supply failure 
incidents and how resilience can be achieved within a complex dynamic system 
of interconnecting elements. 
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Within Chapter 1, Section 1.3 (Figure 1.5), the main elements of the emergency 
management systems were identified and comprise an institutional element at 
the level of government, an operational multi-agency element and individuals and 
communities affected by an emergency.  This review of the literature will explore 
how the concept of resilience is defined within these different levels of society 
and briefly examine the system based approach to explore resilience within 
emergency management systems.  This is to develop a greater understanding of 
what is meant by resilience within the context of a socio-ecological-technical 
system. 
 
This Chapter will proceed with an introduction to the concept of resilience and 
how systems based models are used to explore resilience within socio-
ecological-technical systems.  This will be followed by an examination of how 
individual and community resilience are defined to provide a foundation for 
understanding resilience within the context of this research.  Finally, this Chapter 
will explore the historical development of the UK emergency management system 
to understand how resilience is currently applied within the confines of the 
existing legislation and through the development of the multi-agency approach. 
 
2.2 Exploring resilience within emergency management  
As discussed in Chapter 1, (Section 1.1) the concept of resilience has been 
defined and conceptualised within many different disciplines.  This has resulted 
in a great deal of confusion regarding what resilience actually means and how it 
can be effectively operationalised (Patel et al, 2017).   
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The concept of resilience established particular notoriety within the field of 
ecology following the publication of “Resilience and Stability of Ecological 
Systems” by Holling, 1973 to understand how ecosystems managed to continue 
functioning following a significant disturbance.  Initially resilience was defined as 
“The measure of the persistence of systems and of the ability to absorb change 
and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between state 
variables.” (Holling, 1973).  Later through the understanding of complex adaptive 
systems the theory of ecological resilience was extended to include socio-
ecological systems and the adaptive capacity of a system to manage a 
disturbance resulting from an extreme event (Holling, 2001; Walker et al, 2004).  
In this context resilience was defined as “The capacity of a system to absorb a 
disturbance and reorganise while undergoing change while retaining the same 
function, structure, identity and feedback.” (Walker et al, 2004).  With resilience 
measured according to the magnitude of disturbance that the system could 
absorb before it changed to a different state. 
 
Within the context of the UK emergency management system, the Cabinet Office, 
2013c), defines resilience as: 
 
“The ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, 
prevent and if necessary to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive 
challenges.” 
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However, the ability to “detect, prevent, withstand, handle and recover” may have 
a different meaning for a “community, service, area or infrastructure” 
organisation.   This definition also suggests that resilience operates 
independently within each particular element of the system, rather than a dynamic 
process operating within a complex socio-ecological-technical system.  A greater 
understanding of the complex inter-dependencies that exist within and across a 
system may provide a greater opportunity to identify, understand and determine 
where failures may occur and where resilience intervention measures are 
required (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001; Crichton et al, 2009; Boin and McConnell, 
2007).   
 
Systems thinking and systems dynamic modelling have been applied to 
emergency management systems to explore and understand these complex 
interdependencies and where resilience intervention measures may be required.  
These will be discussed in the following section. 
 
2.3 A systems based approach to understanding resilience 
Systems thinking and systems based models provide an opportunity to 
understand how the physical and social system is connected and this approach 
is increasingly being used to understand the resilience of the emergency 
management system (Bruneau et al, 2003; Pagano et al, 2017; Franchin, 2018).  
Within many of these models resilience is considered a property of the system 
and is measured in terms of system performance (Chapter 1, Section 1.2, and 
Figure 1.1).  This traditional approach within the field of engineering, defines 
resilience in terms of maintaining the stability of system performance when 
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subject to a disturbance (Holling, 1996; Gunderson, 2000; Hollnagel et al, 2007).  
Resilience is measured according to the ability of the system to anticipate and 
resist a disturbance and the time taken for the system to return to the stable state 
(Holling 1996, Hollnagel et al, 2007; De Bruijne et al, 2010; Matyas and Pelling, 
2012).  This assumes a predictable, linear, single stable state where system 
performance does not stray far from optimum operating conditions and the 
disturbance to the system is known.  However, as discussed within Chapter 1, 
Section 1.1, extreme events are characterised by a rapidly changing and 
uncertain environment where many of the threats and hazards are unknown (Boin 
and McConnell, 2007; Crichton et al, 2009; Vespignani, 2010).  Not only that, 
social systems are highly complex and may not necessarily ‘bounce back’ to the 
original state or level of functioning (Carpenter, 2008; Lindell, 2010; DFID, 2011).   
 
There are many examples of system based methodologies to assess resilience 
of the emergency management system.  These include probabilistic assessments 
to develop performance measures and targets, network modelling and system 
based analysis (Bruneau, et al, 2003; Franchin, 2018).   
 
Bruneau et al, 2003, applied a systems based approach to measure community 
resilience to the threat of seismic risk.  It was recognised that community 
resilience was influenced by four interdependent elements within the system.  
These included, the technical element which comprise the physical systems upon 
which the community depend such as water and electricity, the ability of these 
organisations to continue functioning during an emergency, the economic loss 
incurred from seismic damage and the societal element.  This includes the 
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actions and measures taken to reduce the impact on communities and local 
government (TOSE framework).   It was recognised that attributing performance 
measures to each of these individual elements would provide a more effective 
measure of resilience than using the same measure of performance for the whole 
system.  However, while this approach provides a framework and foundation to 
understand how the physical system is connected for the purpose of performance 
measurement (Franchin, 2018) it does not explore how the system operates with 
respect to the social interactions between different organisations, individuals and 
communities affected by an emergency.  As discussed within Chapter 1, Section 
1.3, attitudinal, perceptual and behavioural influences from the social 
environment can exert a strong influence on the ability to achieve resilience of 
technical and physical systems during an emergency. 
 
Building on this approach, Pagano et al, 2017, applied systems dynamic 
modelling to understand resilience in the context of the L’Aquila earthquake case 
study.  A probabilistic approach was taken to assess the physical vulnerability of 
the drinking water distribution system to understand levels of service currently 
provided within the network.  This information was included within a series of 
systems dynamic models incorporating the four elements identified with the 
TOSE framework (Bruneau et al, 2003).  The models were developed together 
with emergency management professionals to understand how the system was 
connected and where resilience measures were required.  While this was an 
effective method to understand the resilience of physical infrastructure, again it 
does not explore how the behaviour of individuals or the local community may 
influence the system.  Another limitation of this approach is that while systems 
dynamic modelling may identify “community awareness” or “cooperation with 
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other institutions” as a potential constraint to achieving resilience, these models 
do not explore why this may be the case and whether this is a persistent problem 
within the system.  As discussed within Chapter 1, Section 1.1, persistent 
problems identified within successive lessons learned reports may contribute to 
the continued failure to provide adequate emergency response and an inability to 
achieve resilience.  However, identifying the cause of these persistent problems 
requires a greater understanding of how organisations, individuals and 
communities work together and the influence of these interactions on the 
resilience of the system. 
 
Many of the system based models reflect a ‘top down’ approach to analysing or 
measuring the resilience of physical systems. The application of social research 
methods may provide the opportunity to explore and understand resilience from 
the ‘bottom up’.  This approach may provide a greater understanding of the 
underlying causative mechanisms inhibiting the ability to achieve resilience or 
enable the identification of methods to improve resilience.  
 
O’Sullivan et al, 2015, applied the structured interview matrix approach (SIM) to 
explore and understand how to achieve a sustainable approach to build 
community resilience.  This methodology relies on a participatory approach to 
encourage community engagement through the process of building collaborative 
working partnerships by combining a systems based approach with action 
research.  The SIM approach was used to encourage participants from within the 
community to engage, collaborate and share information.  This was conducted 
through a three stage process consisting of individual interviews, small group 
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discussions and a full group discussion.  It was found that improved resilience to 
emergencies can be achieved by actively engaging communities in the decision 
making process.  This contributed to a shared understanding of risk and a greater 
awareness of the resources and capabilities available within and outside the 
community for effective emergency response.  Developing collaborative working 
partnerships between local community groups and responder organisations also 
strengthens emergency management through sharing local knowledge, 
information and expertise through the creation of social networks and building 
social capital (Norris et al, 2008; Gilchrist, 2009).  This will be discussed in greater 
detail in Section 2.5.  While the SIM approach is a useful approach to encourage 
greater engagement between community groups and responder organisations, it 
does not include the influence of the technical system and how a reliance on 
physical infrastructure influences the ability to achieve resilience. 
 
Kim et al, 2012 applied a social technical approach to explore the complex 
interdependence between emergency responders and the technical systems 
required for effective emergency management.  Emergency responders were 
asked to complete a structured survey to assess their confidence in delivering 
emergency response.  This included questions relating to emotional support, 
training, information sharing, logistics and leadership.  The results demonstrated 
how effective emergency management was dependent on the provision of 
adequate training, emotional support and the effective use of technology to share 
information.  However, this approach did not explore the wider context and how 
working together with individuals and community groups may also influence the 
ability to achieve resilience in the emergency management system. 
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Examination of the empirical literature demonstrates how a system based 
approach to understanding resilience within emergency management systems 
provides a foundation to understand how the system is structurally connected 
and the identification of the complex interdependencies between different 
elements of the physical system.  However, the limitation of these models is that 
they do not fully explore how resilience operates as a complex dynamic process 
within and across the emergency management system.  This is because many of 
these models concentrate on understanding the physical characteristics of the 
system or the influence of social interactions within one part of the system.  These 
models do not explore the complex interactions between organisations, 
individuals and communities within and across the wider emergency 
management system and how this may influence the ability to achieve resilience. 
 
In the context of emergency management, resilience is also often applied within 
the confines of a risk management approach (Cabinet Office, 2013a) where the 
likelihood and impact of known threats and hazards is used to determine 
resources and capabilities for effective emergency response.  While this 
approach is extremely effective for routine emergencies, it was demonstrated 
within Chapter 1, Section 1.1 and Section 1.3, this approach is not effective with 
regard to building resilience to extreme events (Huppert and Sparks, 2006; 
McCallum and Hemming. 2006; Pitt, 2008; Comfort et al, 2013). 
 
As discussed within Chapter 1, Section 1.2, the Safe and SuRe methodology 
encompasses a socio-ecological-technical approach and defines resilience 
according to the “degree to which the system minimises level of service failure 
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magnitude and duration over its design life when subject to exception conditions”.  
It is not the intention of this research to develop or support specific definitions of 
resilience.  There are hundreds of definitions within the academic and practitioner 
literature (Patel et al. 2017).  While the use of definitions may provide a framework 
to understand the concept of resilience they can also be restrictive in terms of 
exploring how resilience operates as a dynamic process within and across a 
system.   This is because there is tendency for definitions to constrain the 
understanding of resilience to specific threats or hazards or within one part of the 
system (Kimhi, 2016).  It was identified by Franchin, 2018 that understanding the 
flow of resilience through a system would enhance the development of system 
dynamic models.  This requires a greater understanding of the structural 
elements of the emergency management system and what resilience means in 
terms of the contributing and inhibiting social factors that influence the ability to 
achieve resilience. 
 
The Safe and SuRe intervention framework is one approach that can be used to 
understand where resilience intervention measures need to be applied within a 
system.  This approach has traditionally been applied to understand resilience of 
physical systems (Mugame et al, 2015; Butler et al, 2016).  This research is 
developing the Safe and SuRe approach by applying the intervention framework 
to a social system, the UK emergency management system.  However, to 
develop this approach requires a greater understanding of the UK emergency 
management system in terms of how resilience operates within and between the 
different structural elements of the system.  As discussed within Chapter 1, 
(Section 1.3) these include the institutional element, the operational element and 
the individuals and communities affected by an emergency.     
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The following sections (Section 2.4 and 2.5) will examine the academic literature 
to develop a theoretical understanding regarding the concepts of individual and 
community resilience.  The historical development of the UK emergency 
management system will be examined within Section 2.7 to understand how the 
institutional and operational element of the system was developed to incorporate 
the principles of resilience within a legislative framework.  This information will 
provide a foundation to develop knowledge generated within this research, 
regarding how resilience operates within and between the different structural 
elements of the UK emergency management system.  This will also provide a 
greater insight regarding the influence of institutional, individual and community 
resilience when applying the Safe and SuRe intervention framework to the UK 
emergency management system. 
 
2.4 Understanding Individual resilience 
According to the International Federation of the Red Cross “A resilient individual 
is healthy; has knowledge, skills, competencies and mind-set to adapt to new 
situations and improve his/her life, and those of her/his family, friends and 
community.  A resilient person is empowered” (International Federation of the 
Red Cross, 2014).  Understanding key concepts and exploring what is meant by 
individual resilience will help to inform a greater understanding of how attitudes 
and perceptions to water supply failure as defined within Objective 3, (Chapter 1, 
Section 1.4) contribute to the ability to achieve resilience to water supply failure.    
 
The study of resilience at an individual level has its foundations within the field of 
psychology where resilience is defined as “A dynamic process encompassing 
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positive adaptation within the context of significant adversity” (Luther et al, 2000).  
Individual resilience is dynamic, complex and relies upon internal strategies 
dependant on the individual’s personality traits, mental health and personal 
wellbeing and the ability to use and possess resources within the external 
environment to overcome an adverse situation (Luthar, 2006).  While individual 
personality traits will not be explored within the context of this research, this 
research will explore how the provision of information by WSP’s during an 
emergency may increase the ability to achieve access to resources within the 
external environment (Chapter 1, Section 1.4, Objective 3 and Chapter 6).    
 
Within the field of disaster risk reduction, understanding of psychological 
resilience has many practical applications and provided the foundation for 
understanding and developing effective coping mechanisms and strategies that 
may result in ‘positive adaptation’ to the complex, dynamic and unpredictable 
nature of extreme events (Luther et al, 2000; Masten, 2001; Shalev, 2004; 
Mitchell, 2013; Hofler, 2014).  In order to understand ‘positive adaptation’ and the 
ability to achieve individual resilience to extreme events, it is also necessary to 
understand the components that contribute to this (Bonanno, 2004; Hofler, 2014) 
within the context of the wider society in which an individual resides (Becker et 
al, 2013; Eiser et al, 2012; Paton et al, 2006).  Understanding the cognitive 
processes that shape and influence how an individual will perceive threats and 
hazards within their surrounding environment has important applications in 
disaster risk reduction because it may influence whether an individual perceives 
it necessary to take action to prepare.   
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According to the SEMD, 2009 (Chapter 1, Section 1.3) WSP’s have a 
responsibility to ensure individuals affected by water supply failure are provided 
with an alternative supply of water. This increases an individual’s ability to 
achieve resilience through the provision of resources by the WSP.  A reliance on 
the WSP to provide an alternative supply of water may influence whether an 
individual perceives it to be necessary to take action to prepare.  However, this 
will also depend on how they perceive the threat of water supply failure within 
their local environment compared to other hazards (Chapter 1, Section 1.4, 
Objective 3).   
 
An individual’s perception of their surrounding environment may be influenced by 
societal interactions and societal hazards (Dobbie et al, 2016; Donahue et al, 
2014; Paton, 2013; Becker et al, 2013; Eiser et al, 2012; Paton et al, 2006; Dow 
and Cutter et al, 2000; Mileti, 1999).  Societal hazards are hazards encountered 
on a daily basis and may include heavy traffic experienced during the rush hour, 
failure of public services preventing the ability to attend meetings, appointments 
or work, political instability or the threat of unemployment due to economic 
uncertainty.  A daily exposure to these ‘societal hazards’ reinforced through the 
media and through societal interactions will naturally compete with the level of 
perceived risk attributed to an event that has a low probability of occurrence and 
may result in low preparedness for other hazards (Paton, 2003).   
 
These complexities create many challenges for government institutions to raise 
awareness and encourage individual and societal preparedness to hazards within 
the natural environment.  According to Donahue et al, 2014: 
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“Governments typically view individual-level preparedness responsibilities 
as involving activities like being informed about relevant hazards, 
developing an emergency communications plan, and maintaining a 
disaster supplies kit.”   
 
This ‘top down’ approach assumes that providing individuals with information 
regarding hazards will translate into action in the form of preparedness (Brodie et 
al, 2006).  However, if an individual does not perceive a hazard to have an 
immediate effect or influence in their daily life it may not be considered relevant 
and will not be perceived as important to prepare (Bryan et al, 2019).   
 
Within the TOSE framework the societal element relies on the ‘top down’ 
provision of emergency assistance in the form of alternative housing and the 
continuation of essential services  (Bruneau et al, 2003; Pagano et al, 2017),.  
However, it may not be possible to provide emergency assistance during an 
extreme emergency event due to a lack of capability or resources (Pitt, 2008).  
To build resilience within the emergency management system and ensure the 
provision of adequate information to enable people to achieve resilience during 
an extreme emergency situation, requires understanding individual perceptions 
and attitudes to hazards within their local area (Chapter 1, Section 1.4, Objective 
3). 
 
The ‘top down’ approach also relies on the assumption that ‘experts’ and 
individuals share the same perception of risk.  However, ‘experts’ whether they 
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are scientists, emergency management professionals or practitioners may have 
a different interpretation and perception of risk based on ‘technical knowledge’ 
and differences in how risk is defined (Donahue et al, 2014; Eiser et al, 2012; 
Slovic and Webber, 2002; Slovic, 1987).   The ‘expert’ may define risk objectively 
based on numbers of individuals ‘at risk’ or the number of potential fatalities 
should a particular event occur.  Whereas, an individual may define risk 
subjectively based on emotion, beliefs, sense of control, trust and values (Dobbie 
et al, 2016; Slovic and Webber, 2002; Ajzens, 1991).  This may also be influenced 
by the collective knowledge of society, social identity, culture, the influence of the 
media (Dobbie et al, 2016; Rundblad et al, 2010) and whether an individual has 
direct experience of a hazard.  In order to develop effective campaigns to 
encourage individuals to prepare for hazards and become more resilient to 
extreme events, it is necessary to explore individual perceptions of specific 
hazards and whether these exert an influence stimulating an individual to 
prepare.  This will enable the effective targeting of campaigns and strategies to 
encourage individual resilience to specific hazards or extreme events in general.  
The inclusion of this information within systems based modelling (Bruneau et al, 
2003; Pagano et al, 2017) may enhance the ability to understand how resilience 
operates within the wider system of emergency management.  This may also 
enable the identification of persistent problems where a low awareness of 
hazards reduces the ability of individuals to achieve resilience and where 
effective targeting of information is required during an emergency situation 
(Chapter 1, Section 1.4, Objective 5). 
 
The increasing use of social media and the ability to send and receive information 
very quickly may also have an influence on how risk is perceived particularly 
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during an emergency situation.  WSP’s are increasingly using social media 
platforms such as Twitter and Facebook to provide their customers with both 
general information and information regarding water supply issues.  An absence 
of technical and specific information can lead to the spread of misinformation and 
the social amplification of risk (Slovic and Webber, 2002) especially if that 
information is disseminated quickly through social media (Bunney et al, 2018).  
For instance, the media and response of individuals on social media may present 
an image of a hazard that exceeds an individual’s perception of their ability to 
cope or respond.    This could allow an individual to assume they have no control 
over the situation leading to complacency (Dobbie et al, 2016; Paton, 2003) and 
a potential loss of resilience.   
 
Individual perceptions of attributed responsibility and societal expectations of 
governments, responder organisations and utility companies may also influence 
whether an individual actively prepares for an extreme event (Levac et al, 2012).  
This may influence how the risk of a specific hazard such as water supply failure 
is perceived and whether it is perceived necessary to prepare (Levac et al, 2012; 
Paton, 2003).  If an individual has a high level of confidence in the WSP’s ability 
to provide a reliable, continuous and safe supply of water they may not take steps 
to actively prepare during an emergency (Shrubsole, 2000).  Developing a greater 
understanding of individual perceptions and attitudes regarding the ability of 
WSP’s to provide water in all circumstances may provide an insight into whether 
an individual will take action to prepare during a water supply failure incident.  It 
may also provide further information regarding why individuals hold specific 
attitudes and perceptions and whether this will influence the type of action 
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individuals are willing to take to increase their resilience during an emergency 
(Chapter 1, Section 1.4, Objective 3). 
 
Understanding individual interpretation and perception of risk is a complex 
process because it is influenced by many different factors.  Slovic et al, 2004, 
explored the ‘affect heuristic’, how an individual’s perception of risk may be 
influenced by experience or through association, the ability to imagine a particular 
event occurring (Slovic et al, 2004; Slovic and Webber, 2002).  This stimulates 
‘affective reactions’ in the form of emotions and feelings of ‘fear, dread, anxiety’ 
(Slovic et al, 2004).  These emotions, whether positive or negative may stimulate 
hazard anxiety and affect how risk is interpreted and perceived but this does not 
necessarily translate into action (Paton, 2003).  
 
The relationship between risk perception and whether an individual prepares for 
an emergency or disaster situation is also complex (Donahue et al, 2014; Carlino 
et al, 2008; Paton and Johnston. 2001).  Governments, organisations and 
agencies rely on educational awareness programmes and communication 
strategies to warn and inform individuals of threats and hazards to encourage 
preparedness, response and improve recovery (Paton, 2013; Levac, et al, 2012; 
Paton, 2003).  However, there is evidence to suggest these rarely encourage 
individuals to prepare (Donahue et al, 2014; Rundblad et al, 2010; Paton et al, 
2008; Paton, 2006).  Even in locations where hazards frequently occur, research 
suggests that individuals are not as prepared as would be expected and in some 
instances consider themselves to have a high level of preparedness when in fact 
their preparedness is low (Donahue et al, 2014; Levac et al, 2012; Eiser et al, 
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2012; Johnson et al, 2014; Lane et al, 2003; King, 2000; Ballantyne, 2000).  This 
does not mean attempts to communicate the risk of hazards should be 
abandoned but that a greater understanding of the relationship between risk 
perception and preparedness is required.  For instance, this may help to inform 
the communication of information by WSP’s during a water supply failure incident 
to ensure individuals are informed regarding the actions taken by the WSP and 
the actions individuals make take to achieve greater resilience.  It was discussed 
within Chapter 1, (Section 1.3) that following the flooding of Mythe water 
treatment works, the service reservoirs may have contained ‘36 hours supply of 
water in normal circumstances’ (Severn Trent, 2007).  However, this information 
was not communicated to the public and as result the service reservoirs were 
rapidly depleted.  Understanding how the communication of information may 
influence individual’s attitudes, perceptions and an intention to prepare may 
reduce the impact of these incidents and their contribution to a negative 
reinforcing feedback loop (Chapter 1, Section 1.3, and Figure 1.4). 
 
The inter-relationship between risk perception, knowledge, trust and 
preparedness provides some interesting insights for the communication of 
hazards before, during and after an emergency and the process of building 
individual resilience to extreme events.  It is considered the provision of 
information regarding the risk of hazards will provide individuals with the 
information they require to prepare and this will naturally translate into action.  
However, this is also dependent on how that information is interpreted and this 
can depend on many factors.  These include personal beliefs, values, attitudes 
and trust particularly regarding how the sender of the information is perceived 
(Dobbie et al, 2016).  If the information is provided from a trusted source this may 
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exert an influence on preparedness but is also dependent on whether an 
individual perceives preparedness as their responsibility, that of another 
organisation or the trusted source (Paton, 2003; Paton and Johnston, 2001).  A 
greater understanding of these complex inter-relationships and the influence on 
preparedness, may provide further insight regarding how individuals can achieve 
resilience to water supply failure.  
 
Figure 2.1: Framework showing influences of risk and perception adapted from 
Dobbie et al, 2016. 
79 
 
Building on the research conducted by Slovic et al, 1980 (Slovic et al, 1982; 
Slovic, 1987; Slovic, 2001), Dobbie et al, (2016) conducted a review of the 
literature and incorporated these processes within a framework of risk perception.  
This was developed to increase understanding among water practitioners of the 
factors that influence risk perception.  Within the framework, Dobbie et al, (2016) 
demonstrate how knowledge, trust, sense of fairness, perceived control and other 
attitudes, influence affective reactions and cognitive processes and how these in 
turn influence risk perception (Figure 2.3).  However, this model did not explore 
whether risk perception influences an individual to actively prepare.  Paton, 2003, 
proposed a social cognitive model to understand the relationship between risk 
perception, the intention to prepare and actual preparedness.  The model was 
developed to understand the motivations encouraging individuals to take action 
(Figure 2.4).   
 
 
Figure 2.2: Social cognitive preparation model adapted from Paton, 2003 
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It was considered that risk perception is not the only influencing factor that may 
encourage an individual to take effective action to prepare.  The model proposes 
that a combination of hazard anxiety, risk perception and an awareness of the 
consequences of a specific hazard all contribute to a determination of whether an 
individual perceives they possess the capability to take action to prepare.  This is 
also determined by an individual’s perception regarding the availability of 
resources enabling them to respond.  These may include personal 
circumstances, availability of finances, social support and community cohesion.  
These are also influenced by social and cultural identity, knowledge, trust and 
perceived control in the determination of perceived responsibility to prepare for 
extreme events.  All of which influence the cognitive processes contributing to 
risk perception.  This demonstrates there are many similarities between the two 
models in that a critical awareness of hazards requires knowledge and trust which 
also influences an individual’s perceived control, the affect heuristic and 
contribute to an increase or decrease in hazard anxiety.   
 
All of this information contributes to a greater understanding of individual 
resilience to water supply failure and provides a foundation for further exploration 
within this research.  This review of the literature highlights the many complexities 
associated with understanding individual resilience.  To understand how to build 
individual resilience to water supply failure requires a greater understanding of 
the relationship between an individual’s perception of risk and the factors that 
may influence preparedness.  There is a tendency for hazard information to be 
communicated to the individual with the assumption that the individual will 
understand this information and use it to prepare.  However, as research has 
demonstrated the intended outcome is not always achieved and this is related to 
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how an individual will perceive the risk within the context of their ability to prepare 
and perceived responsibility.   
 
Society is composed of a collection of individuals who will go about their daily 
lives interacting and integrating within society but also operating as an individual.  
It is also important to understand how societal hazards, interactions and 
knowledge influence individual perceptions and attitudes.  This is of particular 
interest with regard to the increasing use of social media and how this may 
influence an individual’s perception of risk during an emergency.   
 
While this review of the literature and the empirical research have highlighted 
how a lack of individual and ‘community awareness’ (Pagano et al, 2017), may 
provide a constraint to achieving resilience to water supply failure, it is also 
necessary to contextualise this information within the wider emergency 
management system. This will enable the development of recommendations 
regarding how resilience can be achieved and supported though appropriate 
resilience intervention measures.  This information will contribute to the 
triangulation of results presented within Chapter 8 and a greater understanding 
of how resilience operates within the context of the UK emergency management 
system.  This section demonstrates the empirical approach to systems based 
models may also be supported through knowledge and understanding of 
resilience from within other disciplines.  
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As demonstrated within the social cognitive model proposed by Paton 2003, 
individual resilience can also be supported through the development of social 
networks through a sense of community and increased community involvement 
(Eiser et al, 2012; Paton, 2008; Paton, 2006; Werner and Smith, 1992).   This will 
be explored within the following section. 
 
2.5 Understanding Community resilience  
The concept of community resilience has been widely explored throughout the 
academic literature.  However, a consensus regarding a definition of community 
resilience has been difficult to achieve (Patel et al, 2017; Ostadtaghizadeh et al, 
2015; Deeming et al, 2014; Norris et al, 2008).  This has created difficulties in the 
operationalisation of resilience by practitioners because many of the definitions 
of community resilience are specifically related to the community being studied 
(Patel et al, 2017).  This section explores what is meant by community resilience 
to inform a greater understanding of how working together with community groups 
as defined within Objective 4, (Chapter 1, Section 1.4) may contribute to 
achieving resilience to water supply failure.  
 
O Sullivan et al, (2015), demonstrated how a participatory approach could be 
used to encourage community resilience through building collaborative working 
partnerships that actively engage communities within the emergency 
management process. This approach allows for the heterogeneity that exists 
within and between community groups.   However, this approach also requires a 
great deal of time and resources in order to be effective.  The ‘top down’ approach 
taken by Governments to encourage community resilience does not necessarily 
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support the heterogeneity that exists between communities through the delivery 
of standard community resilience plan templates (Cabinet Office, 2016).  The 
approach taken with the TOSE framework (Bruneau et al, 2003) also assumes a 
homogenous approach to the societal measurement of resilience. 
 
Within the UK emergency management system there is a focus on building 
community resilience to flooding (Cabinet Office, 2016).  However, as 
demonstrated within Chapter 1, (Section 1.1 and 1.3) and the recent ‘Beast from 
the East’ (Ofwat, 2018; Water UK, 2018) water supply failure incident, the failure 
of critical infrastructure and the resultant loss of essential services, are also 
hazards that should be prepared for.  
 
Communities by their very nature are heterogeneous and susceptible to different 
challenges in response to threats and hazards depending on their location, 
structure, connectivity and socio-economic status (Gilchrist, 2009; Paton, 2003; 
Paton and Johnston, 2001; Paton et al, 2000).  While the application of a specific 
set of attributes and measurement scales may be appropriate to understand 
resilience within one particular community, they might not be transferable to 
another.  This has the potential to create difficulties operationalising the concept 
of resilience because a ‘one size fits all’ approach does not allow for the 
differences that exist within and between community groups (Gilchrist, 2009).  
Attempting to constrain the concept of resilience within a prescribed set of 
attributes and associated measurement scales is challenging the ability to 
achieve a consensus regarding a definition for community resilience (Patel et al, 
2017).  In an attempt to overcome some of these difficulties Norris et al, (2008) 
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considered the concept of community resilience as ‘a process linking a network 
of adaptive capacities’.  These include economic development, social capital, 
information and communication and community competence (Figure 2.5).   
 
Economic development may influence the ability of a community to achieve 
resilience if there is adequate financial resources to invest in mitigation to reduce 
the risk of hazards and this is available within each socio-economic status of 
society.  This ensures that vulnerable communities who under normal 
circumstances may have limited access to physical resources are provided with 
the necessary financial support and assistance required for mitigation and 
recovery following an event (Levac et al, 2012; Paton, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Community resilience represented as networked adaptive capacities 
from Norris et al, 2008. 
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Social capital is the process of establishing connections and building 
relationships with people, communities and organisations and understanding how 
these relationships may provide benefit through access to resources (Aldrich and 
Meyer, 2015; Murphy, 2007; Dynes, 2002; Lin et al, 2001; Portes, 1998).  
However, it is not simply the process of establishing a connection with a person 
or organisation but understanding how that connection develops into a 
sustainable relationship over time, how the strength of that connection may 
change and what this means in terms of access to resources (Portes, 1998; Burt 
1992; Granovetter 1983). This in turn influences the process of encouraging 
collective action before, during and after an emergency and may provide a deeper 
understanding of what a community needs in order to build resilience (Aldrich and 
Meyer, 2015; Dynes, 2002; Portes, 1998).  It may also provide a deeper 
understanding of how a responder organisation or utility company can work 
together with a community during an emergency situation.   
 
Information and communication relates to the provision of accurate and timely 
information required for effective emergency response.  However, as 
demonstrated within the previous section regarding individual resilience, access 
to information does not necessarily encourage individuals or communities to 
prepare (Donahue et al, 2014; Levac et al, 2012; Eiser et al, 2012; Johnson et al, 
2014; Lane et al, 2003; King, 2000; Ballantyne, 2000).  
 
Community competence is the ability of a community to actively engage in the 
process of preparedness through the acquisition of accurate local knowledge and 
information regarding the threats and hazards prevalent within their local area.  
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This information can be used to assess the resources and capabilities that exist 
within the local community in the development of a community plan and to 
determine the collective ability to respond (Paton and Johnston, 2001).  As 
demonstrated by O’Sullivan et al, (2015), the sharing of local knowledge with 
responder organisations may also strengthen the emergency management 
process and the development of effective communication networks. 
 
Patel et al, 2017, conducted a thematic analysis of the literature to explore the 
characteristics of community resilience.  From a review of over 80 papers, they 
identified 9 key ‘elements’ of resilience.  These include local knowledge, 
community networks and relationships, communication, health, governance, 
resources, preparedness, economic investment and mental outlook.  These 
themes share many similarities to the adaptive capacities identified by Norris et 
al, 2008, with economic development, social capital, information and 
communication and social competence synonymous with economic investment, 
community networks, communication, local knowledge, resources and 
preparedness.   
 
The identification of themes allows for the heterogeneity that exists within and 
between different communities.  This approach also allows for the development 
of resilience based strategies and increases the ability to effectively 
operationalise the concept of community resilience within the wider system of 
emergency management.  In contrast, the application of a homogenous set of 
measurement scales and indicators constrain the concept of resilience within a 
prescribed set of attributes.  This approach does not allow for heterogeneity of 
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community groups and assumes a homogenous set of criteria is applicable within 
all communities.   
 
The identification of specific indicators as a measure of community resilience may 
also contribute to the perception that resilience is a static outcome rather than a 
continually evolving, dynamic and flexible process (Patel et al, 2017; Cutter et al, 
2008; Norris et al, 2008).  Simply possessing a particular set of attributes does 
not necessarily result in a resilient community particularly considering the 
unpredictable nature of cascading events and the consequences of unknown 
threats and hazards.  Community resilience needs to be understood as part of a 
wider system of emergency management (Paton et al, 2000; Tobin et al, 2014).  
A system that is dynamic, driven and motivated through the development of 
relationships based on trust, knowledge, sharing of information and support.  A 
sense of community and the building of relationships may contribute to a shared 
perception of risk and the development of appropriate mitigation strategies 
relevant to the community (Paton, 2003).  The incorporation of this knowledge 
within systems based models will enhance the understanding of how resilience 
operates within the wider system of emergency management and this is approach 
taken within this research (Chapter 1, Section 1.4, Objective 4). 
 
This review of the literature demonstrates how community resilience can be 
viewed as the collective ability of a community to cope, adapt and recover from 
an adverse situation (Faas and Jones, 2017: Cox and Hamlen, 2015; Cutter, 
2008; Paton and Johnston, 2001).  However, all of these actions require the 
support of external organisations and must be considered within the context of a 
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wider emergency management system.  The next section will explore how the 
process of emergency management is defined. 
 
2.6 The emergency management cycle 
The process of emergency management is traditionally defined by the four stages 
of the emergency management cycle, mitigation, preparedness, response and 
recovery (NGA, 1979; Dynes, 1982; Quarentelli, 1986; Neal, 1997; Alexander, 
2002b).  These represent the main stages through which an emergency develops 
and define the process by which emergency management is conducted. 
Mitigation typically involves the development of physical changes within the built 
environment to reduce exposure to hazards.  For instance, this may include the 
building of flood defences within urban areas to reduce the consequences of 
flooding or the building of earthquake resistant structures within seismically active 
regions. 
 
Emergency preparedness encompasses the accurate identification and 
anticipation of known threats and hazards, the  assessment of the potential risk, 
a defined methodology for forecasting and warning, the preparation of an 
emergency plan (Alexander, 2003), training personnel in the operational delivery 
of emergency response and exercising to ensure operational effectiveness 
(Alexander, 2002a: Perry and Lindell, 2004).   
 
Emergency response is the active process of responding to an emergency and 
typically involves the collaboration and coordination of multiple agencies.  This 
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requires the development of accurate situational awareness to ensure effective 
emergency response (Quarentelli and Dynes, 1977; Perry and Lindell, 2004), 
knowledge of organisational roles and responsibilities to encourage multi-agency 
coordination (Perry, 1991) and the flexibility to respond to rapidly changing, 
dynamic situations (Perry and Lindell, 2004) 
 
Recovery is the process of rebuilding community structure, re-establishing the 
provision of essential services, rebuilding damaged infrastructure and conducting 
a review of the emergency response with an intention to learn lessons and adapt.  
This may be through the development of mitigation strategies, the incorporation 
of lessons learned into emergency procedures or the development of improved 
working practices (Dynes, 1982).   
 
This cycle of emergency management represents a continual and dynamic 
process to reduce the magnitude of any given event through adequate mitigation 
and preparedness and to minimise the event duration through effective 
emergency response and recovery (Dynes, 1982; Alexander, 2002a; Neal, 1997; 
Perry and Lindell, 2004; De Bruijne et al, 2010). 
 
While the emergency management cycle is typically used to define the process 
of emergency management, there are a number of limitations with this approach 
and its application to emergency planning (Neal, 1997; Crondstedt, 2002).  It 
gives the impression that each phase represents a single entity of equal measure 
that follows a natural progression from one phase to the next (Crondstedt, 2002).   
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However, studies of natural disasters demonstrate these phases are often 
interrelated, integrated and include actions that may have attributes that cannot 
easily be applied to one specific phase (Neal, 1997).  Not only that, specific 
actions attributed to a particular phase may be implemented prior to the 
commencement of that phase to ensure an effective emergency response (Neal, 
1997).  The cycle also assumes a linear approach to emergency planning and 
response when in reality this process is non-linear (Perry and Lindell, 2004). 
Despite these limitations, the emergency management cycle is still referred to 
when seeking definitions of emergency management.   
 
This chapter will continue to explore the historical development of emergency 
management within the context of the UK emergency management system and 
the development of the multi-agency approach. 
 
2.7  The development of the UK emergency management system  
Kim et al, (2012) explored the complex interdependence between emergency 
responders and technical systems.  However, understanding the historical 
context and legislative framework developed to enhance resilience through 
encouraging multi-agency collaboration will provide a greater insight into how 
resilience operates within the UK emergency management system.  This section 
examines how the UK emergency management system operates within a 
legislative framework to achieve resilience through a multi-agency approach as 
defined within Objective 2 (Chapter 1, Section 1.4).   
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The last 60 years have seen a considerable change in how emergency 
management is conducted within the UK.  With the introduction of the Civil 
Defence Act, 1948, in response to the singular threat of a nuclear attack, 
emergency management followed the ‘command and control’ methodology 
typified by the zeitgeist of the period.  This was conducted at a local level where 
‘expert knowledge’ would allow for the effective response to a war related 
emergency (Jackson, 1994; Neal and Phillips, 1995: Alexander, 2002b).   
 
The public were actively encouraged to prepare for nuclear attack and by building 
upon the success of voluntary organisations during World War II and 
strengthening the resolve for preparation in the event of attack, the Civil Defence 
Corps was established (Jackson, 1994).  By the 1960’s there were over 30,000 
highly trained volunteers available to provide the necessary assistance before, 
during and after a nuclear emergency (Jackson, 1994).  
 
Throughout this period emergency management was very reactive in terms of 
emergency response (Dynes, 1982; Quarentelli, 1986; Salter, 1998) and was 
largely driven by a focus on single hazards with response organisations working 
in isolation of one another (Salter, 1998; Cronstedt, 2002).  However, poor 
planning, the inability to consider multiple hazards and a lack of collaboration 
between multiple agencies in emergency response demonstrated that this 
approach was not adequate to deal with extreme emergency situations (Dynes, 
1982; Quarentelli, 1986).  
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The authoritarian ‘command and control’ methodology also presented challenges 
in dealing with extreme emergency situations (Alexander, 2002b; Davis, 2011).  
Whilst this approach is very effective when dealing with ‘routine’ emergencies 
(Kapucu, 2005; Boin and Hart, 2010), it does not provide the flexibility that is 
required to deal with a rapidly changing dynamic situation characterised by an 
extreme event or disaster (Alexander, 2002b; Anderson and Adey, 2012; Boin 
and Bynander 2015). 
 
A period of review followed and led to the introduction of the Civil Protection in 
Peacetime Act, 1986 (Jackson, 1994; O’Brien, 2008; Cabinet Office, 2012).  
However, the transition in emergency management from one of Civil Defence to 
Civil Protection was not without difficulty (Hill, 1993: Jackson 1994).  The systems 
that had been developed to ensure effective civil protection, were subject to a 
reduction in government spending resulting in the loss of the 30,000 highly trained 
volunteers and led to an uncertain future for emergency management (Jackson, 
1994; Zebrowski, 2015).   
 
Publications such as ‘Dealing with Disaster’ issued by the Home Office sought to 
provide guidance for emergency responders in how to effectively deal with a 
disaster situation (Home Office, 1993; Jackson, 1994; Bye and Horner, 1998).  
The guidance aimed to support greater flexibility within civil protection for dealing 
with extreme events through an integrated approach.  The Local Authority was 
responsible for the co-ordination of emergency planning with the Police taking the 
lead role of command and control during a major incident.  However, the guidance 
was still constrained within the legislative framework and methodology of the Civil 
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Defence Act, 1948. Furthermore, it was questionable as to whether there were 
adequate resources to deal with a disaster at a local level given the fact that 
government funding had been reduced and there was a significant loss of 
emergency response systems that had been developed and relied upon for Civil 
Defence purposes (Jackson, 1994).  
 
In order to create a flexible and dynamic response to an extreme event, a radical 
change in the legislation would be required.  Tragically, the driving force for a 
fundamental change in  government policy typically results from a major incident 
and the UK is no exception, particularly in the case of flooding (Boin and Hart, 
2010; Johnson et al, 2005).  The 1998 Easter Floods represented a significant 
moment in terms of influencing policy within the UK with respect to the 
management of flooding.  Over 4500 properties were flooded (Bye and Horner, 
1998), with peak river flows in many of the affected locations exceeding historic 
flood levels.  With the formation of a new agency to deal with flood related issues, 
it was easy to apportion blame to a lack of warning and inadequate flood 
defences.  However, the poor response of the emergency services in terms of 
coordination, inadequate resources and multi-agency collaboration were also 
identified as contributing factors (Bye and Horner, 1998).  This also highlighted a 
lack of resilience within emergency management to the challenges imposed by a 
changing climate (Johnson et al, 2005). 
 
While flooding was high on the political agenda in response to the 1998 flood 
event, it was not the only threat to civil protection within the UK.   Throughout the 
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years that followed, a number of incidents occurred that seriously tested the 
effectiveness of the way in which emergency management was being conducted. 
 
The extensive and widespread flooding during Autumn 2000 provided another 
defining moment for UK emergency management.  With over 10,000 properties 
flooded, major disruption to transport networks, critical infrastructure and damage 
totalling over £1 billion (Environment Agency, 2001; Penning-Rowsell et al, 2002; 
Johnson et al, 2005; Penning-Rowsell and Wilson, 2006; Cabinet Office, 2004), 
the true cost of an extreme event was realised.   The ability to deal with an 
escalating situation where one event cascades into a series of events of 
increasing magnitude, demonstrated the need for a flexible approach to 
emergency management (Perry and Lindell, 2004). 
 
This was further reinforced during 2001.  While the country was recovering from 
the effects of Autumn 2000, a severe outbreak of the highly contagious Foot and 
Mouth disease exerted a further strain on the UK emergency management 
system (Anderson, 2002; National Audit Office, 2002).  Again, challenging the 
system of emergency management to respond dynamically to the changing 
needs and pressures resulting from a cascade of multiple events that had not 
been anticipated. 
 
The current system was inadequate to deal with emerging threats of this scale 
and magnitude (Home Office, 1991; Anderson, 2002; National Audit Office, 
2002).  In order to be able to effectively prepare and respond to these rapidly 
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changing, dynamic, extreme events required an approach that had the capacity 
to anticipate, adapt and change in response to the emerging situation (O’Brien, 
2008; Boin and Hart, 2010; Anderson and Adey, 2012).  The future of emergency 
management was in need of a radical change. 
 
These events prompted the government to initiate a thorough review of the 
existing legislative framework and structure.  The responsibility for emergency 
management was passed from the Home Office to a newly formed Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat and a consultation period ensued to change the 
existing legislation (O’Brien and Read, 2005). 
 
The introduction of the CCA, 2004 led to a shift in the way emergency 
management was conducted in the UK with the concept of resilience incorporated 
within a legislative framework and operationalised through the delivery of the 
Resilience Capability Programme (Cabinet Office, 2012; O’Brien and Read, 
2005; O’Brien, 2008).  Building on the principle of integrated emergency 
management this involved the incorporation of 6 main themes of anticipation, 
assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery into the emergency 
planning process (Cabinet Office, 2012; McMaster and Barber, 2012).  With 
resilience building initiatives to be promoted within each theme to ensure the 
country was adequately prepared to respond to an extreme event rapidly and 
effectively (Cabinet Office, 2013a).  It was recognised that in order to be able to 
respond effectively to extreme events would require greater integration, 
cooperation and collaboration between all of the organisations involved in 
emergency management in the UK.  This multi-agency approach was promoted 
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through the development of LRF’s and supported with the publication of guidance 
documents including Emergency Preparedness (Cabinet Office, 2011), 
Emergency Response and Recovery (Cabinet Office, 2013a) and the Concept of 
Operations (Cabinet Office, 2013b).   
 
As discussed within Chapter 1 (Section 1.3), LRF’s are composed of Category 1 
and Category 2 responders (Figure 2.6).  Category 1 responders include the 
emergency services, Local Authorities, Health Authorities and the Environment 
Agency (Cabinet Office, 2012).  These organisations have statutory duties under 
the CCA, 2004 to cooperate, share information, assess risk, maintain emergency 
and business continuity plans, communicate to the public and promote business 
continuity (Cabinet Office, 2012).  
 
Figure 2.4: The UK multi-agency approach to emergency management 
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Category 2 responders include Utility, Telecommunications and Transport 
companies and although they do not have any statutory duties defined within the 
Act they are expected to assist Category 1 responders in their duties:  
 
‘Category 1 responders should be supported in their assessment by 
Category 2 responders, local bodies, DCLG RED and national 
organisations sharing information and cooperating as appropriate.’ 
(Section 4.34, Cabinet Office, 2012). 
 
LRF’s operate locally within the confines of Police operational boundaries.  
However, some of the Category 1 responders such as the Environment Agency, 
Health Trusts and the Ambulance Service operate regionally and cover a much 
larger geographical area.  Within a region, these organisations may encompass 
1 or more LRF’s.   Many of the Category 2 responders such as the WSP’s, 
electricity and telecommunication providers operate over a much wider 
geographical area that may encompass one or more regions and therefore 
multiple LRF’s (Figure 2.7).   
 
In order to ensure good practice and a consistent approach the Cabinet Office 
provided guidance for responders on how the risk assessment process should be 
conducted.  This is contained within Chapter 4 of the Emergency Preparedness 
Guidance (Cabinet Office, 2012) and enables LRF’s to assess risk through the 
development of a Community Risk Register (CRR).   
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Figure 2.5: The area covered by Severn Trent encompasses many Police 
operational boundaries and LRF’s.  
(Police operational boundaries map adapted from HMSO, 2019.  
WSP boundary map adapted from Ofwat, 2019) 
 
Further information regarding hazard and threat categories is provided on an 
annual basis by central government within the Local Risk Assessment Guidance 
and the National Risk Register (NRR).  It is the intention that through the accurate 
identification and understanding of local risks, Category 1 responders are able to 
use this information to inform future planning and assess current and future 
contingency arrangements (Cabinet Office, 2012).  It was considered that within 
a framework of integrated emergency management the introduction of the CCA, 
2004, would provide the flexibility required to respond to changing dynamic 
emergency situations through a multi-agency collaborative approach at a local 
level.   
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Figure 2.6: Cycle of emergency planning as determined by the UK Cabinet 
Office, (2011) 
 
The UK cabinet office categorises the process of emergency management into 
two phases of development (Figure 2.8).  The consult phase involves the 
assessment of risk, defining objectives, the determination of roles and 
responsibilities and finalisation through agreement.  The embed phase is where 
the information determined within the consult phase is incorporated within training 
and exercising for effective emergency response.  These stages are to be 
conducted within the framework of the LRF.  
 
Emergency planning is a continuous process involving the interaction of many 
different organisations in the identification and anticipation of multiple threats and 
hazards, the assessment of risk, mitigation, preparedness and the delivery of an 
effective emergency response (Dynes, 1982; Alexander, 2002a; Perry and 
Lindell, 2004).  The introduction of the CCA, 2004 sought to apply this approach 
to achieve a greater resilience to extreme events.  However, the flooding of Mythe 
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water treatment works in 2007 highlighted difficulties with the multi-agency 
response and the sharing and exchange of information required for effective 
emergency response between the Category 1 and the Category 2 responders 
(Pitt, 2008).  As discussed within Chapter 1, (Section 1.3) this led to a loss of 
resilience contributing to a cascade of failures, increasing the failure magnitude 
and the time taken for recovery (Chapter 1, Figure 1.1). 
 
The Pitt report (Pitt, 2008) proposed 2 recommendation regarding multi-agency 
collaboration: 
“Recommendation 55: The Government should strengthen and enforce 
the duty on Category 2 responders to share information on the risks to 
their infrastructure assets, enabling more effective emergency planning 
within Local Resilience Forums” 
 
“Recommendation 56: The Government should issue clear guidance on 
expected levels of Category 2 responders’ engagement in planning, 
exercising and response and consider the case for strengthening 
arrangements.” 
 
These recommendations assume that the process of multi-agency emergency 
management operates effectively within the framework of the CCA, 2004 and 
enforcing a duty on the Category 2 responders to share information regarding risk 
will prevent this problem from reoccurring in the future.  However,  there may be 
underlying causative mechanisms within the wider system of emergency 
management preventing Category 2 responders from actively participating in the 
emergency management process and these have not been explored. 
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The multi-agency approach is also based on the assumption that organisations 
that operate very differently on a daily basis will be able to work together 
effectively within a pressurised, rapidly changing, dynamic emergency situation 
(Smith and Dowell, 2000).  On a daily basis, many of these organisations operate 
within a very different organisational culture and this may have an influence on 
the management style and structure.  For instance, an emergency response 
organisation typically operates within a top-down, hierarchical, command and 
control environment because this is how they respond to emergency situations 
every day.  Whereas a utility company may adopt a different management style 
where decision making is shared across the organisation.  Operating within a 
different organisational culture may influence an organisations ability to respond 
effectively to an extreme event and this was identified as a problem during the 
flooding of Mythe water treatment works (Pitt, 2008).  The WSP was not familiar 
with the command and control approach adopted by the Category 1 responders 
in the development of accurate situational awareness and the Category 1 
responders were also not aware of the restrictions placed on WSP’s regarding 
the security of information (Pitt, 2008).  This lack of understanding regarding roles 
and responsibilities of each operating organisation created difficulties in the 
sharing of information. 
 
Following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre during 2001, a great deal 
of attention was focussed on the protection of critical infrastructure from the threat 
of terrorism (Perry and Lindell, 2004; O’Brien and Read, 2005).  However, as the 
2007 flood event demonstrated, resilience to other hazards and preparedness for 
extreme emergency situations needed to be assessed.  The lessons learned 
report following this event (Pitt, 2008) was instrumental in changing government 
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policy with regard to achieving a greater resilience of critical infrastructure to 
flooding. 
 
The ‘Adapting to Climate Change’ programme led by Defra and the 2009 
programme ‘Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Change’ sought to investigate 
how the resilience of critical infrastructure could be achieved.  This included a 
critical infrastructure mapping project that identified 63 WSP sites at risk of a 
1:200 year flood event (Cabinet Office, 2010) and recommended all critical 
national infrastructure should be protected to a 1:200 year standard.  In 2010, 
Ofwat published ‘Asset Resilience to Flood Hazards: Development of an 
analytical framework’, this was developed to provide good practice guidance to 
achieving flood resilience (Ofwat, 2010).  The Cabinet Office Infrastructure 
Resilience Programme also published ‘Keeping the Country Running: Natural 
Hazards and Infrastructure’ as guidance for achieving resilience of critical 
infrastructure and a national programme was developed to introduce sector 
resilience plans (Cabinet Office, 2011b).  These were developed to identify the 
current level of resilience within the utility sector, assess and anticipate the risks 
associated with the failure of critical infrastructure to enable the development of 
future plans to achieve resilience.   
 
In 2014 the Water Act provided the water sector financial regulator, Ofwat with a 
duty to ensure the long term resilience of both water and wastewater services 
and during May 2015 the UK Regulators Network embarked upon a cross-sector 
resilience project to identify current levels of resilience and how inter-dependence 
can be improved across sectors.  While there was a great deal of focus on the 
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physical resilience of critical infrastructure within these reports, relatively little 
attention was applied to the resilience of the emergency management system 
with regard to the effectiveness of the CCA, 2004, encouraging Category 1 and 
Category 2 responders to cooperate and collaborate within the multi-agency 
approach defined by the LRF’s.  
 
In response to severe flood events experienced in 2013 and 2015, the UK 
government initiated the National Flood Resilience Review, 2018 to assess how 
the country can improve resilience to future flood events (HM Government, 2016).  
Within the review it was stated: 
“ In particular, we are proactively working with the utilities to 
establish a national infrastructure resilience council or forum to:  
•  sponsor inter-industry cooperation and information sharing;  
•  develop suitable proposals on resilience;  
•  carefully examine and document interdependencies between 
different sectors; and  
•  In an emergency make the link between different industry sectors 
and the relevant local LRFs and the Government COBR 
machinery” 
 
This suggests that despite all of the lessons learned reports following severe flood 
events and reports and guidance documents for achieving resilience of critical 
infrastructure to extreme events, the same difficulties are being experienced with 
regard to the sharing and exchange of information and multi-agency 
collaboration.  A lack of understanding regarding the roles and responsibilities of 
each operating responder organisation were also included within lessons learned 
reports and flood management reviews following widespread flood events within 
the UK (Bye and Horner, 1998; Environment Agency, 2001; Pitt, 2008; 
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Environment Agency 2009a; Environment Agency, 2014a; Defra, 2014; HM 
Government, 2016) 
 
To improve the level of cooperation, coordination and the sharing of information 
between the Category 1 responders, the government initiated the Joint 
Emergency Services Inter-Operability Programme (JESIP, 2016).  This was 
developed to provide a standardised framework encouraging a consistent 
approach to emergency response.  This included the development of principles 
for joint working, a shared understanding of risk and situational awareness, a 
clearly defined operational command profile, a joint decision making model and 
joint organisational learning tools.  These were developed to incorporate lesson 
learned from emergency events through training and exercising to improve the 
operational delivery of multi-agency emergency response. 
 
However, the framework was focussed on encouraging greater operability 
between the Category 1 responders and did not include understanding inter-
operability with regard to the Category 2 responders.  While they are able to follow 
the framework and apply the principles of joint operational working, a lack of 
understanding of the roles and responsibilities of Category 2 responders and how 
they deliver emergency response within the context of their organisational culture 
may continue to perpetuate difficulties in the sharing of information.  This may 
also affect the ability to achieve resilience to extreme events through the delivery 
of multi-agency emergency response.  As demonstrated during the flooding of 
Mythe water treatment works, Category 2 responders experience different 
challenges with regard to the organisational structure, security regarding sharing 
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information, the technical aspects of delivering effective emergency response, 
the physical protection of assets and ensuring the continual delivery of essential 
services to the public. 
 
During 2007,  Ofwat published ‘Resilience in the Round’ to provide guidance and 
good practice for WSP’s to encourage the development of innovative strategies 
to increase the resilience of service delivery for their customers (Ofwat, 2017a).  
This encouraged WSP’s to develop a greater understanding of corporate, 
financial and operational resilience within their organisation and to apply the 
principles of systems thinking to understand inter-dependencies between 
different sectors that may influence the ability to provide a service. 
 
The guidance does not provide specific instructions regarding how to achieve this 
but allows WSP’s to develop their own resilience based strategies according to 
how their organisation operates.  This is very similar to the approach taken by the 
UK government during the introduction of the CCA, 2004 and the development of 
LRF’s. This allows for heterogeneity and for organisations to develop an 
approach that is relevant to their organisational needs. The guidance also 
encourages customer engagement and builds on the findings of the ‘Tapped In’ 
report, 2017 where customers are considered as active participants in the future 
delivery of water services (Ofwat, 2017b). 
 
However, there is no mention within the guidance regarding the building of 
resilience through the development of emergency preparedness and response to 
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water system failure.  While it is important to take a systems based approach to 
understand the inter-relationships between different sectors, it is also necessary 
to recognise the existence of systems within systems as demonstrated within 
Chapter 1 (Section 1.3).  There is also a requirement to understand the system 
of emergency management and how customer behaviour may influence the 
ability to achieve resilience or contribute to an increase in the potential for system 
failure.  This was demonstrated within the negative reinforcing feedback loop 
(Chapter 1, Figure 1.4) where a lack of information and increased timescales 
contributed to customer anxiety regarding a failure of the water supply.  When 
the WSP finally delivered an alternative supply of water, customers responded 
by taking more than they required. This increased the pressure on the WSP to 
deliver more water and contributed to a lack of resilience for other customers. 
 
In order to build resilience to extreme events, it is necessary to incorporate the 
principles of effective emergency management within resilience based strategies.  
The lessons learned from the flooding of Mythe water treatment works were not 
included or incorporated as part of the Ofwat guidance, ‘Resilience in the Round’ 
and there was no mention of effective emergency management with regard to 
developing emergency preparedness and response to extreme events. 
 
This was reinforced following the ‘Beast from the East’, freeze thaw event that 
occurred within the UK during late February, early March 2018.  This event will 
be discussed in greater detail within Chapter 3 (Section 3.5.2) and Chapter 6.  
During this event a number of UK WSP’s experienced a series of pipe bursts 
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resulting in the loss of a centralised water supply to over 200,000 customers 
(Ofwat, 2018). 
 
Section 2, of the Water Industry Act, 1991, requires Ofwat to ‘secure the long-
term resilience of undertakers’ water supply and wastewater systems, and to 
secure they take steps to enable them, in the long term, to meet the need for 
water supplies and wastewater services’ (Defra, 2016).  The subsequent loss of 
water supply prompted the UK water regulator, Ofwat to conduct a review of the 
WSP response to the ‘The Beast from the East’ (Ofwat, 2018).    
 
This involved engaging with LRFs, government departments, politicians, a local 
school, utility and environment regulators and consumer representative groups 
to understand how WSP’s performed during the event.  The review concentrated 
on the key aspects of emergency planning such as the initial assessment of the 
emergency situation, planning and preparation, incident response, 
communication with customers and key stakeholders and recovery. 
 
The review demonstrated there was a lack of consistency in all aspects of 
emergency planning across the country.  There were examples of WSP’s taking 
a proactive approach, anticipating the requirement for alternative water supplies 
and working together with suppliers and LRFs to ensure customers would be 
provided with an alternative supply of water if necessary.  However, there were 
also examples of WSP’s acting reactively, not being able to source alternative 
supplies within sufficient time or having adequate plans and procedures in place 
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to ensure an alternative supply of water for all affected.  This was exacerbated 
where WSP’s failed to communicate effectively with members of the LRF.  
 
In order to understand individual customer’s experience of the event, the 
Consumer Council for Water (CC Water) was commissioned to conduct 
qualitative and quantitative research (CC Water, 2018).  This was to explore 
customer perceptions of four main themes comprising Information and 
Communication, Alternative Supplies of Water, Overall Experience and 
Compensation.  The results revealed the customer experience of this event as 
being negative. 
 
It could be argued that each review was reactive placing responsibility on the 
WSP’s for a failure to develop effective emergency plans and response 
procedures and yet these were not included as part of the resilience based 
strategies within ‘Resilience in the Round’. The reviews did not consider 
customers to be active participants in the emergency management process but 
rather considered customers as passive recipients of a failed service.  While the 
consequences of this event demonstrate the importance of incorporating 
emergency preparedness and response within resilience based strategies, it also 
highlights the importance of considering customer’s as active participants in the 
emergency management process. 
 
The results of each review also demonstrated a lack of incorporating lessons 
learned from the flooding of Mythe water treatment works during the 2007 flood 
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event.  This is because the same difficulties were experienced during each event.  
These included an inability to effectively prepare, plan and respond to an extreme 
event involving water supply failure.  A lack of multi-agency coordination 
regarding the delivery of alternative supplies of water and a lack of information 
sharing between the WSP and the LRF.  There was also a lack of communication 
and information regarding the provision of alternative supplies of water and when 
the water supply would be restored.   
 
A large part of the emergency management system comprise individuals and 
communities affected by potential threats and hazards.  It has been demonstrated 
within the literature review that the active participation of individuals and 
communities during emergency preparedness will strengthen the emergency 
response.  However, this depends on the provision of information, the 
development of trust and the resources available to be able to respond effectively.  
The ‘Resilience in the Round’ guidance does not reference the active participation 
of customers with regard to emergency preparedness or emergency response 
and yet it was demonstrated within Chapter 1, (Section 1.3) that customer 
behaviour may exert a strong influence on the ability of the WSP and the 
customer to achieve resilience to water supply failure. 
 
Within the wider context of emergency management the UK government initiated 
a public awareness campaign in 2004 to encourage individuals to prepare for 
emergencies.  The government distributed a booklet ‘Preparing for Emergencies’ 
(HM Government, 2004) to each individual householder.  The booklet contained 
advice regarding what actions individuals should take during an emergency.  
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While there was a heavy focus on responding to a terrorist threat, there was also 
general advice regarding emergency preparedness.  However, the booklet did 
not contain information regarding a failure of essential services.  Since 2004, the 
government has established a dedicated website providing information to the 
public regarding how they can prepare for an emergency.  The website contains 
a wider range of information regarding potential threats and hazards and links to 
the NRR and the LRF’s so the public are able to access the CRR to promote a 
greater understanding of risk and how threats and hazards may influence the 
provision of essential services to the public.  The website also contains 
information regarding individual preparedness, business preparedness and 
community preparedness with links to emergency plan toolkits, templates and 
guidance documents (Cabinet Office, 2018).  However, all of this information 
relies on the individual and community having knowledge regarding the 
availability of this information and gaining access to the website. 
 
2.8 Summary 
This Chapter sought to explore Objective 1, to critically analyse the traditional risk 
based approach to emergency management and its application towards 
achieving resilience.  This review of the literature and the discussion within 
Chapter 1 (Section 1.1) demonstrates how a risk management approach to the 
anticipation and assessment of known threats and hazards has many limitations 
with respect to achieving resilience to extreme events.  It was also demonstrated 
how the traditional application of the emergency management cycle reinforces 
the risk management approach and simplifies the process of emergency 
management into 4 or more separate stages.  This approach doesn’t allow for a 
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greater understanding of the complex inter-dependencies within the wider socio-
ecological-technical system.  As highlighted within Chapter 1 (Section 1.3), a lack 
of understanding may result in a cascade of failures. 
 
The UK emergency management system operates within the framework of the 
CCA, 2004.  Although this was introduced to build resilience, it still operates within 
the confines of a risk management approach through the development of the 
NRR and the local CRR’s.  To achieve resilience within emergency management 
requires a greater understanding of how the system is connected, the influence 
of these connections and how resilience operates within the wider system. 
 
The lessons learned report from the flooding of Mythe water treatment works 
demonstrated there were difficulties regarding the sharing and exchange of 
information between WSP’s and the LRF’s during the risk assessment process 
and emergency response.  The WSP’s were not active participants in the risk 
assessment process and did not provide the LRF with information regarding the 
consequences of water supply failure.  Despite the introduction of the CCA in 
2004 and the development of LRF’s to encourage resilience through a multi-
agency approach to emergency management, these are still identified as 
persistent problems within lessons learned reports and emergency exercises 
(Watermark, 2011; Environment Agency, 2016; HM Government 2016; Ofwat 
2018).  However, while recommendations are made to improve multi-agency 
communication and cooperation these do not include further exploration of the 
wider system of emergency management to establish whether the failures are 
related to the application and operation of the CCA, 2004.  
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It was also identified within the literature review that successful multi-agency 
coordination and collaboration is enhanced through active participation 
throughout the emergency management process.  However, WSP’s and many of 
the Category 2 responders are expected to engage with multiple LRF’s in order 
to be able to achieve this.  It was demonstrated during the ‘Beast from the East’ 
that difficulties persist with regard to the sharing and exchange of information 
between WSP’s and the LRF’s.  There requires a deeper exploration of the 
processes defined within the CCA, 2004 to understand if there are causative 
mechanisms preventing the sharing and exchange of information between WSP’s 
and LRF’s and the ability to achieve multi-agency resilience to extreme events.  
This will be explored in greater detail within Objective 2. 
 
This review of the literature demonstrated there are many complexities 
associated with applying the concept of resilience.  At an individual level 
resilience may be influenced by a number of different factors.  These may include, 
an individual’s personality traits, how hazards are perceived within the local 
environment, knowledge and experience of hazards, perceived control, trust and 
perceived responsibility of governments, responder organisations and the 
providers of essential services.  It was also demonstrated that these did not 
necessarily contribute to an intention to prepare or the process of actively 
preparing for an extreme event.  The application of a risk management approach 
by governments, responder organisations and providers of essential services, to 
encourage raising awareness of known hazards may encourage greater 
preparedness.  However, evidence from the literature also indicates that even in 
locations where hazards frequently occur, many individuals do not perceive it 
necessary to prepare. 
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The review of individual resilience combined with the lessons learned from 
individual behaviour during the flooding of Mythe water treatment works (Chapter 
1, Section 1.3) demonstrated how a greater understanding was required 
regarding individual perception of water supply failure and the factors that may 
influence individual preparedness.  This provided the foundation for Objective 3 
(Chapter 1, Section 1.4). 
 
At the community level, resilience was interpreted with regard to themes.  These 
included, economic development, local knowledge, social capital, sharing and 
exchange of information, availability of resources and community capability to 
utilise resources for effective emergency response.  Understanding resilience as 
themes allowed for the heterogeneity that exists between different communities 
with regard to location, structure, connectivity and socio-economic status.   
 
Community resilience may be regarded as the collective ability of a community to 
cope, adapt and recover from an extreme event or emergency.  However, the 
ability to achieve resilience requires the support of responder organisations.  The 
review of the literature suggests the development of strong relational ties between 
the community and responder organisations may strengthen the emergency 
response through the sharing of local knowledge and a greater understanding of 
the roles, responsibilities and capabilities of both the responder organisations and 
the local community.  While there is a great deal of research regarding the 
attributes of community resilience, there is relatively little research regarding the 
evolutionary development of relationships between responder organisations and 
community groups during the formation of collaborative working partnerships and 
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how the development of these relationships may contribute to resilience within 
the system of emergency management.  This formed the basis of Objective 4 
(Chapter 1, Section 1.4). 
 
It was identified within Chapter 1, Section 1.3 that in order to be able to achieve 
resilience to extreme events, it is necessary to develop a deeper understanding 
of the system of emergency management.  This involves the identification of the 
main structural elements that comprise the system, how the system is connected 
and the influence of these connections with regard to the ability to achieve 
resilience.  This Chapter examined different applications of the concept of 
resilience by exploring the empirical literature and how a system based approach 
is used to understand resilience within the emergency management system and 
discipline specific literature to understand the meaning of resilience.  While the 
systems based approach provides a foundation to understand how the physical 
system is connected it does not explore the influence of social interactions 
between different parts of the system or how attitudes, perception and behaviour 
influence the ability to achieve resilience within the physical system.  The 
importance of understanding how these elements are connected within the 
system of emergency management and their influence on achieving resilience is 
rarely recognised within resilience based strategies or guidance documents 
(Kimhi, 2016). 
 
This research seeks to apply a systems based approach to understand the 
structural elements that comprise the UK emergency management system and 
apply social research methods to explore the meaning of resilience within and 
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across each structural element of the system (Chapter 1, Section 1.4).  The 
emergency management system will be applied to the Safe and SuRe 
intervention framework (Chapter 1, Section 1.2, Figure 1.5) to identify the main 
threats to the system and the impact and consequence of these threats on the 
ability to achieve resilience to water supply failure .  This information will be 
applied within the Safe and SuRe intervention framework to identify the main 
threats to the emergency management system, the impact and consequence of 
these threats to the system and how the application of intervention measures may 
increase the ability to achieve overall resilience of the system.  This is defined 
within Objective 5 (Chapter 1, Section 1.4) and will be achieved through the 
triangulation of results obtained through the analysis of Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4.  
This will be presented within Chapter 8. 
 
The following chapter will present the methodological design chosen to explore 
the characteristics of resilience within each objective and the implementation of 
specific research methodologies to understand the application of resilience within 
the UK emergency management system. 
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3 CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The literature review (Chapter 2) explored the traditional risk based approach to 
emergency management and the different applications of resilience within the 
wider context of the emergency management system and society.  It was 
recognised that in order to be able to achieve resilience to extreme events, it is 
necessary to develop a deeper understanding of how resilience operates within 
the wider system of emergency management.  This was demonstrated within 
Chapter 1, (Section 1.3).  A lack of understanding of how the emergency 
management system is connected may perpetuate failure within the system 
leading to a negative reinforcing feedback loop (Chapter 1, Figure 1.4).  This has 
the potential to reduce the resilience of a system during an incident and may 
result in an increase in the failure magnitude, prolong the event duration and lead 
to a greater period of recovery (Chapter 1, Figure 1.1). 
 
To develop knowledge and understanding of how resilience to water supply 
failure can be achieved within and across the UK emergency management 
system, it is necessary to examine and explore how the system actually works in 
practice.  Chapter 2, Section 2.7 explored how the UK emergency management 
system has evolved to incorporate resilience within a legislative framework of the 
CCA, (2004). However, examination of lessons learned reports and multi-agency 
exercises would suggest there are difficulties with this approach (Chapter 1, 
Section 1.1).  To explore how the system operates in practice, a pragmatic and 
applied approach was used to develop the research design. This involved the 
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incorporation of action research and social research methods to examine and 
explore how the legislation supports or constrains the ability of different 
organisations to work together.  This also included participant observation to 
understand attitudes, perceptions and behaviour of individuals during an actual 
emergency and participatory action research to understand how a community 
functions and operates in order to achieve resilience to emergency situations.  
Taking a pragmatic and applied approach to the research design using action 
research provides an opportunity for the researcher to participate and become 
immersed within the process of data collection (Bernard, 2006; Robson, 2011).  
This approach provided a grounding for the overall research design because it 
enabled a realistic and contextualised understanding of attitudes, perceptions 
and behaviours towards water supply failure within the context of how the 
emergency management system operates in practice.  This also allowed the 
researcher to explore whether the system operates in accordance with the 
legislation and to identify causative mechanisms that may promote or inhibit the 
ability to achieve resilience throughout the system. 
 
It was proposed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3), that in order to understand how the 
Safe and SuRe intervention framework could be applied, it was necessary to 
explore the meaning of resilience at each stage of the emergency management 
system.  This requires identification of the main elements and connections that 
comprise the system, analysis of the relationships and characteristics of 
resilience within and amongst the connections and how these contribute to the 
overall purpose of the system.   
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Figure 3.1: Simplified system of emergency management in the UK and the 
Objectives used to examine each element of the system. 
 
It was identified in Chapter 1, (Section 1.3) that the UK emergency management 
system comprises three main structural elements (Figure 3.1).  The institutional 
element at the level of Government, the operational element represented by the 
organisations that comprise the LRF and the individuals and communities 
affected by an emergency.  Each element of the system is also connected.  A 
separate connection exists between the institutional element and both the 
operational element and the individuals and communities affected by an 
emergency.  A connection also exists between the operational element and the 
individuals and communities affected by an emergency.   
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Each element of the emergency management system and its associated 
connection is explored through a specific objective to guide the progression of 
the research towards a greater understanding of how resilience can be achieved 
to water supply failure.  The sequence of the research design is defined within 
the thesis plan (Chapter 1, Section 1.5) and partly follows the ‘top down’ structure 
of the emergency management system.  This is because it is necessary to 
understand the legislative framework and how the system operates in practice in 
order to understand where resilience is currently being applied within the system 
and where difficulties may exist. 
 
The research commences with an exploration of the institutional element as 
defined within Objective 1.  In the context of this research the institutional element 
is representative of the legislation, policies and guidance documents to support 
the operational development of resilience to water supply failure within the 
emergency management system.  This includes examination of the traditional risk 
management approach to emergency management (Chapter 1, Section 1.1) and 
how the system currently operates within the legislative framework defined by the 
CCA, 2004 (Chapter 2, Section 2.7).  However, further investigation is required 
to understand the effectiveness of this approach to achieve resilience to water 
supply failure and to understand what the connections mean in terms of resilience 
between the institutional element, the operational element and the individuals and 
communities affected by an emergency. 
 
The operational element of the system is understood within the context of 
Objective 2 (Figure 3.1).  It was considered that exploring how resilience is 
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operationalised in practice through the application of applied social research 
methods would contribute knowledge regarding the effectiveness of the 
legislation in achieving residence through the multi-agency approach.  It was also 
considered that this may provide an insight into the persistent difficulties 
highlighted within lessons learned reports regarding multi-agency collaboration 
and the sharing of information required for effective emergency response.  To 
explore and examine the effectiveness of the multi-agency approach requires the 
active participation of emergency responders from both the WSP’s and from 
within the LRF, to contribute information within semi-structured interviews. This 
also enables a greater understanding of the flow of information throughout the 
system and whether resilience to water supply failure relies on the ‘top down’ 
delivery of information in the form of legislation or if there is a flow of information 
back through the system. 
 
Objectives 3 and 4 (Chapter 1, Section 1.4) explore the individuals and 
communities affected by an emergency through an element situated at the first 
level of the emergency management system.  Individuals and communities 
represent the first element to be affected by an emergency and while information 
regarding the potential impact and consequence of an emergency may be passed 
from the operational element to individuals and communities via early warning 
systems, there is also a transfer of information back through the system to the 
operational element.  As demonstrated within Chapter 1, (Section 1.1), individual 
resilience may be affected by attitudes, perceptions and behaviour of individuals 
regarding water supply failure.  This was also reinforced through analysis of the 
academic literature within Chapter 2, Section 2.4.  It was considered that 
developing a greater understanding of individual attitudes, perceptions and 
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behaviour relating to water supply failure may provide an indication of the current 
levels of resilience and how this can be increased through connections within the 
system.   
 
This was achieved as part of Objective 3, through the application of an individual 
homeowner questionnaire and the analysis of comments on the social media 
platform Facebook during an actual emergency situation.  The individual 
homeowner questionnaire was designed to ask individual homeowners specific 
questions to explore general attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure 
(Chapter 5).  However, this approach may be limited because as demonstrated 
within Chapter 2, (Section 2.4) individual attitudes and perceptions do not always 
influence behaviour in terms of taking action.  Taking a pragmatic approach 
through action research and participant observation of how individuals behave 
during an actual emergency provided a greater insight into attitudes and 
perceptions and how these influence behaviour with regard to achieving 
resilience to water supply failure.  This was examined through analysis of 
Facebook comments during the ‘The Beast from the East’ water supply failure 
incident (Chapter 6).  Consequently, Objective 3 applied two different approaches 
to explore the resilience of an individual to water supply failure.  The methodology 
is presented within Section 3.5. 
 
Individuals form part of communities and community groups and resilience within 
the community was explored in Objective 4, (Chapter 1, Section 1.4).  As 
demonstrated within Chapter 2, Section 2.5, community resilience is enhanced 
through building relationships, the sharing and exchange of local knowledge and 
122 
 
understanding the availability of resources and capability for effective emergency 
response.  There is a great deal of focus on developing community resilience 
within the UK to flooding (Twigger Ross et al, 2015; Cabinet Office, 2016) and 
the connection to the operational element is usually through the local community 
rather than the individual (Cabinet Office, 2018).  However, there is little 
understanding regarding the effectiveness of integrating community groups within 
the emergency management system. It was perceived that working together with 
a local community through participatory action research to explore and 
understand how the community built and developed relationships with local 
authorities and responder organisations would provide a greater understanding 
of both community resilience and the connections between the community and 
the other elements of the system (Chapter 7).  The methodological approach 
taken to explore Objective 4, is presented in Section 3.7. 
 
All of this information is required to develop a greater practical understanding of 
how resilience operates within the emergency management system and this is 
explored as part of Objective 5.  It is necessary to understand how the system 
operates in practice to enable the application of the Safe and SuRe intervention 
framework.  This will allow the identification of where resilience intervention 
measures are required to improve resilience to water supply failure within the 
emergency management system (Chapter 8).  The methodological approach 
taken to explore Objective 5 is presented in Section 3.8. The results will be 
presented as series of recommendations identifying where resilience to water 
supply failure is required for effective emergency management (Chapter 9). 
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This Chapter presents a methodological design to explore the characteristics of 
resilience as detailed within each Objective and discusses the implementation of 
research strategies and methods.  The Chapter starts with an exploration of the 
mixed methods approach. 
 
3.2 Exploring the system of emergency management using a mixed 
methods approach. 
A mixed methods approach involves the combination or integration of different 
research strategies within the same methodological design (Bryman, 2006; 
Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2009).  These may comprise different quantitative 
research methods, different qualitative research methods or represent a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods.  This approach is 
traditionally applied where different perspectives are sought to develop a more 
complete understanding of the wider context of the research (Greene et al, 1989; 
Robson, 2011).  It has been considered that this contributes to a more pragmatic 
approach where mixed methods occupies a paradigm of research located 
between the traditional purist approach of quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies (Bryman, 2006; Johnson et al, 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). 
 
Historically, contention existed as to whether quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies should be combined within a single research project because of 
differences in the epistemological and ontological foundations within each 
strategy (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Bryman, 2008; Chipangura et al, 
2016). These influence the implementation of specific research methods and the 
analysis and interpretation of research findings (Figure 3.2). 
124 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The application of quantitative and qualitative research methods.  
(Adapted from Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). 
 
Quantitative research takes a deductive approach where theory is derived by the 
researcher and hypothesis are tested under experimental conditions and 
supported through the mathematical analysis of data (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 
2004; Bryman, 2008; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Robson, 2011; Chipangura 
et al, 2016).  These strategies take a similar approach to the physical sciences 
where a fixed approach is adopted in the research design to ensure 
reproducibility with a focus on the accurate, reliable measurement of data 
ensuring validity of results.  From the perspective of social research, this 
approach supports the ontological position of objectivism and assumes reality 
exists independent of human thought or understanding.  This is an objective 
approach based on fact that does not consider the subjective influence of the 
external environment on social behaviour.  
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This is in contrast to qualitative research where an inductive approach is taken 
and theory is developed from the research findings or observations (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie 2004; Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2011).   This approach supports a 
more flexible research design that is focussed on understanding meaning and the 
influence of context.  It is generally accepted that the research design will evolve 
to enable the development of a deeper understanding through explorative 
research or themes.  From a sociological perspective, this approach supports the 
ontological position of constructionism and assumes reality is a social construct 
influenced by human interactions and experience of the wider environment.  This 
approach is also subjective and open with regard to the influence of the 
surrounding environment on social behaviour. 
 
While each research strategy is developed from a different philosophy, it has 
been demonstrated that it is possible to combine and integrate these strategies 
effectively by applying a mixed methods approach (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 
2004; Bryman, 2006; Johnson et al, 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).  It has 
been proposed that the application of different research strategies can be used 
to enhance the development of the research process.  For instance, the results 
of quantitative methods such as questionnaires and social network analysis can 
be used in the initial stages of the research process to inform a qualitative 
investigation through interviews (Kelman et al, 2016).  The exploration of different 
perspectives can also be used to guide the research process.  For instance, the 
discovery of conflicting results, themes or observations may indicate further 
exploration is required or the process of triangulation may provide validity and 
confirmation of a particular hypothesis.  
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For the purposes of this research, it was considered that the use of both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods would allow for a deeper 
exploration and understanding of the characteristics of resilience at different parts 
of the emergency management system.  A pragmatic approach was also required 
to understand resilience from the perspective of the individual, community and 
practitioner and how this influenced the overall function and purpose of the 
system.  The research methodology used will be discussed within Section 3.3 
and detailed descriptions of each method are provided in Section 3.4. 
 
A large proportion of this research applies a qualitative participation observation 
approach with regard to data collection with the intention to compliment, support 
or contest the information obtained from academic literature, government 
guidance and reports.  This includes participant observation methods, such as 
the analysis of comments on Facebook during an emergency situation to 
understand individual attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure and 
participatory action research to work collaboratively with a local community 
representative to understand the development of a community flood action group.   
 
The participant observation approach has been widely applied by anthropologists 
(Bernard, 2006; Musante and DeWalt 2010; Jorgenson, 2015) and social 
scientists (Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2011) to explore and understand human 
behaviour within a natural environment.  It was considered that observing 
participants in a real world setting encourages the observation of ‘normal 
behaviour’ as opposed to behavioural studies conducted in an artificial 
environment under experimental conditions (Bernard, 2006; Musante and DeWalt 
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2010).  The latter approach may stimulate a behavioural response that is not 
reflective of how that individual would behave in a normal environment (Bernard, 
2006).   
 
Standard methods and techniques using participant observation involve the 
researcher being considered a participant in the observed group (Robson, 2011).  
According to Musante and DeWalt (2010), “Participant observation is a method 
in which a researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions and 
events of a group of people as one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit 
aspects of their life routines and their culture.”  This approach may be applied 
through different levels of involvement by the researcher.  According to Robson 
(2011), these include: 
 
 The researcher becoming a ‘complete participant’ where the researcher 
does not inform the participants of their intention as a researcher.   
 An ‘observer’ where the participants are aware of the researcher who 
takes an active role in the group,  
 A ‘marginal participant’ where the researcher is known to the group but 
has limited involvement. 
 The ‘observer as participant’.  This is where the researcher is known to 
the participants but does not have any involvement in the research under 
investigation.  
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The active participation of the researcher within the group under observation may 
provide an opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of participant attitudes, 
perceptions and behaviour (Bernard, 2006; Robson, 2011).  Increased familiarity 
between the researcher and the participants through the sharing of information 
and knowledge may encourage participants to develop trust in the researcher 
(Robson, 2011).  This may increase the level of acceptance of the researcher 
providing a greater opportunity to explore and understand the context within 
which the research is being conducted and enhance the quality of the research 
(Bernard, 2006; Robson, 2011).  A greater understanding of the contextual setting 
may also help to inform the development of suitable questions to explore the 
meaning of the research by providing a more intuitive insight regarding the 
interpretation of the data (Musante and DeWalt, 2010).   
 
Questionnaires are also used to understand attitudes, perceptions and 
behaviours.  However, as demonstrated within Chapter 2 (Section 2.4), this 
approach is limited because individual attitudes and perceptions do not always 
lead to a behaviour intention to prepare or act (Dobbie et al, 2016; Donahue et 
al, 2014; Paton, 2013).  The participant observation method is considered to 
provide a greater understanding of the real world by observing people within their 
natural environment (Robson, 2011).   
 
The analysis of comments on Facebook was used to observe how individuals 
responded to water supply failure during an actual emergency.  The intention was 
to develop a greater understanding of whether attitudes and perceptions to water 
supply failure influence behaviour and the ability to achieve resilience during an 
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emergency (Chapter 1, Section 1.4, Objective 3).  The methodology used to 
examine and explore individual resilience (Objective 3, Chapter 1, Section 1.4) is 
presented within Section 3.5 and Section 3.6. 
 
As previously discussed, Robson (2011) defines participant observation methods 
in terms of the ‘complete participant’, an ‘observer’, a ‘marginal participant’ or the 
observer as participant’.  Standard methods and techniques as defined by 
Robson (2011) consider the researcher as ‘a participant in the observed group’.  
However, this was not the case with the analysis of comments on Facebook and 
while participant observation was used, the researcher was not known to the 
participants throughout the process and acted as an anonymous observer.  
 
Participant observation was also used to compliment participatory action 
research to explore and understand how a local community group worked 
collaboratively with local authorities and responder organisations to achieve 
community resilience.  Within this part of the research, the researcher acted as a 
‘marginal participant’ (Robson, 2011) where the researcher was known to the 
community representative but had limited involvement.  The researcher was not 
actively involved in the process of developing the social networks as they had 
already been developed by the local community representative.  However, the 
researcher was involved in the development of social network graphs to 
document the evolutionary development of the community flood group and the 
community flood board.  These graphs were used by the community 
representative at the Environment Agency Flood and Coast Conference, 2018 
and at local workshops to highlight the importance of collaborative working 
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practices and to contribute to knowledge regarding the improvement of current 
operational working practices.  The methodology used to explore community 
resilience is presented in Section 3.7. 
 
The research ethics application process was undertaken to ensure the research 
complied with the University of Exeter’s commitment to  the ethical principles of 
‘Autonomy, Beneficence, Non-maleficence, Confidentiality and Integrity’ 
(University of Exeter Ethics Policy, 2014).  This ensures that each participant is 
made thoroughly aware of the purpose of the research, are free to participate if 
they require and understand they may leave the process at any point in the 
research.  The principles also ensure researcher integrity with regard to the 
confidentiality of personal data and to make certain participant’s details are stored 
securely. 
 
An application to the Ethics Committee had to made and accepted before any of 
the questionnaires could be sent to members of the public (Appendix 1).  The 
application process involved a description of the research methodology, details 
of the potential ethical implications and a risk assessment.  Accompanying 
documents included a final version of the questionnaire (Appendix 2), a covering 
letter for the individual questionnaire and an information and consent form for the 
semi-structured interviews to be conducted as part of Objective 2 (Appendix 3).  
These were submitted to the College of Engineering, Mathematics and Physical 
Sciences and the research did not commence until approval was obtained. 
 
131 
 
3.3 Methodological design 
The research methodology consists of 5 stages each defined by a specific 
Objective (Figure 3.3).  The first stage comprised a literature review and 
attendance at conferences to develop a theoretical framework. The literature 
review explored the different applications of resilience within the emergency 
management system and wider society.  However, in order to gain a greater 
understanding of resilience within the emergency management system, it was 
also necessary to determine how the concept was being applied in practice.  This 
was explored through attendance at conferences (Table 3.1, Appendix 4).  
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Conference Title  Organiser 
Water, Water Everywhere   Bristol City Council 
Flood Resilient Communities: 
Evaluating the Defra Flood 
Resilience Community 
Pathfinder Project 
 
CIWEM and the National 
Flood Forum 
Making our Nation More 
Resilient to Flooding: Designing 
Effective Strategies and 
Delivering Key Solutions to our 
Communities 
 
Public Policy Exchange 
Major Incident and Emergency 
Planning, Preparation, Risk and 
Response 
 
GovKnow 
Beyond the National Flood 
Resilience Review: Building 
Resilient Infrastructure and 
Communities 
 
CIWEM 
Cabinet Office Emergency 
Ambition 
Conference  
 
Cabinet Office 
Flood and Coast: Resilience   Environment Agency  
Delivering Resilience in PR19 
and Beyond 
 
Water Industry Forum 
 
Table 3.1: Conferences attended to understand the practitioner approach to 
resilience. 
 
The second stage involved exploring the multi-agency approach to emergency 
management as defined within Objective 2.  A comparative content analysis was 
conducted on the CRR’s, Chapter 4 of the Local Responder Risk Assessment 
Duty of the Emergency Planning Guidance (Cabinet Office 2012), WSP Water 
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Resource Management Plans, WSP Drought Plans and Sector Resilience Plans.  
This was to gain a greater understanding of the multi-agency assessment of risk 
and whether WSP’s could manage risk and resilience as part of a multi-agency 
approach.  It was recognised that a qualitative methodological approach would 
be required in the form of semi-structured interviews to explore the 
inconsistencies identified within the content analysis and provide a greater 
understanding of the multi-agency approach to emergency management.   
 
Objective 3 represented the third stage of the research methodology and 
consisted of both quantitative and qualitative research methods.  A quantitative 
approach in the form of an individual homeowner questionnaire was designed to 
understand general attitudes, perceptions and behaviour to water supply failure.  
This provided a structured approach with clearly defined research questions 
regarding how individuals perceive risk within their local area, water supply failure 
and whether they prepare for emergency situations.  The qualitative approach 
was applied following an actual failure of the water supply.  This occurred during 
March 2018 as a result of a freeze thaw event following the ‘Beast from the East’ 
(Ofwat, 2018; Water UK, 2018) and is discussed in greater detail within Chapter 
6.  A qualitative approach was taken to analyse individual customer comments 
on WSP Facebook pages to explore and understand perceptions and attitudes to 
water supply failure during an emergency. 
 
Stage 4 was conducted with the active participation of a community 
representative to explore how resilience can be achieved through collaborative 
working partnerships.  This involved a quantitative approach with social network 
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analysis combined with a qualitative approach exploring the development of a 
social network through a series of semi-structured interviews and participatory 
action research to understand the connections and relationships between 
responder organisations and the local community. 
 
Each of the four stages represents an exploration of the characteristics of 
resilience at different stages within the emergency management system.  The 
legislative approach applied at the level of Government is represented within 
stage 1, the operational multi-agency approach is analysed within stage 2 with 
individual and community resilience explored within stages 3 and 4 respectively.  
An investigation of the impact of the failure state is provided within the final, 5th 
stage through the triangulation of results from stage 1 to 4.  Using a systems 
based approach the integration of quantitative and qualitative research methods, 
detailed in Section 3.8, are used to evaluate how resilience can be achieved 
through effective emergency management. 
 
3.4 Research methods used to explore the multi-agency approach to 
emergency management (Objective 2) 
3.4.1 The preliminary analysis of the Community Risk Registers 
The aim of the comparative content analysis was to establish the level of 
engagement of WSP’s in the multi-agency assessment of risk and resilience and 
whether this has changed since the recommendations of the Pitt Review, (2008) 
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Region  LRF 
North West  
 Cheshire 
 Cumbria 
 Greater Manchester 
 Lancashire 
 Merseyside 
North East 
 Cleveland 
 Durham and Darlington 
 Northumbria 
Yorkshire and Humber 
 Humber 
 North Yorkshire 
 South Yorkshire 
 West Yorkshire 
West Midlands 
 Staffordshire 
 Warwickshire 
 West Mercia 
 West Midlands 
East Midlands 
 Derby and Derbyshire 
 Leicestershire 
 Lincolnshire 
 Northamptonshire 
 Nottingham and Nottinghamshire 
East of England 
 Bedfordshire and Luton 
 Cambridgeshire and Peterborough 
 Essex 
 Hertfordshire 
 Norfolk 
 Suffolk 
South West 
 Avon and Somerset 
 Dorset 
 Devon, Cornwall and the Isle of Scilly 
 Gloucestershire 
 Wiltshire and Swindon 
South East 
 Hampshire and the Isle of Wight 
 Kent 
 Surrey 
 Sussex 
 Thames Valley 
London  London 
Table 3.2:  LRF’s in England that were included in the CRR analysis. 
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The first step was to identify the statutory duties and recommendations of best 
practice within Chapter 4, Local Responder Risk Assessment Duty  of the 
Emergency Planning Guidance (Cabinet Office, 2012).  This information was 
used to determine how each LRF fulfilled these duties from an analysis of the 
CRR’s 
 
The comparative content analysis was then performed on 38 CRR’s for England 
(Table 3.2).  The risk categories relevant to the water sector were identified.  
These included the failure of water infrastructure to accidental contamination or 
a major accident, drought and the failure or collapse of a major reservoir dam.  
Where possible the lead assessor, likelihood and impact scores, risk rating and 
the current controls in place for effective emergency management were analysed. 
This was to provide evidence of the level of engagement of WSPs and 
understand how resilience is incorporated within the risk management process.  
 
The results of the analysis were compared to the information provided within the 
WSP Water Resource Management Plans, Drought plans and the nationally 
produced Sector Resilience Plans. This was to understand whether the results of 
the risk assessment correlated with information provided within WSP reports and 
whether the information was used to inform future planning priorities. Exploratory 
interviews were also conducted with Emergency Managers to test the findings of 
the analysis. 
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3.4.2 A visual representation of the multi-agency network 
As discussed within Chapter 1, Section 1.1, LRF’s are composed of Category 1 
and Category 2 responders however, the connections between each organisation 
are highly complex. It was considered that representing this as a social network 
diagram would highlight the complexity of the multi-agency approach to 
emergency management.  
 
The North West region of the UK was selected to map the connections between 
the Category 1 and Category 2 responders because the WSP within this region 
operates over a wide geographical area encompassing 5 LRF’s.  It was 
considered that this would provide a good representation of the complexity 
regarding the connections that exist between the responder organisations and 
the LRF.  The Category 1 and Category 2 responders that comprise each LRF 
was obtained from the CRR’s and the Webpages for each LRF.  However, this 
approach was not consistent because not every LRF included the same level of 
detail.  To ensure consistency in approach, this information was compared to the 
list of Category 1 and Category 2 responders identified within the CCA, 2004 
(CCA, 2004).     
 
An adjacency matrix was developed of directed relationships between each 
organisation within each LRF in the North West region of the UK.  This information 
was imported into R studio for analysis using the social network package, igraph.   
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A simplified version of the social network diagram was also developed to provide 
a visual representation of the connections between 9 of the largest water and 
sewerage providers in England and the LRF’s.  An adjacency matrix of directed 
relationships between the WSP’s and the LRF’s was developed and imported 
within R studio for analysis using the social network package, igraph.   
 
3.4.3 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews are used within qualitative research to explore and 
understand themes identified within the research proposal.  An interview guide is 
developed to drive the interview process however, a flexible approach is taken 
with regard to the response provided.  This approach allows the participant to talk 
freely and provides the researcher with the opportunity to explore themes in 
greater depths (Robson, 2011; Bryman, 2008). 
 
Within this research, semi-structured interviews provide a framework to guide and 
explore inconsistencies revealed within the content analysis.  It was also evident 
throughout the development of the literature review that the multi-agency 
approach to emergency management was complex and there was uncertainty as 
to whether this influenced the application of resilience.  To investigate this in 
greater depth required a flexible approach providing participants with the 
opportunity to discuss their practical experience of the multi-agency approach to 
emergency management.   
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3.4.4 Preparing the interview guide 
The intention was to explore and understand the characteristics of resilience and 
assess the impact of failure from a multi-agency perspective. The semi-structured 
interview schedule comprised 5 sections that each sought to explore a different 
aspect of the multi-agency approach to emergency management (Appendix 5).    
These comprised: 
 Section 1: About You 
 Section 2: Organisational Systems 
 Section 3: Planning for Emergencies 
 Section 4: The Role of your Organisation in the LRF 
 Section 5: Community Involvement 
 
Section 1, contained details of the participant including name, organisation, role 
and length of time within the organisation.  The participant was also asked if the 
interview could be recorded and assured that the process was entirely 
confidential and anonymous.  Prior to the interview each participant was provided 
with a form reinforcing confidentiality and anonymity in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act and ethical guidelines of the University of Exeter (Appendix 3).  
The participants were asked to sign the form indicating they were aware the 
information they provided would only be used for the purposes of this research 
project and all the information they provided would be anonymised. 
 
As identified within the literature, the LRF is composed of multiple organisations 
that operate very differently on a daily basis.  Each organisation also has a 
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different organisational structure.  It was uncertain as to whether this would 
influence how resilience is perceived within an organisation and this was explored 
within Section 2 of the interview schedule (Appendix 5).  This comprised a series 
of questions asking participants to describe the structure of their organisation, 
what they perceive to be the main threats and hazards, how they would define 
resilience and what it means for their organisation.  Questions were also 
determined to understand the legislative context and whether this supports the 
ability to build and achieve resilience to emergencies within each organisation.  
This included questions relating to how an organisation determines resilience to 
extreme events, how they measure organisational resilience and whether they 
monitor the response to small events to assess the likelihood of a greater failure 
from occurring. 
 
The content analysis also revealed a number of inconsistencies that required 
further exploration.  It was difficult to assess the level of engagement of WSP’s in 
the multi-agency assessment of risk and whether there was adequate sharing of 
information to enable the accurate assessment of capabilities and resources 
required for effective emergency planning and response.  This was explored in 
greater detail within Section 3 of the interview schedule where a series of 
questions were designed to understand how organisations assess risk and 
prepare for emergencies both as individual organisations and within a multi-
agency context (Appendix 5).  This also included questions to explore what 
participants consider to be the purpose of an emergency plan and whether plans 
were developed and shared with other organisations that may be affected or 
involved in emergency response for a particular hazard.    
142 
 
WSP’s occupy a wide geographical area that may encompass more than one 
LRF.  It was difficult to understand whether this created difficulties for the WSP’s 
to establish collaborative working relationships if they were expected to engage 
with multiple LRF’s.  Section 4 of the interview schedule explored this in greater 
detail comprising questions that specifically related to the multi-agency approach 
as defined within the statutory duties and recommendations of best practice 
within Chapter 4, Local Responder Risk Assessment Duty of the Emergency 
Planning Guidance (Cabinet Office, 2012).  Questions were included to 
understand the perceived role of each organisation within LRF and the perceived 
level of collaboration and sharing of information between organisations. 
 
The final section of the interview schedule explored whether the organisation 
worked together with local communities in the development of emergency plans, 
how this may strengthen or weaken the emergency response and how 
communities could be integrated within the LRF. 
 
3.4.5 Conducting the semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 16 emergency managers from 
organisations including WSP’s, LRF’s, Local Authorities and the Fire Rescue 
Service.  Each emergency manager was a member of one or multiple LRF’s and 
had experience of working with different organisations during emergency 
planning, response and recovery.  This allowed the exploration of attitudes and 
perceptions of the multi-agency approach to emergency management in the UK, 
from a range of different perspectives. 
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The initial approach was to contact the LRF managers via the contact information 
provided on the UK Government website.  However, this proved to be quite 
difficult as feedback from the initial set of emails revealed that the information 
provided on the government website was out of date.  Many of the persons 
contacted no longer worked within the LRF’s and many of the emails were 
forwarded within organisations before the most appropriate person responded.  
This demonstrated an inconsistency within the information produced by the 
government and the actual situation within the LRF’s.  
 
The interviews were conducted between May 2017 and September 2017 via 
telephone.  At the start of the interview process each participant was asked for 
permission to record the interview and were ensured that all the information 
provided would be strictly confidential and anonymised.  They were also offered 
the opportunity to be supplied with a copy of their interview transcript to provide 
the opportunity for further comment.  In some instances the participant was eager 
to initiate the interview and would start with a brief discussion of their role and 
others required a prompt in the form of the first question.  The interviews ranged 
in length from 42 minutes to 2 hours 6 minutes and this was dependent on the 
amount of time the participant had available for the interview process.  The 
researcher would use the response provided by the participant to guide the 
interview process to determine which questions to include within the timescale 
available. 
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3.4.6 Thematic analysis of the interview response 
The interview recordings were transcribed by a University of Exeter approved 
transcriber.  The files were sent as .mp3 files using a secure hightail link to ensure 
security of data transfer.   The interview transcripts were imported into the NVivo 
(v.12) software package for analysis and to ensure confidentiality, the response 
provided by each participant was anonymised.  Each interview transcript was 
read through repeatedly to allow familiarity with the information provided and the 
question responses were coded using an inductive approach.  The coding 
process was conducted independently for each interview transcript.  This 
provided an element of validity because the majority of responses contained 
information that was relevant to the same codes.  There were many examples 
where a participant would provide a detailed and full explanation that included 
information relating to another question within the interview.  As a result of these 
complexities, an inductive approach was taken for the first level of analysis where 
the information within each transcript was categorised into codes.  There were 
instances where some of the codes were relevant to more than one theme and 
resulted in themes containing information that was interconnected.  In order to 
overcome these difficulties each code was analysed for both meaning and 
context, with consideration of the structure of the interview questions, the 
emergency management system and the process of how emergency 
management is conducted. These were used to identify themes that were 
common across all of the interviews (Table 3.3).  This was very much an iterative 
and complex process.   
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A thematic analysis was considered appropriate for a number of reasons.  Even 
though the research was guided by the interview questions, there were many 
instances where the participant did not specifically answer the question but 
provided information that was both interesting and of value to the research.  Many 
of the participants provided examples and answered the questions based on the 
context of their organisation and their personal experience of the emergency 
management process and system.  A thematic analysis provided an opportunity 
to identify patterns of common themes discussed within each interview transcript. 
 
The responses to the interview questions were also potentially influenced by 
‘responder bias’, where the participant had a particular issue or focus that they 
either consciously included within each response or it was provided at a 
subconscious level.  This was because it was affecting or influencing the work 
they were conducting at that specific moment in time and this resulted in some 
interviews having a theme.  For instance, just before the interview process, many 
of the participants were involved in the National Capabilities Survey (Cabinet 
Office, 2003).  This is produced every couple of years for the government to 
assess the capabilities available for effective emergency management in the UK.  
The value of completing the survey and the information it provides to the 
government was discussed throughout a couple of the interviews. 
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THEMES AND RELATED CODES 
1 LEGISLATION AND GOVERNANCE 
 Applying the Principles of the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004 
 Government Support and Guidance 
2 COLLABORATIVE WORKING PARTNERSHIPS 
 Effective Collaboration – Proximity and Empathy 
 Building Relationships 
 Regional Collaboration 
3 SHARING INFORMATION – SENSITIVITIES AND TIMING 
 Resilience Direct 
 Good Practice and Lessons Learned using Resilience Direct 
4 PLANNING AND PREPARING FOR EXTREME EVENTS 
 The Purpose of the Emergency Plan 
 The Multi-agency Assessment of Risk 
 Collaborative Development of the Multi-agency Emergency Plan 
5 BUILDING RESILIENCE  
 Perception of Resilience  
 Multi-agency Exercising and Training 
6 ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
 Resources AND Availability of Personnel 
7 WORKING WITH COMMUNITIES 
 Social Media 
 Reliance on Water Service Providers  
 
Table 3.3: Interview codebook including themes (highlighted in blue) identified 
from related codes. 
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3.5 Research methods used to explore general attitudes and perceptions 
to water supply failure (Objective 3) 
3.5.1 The individual homeowner questionnaire 
The purpose of the individual questionnaire was to explore general attitudes and 
perceptions to water supply failure.  Do individuals perceive a failure of the water 
supply as a potential risk or is there a reliance on the WSP to provide a continuous 
supply of water under all circumstances?  As discussed within Chapter 2, (Section 
2.4), individual resilience is complex and relies upon internal strategies 
dependant on the individual’s personality traits, mental health and personal 
wellbeing and the ability to use/have resources that an individual can use to 
overcome an adverse situation (Luthar, 2006).   Many of the definitions of 
psychological resilience are based on achieving or returning to a healthy mental 
state (Bonanno, 2004; Luthar, 2006).   However, there are also extrinsic factors 
that must be considered.  For instance, the ability of the individual to access 
knowledge and information regarding the potential threats and hazards and the 
ability to access external resources that can be used to prepare for a potential 
emergency situation.  These required exploration and this was achieved through 
the development of the questionnaire. 
 
3.5.2  Pilot study 
There are many considerations when developing a questionnaire to ensure the 
questions are not bias, are easy to understand and will provide results related to 
the original research objectives (Oppenheim, 2000).  It is a very detailed and 
meticulous process involving numerous iterations to develop the most effective 
questions relating to the research.  A pilot study was conducted to test the 
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effectiveness and efficacy of the draft questionnaire on a small group of 28 
respondent’s representative of the ‘general public’ (Appendix 6). Questionnaires 
were administered in person and as each question was presented to the 
respondent, the response was assessed using the following criteria: 
 
 Was the question clear and did it make sense to the respondent? 
 Was the question of adequate length? 
 Did the response provide the information required to satisfy the objective 
of the research? 
 Did the wording of the question introduce any bias? 
 Did the question response lead to interesting results that should be 
explored further? 
Although the draft questionnaire provided an indication of the attitudes and 
perceptions of individuals to a failure of the water supply, it was evident from the 
pilot study that further work was required to develop the questionnaire further.   
The majority of questions were focussed on a failure of the water supply and did 
not explore the wider context regarding attitudes and perceptions of other 
hazards.  This would provide an indication of how water supply failure was 
perceived in comparison to other hazards and whether individuals considered it 
necessary to prepare.  The draft questionnaire also failed to explore the potential 
cause of water supply failure such as drought, pipe burst, water contamination or 
flooding and perceptions of the WSP.  This information could be used to 
determine whether individuals had knowledge of the causative mechanisms of 
water supply failure and whether their perception of the WSP influenced attitudes 
and behaviour to water supply failure. 
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While the majority of questions were clear, of adequate length and understood 
by the respondent it was evident that a more structured approach was necessary 
to provide the information to satisfy the requirements of Objective 3.  It was 
determined that this could be achieved through the development of the following 
research questions: 
 
 RQ1 How do individuals perceive water supply failure compared to other 
hazards? 
 RQ2 What are the general attitudes and perceptions of water supply 
failure? 
 RQ3 Where do individuals obtain information regarding hazards within 
their local area and if there is a serious failure of the water supply? 
 
The development of research questions enabled the structure and framework of 
the questionnaire to be more clearly defined within the context of the research 
objective.  The findings of the pilot study on the draft questionnaire were 
incorporated within the final questionnaire design to comprise three main 
sections, thinking about your local area, thinking about your local water supply 
and preparing for an emergency. 
 
3.5.3  The development of the final questionnaire 
In order to understand attitudes and behaviour to water supply failure, it was 
necessary to explore individual perceptions within the context of other hazards 
that may be experienced within the local area.  This was explored within Section 
150 
 
1, thinking about your local area.  The hazards were selected from analysis of the 
NRR (National Risk Register, 2015), prior analysis of the CRR’s (Section 3.4.1) 
and represented hazards most likely to affect individuals within the UK.  
Questions were also designed to explore whether individuals perceived it to be 
important to prepare, if they actively prepared and whether this was influenced 
by direct experience (Appendix 2). 
 
Section 2 of the questionnaire, thinking about your local water supply, explored 
individual awareness of the threats and hazards that may lead to a failure of the 
water supply.  The questions within this section also sought to understand 
individual perceptions and attitudes to a failure of the water supply.  This included 
an exploration of the reliance on the WSP to provide a safe, reliable and 
continuous supply of water and how long individuals perceive they are able to 
cope without a supply of water direct from the tap.  As discussed within Chapter 
2, (Section 2.6) the UK Government published the booklet ‘Preparing for 
Emergencies’ which was delivered to every household in the UK during 2004.  
This provided practical information regarding how individual homeowners could 
prepare for an emergency.  Section 3 of the questionnaire explored what steps 
individuals take to prepare for an emergency and who they perceive as 
responsible for preparing for an emergency. 
 
The questionnaire was designed to include a mixture of Likert scale questions, 
questions requiring a direct ‘yes, no. don’t know’ response and some open 
questions to explore why a respondent had made a particular choice. It was 
determined that using a combination of different styles would make the 
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questionnaire more interesting for the respondent to complete and ensure the 
respondent was engaged when providing a response (Figure 3.4).  
Q4 
Do you think it is important for you to prepare for the following hazards? 
Please circle ONE number on each line 
 
Extremely 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Not at all 
Important 
River flooding 1 2 3 4 5 
Coastal flooding 1 2 3 4 5 
Surface water 
flooding 
1 2 3 4 5 
Sewer flooding 1 2 3 4 5 
Drought 1 2 3 4 5 
Heatwaves 1 2 3 4 5 
Low temperatures 1 2 3 4 5 
Heavy snow 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q5 
When thinking about your local area, do you actively prepare for any of the 
following? 
Please tick ONE box on each line. 
 Yes No Don’t think about it 
River flooding    
Coastal flooding    
Surface water flooding    
Sewer Flooding    
Drought    
Heatwaves    
Low temperatures    
Heavy snow    
Storms and gales    
Pandemic influenza    
Failure of the gas supply    
 
Figure 3.4: Examples of the different question styles used within the individual 
householder questionnaire 
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The questionnaire was also designed to take the respondent on a journey through 
the questionnaire where the content of each question was related to the content 
of following question.  This was also designed to allow triangulation of the 
response during data analysis and provide a more complete understanding of 
perceptions, and attitudes to water supply failure and whether they influence 
behaviour through emergency preparedness. To complement this approach and 
ensure a reduction of responder bias, the questionnaire also included questions 
asked in a slightly different manner within a different section of the questionnaire 
to allow the response to be compared and contrasted (Figure 3.5). 
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Figure 3.5: Example of a similar question included within a different section of 
the questionnaire to reduce responder bias. 
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3.5.4 Presentation of the questionnaire 
An important consideration in the design of any questionnaire is appearance, 
format, structure and style.  Particularly if the questionnaire is going to be sent to 
the general public and they will be expected to complete it alone without any 
prompts from the researcher.  It needs to look professional so that the respondent 
will take the general theme and aspect of the questionnaire seriously.  It also 
needs to be easy to read, understand and answer (Figure 3.5, Figure 3.7).  
 
Following a complete review and improvement to the original draft questionnaire, 
the final version was presented to a group of individuals to ensure the 
questionnaire was easy to understand and complete.  This consisted of 7 people 
who were not involved in the initial pilot study.  They were asked to complete the 
questionnaire and the following items were discussed with the researcher: 
 
 Is the introduction clear and easy to understand? 
 Are the questionnaire instructions clear and easy to understand? 
 Were the answer categories easy to understand? 
 Comments regarding the appearance of the final questionnaire 
 The size of the questionnaire.  A5 booklet v A4 sheets 
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Preparing for an Emergency 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. The information that 
you provide will be used as part of a research project by the University of Exeter to 
understand attitudes and opinions to preparing for an emergency.  This is defined 
as ‘an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare, the 
environment or the security of the United Kingdom.’  This may also include an event 
or situation where there is widespread and severe disruption to essential services 
such as transport, water, electricity and gas.   
 
Data Protection Notice 
The information that you provide will be used for the purpose of this research study 
and any personal data you provide will be processed in the strictest confidence in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act.  It will not be disclosed to any third parties.  
Personal data and the original questionnaires will be stored securely in a locked 
cabinet at all times and data used for analysis will be saved securely on a password 
protected and encrypted computer.   All of the data used for analysis and the results 
of the research will be published in anonymised form. 
          Completing the survey online 
       You are more than welcome to complete the questionnaire online at:     
                                   http://www.smartsurvey.co.uk/s/bishops/  
            To do this, you will need to enter the Password: water01 
Figure 3.6: Front cover of the final questionnaire including instructions for 
completion. 
Instructions 
Please answer all the questions and return the questionnaire in the pre-paid envelope 
provided.   For each question, please place a tick in the box that matches your answer.  
For example, if your answer is yes:  
Yes      
No 
Please don’t worry if you make a mistake.  Just cross it out and tick the box that matches 
your answer. 
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Section 1: Thinking about your local area. 
 
The next few questions are about the local village, town or city where this questionnaire 
was delivered.  
Q1 
When thinking about your local area, do you think any of the following hazards are a 
risk to you? 
Please tick ONE box on each line 
 High Risk 
Medium 
Risk  
Don’t 
know 
Low Risk No Risk 
River flooding      
Coastal flooding      
Surface water flooding      
Sewer flooding      
Drought      
Heatwaves      
Low temperatures      
Heavy snow      
Storms and gales      
Pandemic influenza      
Widespread electricity 
failure 
     
Failure of the water 
supply 
     
Failure of the gas supply      
Other (please specify):  
 
Q2 
What do you understand by a 1 in a 100 year event? 
Please tick ONE option 
An event that statistically can only happen once in every 100 years  
An event that statistically has a 1% chance of occurring in any given year  
An event that statistically has a 1% chance of occurring once in every 100 
years 
 
An event that statistically happens every 100 years  
 
Figure 3.7: Example of the question layout of the final questionnaire. 
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The majority of respondents agreed the introduction and instructions were easy 
to understand and the application of different colours made it easier for 
respondents to select the appropriate response.  It was considered that the 
response categories were easy to understand and this was reinforced through 
the use of prompts at the start of each question.  The appearance of the 
questionnaire was evaluated as professional with the addition of the University of 
Exeter logo on the front of the questionnaire and the use of colour throughout the 
questionnaire was considered to provide an aesthetic quality that encouraged 
respondents to complete the questionnaire.  Finally, respondents indicated a 
preference in the questionnaire being produced in the A4 size because it would 
be difficult to read as an A5-sized booklet. Amendments to the questionnaire were 
applied and a copy of the finalised questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2. 
 
3.5.5 Distribution of questionnaires 
Distribution of the questionnaire was conducted by post and hand delivery where 
possible.  These were considered as the preferred methods of distribution in an 
attempt to achieve a representative sample of individual attitudes and 
perceptions to water supply failure.  Traditionally, the response rate for postal 
surveys is relatively low (Oppenheim, 2000; Robson, 2011) and there are a 
number of methods that can be used in an attempt to increase the response rate 
of postal surveys.  For example, the inclusion of a clearly defined covering letter 
to engage the respondent by explaining the purpose of the research, represents 
one method that could be applied (Appendix 3).  If it is demonstrated that the 
research is applicable in ‘real world’ situations this may influence whether a 
respondent decides to respond.  Ensuring the questionnaire is presentable with 
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easy to follow instructions, the inclusion of a pre-paid envelope and the inclusion 
of relatable questions that are easy to understand may also contribute to an 
increased response.  It has also been proposed that prompting respondents with 
follow up letter (Appendix 7) and providing an alternative method to complete the 
questionnaire such as online may contribute to an increased response 
(Oppenheim, 2000). All of these methods were used to try and increase the 
response rate.   
 
However, it cannot be assumed that these methods will provide an adequate 
response rate for the application of statistical analysis.  To ensure an adequate 
response rate, the postal distribution of questionnaires was supported with the 
delivery of questionnaires by hand.  While postal questionnaires allow the rapid 
distribution of questionnaires to a wide geographical area, there is also an 
element of detachment between the researcher and the potential respondent 
which may result in a lack of response (Oppenheim, 2000).  The delivery of a 
questionnaire by hand, if the respondent is at home, may provide a more personal 
element as the respondent has been provided with the opportunity to meet the 
researcher.  However, there is also the potential that this may increase social 
desirability bias, especially if the questionnaire is administered face-to-face, 
where the respondent provides answers they perceive will be helpful for the 
researcher rather than a reflection of their true perceptions or attitudes (Bryman, 
2006; Robson, 2011).  In an attempt to reduce this, the researcher was not 
present when the questionnaire was completed. 
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Another potential difficulty was timing of the postal questionnaire.  The 
questionnaires were distributed prior to an announcement by the UK Prime 
Minister of a General Election to determine who would take the country through 
the BREXIT process.  It is possible that this may have influenced the response 
rate.  There are also other considerations to be made when distributing 
questionnaires by post. It is not possible to ascertain if the questionnaires have 
been delivered to properties that are currently occupied and therefore a 
cooperation rate rather than a response rate is usually preferable in these cases. 
 
600 questionnaires were distributed equally between 6 WSP areas and included, 
South West Water, Wessex Water, Severn Trent, Anglian Water, Yorkshire Water 
and United Utilities (Figure 3.8).  It was considered that this would provide a broad 
perspective regarding the different challenges that each WSP may experience in 
terms of water availability, flooding of critical infrastructure, influx of tourists and 
the susceptibility of different regions to drought.  It was not the intention to 
compare and contrast results of the questionnaire between WSP areas but it was 
necessary to select specific locations to allow for the distribution of follow up 
letters.  However, because the response was anonymous, it was not possible to 
determine which respondent had provided a response.  So, follow up letters were 
also distributed to locations that had already replied.  Research was conducted 
to explore locations within each region that may provide a representative sample 
relating to the challenges identified by the WSP within the Water Resource 
Management Plans, the Pitt Report, Drought Reports and locations that had 
experience of water supply failure.  It was also recognised that a low cooperation 
rate within a particular location would make it difficult to compare and contrast the 
response between different locations. 
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Figure 3.8: WSP locations chosen for the distribution of questionnaires  
(Adapted from Ofwat, 2019) 
 
South West Water 
The region covered by South West Water experiences a water surplus (South 
West Water, 2015) and is able to effectively manage water supplies during the 
summer months despite an influx of tourists.  Although the WSP covers a wide 
geographical area they engage with one dominant LRF within the region and 2 
LRF’s located on the periphery.  This is relatively low compared to the other WSP 
regions.   
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Exeter was chosen as one of the locations for the postal survey because the main 
water treatment works was particularly susceptible to flooding prior to the 
installation of flood defences in 2011.  Exeter City Centre also suffered a short 
loss of supply during October 2016 as a result of a severe fire within the city 
centre.   
 
Torquay was selected because during the summer months the population almost 
doubles due to the influx of tourists.  To cope with the increased demand South 
West Water have upgraded the Littlehempston Water Treatment Works and 
installed a new service reservoir.   
 
Wessex Water 
Wessex Water is also a region experiencing a water surplus (Wessex Water, 
2015).  However, they are actively working toward reducing consumption through 
the ‘Water Save’ initiative involving active engagement with communities and 
local schools.   
 
Bridgwater was chosen as a location for the distribution of questionnaires 
because it is currently experiencing growth in response to the building of Hinkley 
Point C.  This has resulted in an increase in property development within the area 
and the investment of £39 million to improve sewerage infrastructure within the 
area (Wessex Water, 2019).  The villages of Goathurst and Bawdrip were also 
chosen as these represent small rural communities located on opposing sides of 
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the town of Bridgwater.  The village of Goathurst is located at the foot of the 
Quantock Hills and the village of Bawdrip is located at the foot of the Polden Hills. 
 
Severn Trent 
The Severn Trent region was selected because Mythe Water Treatment Works 
is located within this region.  Mythe Water Treatment Works was severely flooded 
during the 2007 flood event and resulted in over 350,000 people left without a 
centralised water supply for over 17 days (Pitt, 2008).  This was a significant 
event highlighting the vulnerability of the UK’s critical infrastructure to flooding.   
 
This water company also encompasses a significant number of LRF’s.  Within the 
region Severn Trent are expected to engage with 15 LRF’s and a further 9 located 
on the periphery of the area.  This presents challenges in terms of coordinating a 
multi-agency approach to an incident that covers a wide geographical area.  
Analysis of the CRR’s within this region also identified differences in the level of 
risk assigned to the same hazards and in some locations the lead assessor was 
not a representative from the water company.  This will be explored further within 
the semi-structured interviews in Chapter 4. 
 
Bishops Cleeve was the first location to be selected within this region because it 
directly experienced a loss of water supply during 2007 as a result of the flooding 
of Mythe Water Treatment Works.  Content analysis of the internet responses on 
the principal information provider website (BBC Radio Gloucester, 2007) 
revealed that the provision of information supplied by Severn Trent throughout 
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the emergency was not considered by the public to be adequate with a high level 
of complaints directed toward Severn Trent and a high response from customers 
requesting information, advice compensation and help (Appendix 8).  A question 
relating to the provision of information was included as part of the individual 
questionnaire. 
 
Chilwell was the second location to be targeted within the Severn Trent region.  
This location was not affected by a loss of water supply during 2007.  However, 
it is supplied by Church Wilne Water Treatment Works which supplies over 
600,000 customers in the Nottingham Water Resource Zone.  This area also 
obtains water from another water resource zone to be able to meet the demands 
of supply.   
 
Yorkshire Water 
Yorkshire Water was selected because it has proactively adopted a resilient 
approach to water supply within the region through the construction of a single 
interconnected grid.  This was in response to the 1995 drought when water had 
to be transported to Halifax by a continuous stream of tankers to provide a water 
supply to the region.  To prevent a recurrence of this situation, Yorkshire Water 
developed a single interconnected grid where water can be transported from an 
area where there is a plentiful supply to an area experiencing water scarcity, 
providing there is an adequate supply of water within the system.  
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Halifax was selected as the target location for the postal questionnaires because 
this City had direct experience of the 1995 drought.  The second location selected 
was the Shiregreen area of Sheffield.  This area is supplied with water from two 
Water Treatment Works (Ewden and Langsett Reservoir) and by importing water 
from Severn Trent.  During 2007 Ewden Water Treatment Works had to be shut 
down as a result of damage to the main outlet on the River Don as a result of 
bank erosion induced by flooding.  Also during 2007, there was a major power 
outage which forced Yorkshire Water to switch to the on-site back-up generator 
resulting in a significant drop in capacity.  This area of Sheffield experienced a 
near drought during 2012 and subsequent widespread flooding shortly after. 
 
Anglian Water 
Anglian Water was selected because this water company experiences major 
challenges as a result of water scarcity within the region.  With a high population 
density and low rainfall, Anglian Water has developed a large publicity campaign 
called ‘Every Drop Counts’ to encourage customers to think about how they use 
water more efficiently.  This water company covers a wide area encompassing 
and engaging with a number of LRFs in the preparation of an emergency.  This 
region also experienced widespread coastal flooding in 1953 as a result of a tidal 
storm surge with over 160,000 acres of land submerged by seawater (Lumbroso 
and Vinet, 2011).   Poringland was selected as a location for the postal 
questionnaire in this region because this town experienced a burst pipe during 
the Christmas of 2014 which resulted in the loss of a centralised water supply for 
over 3 days.  Huntingdon was chosen as the second location because this is an 
area considered to be at high risk of a severe drought (Anglian Water, 2015).   
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United Utilities  
This region experienced severe flooding during the winter of 2015/16 and resulted 
in the failure of the water supply within some locations and the flooding of over 
85 waste water treatment works (United Utilities 2016).   Following this event, 
United Utilities work in partnership with Local Authorities, the Environment 
Agency and local Community Groups as part of the Cumbria Strategic Floods 
Partnership.  This is to encourage a catchment wide approach to the 
management of flood risk through a multi-agency collaborative working 
partnership (Environment Agency, 2016).  Cockermouth and Lancaster were 
selected as locations for the distribution of the questionnaire because they 
represent locations that have presented the WSP with different challenges. 
 
Cockermouth is located within the West Cumbria Water Resource Zone and is 
supplied with water from Ennerdale Water and Crummock Water (United Utilities, 
2015a).  These are designated Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and it is 
no longer possible to continue abstracting water from these locations.  United 
Utilities proposed the development of a pipeline between West Cumbria and 
Thirlmere Reservoir to provide customers with a sustainable supply of water.   
During the 2015/16 flood event the city of Lancaster was flooded, over 61,000 
homes were without power and over 200 homes experienced water supply failure 
over a period of four days as a result of the flooding of water treatment works 
(Lancashire County Council, 2016; United Utilities, 2015b).   
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Figure 3.9: Example of the process of targeting locations for questionnaire 
distribution. 
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Once a location was identified, 5 streets were selected at random from an aerial 
map of the location using Google Earth.  The individual property addresses were 
obtained using council tax band information available on the internet and a 
proportional sample of properties were selected at random for each location using 
google random number generator (Figure 3.9).  
 
3.5.6 Analysis of the questionnaire response 
131 respondents participated in the individual householder questionnaire, this 
represented a 22% cooperation rate.  The response for each questionnaire was 
imported into the statistical software package IBM SPSS 25 for data analysis.  
The questionnaire data was analysed in its original form with a focus on 
descriptive measures of frequency rather than regression analysis.  This is 
because it was not possible to use the same Likert scale for each individual 
question without losing the original meaning of the question.  As discussed within 
Section 3.5.2, the questionnaire was designed to allow triangulation of the 
response during data analysis and provide a more complete understanding of 
perceptions, and attitudes to water supply failure. As each question was 
specifically designed to explore attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure, 
it was considered more appropriate to preserve the original meaning of the 
question rather than change the question to suit a standard Likert scale solely for 
the application of statistical analysis. 
 
Likert data represents ordinal, discrete data with a limited range which creates 
difficulties with the application of suitable statistical tests (De Winter et al, 2010).  
The response to postal questionnaires may also present difficulties in obtaining 
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a sufficient cooperation rate for the use of statistical tests (Oppenheim, 2000). In 
order to overcome these difficulties and obtain specific information regarding 
attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure, the questionnaire was carefully 
constructed to ensure each question was related to and could be supported by 
the response provided by other questions within the questionnaire (Section 
3.5.2). It was considered more appropriate to present the data accurately in its 
original form as a true representation of individual attitudes and perceptions to 
water supply failure. 
 
The results of two respondents were removed from the analysis.  Respondent 
STBC005 was removed from the dataset because they did not answer 71% of 
the questions and respondent WWBD005 was removed because they did not 
answer 50% of the questions. 
 
There were also instances where respondents did not answer every question or 
did not answer a section within a Likert-scale response.  This is recorded as 
’missing data’ or an ‘item of non-response’ (Schlomer et al, 2010) and led to a 
variation in the number of responses for each individual question.   
 
There were instances within the Likert-scale question response, where a 
respondent did not provide information for a particular hazard even though they 
had provided a response above and below the item of non-response (Figure 
3.10). This may be because they are unsure what to select, preferred not to say, 
did not understand the hazard or inadvertently missed these questions while 
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selecting options or changing pages.  However, because the questionnaire 
responses were anonymous, it is not possible to ask respondents why they 
provided an item non-response.   
 
Figure 3.10: Example of questionnaire response 
 
There are a number of different approaches for handling missing data and items 
of non-response and many of these are influenced by the amount of data that is 
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missing.  One approach is to conduct a list wise deletion and remove all of the 
respondents that did not provide a response for every question or questionnaires 
with more than a defined percentage of missing data (Pigott, 2001).  However, 
the removal of this information may contribute to bias results and ‘a loss of 
statistical power’ (Schlomer et al, 2010) if a large number of questionnaires are 
removed.  This approach also neglects the possibility that there may be a pattern 
to the missing data that requires further exploration.   
 
Examples of good practice with regard to the handling of missing data involve the 
determination of whether the missing data is ‘missing completely at random’, 
‘missing at random’ or ‘not missing at random’ (Schlomer et al, 2010).  
Categorising missing data is based on whether there is a relationship between 
the variable being examined and the missing data.  ‘Missing completely at 
random’ assumes there is no relationship and no observable pattern to missing 
data within the data set.  ‘Missing at random’ also assumes there is no 
relationship between missing data and the variable being examined.  However, a 
relationship may exist between the missing data and a different variable within 
the data.  For instance, the reason for missing data is related to the answer given 
within another question.  Where there is an observed pattern to the data, it is 
considered to be ‘not missing at random’.  It is very difficult to assess and 
categorise missing data because within an anonymous questionnaire it is not 
possible to ask respondents why an item of non-response was given.  However, 
missing data should not be ignored or excluded from the analysis without 
investigating if there is a pattern to the data because this may highlight where a 
particular hazard has been misunderstood. 
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3.5.7 Missing data analysis 
Missing data was identified and recorded within SPSS as an item of ‘no 
response’.  A missing value analysis was conducted within SPSS using the 
‘analyse – missing value analysis’ function.  This performs a variable analysis on 
the dataset to calculate the percentage of missing data and to identify the 
existence of a pattern.  The analysis produces an overall summary of missing 
values, the missing values pattern and the pattern frequencies graphs.  The 
summary of missing data is presented as a series of 3 pie charts (Figure 3.11) 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Overall summary of missing values 
 
The Variables pie chart demonstrates the majority of question responses (87%) 
include at least one missing response.  Many of the questions were designed as 
Likert-scale questions and as explained in Section 3.5.8, the majority of items of 
‘no response’ were the result of the omission of a single Likert-scale response.  
The Cases pie chart also reveals that 42% of respondents did not provide at least 
one response resulting in missing data.  If a list-wise deletion was performed on 
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this data, this would significantly reduce the statistical power of the data set and 
may also contribute to bias results.   The Values pie chart indicates that in total 
only 1.4% of the values are missing however, due to the nature and design of the 
questionnaire this represents missing data from a large proportion of 
respondents. 
 
The graph of missing value pattern provides an indication of whether monotonicity 
exists within the dataset.  This is to establish if there is a strong pattern or 
concentration of values within the data (Figure 3.12).  Each row represents a 
group of respondent’s records that have the same pattern of missing or non-
missing data.  The individual questions are displayed along the x-axis in 
increasing order of the amount of missing data each one may contain.  For 
instance the first pattern does not contain any missing data and the final pattern 
consists of a greater proportion of missing data.  This test is conducted to 
determine the appropriate method of imputation of missing data (Little and Rubin, 
2019).  Monotonicity is evidenced if the pattern consists of dominant blocks of 
adjoined missing and non-missing data.   If it is demonstrated that the dataset is 
monotone then a monotone imputation method would be required to replace 
missing values.   
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A Do you actively prepare for Surface Water Flooding?  
B Do you obtain local area hazard information from the Met Office? 
C Do you actively prepare for heavy snow? 
D Do you have experience of sewer flooding? 
E Do you obtain information from local radio for serious water supply 
failure? 
F Do you obtain information about how to prepare from the Television? 
G Do you actively prepare for heatwaves? 
H Do you obtain local area hazard information from Environment Agency? 
I Do you think heatwaves are a hazard in your local area? 
J What is the likelihood malicious attack could cause water supply failure  
K Do you actively prepare for drought? 
L Do you think pandemic influenza is a hazard in your local area? 
 
Figure 3.12: Graph of Missing Value Patterns  
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Within this dataset, the missing data is represented as discrete islands and small 
clumps and would indicate no systemic pattern to the missing values.  This is 
supported within the pattern frequencies graph (Figure 3.13).  This demonstrates 
that Pattern 1, representative of no missing data is the most common pattern with 
a percentage of over 80%. 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Pattern Frequencies Graph 
 
These tests indicate there is no pattern to the missing data.  A Little’s MCAR Test 
was performed using the missing values analysis procedure in SPSS to assess 
if the missing data was ‘missing completely at random’.  This approach calculates 
the difference between the estimated and observed mean within each data 
pattern with the null hypothesis that data are missing completely at random (Little, 
1988). 
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Table 3.4: Results of the Little’s MCAR Test 
The results demonstrate a non-significant Little’s MCAR test, χ2 (1664), df.1838, 
p = .998, indicating the data are missing completely at random (Table 3.4).  This 
was supported by a visual inspection of the dataset to assess whether the lack of 
response was related to an answer provided for another question.  This also 
involved referring back to the original questionnaires to see if a respondent had 
provided any further information regarding their ‘no response’.   
 
A multiple imputation was performed on the dataset to replace the missing data.  
This is an iterative process using a Monte Carlo Simulation and simulates 
possible values for the missing data.  However, before this can conducted it was 
necessary to set the parameters required for imputation.   
 
The ‘Analyse - Multiple Imputation – Impute Missing Data Values’ function in 
SPSS was selected to perform the multiple imputation.  The variables requiring 
imputation were selected within the ‘variables tab’ with a maximum of 5 
imputations selected for each variable.  Within the methods tab, the ‘Fully 
Conditional Specification Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)’ was selected as 
the appropriate method to be applied to the data because there was no evidence 
of monotonicity.  A maximum of 100 iterations per imputation was selected to 
improve the likelihood of reaching convergence.  The default model type of a 
standard linear regression was selected for scale variables.  Within the 
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom P Value
1664 1838 .998
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constraints tab, the minimum and maximum values were determined manually 
for the model variables, the imputations were selected to open as a new dataset 
within the output tab and the multiple imputation was performed. 
 
This created a dataset containing the results of each of the 5 imputations for each 
item of missing data.  The next stage was to compare the range of imputations 
with the original dataset and determine the most appropriate value for each item 
of missing data.  To ensure validity of this process, a sample of question 
responses from the original dataset were compared with the new dataset 
containing imputed missing values to establish if there was a significant difference 
between the two datasets.  This was performed using an independent samples T 
Test.  The results indicated there was no significant difference between the 
original data and the data containing imputed values for each question sampled 
t = (0.08, 0.23, 0.13, 0.08), df = 8 , p > 0.05, (Appendix 9).  The final dataset was 
analysed and the results are presented in Chapter 5. 
 
3.6 Research methods used to explore attitudes and perceptions to 
water supply failure during an emergency (Objective 3) 
During late February and early March 2018 the UK experienced a prolonged 
period of sub-zero temperatures affecting many parts of the country.  Termed the 
‘Beast from the East’ by the UK media, the freezing conditions coincided with 
strong north easterly winds bringing heavy snow into many parts of the country.  
This prompted the Met Office to issue a red warning of snow, indicating 
‘Widespread damage, travel and power disruption and risk to life is likely’.   
Thousands of schools were closed, road and rail travel was severely affected with 
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motorists trapped in their cars overnight in freezing conditions, a major incident 
was declared in one region and tragically 10 people lost their lives. The heavy 
snow, freezing conditions and the resultant thaw presented a new set of 
challenges particularly for the UK water sector.  
 
Throughout the event, UK WSP’s were actively providing customers with advice 
regarding the potential consequences of frozen pipes within their homes.  
However, as the temperatures increased, it was the WSP’s that were confronted 
with a series of pipe bursts resulting in the loss of the centralised water supply to 
over 200,000 customers (Ofwat, 2018).  36,000 people were left without a 
centralised water supply for over 24hrs and in some instances this extended over 
5 days (CCWater, 2018). 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, (Section 1.3) individual behaviour to water supply 
failure can significantly influence the ability of both individuals and WSP’s to 
achieve resilience during an emergency.  This event provided an opportunity to 
understand how individual attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure may 
influence an individual’s behaviour to water supply failure through the direct 
observation of comments on the social media platform Facebook. 
 
This also provided an interesting insight into how customers and WSP’s engage 
during an emergency situation to understand what information customers require 
to enable them to become more resilient to a failure of the water supply.   What 
information can individual customers provide the WSP’s to allow them to manage 
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an emergency situation more effectively?  Can this interaction between 
customers and WSP’s be used to increase future resilience to extreme events? 
 
 3.6.1 Thematic analysis of Facebook comment dataset 
The social media platform Facebook was considered a source of information for 
this part of the research because it is accessible and was actively used by WSP 
and their customers to share and exchange information regarding water supply 
failure throughout the duration of the event.  Twitter was also considered for 
analysis but the imposed word restriction provided a limited understanding of 
individual attitudes and perceptions of water supply failure.  Facebook does not 
impose a restriction on the number of words an individual may post therefore 
allowing customers to freely express their attitudes and perceptions.  This was 
considered to provide a much richer data set to explore individual attitudes and 
perceptions to water supply failure.   
 
188 posts and 7873 comments were downloaded for the period 3rd March 2018 
to 8th March 2018 for three different WSP’s.  Analysing Facebook provides only 
one source of data for analysis.  The results of this analysis will be compared with 
the results of the individual questionnaires (presented in Chapter 5). This will be 
presented in Chapter 8, which undertakes a full triangulation of all the data 
analysis and findings.  
 
Facebook posts are composed of two main sections.  The first section is where 
the owner of the Facebook page will write a post.  The second section is where 
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individuals respond to the original post by writing a comment or replying to a 
comment that has already been posted (Figure 3.14) 
 
The posts were ‘screen dumped’ as .pdf files and then converted into text files.  
The individual comments were anonymised and imported into the qualitative data 
analysis software package, NVivo (v.12) for analysis. The comments relating to 
each WSP were analysed independently of one another within a separate project 
within NVivo (v.12).  This was to provide an element of validity in the coding 
process. The comments were read through repeatedly to enable familiarisation 
with customer attitudes and perceptions.  Taking an inductive approach, a first 
level analysis was conducted to identify common discussion points within the data 
and comments were coded within the context of the original post and the theme 
of the responding comments.   
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Figure 3.14: Example of the structure of a Facebook Post 
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Figure 3.15: Example of coding a Facebook comment 
 
 
Due to the nature of Facebook and the ability to post detailed comments, many 
of the responding comments contained information that could be coded within 
many different codes and were therefore coded accordingly (Figure 3.15). 
Comments consisting of emoji’s were not considered as part of the analysis and 
comments used as a ‘tag’ to share information with another individual were also 
excluded.  Comments that were part of a conversation were coded as both 
conversational and individual comments.  Where comments were incomplete, 
they were coded according to the majority of the information provided within the 
comment.  59 codes were identified from analysis of the Facebook comments. 
 
A number of different approaches could be applied to understand the attitudes 
and perceptions of customers from the Facebook posts.  One approach would be 
to analyse the comments relating to each individual post.  However, there were 
difficulties with this because there were many instances where customers would 
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post a comment relating to water supply failure that was not related to the 
information provided by the WSP in the original post.   
 
There were also instances where the WSP provided a general information post, 
requesting customers to be patient while they investigate the ongoing situation.  
In response to these posts, customers would post comments relating to many 
different locations and difficulties they encountered as a result of water supply 
failure.   While each comment was analysed within the context of the original post 
and the thread of comments before and after the post, it was considered that in 
order to understand attitudes and perceptions throughout the incident all the 
comments would be analysed regardless of attachment to a specific post.   
 
 
Figure 3.16:  Identification of themes using a combination of NVivo and a 
manual approach. 
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CODES  
1 COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION 
 Provision of Information 
 Requesting Information 
 Conversations between the WSP and the Customer 
 Customers Sharing Information 
2 ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIES OF WATER  
 Availability of Alternative Supplies of Water 
 Contingency Planning  
 Altruistic Behaviour 
3 LIVING WITHOUT A WATER SUPPLY 
4 PROVISION OF SERVICE 
 WSP Customer Service 
 Vulnerable Customers 
5 COMPENSATION AND BILLS 
 Complaints to the Regulator 
 
Table 3.5: Interview codebook including themes (highlighted in blue) identified 
from related codes. 
 
The second level of analysis involved understanding the context of the 
information contained within the codes and identifying themes.  This is an iterative 
process and was conducted using both NVivo to explore the content within the 
codes and the manual manipulation of codes into relevant themes (Figure 3.16).  
An inductive approach using thematic analysis was considered appropriate for 
this analysis because it provided an opportunity to understand and explore 
individual attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure during an actual 
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emergency.  This allowed the identification of themes within the context of a real 
event where individuals were actually experiencing the consequences of water 
supply failure.  Five main themes were identified and developed into a codebook 
(Table 3.5).  The results of the thematic analysis are presented within Chapter 6. 
 
3.7 Research methods used to explore collaborative working 
partnerships (Objective 4) 
An emergency presents an uncertain environment that is dynamic, and rapidly 
evolving.  To achieve a greater resilience to an extreme event or an emergency 
situation requires the ability of a community and the responder organisations to 
be flexible and have the ability to adapt to unanticipated conditions (Comfort et 
al, 2010).   Establishing integrated social networks prior to an emergency is 
important for a number of reasons.  During the development process 
organisations and communities gain a greater understanding of the roles and 
responsibilities of each organisation, which helps to understand and manage 
realistic expectations.  The process of attending regular meetings and 
establishing relationships helps to build trust and strengthen relationships, which 
in turn promotes more effective collective action before, during and after an 
emergency.  Establishing the network also allows more effective communication 
of risk and during an emergency can be used effectively to improve situational 
awareness.   
 
Social network analysis provides an effective method to identify both formal and 
informal relationships amongst a community and responder organisations.  
Analysis of the network structure and the strength of the relationship ties can be 
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used to understand how a community can achieve greater resilience to extreme 
events through collective action and learning.  This can provide valuable 
information to understand how a community and the responder organisations will 
collaborate and respond during an emergency situation.  The development of 
strong relational ties between the community and local organisations will not only 
strengthen the emergency response but also enable the development of a more 
resilient society (Comfort et al, 2010).   
 
3.7.1 Social Network Analysis through participatory action research  
Social network analysis is a method used to understand and analyse the 
connections, ties and relationships between different actors within a network 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994.  The measurement of relational data can be used 
to identify prominent actors within a network through centrality measures of 
betweenness centrality and degree centrality (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; 
Freeman et al, 1979).  Betweenness centrality is a measure of the number of 
times an actor lies on the shortest path through the network.  An actor with a high 
betweenness centrality is assumed to have a greater influence within the network 
because from a structural perspective they have access to more information 
passing through the network and occupy a positon enabling control over the flow 
of information (Hanneman and Riddle, 2011).    
 
The degree centrality is a measure of the number of connections an individual 
actor has with other actors within the network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
This is comprised of in-degree and out-degree.  In-degree in a measure of the 
number of connections directed toward the actor and if an actor displays a high 
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in-degree they are considered prominent within the network (Hannemann and 
Riddle 2011).  Out-degree is the number of connections directed away from the 
actor towards others in the network and it is considered that actors possessing a 
high out-degree are very influential within the network because they are able to 
share information with a large number of actors (Hannemann and Riddle, 2011).  
The density of a network provides an indication of the level of connectedness 
between actors within the network.  This is simply the number of actual 
connections within the network divided by the total number of possible 
connections.  Density also provides an indication of the level of connectivity within 
the network (Hannemann and Riddle, 2011). 
 
Traditionally, social networks are analysed as static networks representing a 
specific moment in time (Choi and Brower, 2006).  However, social networks are 
dynamic and evolve in response to influences within the socio-ecological-
technical environment.  The ability to understand the complexities and 
interactions require the application of both quantitative and qualitative methods.  
Quantitative social network analysis can be combined with qualitative semi-
structured interviews and participatory action research (Kelman et al, 2016).  
These methods were used to explore the evolutionary development of a 
community-led Flood Group and a Local Authority-led Flood Board to understand 
the multi-agency approach to flood resilience.  
 
Participatory action research allowed the practical exploration of the relationships 
within the network through a ‘bottom up’ approach (McTaggart, 1991; Greenwood 
et al, 1993).  This provided a realistic interpretation of how the network developed 
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and explored the benefits and difficulties of bringing community groups and 
practitioners together.  Participatory action research involves the engagement 
and active participation of the community to work together in collaboration with 
the researcher to explore and understand problems affecting the community 
(Kemmis and Wilkinson, 1998; Minkler, 2000).  The intention is for the practical 
application of this information to initiate change within the community to resolve 
problematical issues (Greenwood et al, 1993; McTaggart, 1991; Kemmis and 
Wilkinson, 1998; Minkler, 2000). 
 
Within this research, the collaborative working partnership between the 
researcher and a community representative led to the development of a series of 
social network graphs.  These were developed from the perspective of one 
individual within the local community who had direct experience of establishing a 
network of connections with local authorities and responder organisations.  While 
analysis of social networks are used to identify prominent actors within the 
network it was also necessary within the context of this research to understand 
how and why the social networks were developed.  It could be argued that a small 
sample size may restrict the level of understanding regarding community 
resilience and a comparative analysis with different community groups may be 
more reflective of how these groups are established (Yates, 2002).  However, it 
takes a great deal of time to develop and establish a relationship between the 
researcher and the participant and it was considered that taking a pragmatic 
approach using participatory action research would provide an opportunity to 
explore and understand the contextual meaning of achieving resilience at the 
level of the community (Yates, 2002).  This could then be applied as a foundation 
for further research. 
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The social networks developed as part of this research also included a direct 
connection with a representative from the local WSP.  During past flood events 
the local community had experienced surface water flooding resulting from 
blocked drains and it was perceived by the local community representative, that 
a holistic approach to flood risk management also required the involvement of the 
local WSP.  The original network was developed from the perspective of flood 
risk management however, there is an active connection within the network to the 
WSP.  The Government ‘top down’ approach to community resilience places an 
emphasis on the development of community groups in relation to flooding 
(Twigger Ross et al, 2015; Cabinet Office, 2016).  While this is recognised as one 
of the most prevalent hazards in the UK (National Risk Register, 2015), this 
research seeks to explore whether the networks developed within local 
community groups can also be utilised for the distribution of alternative supplies 
of water during water supply failure incidents. 
 
The social network graphs were developed throughout a process of interviews 
held within the home of the community representative from November 2017 to 
March 2018.  The interviews were semi-structured to enable the development of 
the social network graph and to explore and understand how the relationships 
were established between the local community groups and the responder 
organisations.  During the initial interviews all of the information was recorded in 
written form and imported within R Studio for analysis using the social network 
package, igraph.  This was used to develop an adjacency matrix of undirected 
and directed relationships for each social network graph representing a specific 
moment in time during the development of the Flood Group and the Flood Board.  
The development of the social network graphs was an iterative process over a 
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period of several interviews where the relationships identified within the graphs 
were discussed and annotated to ensure accuracy.  These are presented and 
discussed within Chapter 7.   
 
The social network graphs explore the evolutionary development of the 
community-led Flood Group and the Local Authority-led Flood Board to 
understand how a ‘bottom up’ approach to emergency planning can help to 
achieve resilience through collaborative working partnerships as defined within 
Objective 4.   
 
The community representative presented the social network graphs at the 
Environment Agency Flood and Coast Conference, 2018 and at local 
Environment Agency workshops to demonstrate the importance of including the 
community within the multi-agency approach to flood risk management.   This 
demonstrated how participatory action research was used to stimulate change in 
approach with regard to including communities within flood risk management 
decisions. 
 
3.7.2 Case study area 
The case study area was chosen because the West Somerset region is 
comprised of small rural isolated communities susceptible to flash flooding.  
These communities could easily become isolated during a flood event and may 
have to wait a considerable period of time before they would receive any 
assistance from the emergency services.   
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The district of West Somerset covers an area of approximately 320 sq km 
(Environment Agency, 2009b) comprising 42 Parishes and Towns with a 
combined population of approximately 34,000 (Office for National Statistics, 
2011; West Somerset Flood Board, 2014). West Somerset is predominately rural 
with the majority of the region located within Exmoor National Park to the west 
and bordered by the Quantock Hills to the east. The main urban areas of 
Minehead, Watchet, Williton, Dunster and Porlock are located to the north along 
the Bristol Channel (Figure 3.17). 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Location of West Somerset courtesy of Google map data, 2019. 
 
The south of the region is characterised by a very steep topography with streams 
and rivers flowing from their source in the upland areas of Exmoor and the 
Quantocks towards the low lying coastal plains along the Bristol Channel.  Flash 
fluvial flooding and surface water flooding are particular hazards within this 
region.  The steep topography combined with the low permeable nature of the 
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underlying geology (Devonian sandstones, siltstones and mudstone), contributes 
to high surface runoff and rapidly responding rivers during periods of high rainfall 
(West Somerset Council, 2009: Environment Agency, 2014b).  There are 
approximately 1600 properties that have a 1% chance of fluvial flooding in any 
given year (Environment Agency, 2014b) however, this is set to increase to over 
2,040 properties by 2100.   
 
To the north of the region Porlock, Minehead and Williton are susceptible to tidal 
flooding as a result of high tides resulting from a storm/tidal surge. The main 
transport link within the region, A39 is also susceptible to fluvial and surface water 
flooding with the potential consequence of isolating communities and preventing 
emergency responders providing assistance during an emergency.  In terms of 
critical infrastructure there are 3 electricity substations and 1 water treatment 
works at risk of flooding (Environment Agency, 2014b). 
 
Many of the communities at risk of flooding in West Somerset have developed 
community flood plans and flood warden schemes.  This has been conducted 
independently or with the assistance of the Local Authority and the Environment 
Agency.  Through the development of these schemes they have developed social 
networks with many of the responder organisations and the development of these 
networks is explored within Chapter 7. 
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3.8 Research methods used to explore the system of emergency 
management in the UK (Objective 5) 
Objective 5 takes a systems based approach to investigate the impact of the 
failure state and explore how resilience can be achieved through effective 
emergency planning.  This requires exploring the elements that comprise the 
emergency management system in greater detail to understand how they are 
interconnected and how they enable the purpose of the system to be achieved 
(Meadows, 2008; Senge 2006; Arnold and Wade, 2015).  However, even though 
the purpose of a system may be clearly defined, the actual intrinsic behaviour of 
the system may reveal something different.  In order to determine whether the 
purpose and behaviour of the system are aligned it is necessary to explore and 
understand the structure of the system. 
 
The literature review revealed the purpose of the UK emergency management 
system is the protection of human welfare from ‘an event or situation which 
threatens serious damage’ (CCA, 2004).  This is to be achieved through the 
application of resilience and is defined as: 
 
‘The ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, 
prevent and if necessary to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive 
challenges’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2013c) 
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This definition highlights that resilience is to be applied at different stages within 
the emergency management system from the level of community to the level of 
infrastructure.    
 
Within this research it is proposed that the application of quantitative and 
qualitative research methods can be used to explore and understand the 
perception and application of resilience within different elements of the UK 
emergency management system.  This is through semi-structured interviews, 
questionnaires, analysis of Facebook comments and Social Network Analysis.   
Each individual analysis will provide an indication of how resilience is interpreted 
and applied within each element of the system.  However, this represents a silo 
approach to understanding resilience.  If the effective application of resilience 
requires contextualisation and a wider understanding with regard to resilience ‘of 
what, to what’ (Carpenter et al, 2001) then it is also necessary to take a holistic 
approach to understand resilience within the context of the overall system.   
 
Data triangulation is traditionally applied where validation is sought through the 
analysis of difference research methods (Robson, 2011; Bryman, 2006).  Within 
this research, the process of triangulation is used to bring all of the results 
together and develop a deeper understanding of the meaning of resilience within 
different elements of the emergency management system. This enables the 
identification and exploration of interconnections between different parts of the 
system and a greater understanding of how these influence the function and 
behaviour of the system. 
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However, as demonstrated within the literature review (Chapter 2), the system of 
emergency management in the UK is complex with regard to legislation, the 
organisations involved in emergency planning, response and recovery and the 
perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of individuals within society.  While the 
application of quantitative and qualitative methods provide an opportunity to 
explore the characteristics of resilience within each structural element of the 
system, these methods represent a linear approach to analysing and 
understanding a system that is complex, dynamic and multi-dimensional.   
 
In order to explore these complexities and understand the dynamic behaviour of 
the system requires the application of a systems based approach.  This applies 
the principles of system thinking which is defined as: 
 
‘Systems thinking is a set of synergistic analytical skills used to improve 
the capability of identifying and understanding systems, predicting their 
behaviours, and devising modifications to them in order to produce desired 
effects.  These skills work together as a system’.   (Arnold and Wade, 
2015) 
 
Systems thinking explores how the influence of interconnections and 
relationships within a system determine the system behaviour (Meadows, 2008).  
This requires an understanding of the overall structure of the system and the 
identification of causal processes operating within the system.  This approach 
recognises the complexity and non-linearity of systems and allows the analysis 
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of systems at different scales.  For instance, systems may be part of other 
systems.  This approach also allows a more complete evaluation of whether the 
behaviour of the system contributes effectively to the overall function and purpose 
of the system (Meadows, 2008; Arnold et al, 2015).  An example of this approach 
was demonstrated within Chapter 1 (Section 1.3) in relation to the causal 
processes influencing the failure of the water supply during the severe flood event 
of 2007 in Gloucestershire.   
 
In Chapter 1 (Section 1.3, Figure 1.5), the main structural elements of the 
emergency management system were identified.  Section 3.1 (Figure 3.1) 
discussed how each structural element of the system will be explored using the 
Objectives defined within Chapter 1, (Section 1.4).  This systems based approach 
provides an opportunity to understand how resilience is interpreted, applied and 
operationalised within and between each element of the emergency management 
system.  The triangulation of these results using the quantitative and qualitative 
research methods applied within Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 (Chapter 1, Figure 1.6) 
will provide a greater understanding of how resilience operates within the 
emergency management system.  Once this has been achieved, the Safe and 
SuRe intervention framework will be applied to the emergency management 
system to identify the main threats to the system and the potential impact and 
consequence of these threats on the ability to achieve resilience to water supply 
failure (Figure 3.18).   This analysis will also include an exploration of the 
intervention measures, mitigation, adaptation, coping and learning to understand 
how these can be applied to the system of emergency management to achieve 
overall system resilience to water supply failure (Chapter 8). 
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Figure 3.18:  Relating the systems based approach to emergency management 
with the Safe and SuRe intervention framework (Adapted from Butler et al, 2016). 
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4 CHAPTER 4 - THE MULTI-AGENCY APROACH TO EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Chapter 3 explored how the application of qualitative and quantitative research 
methods could be applied to understand characteristics of resilience within the 
context of the UK emergency management system.  Using the methodology 
described within Chapter 3 (Section 3.4 and Section 3.7.1), this Chapter presents 
the results of a Social Network Analysis to understand how the Category 1 and 
Category 2 responders are connected and the results of semi-structured 
interviews to explore characteristics of resilience within the system.  The results 
will be used to investigate the multi-agency approach to emergency management 
as defined within Objective 2 (Chapter 1) and explore whether the CCA, 2004 
allows for the differences amongst multiple organisations to promote resilience 
within the UK water sector.  This will be explored using the research questions 
presented in Chapter 1, (Section 1.4, Objective 3). 
 
The Chapter will proceed as follows: Section 4.1 will explore how Category 1 and 
Category 2 responders are connected within the emergency management 
system. This is followed by Section 4.2, a thematic analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews to understand characteristics of resilience. Finally, Section 4.9 will 
provide a summary of the key findings to answer these research questions.  
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4.1 Preliminary analysis of the community risk registers 
A preliminary analysis was conducted to understand if WSP’s and LRF’s could 
manage risk and resilience as part of a multi-agency approach using the 
methodology described within Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1.  This was conducted 
through a comparative content analysis of Chapter 4 – Local Responder Risk 
Assessment Duty of the Emergency Planning Guidance (Cabinet Office, 2013a), 
the WSP Water Resource Management Plans, Drought Plans, Sector Resilience 
Plans and the CRR’s produced by each LRF within England.  The results were 
collated within an excel spreadsheet and are presented within Appendix 9. 
 
Chapter 4 of the Emergency Planning guidance aims to encourage consistency 
in the risk assessment process so that the risks identified within each individual 
LRF area can be easily compared.  Either to inform decision making during an 
emergency or to compare the risks between adjacent LRF areas (Cabinet Office, 
2012).  However, analysis of the 38 CRR’s within England, demonstrate that there 
is a great deal of variation in the structure, style and the level of detail provided 
within each individual register (Figure 4.1).   
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Figure 4.1: Examples of the different structure, style and level of detail of the 
CRR’s.  
 
 Risk 
ID
Risk Title Risk Category Likelihood Impact Risk Rating
HL1 Fire or explosion at a gas terminal or involving a gas pipeline  Industrial Accident Medium-low (2) Minor (2) Medium
HL2
Localised industrial Accident involving large toxic release (e.g. from a site storing large 
quantities of chlorine) 
Industrial Accident Medium (3) Significant (4)
Very High
HL3 Localised industrial accident involving small toxic release Industrial Accident Medium (3) Moderate (3) Medium
HL4 Major pollution of surface waters and groundwater Industrial Accident High (5) Moderate (3) High
HL7 Industrial explosion and major fires Industrial Accident Medium-Low (2) Minor (2) Medium
HL8
Fire, flooding, stranding or collision involving a passenger vessel in or close to UK 
waters or on inland waterways, leading to the ship's evacuation 
Transport Accident Low (1) Minor (2)
Low
HL9 Aviation Accident Transport Accident Low (1) Moderate (3) Medium
HL10 Local accident on motorways and major trunk roads Transport Accident Medium-High (4) Minor (2) Medium
HL11 Railway Accident Transport Accident Medium (3) Minor (2) Medium
HL14 Local (road) accident involving transport of fuel/explosives Transport Accident Medium-Low (2) Minor (2) Medium
HL18 Local / Urban flooding (fluvial or surface run-off) Natural Hazard Medium (3) Moderate (3) High
HL19 Local fluvial flooding Natural Hazard Medium-High (4) Minor (2) Medium
HL20 Localised, extremely hazardous flash flooding Natural Hazard Medium-High (4) Moderate (3) High
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Whilst there is a statutory duty to publish the results of the risk assessment 
(Cabinet Office, 2013a), there is an element of discretion dependant on security 
issues, as to the amount of information the LRF has to provide.  According to the 
guidance the information should be: 
 
‘…presented in such a way that informs and encourages members of the 
public to mitigate the consequences of the risks in their area.’ 
 
Guidance has been provided regarding the structure of an individual risk 
assessment however, the guidance relating to the format and style of a CRR is 
limited.  The majority provide the risk category, hazard description, likelihood, 
impact and control measures for water related hazards.  However, there were 
variations in the level of detail provided within each individual register.  7 risk 
registers contained a detailed assessment of each risk category describing the 
nature of the hazard, likelihood and impact scores, risk ratings, lead assessors 
and control measures that were in place.  6 LRF’s opted to produce a glossy 
brochure detailing general information regarding hazards of the highest risk rating 
but did not contain information regarding the likelihood, impact or risk rating 
scores.  However, a lack of consistency in the approach taken made it very 
difficult to assess the level of engagement of the WSP with regard to risk 
assessment.   
 
Where the WSP was designated as a lead assessor for the risk category relating 
to water supply failure, a clear understanding of the risk was demonstrated and 
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information regarding control measures was provided.  However, detailed 
information was not provided within the CRR’s that stated the Category 2 
responders had been consulted as part of the process.  Further examination of 
the risk assessment group membership demonstrated that in some locations 
WSP’s were not included as part of the group or designated as the lead assessor 
for water related hazards.  It is unclear whether they were invited to participate in 
the process and declined to attend or were excluded.  This provided further 
difficulties assessing the level of engagement of the WSP in the risk assessment 
process and requires further investigation during the semi-structured interviews. 
 
As discussed within Chapter 1, WSP’s operate over a wide geographical area 
that may encompass one or more LRF’s.  There was a great deal of variation 
regarding the risk matrix style that had been adopted in the risk assessment 
process.  For many WSP areas it was discovered that the same risk category 
was being assessed by each LRF using a different risk matrix.  In total 4 different 
risk matrices were identified from analysis of the CRR’s with one risk matrix 
specifically designed by a LRF for their local area and not consistent with 
nationally published guidance (Figure 4.2).  It may be argued that geographical 
variations exist within the areas covered by WSP’s that will affect the likelihood 
and impact scores assigned to particular risk categories.  However, it is difficult 
to compare the results of the same risk category and assess capability 
requirements if each LRF is using a different risk matrix. 
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Figure 4.2: Examples of the different risk matrices used within the CRR’s 
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Many of the CRR’s were also in different stages of update ranging from 2012 to 
2016.  Of the 32 registers that provided information regarding the date of issue, 
16 had not been update since 2014 and 1 register had not been updated since 
2012. Of those that were updated from 2015 onwards, the same risk matrix is 
applied.  Only one LRF adopted the style of risk matrix present within the Risk 
Assessment Guidelines (Cabinet Office, 2013).  One of the recommendations of 
best practice from the guidance is that the CRR’s should be updated on an annual 
basis following the production of the Local Risk Assessment Guidance.  However, 
if this is occurring, the most recent information is not being made available to the 
public. 
 
In terms of accessibility, 3 out of the 38 CRR’s were not available and required 
an e-mail to the relevant LRF to obtain a copy and 1 was not available due to the 
content being of a sensitive nature.  This particular LRF provides general 
information regarding the risks to that area on the LRF website.  However, a 
google search for the latest CRR for this LRF revealed a CRR for 2006.  This 
demonstrated a difficulty attempting to obtain the most up to date version of the 
CRR.   
 
There were also instances where a likelihood and impact score had been 
assigned to a particular risk category with the caveat that ‘risk assessment to be 
provided by the Utility Company’ and within another risk register ‘work is ongoing 
to better understand the risk’.  This would suggest that there was limited 
engagement with the WSP prior to the register being published, though again it 
is difficult to determine why there was limited engagement.   
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Within many of the CRR’s, risk category and outcome descriptions had been 
wrongly assigned for drought.  The Local Risk Assessment guidance refers to a 
drought affecting London.  Whilst the majority of CRR’s tailored the outcome 
description to cover a drought within their local area, there were a number of 
registers that had assigned likelihood and impact scores to a drought occurring 
within London and not within their local area.  Drought had also been assigned 
as low risk within one WSP area with the lowest likelihood of occurrence.  
However, analysis of the Water Resource Plan for this location indicated that the 
LRF was within a water scarce location and at particular risk of drought.  Again, 
this would suggest there was limited engagement of the WSP in the assessment 
of this risk.  However, this is very difficult to determine from analysis of the CRR’s 
and requires further investigation through the process of semi-structured 
interviews presented within Section 4.2.  The following Section will explore the 
multi-agency network in greater detail to understand difficulties applying a multi-
agency approach to emergency planning. 
 
4.1.1 The multi-agency network 
The multi-agency approach to emergency management in the UK is conducted 
through the development of LRF’s, which  as previously mentioned in Chapter 2, 
are composed of Category 1 and Category 2 responders 
 
While the concept of the LRF is relatively straightforward in terms of the 
organisations involved, the connections between each of the organisations within 
the LRF are highly complex.  A social network diagram was developed using R 
Studio and the social network package, igraph as described within Chapter 3 
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(Section 3.4.2) to provide a visual representation of how these organisations are 
connected and demonstrate the complexities associated with the multi-agency 
approach to emergency management in the UK (Figure 4.3). 
 
Within the social network diagram (Figure 4.3), each connection between the 
organisations is represented by a grey line (vertices) and each organisation is 
represented by a coloured node.  Within the framework of the CCA, 2004, 
Category 1 and Category 2 responders are expected to engage and share 
information as part of the LRF within their local area.  Therefore, it was assumed 
that being part of the LRF represented a connection with each of the 
organisations that comprise the LRF. While these organisations may not 
necessarily have formed a close relationship with one another, they are 
considered part of the LRF.  The social network diagram only represents 
connections within the LRF and while many other connections exist between 
organisations outside of the LRF’s, these have not been considered as part of 
this research because they were not investigated. 
 
206 
 
 
Figure 4.3:  Social network diagram of the connections between organisations 
within the LRF’s operating within the North West region of the UK. 
 
The organisations that operate regionally and are connected to more than one 
LRF are represented within the centre of the social network diagram.  This is 
because they have a greater number of connections within the network.  A visual 
representation enables the complexity of connecting with multiple LRF’s to be 
identified.  However, this represents an organisational connection and does not 
consider the multitude of different communication methods this connection my 
represent or how many representatives within each organisation are involved in 
the establishment of this connection.  It is possible to gain an understanding of 
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the complexities associated with developing good working relationships within the 
LRF’s for organisations that operate over a wider geographically area but an 
understanding of the difficulties this may present requires further investigation 
and is presented within Section 4.2 as part of the semi-structured interviews. 
 
As already mentioned, WSP’s operate over a geographical area that may 
encompass more than one region and multiple LRF’s.   While Figure 4.3 
demonstrates the complexity of the connections between the Category 2 
responders and the LRF’s within one region, a simplified social network diagram 
was also developed to demonstrate how many LRF’s the WSP’s are connected 
to (Figure 4.4).  9 of the largest water and sewerage providers in England were 
included within the analysis to provide an example of the complexity associated 
with being part of the LRF’s.  This was developed by creating a transparent 
version of the Ofwat, WSP boundary map and overlaying it with the HMIC map 
of the police operational boundaries.  To ensure accuracy, this was combined 
with information obtained within the semi-structured interviews (Section 4.2).  The 
original method chosen to identify which LRF’s operated within WSP boundary 
areas was using a WSP GIS boundary layer.  However, this information is only 
available under licence direct from the WSP and is not available to the public. 
 
Within Figure 4.4, all the connections between organisations within the LRF are 
represented as a single node and the connections between the WSP and the 
LRF’s are mapped as grey vertices.  A simplified approach was taken because it 
was easier to visually identify how many LRF’s each WSP was connected to.  The 
names of each LRF were omitted to allow a clear visualisation. 
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It is evident that all of the WSP’s are connected to more than one LRF with some 
WSP’s connected to over 10 LRF’s.  As part of the CCA, 2004, WSP’s are 
expected to share information and engage with each LRF that operates within 
their area.  This may create challenges for both WSP’s and LRF’s and these will 
be explored throughout this Chapter. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Social network diagram of the connections between 9 of the 
largest water and sewerage providers in England and the LRF’s 
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4.2 Legislation and Governance 
4.2.1 Practitioner interpretations of applying the principles of the Civil 
Contingencies Act, 2004  
The majority of participants felt the introduction of the CCA, 2004 had a positive 
influence on the way in which emergency management was conducted within the 
UK.  It brought emergency responders and the utility and transport sectors 
together to operate within a single framework that encouraged collaborative 
working practices.  Further supporting quotes for each section within this Chapter 
are provided within Appendix 11. 
“…if you think about 2004, when the Civil Contingencies act came out 
before, there was nothing before that, well there was but it was very cold 
war style approach which didn’t help anyone. So, when the Civil 
Contingencies Act came out, I think the last, what are we now 2017, say 
the last ten years I think it has definitely improved and people are working 
together more and I think actually as organisations we are better off…” – 
01 Participant 
 
However, many participants reflected on the introduction of the CCA in 2004 and 
how the legislation and supporting guidance did not provide a clear set of 
operating guidelines as to how the LRF was to be structured and which 
organisation would take ownership of the LRF and the LRF manager.  This 
implies local government interpret this information within the context of their 
existing structures, which are variable.  As a consequence each LRF has taken 
a slightly different approach.  Throughout the interview process participants 
highlighted differences regarding which organisation has taken overall 
responsibility for the LRF.  For instance, some LRF managers are part of the 
Police or Fire Rescue Service, others are part of the Local Authority and there 
are also Civil Contingency Units that consist of a larger team of people.  This was 
recognised as creating a challenge for organisations that operate over a wide 
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geographic area.  Not only are they expected to engage with multiple LRF’s, each 
one is structured differently and as a consequence operates slightly differently.   
“So potentially you have forty-three different ways of looking at things and 
each LRF has got their own autonomy and can set up how they wish to 
look at risk and mitigate it and work in partnership.” – 07 Participant 
 
There is also another aspect to this and that is the way in which LRF’s operate 
within the structure of the organisation that has taken responsibility of the LRF.  
The majority of LRF managers sit within the Police or the Fire Rescue Service 
and operate within a hierarchical structure of ‘command and control’.  This is very 
different to the horizontal structure that exists within a WSP and other Category 
2 responder organisations.  One of the criticisms by the Army during the flooding 
of Mythe water treatment works was the flat structure of the WSP hindered the 
ability to manage the logistics of an alternative water supply (Pitt, 2008).  
However, this was not identified as a constraint within the interviews because it 
was recognised that some of the WSP’s have started to incorporate the same 
principle of joint operational working that is used by the Category 1 responders 
during emergency response (JESIP, 2016).  This allows for consistency in the 
multi-agency approach to emergency management and although the 
organisational structure may be different during the day to day operation within 
each organisation, during an emergency many of the Category 2 responders will 
switch to the hierarchical command and control approach.  
 
“But in terms of JESIP we have started incorporating parts of JESIP into 
our response. Not everything in JESIP is relevant to a category 2 
responder cause obviously a lot of it was blue light focussed but there is 
some other principles like the joint understanding model, joint decision 
making model and some of them examples are actually very good models 
that we can implement we started to but obviously we are still working 
towards implementing it.” – 01 Participant 
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This demonstrates how a greater understanding of inter-agency operational 
practices can enhance the multi-agency approach to emergency management 
through the process of inter-organisational learning.  However, this also presents 
challenges regarding the ability to incorporate changes within a static legislative 
framework particularly with the rapid advancement of technology.  Since the 
introduction of the CCA, 2004, many participants considered the resilience 
agenda had changed considerably and many participants questioned whether the 
legislation required reviewing.  In particular, participants highlighted the need for 
performance measures, standards and a review of the CCA, 2004.  This is to 
determine whether organisations are operating effectively within the framework 
of the current legislation and to incorporate any changes in working practices 
between the responder organisations.  Another perceived challenge with the 
legislation is the lack of enforcement and duties placed on organisations to 
ensure they comply with the requirements of the CCA, 2004, in the sharing and 
exchange of information throughout the emergency planning process. 
“So I think there’s a lot missing there that needs to make sure that we don’t 
end up in ten years’ time facing the same reason why they brought in the 
Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 that they should have reviewed it and done 
something and definitely come round with the civil contingencies 
secretariat should be you know organising for example like every 
organisation has people coming in and does like the checks on them.” – 
06 Participant 
 
The challenges experienced by participants with the increased use of social 
media has also led participants to question whether the legislation is still fit for 
purpose.  The use of social media has changed considerably since the 
introduction of the CCA in 2004, however the legislation has remained static and 
there is little guidance as to how Category 1 and Category 2 responders should 
manage the challenges of social media. 
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“Under the Civil Contingencies Act.  Now for me that’s no longer fit for 
purpose because we’re very good at the big bang emergencies but 
because of social media the game has changed so you may have an 
incident that impacts on your community but it’s not a big emergency but 
you still need to respond in every other way.” – 07 Participant 
 
The ability of the public to instantaneously ‘post’ information regarding an 
emergency situation has placed both Category 1 and Category 2 responders 
under pressure to control the spread of information and misinformation (Bunney 
et al, 2018).  Emergency responders develop an awareness of the emergency 
situation to determine the resources and capabilities required for emergency 
response.  However, the speed at which information is spread across social 
media, makes it very difficult for the Category 1 and Category 2 responders to 
develop situational awareness, provide an immediate source of information to the 
public and manage public expectations.  This is particularly challenging because 
there are limited resources available in terms of finances and trained people to 
manage responses on social media. 
“I think the biggest issue I think is around social media and taking 
customers, meeting customers’ expectations because before you used to 
have 6 o’clock news and or 6 o’clock and night news or 9 o’clock in the 
morning news, whatever time you had set deadlines, when now 
everything’s 24/7. One wrong tweet, one wrong message could change 
customers perception very quickly and so it’s very hard to stay on top of 
our comms and that’s why we have a comms department who do all the 
social media and keep track of our social media because we realise that 
actually that this is an area we could slip up on and it might not be because 
the organisations not doing anything it’s because it’s the expectations a lot 
more’s expected because everyone’s expects everything with the click of 
a finger.” – 01 Participant 
 
Since the introduction of the CCA, 2004, there are a greater number of 
organisations actively involved in emergency management within the UK.  For 
instance the Met Office and the Army are not considered as responders within 
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the CCA, 2004 and yet their assistance is required for warning, informing and 
emergency response, One participant considered that these organisations should 
also be included within the CCA. 
“I think what it hasn’t done I think the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 was 
a great piece of legislation because it obviously give us duties, it give us 
Category 1, Category 2 and also some basic stuff.  What it hasn’t done is 
kept apace with changes and the fact is now that some people that aren’t 
Category 1 or Category 2 were missed out and they haven't been included.  
For example the army is now forward leaning whatever that means and 
they engage more but to me they should be a category, they should 
definitely be given a category and not just stand outside it and there’s 
others that you know have been missed out and haven't been included”  – 
06 Participant 
 
It was also suggested that the organisations providing essential services to the 
public should be considered as Category 1 responders.  Without the provision of 
essential services such as water and electricity, many of the responder 
organisations would not be able to perform their roles effectively.  Therefore it 
was considered the legislation should take into consideration the importance of 
these sectors in terms of statutory duties.   
“The tolerable threshold for living without water because not only are we 
looking at from the drinking water side but also from the sanitation and the 
public health side of things your thresholds drastically reduce compared to 
other Cat 2 responders especially in the utility areas.  So it’s quite difficult 
where we are as a Cat 2 responder when there’s such a reliance from the 
Cat 1 responders on the industry.” – 13 Participant 
 
The legislation was designed to bring responder organisations together in a 
collaborative emergency management framework where Category 2 responders 
are expected to share information and provide support to the Category 1 
responders.  However, this is not a duty and according to the participants, the 
legislation and guidance does not specify a particular way in which this should be 
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conducted.  Also, because there is no evidence of enforcement through the 
legislation, this has the potential to allow Category 2 responders to ‘opt out’ of the 
process.  Especially if their day to day operational activities within their 
organisation are considered more important. 
“Unfortunately the driver for the LRF through the Civil Contingencies Act 
is a toothless tiger because if an agency decides actually I am not going 
to get involved in that because from a Cat 2 perspective it’s very easy for 
us because actually we have two statutory responsibilities under the CCA, 
to share information which we don’t have to physically be present to share 
information and to work with partners which we don’t have to physically be 
there to do that and actually that’s as far as it goes, there is no definition 
of sharing information or working with partners so in its broadest sense 
that could be a phone call once a year, it could be two emails a year.” – 13 
Participant 
 
This Section highlights that while the legislation has provided a framework and a 
structure for emergency management in the UK, the introduction of new 
technologies continually present responders with operational challenges.  This 
has led participants to question whether the legislation written in 2004 remains fit 
for purpose in 2019 considering the rapid advancement of technology and its 
application through social media.   
 
4.2.2 Government support and guidance  
With the advent of social media it was perceived that the government is taking a 
more active role in the management of emergencies at a local level. However, 
the provision of support and guidance in preparing for emergencies was not 
considered to be so prevalent.  The guidance provided by the government was 
not perceived as providing enough detail and direction as to how it should be 
implemented.  Participants perceived the government was deliberate in not 
providing a ‘step by step’ approach to guidance documents because this would 
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allow autonomy at the local level.  However, while participants accepted this, it 
also left them uncertain as to whether they were implementing the concepts within 
the guidance correctly:   
“I think that’s more down to social media and public perception because I 
think previously it was left to manage locally where now you tend to find a 
small incident or an incident the governments heavily involved because 
they want to be seen to be doing stuff, I’m not saying that’s a good thing 
(laughs) but if you think about COBR and how many times COBR stepped 
up for incidents, there are stepping up a lot more than they used to, they 
used to do about three or four a year, I think they’ve done about ten this 
year” – 01 Participant 
 
 
“I don’t think the guidance goes far enough.  I don’t think there’s enough 
contextual information in the guidance.” – 13 Participant 
 
Participants agreed the driving force for change and the implementation of good 
practice was achieved at the local level.  However, they required support from the 
government to provide direction through the delivery of resilience standards, 
frameworks, benchmarking or performance indicators.  They also required the 
government to formally identify and share examples of good practice rather than 
relying on the informal mechanisms of a peer to peer review. 
 “The, I suppose the government’s pitch has been that they don’t want to 
tell LRFs how to do their business so they want to encourage innovation 
and people to come up with their own ideas from the ground up but one of 
the frustrations for the LRFs is we’d also like the government not to say 
this is the only way to do something but we would like them probably to 
contribute best practice a lot more.” – 07 Participant 
 
The National Capabilities Survey implemented by the government requests all 
members of the LRF to complete a series of questions every two years.  This is 
intended to provide the government with an indication of the national capabilities 
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available for emergency response.  This approach was criticised by participants 
as a ‘tick box’ exercise because it did not explore whether there were adequate 
plans and procedures in place: 
“We do a resilience capability survey where I answer some questions and 
they go into Whitehall, we don’t get someone following us back up with a 
quick query it’s and it’s one of those ones it doesn't feel like there’s any 
version of Ofsted in my area.  I know Ofwat does have a look at resilience 
within the water industry I’ve been asked to sort of provide some peer input 
to Ofwat for one of the local providers so are they active members of the 
resilience forum de-de-de but I’ve not had that kind of from my side” – 02 
Participant 
  
“It tells you nothing [laughs] what it tells you is for example it says do you 
have a plan for flooding and you say yes or no and that’s it and they come 
back with it with the benchmark saying twenty-five did, twenty-five didn't, 
twenty-five are considering doing it and I don’t know instead of saying you 
will all do it in other words what you haven't got is you know if seventy-five 
percent of the local resilience forums have a plan for flooding”  – 06 
Participant 
 
Many of the participants lament the loss of the regional government offices.  
These used to contain a team of people who would attend LRF meetings and 
provide a conduit of information to pass to and from government.  These were 
replaced by the Department of Communities and Local Government, Resilient 
Emergencies Division (DCLG RED) in 2006.  The semi-structured interviews 
were conducted between May 2017 and September 2017 and as of January 2018 
the DCLG RED became the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government.   Participants discussed how the DCLG RED operated over a much 
wider area and a reduction in staff over the last few years due to reduced funding 
has resulted in a lack of attendance at LRF meetings.  Many of the participants 
did not perceive they were receiving enough support to be able to share 
information back to Government. 
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“And that’s what we’re missing from I think the government offices when 
we used to have them when you know we’d have people who would look 
after three or four LRFs.  We’ve got you know the resilience team but 
they’re now getting smaller and smaller and every time I talk to [name] it’s 
well I’m now looking after seven LRFs, I’m now looking after eight LRFs, 
don’t ask us anything because we haven't got time to do anything.  So we 
appear to be losing that regional pulling together which government I think 
should be doing because I think it’s difficult for the LRFs to do it.” – 10 
Participant 
 
It was perceived that the regional government offices provided a link to feed 
information back to government and contribute to an increase in the sharing of 
information between LRF’s at a regional level.  The following Section explores 
collaborative working partnerships within each LRF. 
 
4.3 Collaborative working partnerships 
4.3.1 Effective collaboration – proximity and empathy 
The level of collaboration between Category 1 and Category 2 responders was 
perceived to be good where strong relationships existed.  However, in the WSP 
interviews it was evident that there were some LRF’s where the level of 
collaboration was high and other instances where there was little or no 
collaboration.   
“It’s just interesting to see how some LRFs are very much, let’s work with 
Category 2 responders and other LRFs aren’t as much favourable for that. 
But that’s just from experience.” – 01 Participant 
 
“So you know I think there’s a little bit about organisational sign-up to the 
LRF process but I think that the secondary bit is because LRFs are based 
on police force areas the issue that we have is the same issue that I’ve got 
it’s you know I am now trying to service four LRFs successfully in some 
areas but unsuccessfully in others.” – 13 Participant 
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Analysis of the interviews revealed a number of contributing factors to this.  
Having a very active LRF manager who is consistently engaged with the WSP 
through regular communication encourages greater collaboration.   
“I think it’s good, it could always be better. I think it depends on the LRFs, 
I think some LRFs are more proactive, and that is something that I’ve found 
a lot, is some LRFs is really proactive, they were great at sharing 
information with it and other LRFs unless we push ourselves to the 
meeting or get involved we probably wouldn’t be invited so it depends what 
local resilience forum areas.” – 01 Participant 
 
 
Also, proximity to the offices/location of the LRF’s had an influence on the level 
of collaboration because it was considered easier to attend meetings if they were 
co-located in the same town or city.  It was not always easy to justify attending 
meetings in terms of the amount of time that would have to be committed to travel 
and taking the WSP participant away from the daily work environment.  None of 
the participants mentioned attending meetings remotely via skype or any other 
software that enables remote attendance at meetings: 
“So as much as I’m on mailing lists for the other LRFs I’m not as engaged 
if I’m honest because I could spend each LRF tend to run this one day a 
month and I could so I could be four days a month, working days a month 
I could be just sitting at LRF meetings and unfortunately when there’s only 
myself and one other full-time employee in my team we don’t have the 
luxury to be able to do that.” – 13 Participant 
 
“[name] are good because they collocate into the same city and that helps, 
it cuts down transport times and stuff but that’s usually the issue with most 
other utilities they’ve got to trek a long way.” – 05 Participant 
A couple of participants had either previously worked within the Local Authority 
or WSP where they had established relationships within the LRF during their 
previous role.  This also influenced the level of collaboration between the LRF 
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and the WSP because there was a greater understanding of the challenges faced 
by each organisation and it was easier to maintain established relationships: 
“…if I’m speaking on behalf of the [Name] because I’ve been here nearly 
five years and then I’ve got ten years of [Name] experience from the other 
side of the fence, I’ve seen it from the other end.” – 05 Participant 
 
“…I used to be when I was, before I took over here and my job sort of like 
expanded I used to be the capability lead for training and exercising for 
the LRF so I used to put together all of the training and exercising 
programme, how it linked into all of the plans, the validation process, we 
did a little bit on modularisation so if we exercise that plan actually it 
exercises a little bit of that one as well …” – 13 Participant 
 
Good collaboration is influenced by the ability to attend LRF meetings and 
establish good relationships.  However, this is not very practical for WSP’s with a 
small emergency management team that have to engage with multiple LRF’s.  To 
overcome this difficulty WSP’s conduct LRF engagement days to provide LRF’s 
with consistent information regarding how the WSP operates during an 
emergency and when support from the LRF would be required.   
“I’d stop short of problems I think so it might cause a few issues.  We 
obviously we can't have nine different ways of working with another further 
nine on the periphery so the reason we have the engagement days is and 
we try and adopt standard approaches to let them all know this is the way 
we work and this is what we will need from you in these incidents if it’s a 
water incident so that they all know the same thing if you like.  They might 
try and deliver it in a different way and some of them we find that if we do 
have an incident and we engage with them that some of them are very 
responsive to put it politely, they want lots of information, they want a lot 
of engagement they stand up at a TCG or an SCG whereas some of the 
other LRFs will be a little bit more laid back I think you know well if you 
need more help just tell us we’re not going to alert you know stand up 
unless you tell us it’s necessary, those sorts of things so they all respond 
in a different way, I think we’re coming to terms with that.” – 11 Participant 
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But does this top down approach allow for the ability to establish good working 
relationships?  This will be explored within the following Section. 
 
4.3.2 Building relationships 
The building and establishment of good working relationships was considered to 
be fundamental in the emergency management process particularly for 
emergency response.  In many instances this was considered to be more 
important than the plan itself.  It was perceived that the LRF provided a good 
opportunity to bring different organisations together to plan and prepare for an 
emergency situation.  This approach encouraged the development of 
relationships with individuals that would also be present in the incident room 
during an emergency.   It also provided an opportunity to discuss the resources 
available within each operating organisation. 
“I think it’s a really good opportunity for building relationships and networks 
between partners from the various agencies.  LRFs generally we actually 
run on relationships so you can have all your plans, policies and 
procedures as far as you like but actually fundamentally as long as you’ve 
got those relationships in place then the rest of it will come together so I 
think the networking and the building relationships is sort of one of the top 
priorities.” – 14 Participant 
 
 
“….. it’s investing in those relationships so that we don’t come together in 
an emergency and not know each other and how we work so to me that’s 
the real key is putting some collateral in the bank around relationships 
……” – 16 Participant 
 
The process of building and developing relationships helps to build a shared 
understanding of each organisation, how they operate during an emergency and 
the capabilities available in terms of resources and organisational needs.  This 
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helps to build trust and realistic expectations of what an organisation is able to 
provide during an emergency situation.  These are important considerations for 
effective multi-agency collaboration and emergency response. 
“…..but also one of the key things we think from that is building 
relationships and making sure we understand how each other work and 
how you’re going to respond so that again for interoperability you’re not at, 
you shouldn’t be at odds with each other.” – 11 Participant 
 
“It gives, it allows us an avenue into sort of having relationships with people 
who we would be reliant on in a multiagency response.  That’s one side of 
it, the other side of it is it’s understanding expectations so they get an 
understanding of what they can expect from us and vice versa we get an 
understanding what we can expect from them and the different partners 
and agencies and I think that’s probably the two biggest things.  There’s 
obviously lots of other things like you know sharing risk assessment and 
knowledge and everything else and exercising and learning but those two 
are probably the biggest things.” – 09 Participant 
 
Examples were provided from both an LRF and a WSP perspective 
demonstrating the importance of a shared understanding of organisational 
capabilities.  One example involved the Fire Rescue Service who were required 
to extract large volumes of water from the water supply system to respond to a 
very serious fire.  However, there was little understanding of the effects on the 
water supply system of using high volume pumps.  This resulted in the WSP 
having to provide their customers with bottled water because there was not 
enough pressure in the system to pump water to second floor flats located within 
the same local area as the fire.  Following the incident, a number of workshops 
were conducted to improve understanding, not just of the water supply system 
but also to understand the requirements of the Fire Rescue Service during an 
emergency situation. 
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“The fire service didn't necessarily understand how the water network 
works and the water production side of thing works.  So for example if we 
have five fire appliances tap into our water mains to start drawing of 
hydrants for a fire that causes significant pressure issues on our 
customers.  We don’t have a duty, we don’t have a statutory duty to supply 
water to the fire service, we have a statutory duty to supply water to 
customers for which if we don’t do that we can get heavily fined so without 
that understanding of the network and understanding the potential 
challenges to that.  For that fire incidence for example we had there was 
quite a few properties because urban planners now decide that they’re 
going to put student accommodation on top of all the shops in the town so 
in city centres you very rarely, years ago you very rarely had residential 
properties.” – 13 Participant 
 
The consequences of critical infrastructure failure are very difficult to understand 
due to the complex interdependencies that exist between many sectors. While 
there have been many attempts to formally identify these through traditional risk 
assessments, there are still a large number of unknowns.  This is of particular 
concern regarding the potential for cascading failures.  The process of bringing 
organisations from different sectors together to share stories and perspectives 
through the multi-agency approach to emergency planning, may allow for the 
greater identification of potential failures within the system.   
 
Building effective relationships not only allows for managing expectations but can 
also lead to greater communication between organisations during emergency 
response.  One participant provided an example of where the LRF had made 
operational decisions on behalf of the WSP, regarding the provision of an 
alternative supply of water during a water supply incident.  The expectation of the 
LRF was not matched by the WSP’s operational procedures and decisions were 
made without prior communication to the WSP.  This was largely attributed to a 
lack of attendance by the WSP to the multi-agency incident room.  Establishing 
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good working relationships between the WSP and the LRF may encourage a 
shared understanding of organisational roles and responsibilities.   
“Whereas if we’re in the room then we find that it’s much easier to talk to 
people to talk them through the issues so that they’ve got a clearer 
understanding of what it is that we normally do and what sort of things 
we’re going to need.” – 11 Participant 
 
Establishing good working relationships can also help to develop a shared 
understanding of risk.  One of the risks identified for effective emergency 
response was the provision of adequate resources in terms of available people 
to manage an incident.  The development of good relationships allows each 
organisation to understand the resources available and the capabilities of each 
organisation.  This is of particular importance when determining the availability of 
mutual aid.    
 
4.3.3 Regional collaboration 
The capability of a WSP to establish good working relationships with numerous 
LRF’s was identified as a difficulty within the majority of interviews.  However, it 
was also recognised that this was not just a problem for WSP’s but for electricity 
providers, NHS Ambulance Service, telecommunication operators, NHS England 
and other organisations that operate regionally or over a wider geographical area. 
 
To overcome this many of the LRF’s have either taken a more regional approach 
to multi-agency collaboration or developed specific Category 2 groups.  The 
problem identified by participants with the latter approach was that many of the 
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Category 2 responders had little in common other than the fact they were 
categorised as Category 2 responders within the framework of the CCA, 2004.   
“….I think part of the problem with that is again labelling a whole variety of 
agencies that bring various disciplines, expertise and specialisms to the 
table as Category 2s when in fact some of them have got nothing in 
common at all with others is a challenge you know so again you’d have to 
ask why would a CCG want to sit down with a utility company and just say 
your Category 2 have a meeting so I think we need to be more smart than 
that and that’s why I think it’s the way it’s sort of done locally but in a 
tailored way that supports local need…” – 16 Participant 
 
It was considered more appropriate if a regional approach was taken and the 
Category 2 responders were invited to collaborate on emergency planning 
relevant to their particular sector.  This would save time in the development of 
plans and would encourage the sharing of information through a collaborative 
approach.  However, it was perceived that this may also lead to a loss of ‘local 
ownership’ with regard to developing plans with local communities. 
“it is difficult I mean I think people realise that now and think you know 
because you’re working in a bound, within a confined boundary like police 
and fire do your actual utilities and others work across it like north west 
ambulance service and they don’t want to keep doing five different 
documents or four it just makes more, it makes it more effective and 
efficient and it saves people time and that’s what I think you know time’s 
precious nowadays and there’s not enough resources to do it so it’s about 
time we worked collaboratively and across the borders and not be oh yes 
this is [Location] we do it different in [Location] and do it different in 
[Location].  Why the hell are we doing it differently?  It just doesn't make 
any sense at all.” – 06 Participant 
 
The regional approach has extended to include the risk assessment process and 
emergency exercises.  These will be discussed throughout the following sections. 
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4.4 Sharing information – sensitivities and timing 
Participant’s views on the sharing of information between Category 1 and 
Category 2 responders revealed there are still difficulties sharing information 
during emergency planning.  While all the participants understand the importance 
of sharing information and to a certain extent are happy to share and exchange 
information, there are still problems associated with security of information and 
data protection.  This is largely because of the perception that fines will be 
imposed if information is shared inappropriately.  This is largely an issue for the 
Category 2 responders that are private companies and do not wish to share 
information that may be considered ‘company sensitive’.     
 
“I think there’s far better understanding of why it might be required.  I think 
there are still concerns around that interface between security and 
resilience so and I mean it’s the same across all sectors of we have people 
whose remit in life is take the governance and they will not release that 
information, they will not release that information because of significant 
fines or the legislation which might be in place.  That all changes a hundred 
and eighty degree in the event of an incident…” – 02 Participant 
 
“….it’s almost the Act puts us in the same box as Category 1 responders 
who are by and large public services or non-government organisations that 
act in the same manner as public services whereas a lot of the majority of 
the Cat 2 responders are private companies.” – 11 
Participant    
       
These difficulties with sharing information have a tendency to occur during 
emergency planning.  It was generally agreed throughout the interviews that 
when information is requested during emergency response it is released more 
readily. 
“I think it becomes, I think it’s if I’m honest I think it’s more of an issue 
during the actual response, sorry during the planning phase rather than it 
necessarily being an issue during the response phase because I think if 
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you get to the point where it’s all hands on deck and all hands to the pump 
then you know people will bend over backwards and do whatever they can 
do to make things work.  To share that information in the planning stage 
that’s where it becomes difficult because of the company sensitivities and 
the confidentiality of contract.” – 11 Participant 
 
The sharing of information regarding vulnerable people was of particular concern 
for participants.   This information is not shared during the planning process 
because organisations need to ensure the information they provide is up to date.  
Participants also perceived that a lack of standards and a common approach 
made it difficult to easily share this information between organisations.  The 
introduction of Resilience Direct may provide necessary improvements to this 
process and will be discussed in Section 4.5.1. 
“Their position is that they won't share information in advance, quite rightly 
so I would say because they say the list of vulnerable people changes so 
often and so regularly that if I gave you that list now it would be out-of-date 
by tomorrow.  So what they say is they will share that information but only 
when there’s actually an emergency taking place so that they know the 
information is current, that’s the only sort of exception I can think of really, 
other than that we share information quite efficiently.” – 15 Participant 
 
“I’ll tell you the smaller things are that they all have their own information 
sharing agreements, there’s no standard which we’ve signed, there’s no 
real standard around how information is shared across the UK so if you 
need to share vulnerable customer information there isn’t a single 
procedure for sharing vulnerable customer information so you know 
[Loaction] might want it in one form and [Location] might want it in another 
form.” – 11 Participant 
 
It was also generally recognised that there are relatively few problems sharing 
information where there are good relationships between the Category 1 and 
Category 2 responders. But this is not consistent across the country. 
“We have never but I am very conscious that this is a discussion elsewhere 
and but whenever we’ve asked for anything I can personally say we’ve not 
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had a problem and I think sometimes at the planning stage there seems 
to be more talk and people being precious about information which can 
create a little bit of uncertainty and perhaps ill feeling would be too strong 
but I can't think of a better way of saying it when actually when it comes to 
deploying in anger I’ve not found that people are precious and they will 
share information appropriately but I am very aware of that sort of national 
conflict if you like there because I hear it very often but I can only say from 
a personal perspective we’ve not had that problem.”  - 16 Participant 
 
There were examples where WSP’s identified a difficulty responding to requests 
from LRF’s for specific information regarding the resilience of their assets.  WSP’s 
were reluctant to share this information because they perceive the LRF’s will then 
take it upon themselves to install flood defences around their assets.  When this 
information is not provided by the WSP, the LRF perceive the assets are not 
being protected.   
“We struggle a little bit with the question that you usually get from things 
like the Pitt Review and other flooding which is what level of resilience 
does critical infrastructure offices have in terms of flood protection and we 
struggle to get I would say anything other than sometimes a very generic 
answer to that but sometimes there are, can be generic answers.”– 05 
Participant 
 
In some instances the participants from the LRF provided examples where the 
WSP had not provided information regarding an incident and the LRF was notified 
by members of the local community.   
“And I suppose our worry is we’ll start seeing some community impacts on 
the ground before it gets to that point so there is a little bit of that in terms 
of the concern that when it, that there’s still a little bit of keeping it within 
the organisation even though there’s the CCA, even though there’s the 
you know the duty to share information and even though that we’ve got a 
plan in place that has triggers..” – 05 Participant 
 
There were also concerns that the WSP’s do not share enough information at an 
earlier stage of the incident.  This has important implications for the building of 
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situational awareness and effective emergency response.  A couple of examples 
were provided during the interviews of the WSP requesting assistance from the 
LRF when the emergency situation was perceived to be beyond the capabilities 
of the WSP.   
“So certainly some feedback centred a little bit why did you not escalate 
that because there was certain things that we could have at least helped 
with the co-ordination of some of the responses and the communications 
and even if it’s just a teleconference to say that everyone knows exactly 
what the situation is.” – 05 Participant 
 
Sharing information at an earlier stage of the incident would allow the LRF to 
provide additional resources and capabilities to assist the WSP.  But if this is left 
too late, there is a danger of the emergency situation becoming out of control.  
 
4.4.1 Resilience Direct 
Resilience Direct is a situational awareness tool that was introduced in April 2014 
to alleviate some of the difficulties with sharing information within a multi-agency 
environment.  All of the Category 1 and Category 2 responders that are part of 
the LRF have been provided with access to the system and are able to upload 
and view documents that may assist with effective planning and emergency 
response.   
“So I think the sharing plans in peace time it’s a really good tool and it 
means that everything’s in one place, we have to store less on our own 
systems, we are less likely to have something out-of-date if we ever need 
to refer to it because we can go to Resilience Direct and get their most up-
to-date copy so for those things I think it’s great.  In an incident when we’re 
trying to use it it’s I think we’re still in the early stages so it’s, we don’t think 
it’s quite so good and also the way we’re structured we haven’t yet 
identified who in an incident would need to be sat full time at a computer 
uploading and downloading information.” – 12 Participant 
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Resilience Direct was in the early stages of adoption during the time of the 
interviews and while many of the participants acknowledged the benefits of a 
multi-agency tool for the sharing of information they did not have enough people 
to operate the system, particularly during an emergency.  This resulted in many 
of the Category 1 and Category 2 responders using the system as a document 
store or to post minutes of LRF meetings: 
“Which is absolutely amazing software but the issue we have is, you’ve 
got this amazing software but who runs it in an incident because you’ve 
got so many different organisations who have got their own priorities just 
as much as multi-agency priorities and I lot of it I think is resources. How 
to actually physically man this.  If you have an incident lasted two weeks 
for example, how do you man two weeks of staff for that incident as well 
as deal with your own operational incidents and I think that’s probably the 
key thing but I think there is always going to be the key challenge I 
mentioned at the beginning is resources. Is where do we get the resources 
to manage it when everyone is being stretched, it’s not, all organisations 
have got limited resources how do they keep going when things get kicked 
off …” – 01 Participant 
 
 
For planning and preparation, Resilience Direct was perceived to be a useful 
method to share information regarding emergency plans and procedures but 
there was concern that during an emergency WSP’s wouldn’t have enough 
people to operate the system.  Not only that, the Category 2 organisations already 
have their own technical systems in place that they are familiar with and are 
experienced in using during an emergency.  
 
4.4.2 Good practice and lessons learned using Resilience Direct 
Many of the participants commented on the need for greater support from 
government to share good practice and lessons learned.  This is becoming 
increasing important as resources in terms of finances and people are continually 
being stretched.  Resilience Direct provides a formal mechanism to share this 
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information but again networking and building relationships between 
organisations allows for a greater sharing of good practice and lessons learned 
because the information comes from a trusted source.  Organisations such as the 
DCLG RED also provided an effective opportunity to share good practice and 
lessons learned, however as previously mentioned, these teams are declining in 
size and there are not enough people to attend LRF meetings.  So, this 
information is no longer being shared as much as it used to in the past.   
“So rather than us trying to do the work laboriously you can actually go on 
this what they call this joint organisational learning platform on RD and 
access that information so it’s been very, very good.  That combined with 
the forum you know the chairs forum we get talking to people, networking 
and you meet people from all the different forums which is good. – 06 
Participant 
 
One participant also mentioned that although there may be mechanisms in place 
to share good practice there was ‘no driver for it’. 
“If you look at JESIP you’ve got the joint organisational learning part of 
JESIP that comes so if you have an incident you’re supposed to share 
your organisational learning so what didn't go so well and what have you 
done to rectify that so that’s all really good stuff but again there’s no driver 
for it.” – 13 Participant 
 
All of the participants discussed attending formal debrief sessions to identify 
lessons learned from emergency events, training and exercising and incorporate 
these into the development of future plans and emergency management 
procedures.  This was embedded within the emergency management process 
and considered to be important in terms of building resilience to future events.  
This was a standard approach across the country within each organisation. 
“a real world event of any size or if we have an exercise then we seek to 
learn the lessons out of that event by holding formal debrief sessions and 
we have a process that we follow and we identify those lessons and then 
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we play those lessons into any planning developments that we need in the 
future.” – 15 Participant 
 
Many of the regional groups established between the local LRF’s provide 
opportunities for the LRF’s to share examples of good practice, but it was difficult 
to identify examples of cross organisational learning or learning regarding the 
multi-agency approach.  Many of the examples of sharing good practice and 
lessons learned were focused on individual organisations rather than across the 
multiple agencies.  While it could be argued cross organisational lessons are 
learned and shared within the LRF this was not clearly identified within the 
interviews. 
“So you could have I mean like the flooding we did pick up, we have picked 
up quite a lot of stuff about the flooding events in [Location] through [Name] 
cascading that information and through a couple of other workshops that 
have sent stuff out but it had to be something that big to cascade some of 
that stuff out, does that make sense?  So as the stuff that happens all over 
the country doesn't get cascaded down so that you could go oh that could 
happen here, what have we got in place for that so you kind of do operate 
in a county looking at well what’s happened within the county.”  - 05 
Participant 
 
There were also inconsistencies regarding whether lessons learned were 
adequately shared throughout the country and how lessons were only shared 
regarding extreme events. 
 
4.5 Planning and preparing for extreme events 
Effective collaboration, building relationships and sharing information are 
important components in planning and preparing for an emergency, but all of 
these require strategic direction during multi-agency emergency response.  This 
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direction is provided in the form of an emergency plan.  Participants were asked 
what they perceive to be the purpose of the emergency plan. 
 
4.5.1 The purpose of the emergency plan 
The purpose of the emergency plan is to provide a structured and strategic 
approach to emergency response.  Participants highlighted it allowed them to 
identify the resources and capabilities required for effective emergency response, 
ensure roles and responsibilities were clearly defined and provide a framework 
for command and control.  While all of these aspects were considered important, 
investing in people and the process of developing the plan, building relationships 
and sharing information was considered of greater value.  Many of the 
participants recognised the plan as a reference document, but the real value of 
the plan was recognised in training and exercising people so they were 
experienced in providing effective emergency response.   
 
“So what I’m saying there is effectively the plan, the three inches of 
paperwork that we’ve put together to tell us what to do is very nice, it’s very 
nice but the real preparation was in actually creating the plan and sharing 
the information as we did to get us to the point where we could sign off the 
plan and say we’ve got one.  So it is the process more than the plan that 
is important I would say and that process if you understand your risk, if you 
prepared around that risk, if you shared information about that risk, if 
you’ve worked out what do I do if, that’s where you’ve actually got the value 
and that is the value of the plan but the plan itself is of little value, it is an 
enabler for other things.” – 15 Participant 
 
Emergency situations are rapidly changing, dynamic environments that are 
challenging in that each emergency situation will present a different set of 
challenges.  The capability to respond effectively requires a flexible and 
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adaptable approach and is not provided within a structured emergency plan. 
Participants considered this is provided by investing in well trained and exercised 
personnel. 
“….the people who rely on plans totally I think are doomed to fail because 
that’s when professional judgement has to come in, experience et cetera, 
dialogue with other agencies and all the things and if you think that you 
can have all the answers in a plan I think people will be sadly mistaken 
because I think uniqueness of each incident.” – 16 Participant 
 
4.5.2 The Multi-Agency Assessment of Risk  
The multi-agency assessment of risk is conducted through the development of 
the CRR, as discussed in Chapter 2, (Section 2.7).  All of the LRF’s have 
developed a system to enable them to complete these CRR’s using a multi-
agency approach.  However, each LRF may have a slightly different method of 
conducting the risk assessment process and again this creates difficulties for 
WSP’s and other organisations that operate over a wide geographical area.  
Examples were also provided where each CRR was developed using a different 
software package. 
“No I think now we need to have you know … Civil Contingencies Act and 
I think we just need a bit more sophistication in it as I said earlier you know 
regionalised a little bit, resources are limited so why are we writing forty-
seven community risk registers so I think you know we need some way of 
being a bit more sophisticated now.” – 08 Participant 
 
Every two years the Government publishes the National Risk Assumptions and 
these are used to inform the risk assessment process at a local level.  Many 
participants identified there were difficulties with this approach because some of 
the national guidance was not relevant for their particular area so they would re-
evaluate the risk based on their local planning assumptions. 
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“…interpreting the national risks in the local context, some of the national 
ones are a bit extreme but we do adjust them.” – 03 Participant 
 
A lack of resources was also identified as a potential difficulty for Category 1 and 
Category 2 responders and having the time and people available to attend 
multiple LRF risk assessment meetings. This has led many LRF’s to take a 
regional approach to the multi-agency assessment of risk.   
“Generally I think what we’ve done is looked at the risk assessment, we’ve 
done our, at the national risk register sorry, we’ve done our own risk 
assessments for the ones that we think affect us.  We’ve drafted a generic 
response again so that we’re not doing it [number] different ways or 
[number] different ways, those are published on Resilience Direct and 
we’ve shared them, we did a booklet as well for all the LRFs.” – 12 
Participant 
 
Participants discussed how the national risk assumptions provide the foundation 
for assessing risk but there are some risks that are not considered to be as 
relevant at the local level.   
 
4.5.3 Working collaboratively in the development of a multi-agency 
emergency plan  
Participants discussed a number of different approaches to the development of a 
multi-agency emergency plan.  There were examples of a multi-agency working 
group where all of the organisations involved in emergency response for a 
particular incident would develop the multi-agency plan together through a series 
of meetings and workshops.  There were also examples where a critical 
infrastructure group or the lead organisation was responsible for the development 
of a multi-agency plan and would consult with the other organisations rather than 
develop the whole plan together.   
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“So we’ve got a critical infrastructure group and that the [Name] chair and 
that means they as a general rule it doesn't always work like this but we, 
as we chair the group we sort of also lead on writing the plans and then 
we’ll call together meetings with [Name] and [Name] and [Name] and the 
others when we need to and sort of work on the plans together on that 
basis.  Yes, so yes I think we get generally speaking we get the sort of 
involvement of everyone when needed.”  - 10 Participant 
 
“So if it’s a multiagency plan you would generally have a lead agency so 
what they call the sort of lead responder principle so the lead responder 
would actually be kind of responsible for writing the plan on behalf of and 
in consultation with the other agencies in the LRF.” – 14 Participant 
 
Examples were provided where the LRF and Local Authority participants had not 
been involved in the consultation process but instead received plans from a utility 
company detailing at what point assistance would be required for effective 
emergency response.   
“For most of the utility plans what we tend to see is their plan and then sort 
of this is where you guys fit in.  I think there’d maybe be, there’s been quite 
a lot of work done to try and support wider partners in understanding red 
liners for utilities those kind of, at this point we failed because we’ve drawn 
on mutual aid, it’s beyond us now.” – 02 Participant 
 
There were also examples where assumptions had been made regarding the 
capability of the Local Authority and the resources that would be provided during 
an emergency.  In some instances roles and responsibilities were assigned to the 
Local Authority that they were unable to deliver.   
“We’ve seen it a few times yes, yes or things which have been agreed 
under almost a different age on there or there’s some I mean sometimes 
it’s industry agreed but it’s not clear or it’s not been fully explored as to 
right, what exactly does that mean, what’s your expectation of that versus 
ours because just because it says local authority will doesn't mean that we 
can and it doesn't mean that we can do it to the level that you would expect 
necessarily so let’s have some discussion about this in advance rather 
than just a line saying we will.” – 02 Participant 
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“Some agencies are like that, they have empire builders and they think 
well this is our plan and so this is our plan and you know we’ll tell 
everybody else what they need to be doing and actually then they make 
decisions on behalf of other agencies without consultation with those 
agencies, so … “ – 15 Participant 
 
These examples demonstrate how effective collaboration, the sharing and 
exchange of information and a greater understanding of roles and responsibilities 
is required in the development of a multi-agency emergency plan. 
 
4.6 Building resilience  
Throughout the interview process there were many perspectives regarding how 
resilience was perceived and how resilience could be achieved for low probability, 
high consequence events through multi-agency training and exercises.  These 
will be explored within this section. 
 
4.6.1 Perception of resilience  
All of the participants were asked how they would define resilience and what it 
means for their organisation.  All of the participants considered resilience as the 
ability to be prepared, to respond effectively and for the organisation to be able 
to recover to a ‘normal’ level of functioning.   
“Right, to me it’s you know it’s a number of things for me.  It’s making sure 
that you are fully prepared, able to respond, able to recover, keep the 
public warned and informed and engage with the community so all that to 
me is resilience.” – 06 Participant 
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Once a general definition had been provided, the participant would then add 
further information to reinforce their perception of resilience.  This provided insight 
into how resilience is perceived.  For multi-agency emergency response, 
resilience was perceived to be about having strong leadership, managing 
expectations and organisations adopting the same procedures for 
communicating to the public.  
“But I think it’s about leadership, it’s about communication, it’s about robust 
business continuity plans that’s what I think creates resilience and I think 
it’s also again about in the multiagency arena about you know who can do 
what to support another organisation and I guess again in the multiagency 
around this message it’s consistency of approach, we have found many 
times that you know you cannot have one organisation almost going rogue 
and putting out a message that’s not consistent so we have to agree 
consistent lines to take around communication.”  - 16 Participant 
 
“ …. in emergency planning we are more focussing on if we lose these 
assets or these assets get flooded how do we manage customers 
expectations but also ensuring that customers remain on water and still 
get the best service that we can actually provide during the circumstances 
… “ – 01 Participant 
 
During an emergency it is very important to have a good, clear understanding of 
the emergency situation to allow for effective emergency response and this was 
highlighted by participants as necessary to achieve resilience.   
 
“…..and I think and that’s probably the constant struggle is are people, two 
things, one is do people fully understand what they think the risks are and 
what they almost in their heads accept they should be able to deal with 
and then can they resource that but I mean there’s people that have that 
think you know we should be able to deal with X, Y and Z but actually the 
reality is we’ve lost the people to be able to do it.” – 05 Participant 
 
“I think where things have failed it’s because people haven't understood 
what’s really important and so yes you might be very, very busy, you might 
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be stretched but you’ve not actually understood what’s most important at 
that time and what resources you’ve got to deal with it and then that ability 
to adapt …” – 02 Participant 
 
However, emergency response will only be effective if there are enough people 
available to provide assistance and respond.  The availability of resources for 
emergency response is discussed in greater detail in Section 4.71. 
“So we are looking at from our point of view performance of our assets but 
in terms of resilience its making sure there are plans in place or resources 
in place to deal with whatever can come across because I’ve been in 
[Name] for the last four or five years and I’ve never had a, we’ve had similar 
incidents but they’ve always had different outcomes and so it’s you had to 
be resilient to ensure you can get, you have the right capability in place.” 
– 01 Participant 
 
 
“I mean we’ve had I mean the simple terms is I suppose is it’s the capability 
to sort of respond and adapt to an adverse event and that’s the basic sort 
of response I suppose but we’ll have lots of assets in terms of the business 
I mean how, how resilient we are as individuals in the business…” – 09 
Participant 
 
This will be explored in greater detail within Chapter 8 and within the context of 
the wider system of emergency management. 
 
4.6.2 Multi-agency exercising and training 
Training and exercising was considered to be extremely important in terms of 
achieving and building resilience within emergency management.  This is 
because every emergency situation will present a different set of challenges that 
may not have been considered within the emergency plan.  Therefore it is 
important that everyone who is involved in dealing with an emergency is fully 
trained and exercised.  This provides flexibility within emergency management 
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because responders are able to think around a problem if they are confident and 
understand the system of emergency management. 
“…one thing is you will never say in the [Name] is that will never happen 
inevitability it always does you know you can’t do too much pre-planning 
you know that is one of the things we need to do, we need to do that more, 
to test our procedures and test our plans to make sure we have got it right.” 
– 04 Participant 
 
“On the other side of things if we can't predict what it’s going to be then so 
we can't say it’s going to be this widespread power outage again I think 
the reason we focused on the training I spoke about earlier is that we want 
managers who’ve got the ability to plan and run an incident on the hoof 
and to respond to the information they’ve got to hand.  So we want them 
to be able to make decisions based on the information they’ve got in an 
incident rather than say right I’m going to pick up this plan and just work 
through the plan.  So we’ve focused more heavily on the training than we 
have on the plan development I think so that we’ve got that capability in 
the organisation rather than a plan which might not be appropriate.” – 11 
Participant 
 
Within the context of multi-agency training and exercising, this presented another 
opportunity to build relationships, collaborate effectively and meet the people that 
would be involved in the multi-agency emergency response. 
 
 “So training is a good one to get people together to learn the faces, to 
make contacts and then when you know the sherbet hits the fan you pick 
up the phone and you’re talking to X you probably already know that 
person and you’ve already established some form of rapport with them.” – 
03 Participant  
 
“Well obviously it’s having that relationships with the LRF and other people 
and again working then with people who you know and you know what 
their expectations are and what they can do and what they expect from us 
et cetera so it’s having all that knowledge and the relationships and then 
obviously we do multiagency debriefs post an event or an exercise and 
again those learnings are then sort of shared and actioned upon and again 
that’s sort of then managed by the training and exercising group as part of 
the LRF so it’s quite tied together.” – 09 Participant 
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This also ensures there is the right capability in place for emergency response 
because when people are together in the exercise they will share information 
regarding the resources they have available.  This process helps to manage 
expectations and reinforce the roles and responsibilities of each responding 
organisation.  However, with austerity and the cost of designing effective 
exercises in terms of time, resources and finances, the process of training and 
participating in multi-agency exercises is not always possible.   
“Yeah cause I think maybe some see it as like organising something quite 
intensive in terms of resources organising a big exercising takes quite a 
bit of time … when you sit down and start to think about things there’s all 
sorts to think about and I think sometimes people are organising and think 
have I got enough resource to put to that maybe not and maybe it gets put 
to the back of the pile on the bottom of the pile you know in terms of 
whatever else is going on in the [Organisation].” – 04 Participant 
 
 
“We monitor the sort of response capabilities we have to that exercise and 
then implement I don’t think we’ve ever run an exercise whereby we 
haven't had some learnings …” – 09 Participant 
 
There are many different approaches that are taken with how an exercise is 
conducted.  Participants commented that austerity measures and a lack of 
finance have meant that they need to look at ‘smarter’ ways to provide training 
and exercise.  This may be table top exercises looking at a particular scenario or 
using one big exercise to test many different components of the emergency plans.  
“But it’s very much a low level tabletop exercise this one but clearly they’re 
really quite important players and we’re looking to develop with [Location] 
again a very low level exercise to test our water distribution plan which we 
haven't needed to sort of test but it would be more a low level sort of walk 
through tabletop as opposed to a you know getting people out and about 
live.” – 16 Participant 
 
241 
 
“Yes so in the LRF we aim to have a multiagency sort of large exercise 
every three years but between sort of exercise to exercise you know we 
do sort of multiagency training and exercising on various issues and 
aspects as well so.” – 14 Participant 
 
Participants also provided examples of regional exercising and training groups 
that look at low probability high consequence events in terms of the level of 
disruption the region could withstand if a major highway was destroyed or a 
reservoir failed. This allowed participants to form a comprehensive understanding 
of the resources and capabilities required for emergency response: 
“But they do a lot of training and exercising on big incidents so they have 
done plane crashes over big road networks, they’ve done flooding, they’ve 
done avian influenza, they done some of the key incidents and basically 
they’ve got, whoever the lead organisation is they end up leading the 
exercise and it’s not specifically to look at that incident it’s more to look at 
the wider consequences as a team as individual organisations that as a 
group what would be the main issues. So, for example if an aeroplane hit 
one of the major road networks, forgetting about how to deal with that on 
the ground, we don’t look at that, that is more to look at what are the wider 
consequences of losing that road for say six weeks, seven weeks, eight 
weeks.” – 01 Participant 
 
The Category 1 responders are very experienced in dealing with emergency 
situations because it is an essential part of their day job.  For the Category 1 
responders, command and control is very much part of their organisational 
culture.  However, this is not the same for Category 2 responders or the WSP’s.  
One participant perceived this to be quite intimidating and attending emergency 
exercises and training provides an opportunity to overcome concerns working 
with the Category 1 responders.  
“So I think we want to get over the fear factor of our people being asked to 
work with other organisations whose day job is responding to incidents.  
So I think there’s a little bit of, well we’ll still get nervous if you’ve got to go 
to the local resilience forum GCG then it’s better if you know what you’re 
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going to find when you get there rather than go along thinking right, there’s 
going to be the chief superintendent running it, there’s going to be senior 
managers from all of these other organisations like fire and ambulance 
and I’m going to be sitting there representing [Name] so you want people 
to know what it’s going to feel like.” – 11 Participant 
 
4.7 Achieving effective emergency response 
Effective emergency response is supported through good situational awareness 
and this needs to be achieved very early in the incident to allow emergency 
responders time to assess the capabilities and resources required to manage the 
incident.  Many participants highlighted the need for Category 2 responders to 
share information regarding their incidents at an earlier stage of the emergency 
and how communication is essential throughout the process of emergency 
management.  This is usually developed and enhanced though good working 
relationships. 
“I think there’s something around that from the wider perspective of a lot 
of incidents we’re only notified of once they’ve reached a certain level and 
it’s there might be something more from our side of a better awareness 
early on or with those smaller incidents so it becomes business as usual.  
The nightmare for me would be a utility failing and saying we’ve done as 
much as we can, over to you now.  OK right, where do I even start so I 
think there’s maybe some more, more work to be done around getting 
those links in earlier.” – 02 Participant 
 
“…you know how are we going to, what plans do we need, are those plans 
fit for purpose or what do we need to train and exercise on and it’s ticking 
those boxes and then when you actually have an incident you’re dealing 
with the same people who have been sat round a table discussing the 
problems before so it’s that relationship building and it’s being confident 
that when you respond that you know you will be able to deal with 
whatever’s in front of you because if you get the right people around the 
table with the right resources and the right will and focus then you can 
drive it forward and a lot of the JESIP principles come into that.” – 07 
Participant 
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Participants also mentioned potential difficulties accessing mutual aid if each 
organisation has a different approach to emergency response.  Multi-agency 
collaboration during the planning process is important so that organisations are 
familiar with working practices and there is a standardised consistent approach. 
“…..are you capable of doing the plan having proved that you’ve got both 
the assets in place and the staffing to make it work because anything less 
than that you’re putting yourself under more pressure and more relying on 
mutual aid and if you are relying on mutual aid have you actually thought 
through where those people are coming from because it’s easy to say oh 
we’ll just bring people in from another county but then you started to realise 
but they don’t know the plans, they have different ways of working.” – 06 
Participant 
 
Providing effective emergency response to low probability, high consequence 
events can be very challenging in terms of understanding the resources and 
capabilities required for an uncertain situation.  There are very good mechanisms 
in place for known threats and hazards that occur on a daily basis and both the 
Category 1 and Category 2 responders are very experienced at dealing with 
these incidents.  However, participants considered low probability, high 
consequence events required a different approach, utilising a different set of skills 
where increasing resources may not provide an effective response.  The 
command and control methodology also places a restriction on the ability to 
recognise this because it is not flexible in its approach. 
“……and the intention was that you would just then replicate that and 
multiple that a number of times depending on how severe the scenario 
was and they said it just that didn't work you couldn’t just multiple your 
response up ten times sort of thing it just became a completely different 
sort of response requirement.  So I think that was one of the big learnings 
for a lot of the water companies that came out of that.” – 09 Participant 
 
Two participants expressed concern regarding the availability of mutual aid and 
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WSP’s potentially using the same contractor to provide an alternative supply of 
water during an emergency.   WSP’s did not actively share information regarding 
the contractors they used because this was considered sensitive information. 
However, many of the participants have made the assumption they are using the 
same one.  This raises the question as to whether the contractor will be able to 
fulfil their contracts if there is more than one incident requiring an alternative 
supply of water.  This has encouraged many of the WSP’s to assess how they 
can provide their own supply during an emergency. 
“No, there is no sort of, there is no sort of like contract manual that says 
here’s a list of all the contractors that [Name] use and this is what they do 
for them and [Name] don’t provide the same and [Name] and [Name] so 
nobody feeds into this massive sort of like you know contractor supply list 
so I could be sitting here saying well we use this company delivering that 
but I don’t know if five other companies do as well.”  - 13 Participant 
 
“So, it’s actually making sure that there is other resilience, so we’ve got 
our own measures in place with other companies and we are looking at 
other stuff, in terms of bottling our own water ourselves, potential business 
case,  just to see what’s out there and see if we can do it for our own 
resilience purposes because we realised if everyone relies on this one 
company, it’s not going to have, and it’s not just water companies that have 
a contract with them, local authorities have contracts with them other 
companies have contracts with them…” – 01 Participant 
 
4.7.1 Resources and availability of personnel 
The availability of personnel to be able to deliver an effective emergency 
response was a dominant theme throughout the interview process.  Every 
organisation participant mentioned challenges and difficulties associated with a 
lack of available personnel. This was not just related to emergency response, 
many of the participants discussed how emergency management teams were 
becoming smaller and yet they were expected to produce the same amount of 
work.  Participants also expressed concern regarding the number of people 
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available to provide a support role during an emergency.   A lack of available 
people would require organisations to rely on mutual aid. However, the 
organisations they rely on, are also experiencing the same issues.  The capability 
to respond to emergency situations is perceived as becoming greatly 
reduced.  
“I think my measure for everything ideally would be you find a way of 
working out what your structure’s going to be, how many people you need 
to make that structure, to populate that structure, can you do it over 
multiple shifts, have you got any slippage for extra people, have you 
thought mutual aid i.e. the practical ability to do what the plan says.” – 05 
Participant 
 
The loss of emergency management staff has a knock on effect because the 
emergency planning teams are also losing essential experience and knowledge.   
“…in recent times austerity has affected that where we’ve had you know 
fewer people to do those things and the turnover of staff means turbulence 
and turnover in the knowledge base and that becomes quite an issue in 
matters of resilience and planning the knowledge just drifts away and you 
have to prepare other people and that’s a constant battle.” – 15 
Participant 
 
This also has implications regarding the ability to work with external organisations 
and local community groups if there are not enough personnel to be able to 
engage in collaborative working partnerships. 
 
4.8 Working with Communities 
Working together with local communities was considered to be of great benefit 
throughout the process of emergency management because it strengthens the 
emergency response.  Working collaboratively with a local community gave the 
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participants access to local knowledge and the potential for additional resource 
during an emergency depending on the skill set.  It was also perceived as allowing 
for greater communication, a shared understanding of risk, the ability to manage 
expectations and a shared understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the 
responder organisations. 
“Oh communication, identified skills, local knowledge, it’s all of those 
things and you know I see it from both sides because I’m part of the 
community that gets flooded in [Location] so again you know we, our 
community, I’m only new to it but it’s quite clear when the emergency 
services turn up they’ll be told what to do by the community group because 
they’ve got flood wardens who have been flood wardens for forty years 
and know how to read the sea so it is a, it’s really interesting you see that 
has been an absolute perfect model through to probably what we’ve got in 
[Location] which we haven’t had the major incidences recently so therefore 
we keep talking about what each agency would do but we’re not absolutely 
certain how it would come together because we haven’t been able to put 
it into practice, exercises are OK but they don’t actually get to the real 
thing.” – 07 Participant 
 
“Oh it strengthens it because generally speaking when you get involved 
with communities and you start planning around risks that affect those 
communities you will find that you’ve got an awful lot of expertise in the 
area because people know it and they understand it.” – 14 Participant 
 
Where strong collaboration exists, participants are moving towards developing 
response structures within the community and actively incorporating the 
community within the emergency management process.  This will be explored in 
greater depth in Chapter 7. 
“We’re trying to train, so we have basically a response structure very small 
scale and a list of what the risks are in the community and a list of 
community assets so have you got church halls, village halls, pubs things 
that you can use and what we say to them as a community group is 
effectively because we’re such a large county it can take a while for 
emergency services to get there, even the ability to deal with certain 
incidents in the first, until such time the support gets there.” – 05 
Participant 
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Within the multi-agency environment of the LRF, it is usually the Local Authority 
and Environment Agency that take a lead role in engaging with communities in 
the development of flood plans.  WSP’s are not involved in the development of 
community flood plans although, they do engage and educate communities in 
water related issues. This may involve visiting a local school to teach children 
about the water cycle. 
“We don’t work with community plans, we do stuff in the communities, 
[Location] works with communities, we won’t, we don’t get involved in any 
community plans because obviously a lot of it’s down, just to do with our 
water network assets. I know local authorities do, local authorities do their 
local flood plans along with the EA but we do do education, educating 
people in communities.” – 01 Participant 
 
 
”.yes community resilience is key it’s one of our strategic objectives and I 
think again it’s building bridges and after the flooding it was for us it was 
strike while the iron’s hot and go into communities and say right we’d like 
you to have this template which we give them for community resilience 
plan .” – 07 Participant 
 
Participants also mentioned difficulties collaborating with communities in large 
urban areas because there is a perception that these communities are not so well 
connected as those in a rural environment. 
“We’ve got quite high urban population at risk of flooding and we’ve tried 
engagement, we’ve tried a number of ways and what we’ve found is that 
traditional community emergency plan really doesn't lend itself within those 
sort of environments.  We’ve got a number of community plans for smaller, 
more rural locations where it’s not even socioeconomic some of them 
they’re not the wealthiest villages by any chance but they’ve got a good 
network in there, everyone knows everyone else …. “ – 02 Participant 
 
While it is recognised that working collaboratively with local community groups 
strengthens the emergency management process, a different approach may be 
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required to identify and engage with community groups within an urban 
environment. 
 
4.8.1 Social Media  
The introduction of social media has added another dimension to emergency 
response that was of concern to many of the participants.  This is because of the 
speed at which members of the public can upload information to the internet.  This 
instantaneous supply of information has presented a number of challenges for 
emergency responders in terms of controlling misinformation and being able to 
establish an authoritative social media presence. 
“I think the biggest issue I think is around social media and taking 
customers, meeting customers’ expectations because before you used to 
have 6 o’clock news and or 6 o’clock and night news or 9 o’clock in the 
morning news, whatever time you had set deadlines, when now 
everything’s 24/7. One wrong tweet, one wrong message could change 
customers perception very quickly and so it’s very hard to stay on top of 
our comms and that’s why we have a comms department who do all the 
social media and keep track of our social media because we realise that 
actually that this is an area we could slip up on and it might not be because 
the organisations not doing anything it’s because it’s the expectations a lot 
more’s expected because everyone’s expects everything with the click of 
a finger …” – 01 Participant 
 
Social media has also challenged public perception of the emergency 
responder’s and WSP’s ability to attend an incident within an appropriate 
timescale.  Information is instantly uploaded, which creates a perception that 
there should also be an instantaneous response.  However, it takes time to 
develop situational awareness and determine the capabilities required for 
effective emergency response. 
“…you know if you’re going to use it you need to get in early and get the 
right hashtag on it so people refer to that rather than anything else and you 
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can actually control you know, well have some influence on it because you 
know people will believe in conspiracy theories and all the rest of it and as 
you’ve already said you know anyone can be Twittering anything and it 
could be the wrong message.” – 03 Participant 
 
4.8.2 Reliance on the WSP 
Many participants recognised that the utility companies are facing a difficult 
challenge because people are so reliant on the provision of essential services 
that they may not prepare for a failure of the water supply which may make them 
less resilient should a failure occur. 
“I think we’re entering a bit of a new phase where that expectation there’s 
going to be work done around trying to manage that public expectation 
and the whole community resilience side from the water industry I think 
there’s probably some messages starting to come out around what you 
can do for yourself that I think people are so used to utilities not failing now 
that when it does come it comes as a, it’s seen as a surprise and maybe 
there’s not that resilience there used to be even the design of water boilers 
used to have quite a bit of water inside them but everyone’s moved 
towards combi-boilers where you ain’t going to have any spare capacity in 
your systems and you just sort of think some of the ways we used to 
operate had some redundancy in them.” – 02 Participant 
 
The expectation of a continuous supply of water or electricity is very high and 
because people pay for these services they may not consider the need to develop 
resilience to failure.  This will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 5. 
 
4.9 Summary 
The aim of Objective 2 was to investigate the multi-agency approach to 
emergency management.  This was achieved through semi-structured interviews 
with LRF, WSP and Fire and Rescue Service emergency managers and 
contextualised using the following research questions. 
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4.9.1 Does the CCA, 2004 support the multi-agency approach to 
emergency management? 
The CCA, 2004 was perceived by participants as a positive approach to 
emergency management in the UK, by encouraging multi-agency collaboration 
before, during and after an emergency.  However, the legislation was also 
considered to be in need of review to reflect changes in current working practices.  
For instance the increasing use of social media by the public during an 
emergency.  This is creating difficulties for emergency responders and WSP’s 
because the public are providing an instantaneous source of information 
regarding the emerging situation.  However, this information may not be correct 
and is issued before participants are able to develop situational awareness and 
establish the resources and capabilities required for emergency response.  
Participants identified the ability to provide an authoritative presence on social 
media as a challenge without government guidance and the finances to hire and 
train specific personnel to maintain and manage social media.   
 
As part of the CCA, 2004, participants also identified the need for government 
regulation of emergency management in the form of audits, benchmarking or 
performance measures.  Every two years all members of the LRF are required to 
complete the National Capabilities Survey to provide the government with 
information regarding emergency capabilities at a local level.  However, 
participants did not consider this to be an effective approach because it does not 
explore how emergency management is conducted in enough detail or explore 
whether the emergency plans that have been developed are fit for purpose.  
 
251 
 
Participants require more direction from government and in particular the sharing 
of good practice.  This would allow participants to identify strengths and 
weaknesses in the approach they have taken to emergency management.  It also 
promotes and encourages learning if good practice includes examples where an 
approach was not successful. 
 
Within the framework of the CCA, 2004, multi-agency collaboration and the 
sharing of information at a local level is conducted though the LRF.  However, 
this is difficult for organisations that operate over a large geographic area that 
may encompass one or more LRF’s.  This is complicated further with each LRF 
operating autonomously at a local level.  It is not possible for WSP’s and other 
utility companies to engage effectively with every LRF and this has led many 
participants to take a regional approach to multi-agency collaboration rather than 
operate at a local level. 
 
The lack of statutory duties or evidence of enforcement, created the perception 
that Category 2 responders have the ability to ‘opt out’ and provide the minimum 
in terms of engagement.  This led one participant to term the CCA, 2004 as a 
‘toothless tiger’.  It was suggested by participants that utility companies providing 
essential services to the public should also be considered as Category 1 
responders with a legislative duty to share and exchange information.  This would 
reinforce the emergency management process and prevent organisations from 
being able to ‘opt out’. 
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Many organisations that comprise the LRF operate within a different 
organisational culture.  However this was not considered by participants as a 
barrier to effective multi-agency collaboration because during an emergency they 
operate within the same principles of joint operational working practices as 
defined within JESIP (JESIP, 2016). 
 
4.9.2 How do the Category 1 responders and the WSP’s perceive the multi-
agency approach to emergency management? 
Building and establishing relationships was a dominant factor attributed to the 
effectiveness of each theme and collaboration was perceived to be enhanced 
where strong relationships existed between organisations.  A multi-agency 
approach to emergency planning encourages organisations to share information 
regarding the resources and capabilities required for effective emergency 
response and promotes the development of a shared perception of risk.  This 
allows participants to determine and assess the ability to achieve resilience both 
within their own organisation and through a multi-agency approach. If 
organisations are relying on one another to provide mutual aid during an 
emergency, it is necessary to have a realistic expectation of what an organisation 
is able to provide. 
 
The process of building relationships also helps to establish trust between 
organisations.  However, this also relies on the sharing of information and many 
participants identified difficulties sharing information between organisations.  This 
was a particular problem regarding vulnerable people because formal 
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mechanisms had not been established for sharing this information across 
different organisations. 
 
Effective collaboration through building relationships and sharing information to 
develop a greater understanding of how each organisation operates during an 
emergency, is essential for effective emergency response.  Throughout the 
interviews, participants discussed how this was reinforced through multi-agency 
training and exercising.  This enabled a shared understanding of the roles and 
responsibilities of each organisation and provided participants with the 
opportunity to gain experience of working together during an emergency.  
Knowledge and experience gained from both exercising and responding to actual 
emergencies was perceived to contribute towards achieving resilience.  This is 
because every emergency is different and requires responders to be flexible and 
adaptable in their approach. This can only be achieved if participants are trained 
and competent within their roles.  These skills are necessary to determine and 
assess the resources and capabilities required when responding to an extreme 
event.  
 
Throughout the interviews limitations of finance and resources was perceived to 
be a great challenge for emergency management professionals.  This was of 
great concern for participants because they perceived they were expected to 
provide the same level of service with less resources.  The introduction of 
software such as Resilience Direct was widely recognised as beneficial to 
improve multi-agency collaboration.  However, participants did not have enough 
people to train and use the system effectively.  While participants recognised the 
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importance of multi-agency training and exercising, these were also considered 
expensive in terms of finance and available resource to implement.   
 
4.9.3 How do LRF’s and the WSP’s collaborate with local community 
groups in the multi-agency approach to emergency management? 
Working together with communities was considered to strengthen emergency 
management because participants were provided with local knowledge and the 
potential for additional resource.  The sharing and exchange of information with 
communities also contributed to a shared perception of risk and the realistic 
determination of how responder organisations operate during an emergency.   
 
Participants perceived the use of social media by the public during an emergency 
as a particular challenge.  This is because they perceived the instantaneous 
upload of information difficult to manage.  There were examples where 
information regarding an emergency situation had been uploaded before the 
emergency responders arrived at the scene.  There were concerns regarding a 
public expectation that information should be provided immediately by 
participants on social media.  This does not allow participants enough time to 
develop an awareness of the emergency situation and to determine how 
emergency response should be delivered. Managing public expectations 
regarding the continual provision of a centralised supply of water was also 
considered by participants.  It was perceived that the public were not prepared 
and were not resilient to a failure of the water supply.  This will be explored in 
greater depth within Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
255 
 
5 CHAPTER 5 - GENERAL ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS TO 
WATER SUPPLY FAILURE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 sought to understand the multi-agency approach to emergency 
management within the framework of the CCA, (2004) and how this contributed 
to achieving resilience within the UK water sector.  However, this only represents 
one aspect of the emergency management system.  It was demonstrated within 
Chapter 1 (Section 1.3) that in order to achieve resilience to extreme events it is 
necessary to understand the structural elements that comprise the system and 
how they are connected to identify where resilience measures should be applied.     
 
As discussed within the literature review (Chapter 2, Section 2.6) there is an 
increasing emphasis to encourage the resilience of communities and individuals 
to emergency situations.  In order to develop effective resilience based strategies 
that engage and encourage individuals to achieve resilience requires a greater 
understanding of individual attitudes and perceptions of water supply failure.  This 
was explored using an individual homeowner questionnaire developed using the 
methodology presented within Chapter 3 (Section 3.5) using the research 
questions identified within Chapter 1, Section 1.4 (Objective 3).  The results of 
the individual homeowner questionnaire represent a partial contribution to 
achieving Objective 3 (Chapter 1, Section 1.4) by exploring general attitudes and 
perceptions to water supply failure whereas Chapter 6 explores attitudes and 
perceptions to water supply failure during an extreme event.  
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This Chapter will proceed as follows:  Section 5.2 will examine the demographic 
profile of the questionnaire respondents, Section 5.3 and 5.4 will discuss attitudes 
and perceptions to hazards within a respondent’s local area.  Section 5.5 explores 
attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure followed by a Chapter summary 
in Section 5.6. 
 
5.2 The demographic profile of questionnaire respondents 
There were 131 responses to the individual home owner questionnaire.  The 
majority of respondents were male (60%), 38% of the respondents were female 
and 2% did not provide a response.  The 18 to 24 age range was under-
represented compared with the other age range categories and there was a 
greater proportion of males within the 65 years and over age range.  This has 
resulted in a skewed dataset (Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1:  Population pyramid demonstrating age range and gender of 
questionnaire respondents. 
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Figure 5.2: Property ownership and the length of time respondents had lived 
within their current property. 
 
With regard to property ownership (Figure 5.2), the majority of respondents either 
owned their property outright (48%) or owned their property with a mortgage 
(43%).  Of the respondents that owned their property outright, there was a range 
of response regarding the length of time respondents had lived within their current 
property.  This information was of interest because it may enable a greater 
understanding of how a respondent perceived the hazards within their local area.  
The majority of respondents (32%), had lived within their current property for 
under 10 years, 25% had lived within their current property between 11 to 20 
years,  23% between 21 to 30 years and 20% of respondents had lived with their 
current property for over 31 years including one respondent who had lived within 
their current property for 63 years.  
 
Of the respondents that owned their property with a mortgage, 51% had lived 
within their property for under 10 years, 29% had lived within their current 
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property between 11 to 20 years and 20% had lived in their current property for 
21 to 30 years. 
 
5% of respondents rented their property either from the Local Authority or from 
the Housing Association.  The majority of these (50%) had lived within their 
current property for under 10 years.  1 respondent <1% had lived within their 
current property between 11 to 20 years with the remaining respondents 
occupying their current property between 21 to 30 years.  All of the respondent 
living in privately rented accommodation had lived within their current property for 
under 10 years. 
 
In terms of current working status, 49% of respondents, are employed full time, 
33%, are retired, 14%, are employed part time, 2%, selected house wife/house 
husband, 1%, are students, <1%, were unemployed not looking for work and <1%  
selected the ‘other’ category.  
 
5.3 Thinking about your local area 
This section of the questionnaire relates to the general hazards that may affect 
an individual within the local village, town or city where the questionnaire was 
delivered.  Respondents were asked a series of questions relating to the hazards 
considered to be of most risk to residents within the UK (Appendix 2, Section 1).  
The hazards were taken from the 2015 NRR (National Risk Register, 2015).  This 
was developed by the UK Government to provide a national assessment of risk 
that members of the public can access.  This research will predominately 
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concentrate on the response to questions relating to water supply failure.   
However, questions relating to other hazards were included to understand how 
water supply failure was perceived within the context of other hazards that are 
considered a risk within the NRR (National Risk Register, 2015).   
 
It was not the intention of this research to assess whether a respondent had 
correctly identified these as hazards within their area.  River flooding, coastal 
flooding and gas supply failure are location specific hazards. These hazards were 
included to provide context for respondents when answering questions but are 
excluded from the analysis because they are location specific and some of the 
respondents do not live in a location that would be affected by one of these 
hazards.  The questionnaire responses were anonymous so it is not possible to 
request this information from respondents.  The following analysis will consider 
water supply failure in the context of general hazards that potentially affect all 
locations.  These include, surface water flooding, sewer flooding, drought, 
heatwaves, low temperatures, heavy snow, storms and gales, pandemic 
influenza, widespread electricity failure and water supply failure. 
 
The range of hazards was included within four questions to enable respondents 
to contextualise water supply failure in relation to other hazards that may affect 
them.  These questions explored risk perception, experience of hazards, 
perceived importance of preparing for hazards and whether respondents actively 
prepared.   
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5.4 Understanding attitudes and perceptions of general hazards 
The first question asked respondents, when thinking about your local area, do 
you think any of the following hazards are a risk to you?  This question was 
intended to provide an indication of how individual respondents perceive the risk 
of hazards within their local area.   Understanding individual perception of risk, 
and the factors that may influence it, may help to inform risk awareness and 
communication programmes.  This will also provide an insight into how 
respondents perceive the risk of hazards and whether this influences attitudes 
toward preparedness and perceived responsibility to take action.   
 
Figure 5.3: Respondents perception of the risk of hazards within their local area. 
 
The majority of hazards were perceived to be low risk with the exception of storms 
and gales (Figure 5.3).  This hazard received the greatest response within the 
‘high risk’ and ‘medium risk’ category.  Storms and Gales represent one of the 
most prevalent hazards in the UK and occur frequently during the winter months.  
Since 2015, the Met Office has been naming storms to raise awareness of each 
event and promote more effective communication of information.  Storm names 
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are also used extensively by the media which reinforces awareness of each storm 
event.  The last severe storm affecting the UK was Storm Desmond.  This 
occurred during the winter of 2015-2016, and brought severe gale force winds 
and heavy rainfall to northern parts of the UK.  This resulted in the closure of main 
arterial roads, disruption to the UK rail network and widespread flooding of over 
5,000 homes.  The flooding of an electricity substation also resulted in the loss of 
electricity to over 60,000 homes (van Oldenborgh et al, 2015).   
 
The highest response attributed to the category ‘don’t know’ was for pandemic 
influenza.  According to the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK, there have 
been 3 instances of a flu pandemic throughout the last century. The most serious 
outbreak of influenza occurred during 1918 resulting in the deaths of over 50 
million people across the world (Johnson and Mueller, 2002).  A pandemic on this 
scale has not been experienced since 1918, although there have been 
pandemics on a smaller scale occurring in 1957 and 1968.  This may have 
contributed to the high response within the category ‘don’t know’ for this hazard. 
 
The greatest response attributed to the category of ‘low risk’, was in response to 
snow and the greatest response attributed to the category ‘no risk’, was in 
response to drought.  Drought is considered to be a relatively rare event within 
the UK and compared to storms and gales, there have been relatively few 
episodes of drought over the last 50 years (Watts et al, 2012; Marsh, 2007).    
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Figure 5.4: Respondents experience of hazards within their local area. 
 
In order to gain a greater understanding of risk perception, respondents were 
asked whether they had experience of any of the hazards within their local area.  
Storms and gales, low temperatures, heavy snow, heatwaves and surface water 
flooding received a higher response compared to sewer flooding, drought, 
pandemic influenza, widespread electricity failure and water supply failure. 
 
Storms and gales were experienced by the majority of respondents and were 
perceived to be ‘high risk’ and ‘medium risk’ hazards.  While many respondents 
had experience of low temperatures and heavy snow, these were perceived as 
‘low risk’.  It is possible that a lack of experience with regard to sewer flooding, 
drought, pandemic influenza, widespread electricity failure and water supply 
failure may have contributed to the perception of these hazards as ‘low risk’ within 
the context of this questionnaire (Figure 5.4).  However, as discussed within the 
literature review (Chapter 2, Section 2.4), it is also important to acknowledge that 
risk perception is a complex process influenced by many factors.  These may 
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include the possession of knowledge, trust, perceived control, cultural identity, 
societal expectations and the complexities associated with the personality traits 
of an individual (Dobbie et al, 2016; Slovic et al, 2004; Slovic and Webber, 2002) 
and may not be dependent on one single factor such as experience of a hazard. 
 
Figure 5.5: Respondents perception of the importance of preparing for hazards 
within their local area. 
 
To explore the relationship between individual risk perceptions and experience, 
respondents were asked to provide information regarding whether they perceive 
it to be important to prepare for hazards (Figure 5.5).  For the majority of hazards, 
respondents perceived it was ‘slightly important’ to prepare and this is consistent 
with the perception of many of the hazards as ‘low risk’.  This with the exception 
of storms and gales and low temperatures.  The highest response for these 
hazards was attributed to the category ‘moderately important’ to prepare.  Storms 
and gales and water supply failure also received the highest response to the 
category ‘very important’ to prepare.  As previously mentioned, storms and gales 
represent one of the most prevalent hazards in the UK and have been 
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experienced by a greater proportion of respondents.  This hazard also received 
the highest response for perceived risk in the ‘high risk’ and ‘medium risk’ 
category supporting the perception of this hazard as ‘very important’ to prepare.   
 
The greatest response attributed to the category ‘not at all important’ was 
attributed to pandemic influenza.  This response is consistent with the answers 
to the previous questions.  As the majority of respondents do not know if this 
hazard is a risk and do not know if they have had experience of this hazard then 
it would be reasonable to assume that respondents would perceive the 
importance of preparing for this hazard as ‘not at all important’.  The highest 
response attributed to the category, ‘extremely important’ to prepare was for 
water supply failure and this will be explored in greater detail in Section 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.6: Response regarding whether respondents actively prepare for 
hazards within their local area. 
In order to contextualise how respondents perceive the importance of preparing 
for hazards, they were also asked if they actively prepare for hazards within their 
local area.  It is considered that the act of being prepared enables an individual 
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to achieve a greater resilience to emergency situations and extreme events 
(Paton et al, 2008).  However, the results of the individual householder 
questionnaire demonstrate the majority of respondents do not actively prepare 
for hazards within their local area (Figure 5.6).   
 
The greatest response attributed to the hazards respondents actively prepared 
for, were storms and gales, low temperatures, heavy snow, widespread electricity 
failure and surface water flooding.  Storms and gales, low temperatures and 
heavy snow were experienced by the majority of respondents.  However, only 
storms and gales were perceived as ‘very important’ to prepare, yet despite this, 
the majority of respondents do not actively prepare for this hazard. 
 
Surface water flooding and widespread electricity failure were perceived as ‘low 
risk’ and only ‘slightly important’ to prepare by the majority of respondents and 
this was supported by a low response regarding experience of these hazards.  
The results demonstrate that a small proportion of respondents actively prepare 
for these hazards.   
 
These results demonstrate the relationship between risk perception, experience 
of hazards and whether an individual will actively prepare is complex and as 
discussed within the literature review (Chapter 2, Section 2.4) may be determined 
by other factors.  To explore the response to these questions in greater depth, 
respondents were provided with a series of statements with Section 3 of the 
questionnaire.  These were related to emergency preparedness and respondents 
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were asked to select a response from a 5 point Likert scale composed of ‘strongly 
agree’, ‘agree’, ‘don’t know’, ‘disagree’, ‘strongly disagree’. Respondents were 
asked to provide a response to the statements:  
 
‘I have a responsibility to prepare for an emergency’ and  
‘I take action to prepare for an emergency’. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Response to statements regarding whether a respondent perceives 
it is their responsibility to prepare for an emergency and whether they take 
action to prepare. 
 
The results demonstrate (Figure 5.7) the majority of respondents ‘agree’ (65%) 
they have a responsibility to prepare for an emergency.  However, the response 
to the statement, ‘I take action to prepare’ is mixed, with 45% of respondents 
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selecting they ‘disagree’ with this statement and 33% of respondents selecting 
they ‘agree’ and do take action to prepare for an emergency.  In response to the 
question regarding whether respondents actively prepare for hazards within their 
local area, the majority of these respondents stated they did not actively prepare 
(Figure 5.7).  Again this conflicting result would suggest there are other factors 
that influence decisions regarding whether an individual will take steps to actively 
prepare for a hazard. 
 
It was discussed within the literature review (Section 2.4) that preparedness is 
also influenced by perceived responsibility.  If an individual does not perceive it 
to be their responsibility, they may not take steps to actively prepare for an 
emergency.  This may provide an indication of why 45% of respondents do not 
take action to prepare for an emergency.  Questions were included within Section 
3 of the questionnaire, to explore perceived responsibility. 
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Figure 5.8: Response to the statements regarding whether respondents 
perceive the Local Authority has a responsibility to prepare for an emergency 
and whether respondents rely on the Local Authority to provide information 
during an emergency. 
 
Respondents were asked to respond to the statement: 
 ‘The Local Authority has a responsibility to prepare for an emergency’ 
 
This was to provide a greater understanding of whether respondents also 
perceive the Local Authority to be responsible for preparing for an emergency. 
The majority of respondents ‘agree’ (50%) and ‘strongly agree’ (41%) that the 
Local Authority has a responsibility to prepare (Figure 5.8).  This is also supported 
by the response to the statement: 
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‘I rely on the Local Authority to provide me with information during an 
emergency’.   
42% of respondents ‘agree’ with this statement.  However, there is also a large 
proportion of respondents (27%) that ‘disagree’ with this statement.  It is possible 
these respondents do not rely on the provision of information from one source 
but take a more active approach to access information from other sources.  To 
explore this further, respondents were asked to respond to the statements: 
 
‘I have been provided with information about how I can prepare for an 
emergency’  
‘I know where to obtain information about how I can prepare for an 
emergency’ 
 
These statements were included to explore the ‘top down’ approach to the 
communication of hazard information as discussed within the literature review 
(Section 2.6).  The UK Government has a dedicated website providing 
information to the public regarding how they can prepare for an emergency.  The 
website contains a great deal of information regarding individual preparedness   
However, all of this information relies on the individual having knowledge 
regarding the availability of this information and gaining access to the website.  
270 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Response to the statements regarding the provision of information 
during an emergency and whether a respondent perceives they know where to 
obtain information. 
 
While the majority of respondents ‘disagree’ (38%) with the statement regarding 
the provision of information, 39% ‘agree’  to knowing where to obtain information 
regarding emergency preparedness (Figure 5.9).   
 
It was discussed within the literature review (Chapter 2, Section 2.7), how 
information regarding national and local hazards can be obtained through the 
government website, the NRR and CRR’s produced by the LRF’s.  To understand 
if this information contributed to a greater understanding of local hazards, 
respondents were asked where they obtain information regarding hazards in their 
local area (Figure 5.10).  The results demonstrate, the majority of respondents 
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obtain information regarding hazards within their local area from the television, 
family and friends, radio and the Met Office. 
 
 
Figure 5.10:  Respondent perception of where they would obtain information 
regarding hazards within their local area. 
 
There was a low response regarding Local Resilience Forums, the NRR or the 
CRR and these sources of information also received the greatest response in the 
category ‘don’t think about it’.  This may suggest that respondents are not aware 
this information is available and it is not being used by respondents to find out 
about hazards within their local area.   
 
Social media is increasingly used by utility companies to provide customers with 
information regarding the provision of essential services.  WSP’s use Facebook, 
Twitter and their company webpage to provide customers with information 
regarding water supply issues.  However, the majority of respondents within this 
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questionnaire do not use Twitter or Facebook to find out about hazards within 
their local area.   
 
5.5 Understanding attitudes and perceptions of water supply failure 
The previous section explored attitudes and perceptions to general hazards 
identified within the NRR.  This section aims to explore and develop a greater 
understanding of individual attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Risk perception of water supply failure 
 
The results of the individual homeowner questionnaire indicate the majority of 
respondents (63%) perceive water supply failure to be ‘low risk’ within their local 
area.  19% of respondents perceive water supply failure to a ‘medium risk’, 11% 
‘didn’t know’, 5% of respondents perceived it to be ‘no risk’ and 2% of 
respondents perceived water supply failure to be a ‘high risk’ (Figure 5.11).    
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Further analysis was conducted to explore if there were any influencing factors 
that may contribute to the perception of water supply failure as ‘low risk’.  These 
included questions relating to experience of water supply failure and the length 
of time respondents had lived within their current property.  The majority of 
respondents indicated they did not have experience of water supply failure 
(Figure 5.12).  A comparison of the perceived level of risk and whether 
respondents have experience of water supply failure was conducted within SPSS 
(Table 5.1) to gain a greater understanding of how risk was perceived compared 
to experience. 
 
Figure 5.12: Response to the question regarding experience of water supply 
failure. 
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Experience of Water Supply Failure (%) 
Yes No Don't Know 
At Risk of Water Supply 
Failure 
High Risk 1 2 0 
Medium Risk 9 9 1 
Don't Know 1 9 1 
Low Risk 13 48 2 
No Risk 2 4 0 
 
Table 5.1: Comparison of how respondents perceive the risk of water supply 
failure against experience. 
 
The results indicate that 48% of respondents that did not have experience of 
water supply failure also perceive the risk of water supply failure to be ‘low risk’.  
Of these, 51% of the respondents that perceive water supply failure to be ‘low 
risk’ have lived in their property for over 10 years.  If respondents have lived within 
their current property and have not had any prior experience of water supply 
failure, then it is possible they would perceive water supply failure as ‘low risk’.   
 
However, as previously mentioned in Section 5.4 and within the literature review 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.4), it is important to acknowledge this may not be the only 
factor influencing the perception of water supply failure.  The possession of 
knowledge, trust, perceived control and perceived responsibility were some of the 
factors considered to influence an individual’s perception of risk (Dobbie et al, 
2016; Slovic et al, 2004; Slovic and Webber, 2002).  Questions were included 
within Section 2 and Section 3 of the questionnaire to explore these factors in 
relation to water supply failure (Appendix 2, Section 2 and 3).  
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Section 3 of the questionnaire included statements to explore individual 
perceptions with regard to perceived responsibility and to provide an insight 
regarding individual attitudes and perceptions to the WSP.  Respondents were 
asked to select a response from a five point Likert scale composed of ‘strongly 
agree’, ‘agree’, ‘don’t know’, ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ in response to 
each statement.  The statements included: 
“The water company will provide water if there is a failure of the water 
supply.” 
“I rely on the local water company to provide water in all circumstances.” 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Response to statements relating to the provision of water and 
perceived reliance on water provision. 
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It was perceived by 51% of the respondents that the WSP will provide water if 
there is a failure of the water supply.  25% of respondents, ‘don’t know’, 17% of 
respondents ‘strongly agree’, 5% ‘disagree’ and 2% ‘strongly disagree’ (Figure 
5.13).  These results demonstrate, the majority of respondents have a great deal 
of confidence that the water service provider will provide water if there is a failure 
of the water supply.  This may influence how the risk of water supply failure is 
perceived and whether respondents perceive it necessary to prepare.  It is 
possible that respondents do not perceive the risk to be high because they have 
confidence and trust in the WSP to provide a supply of water during periods of 
failure.  This perception is also supported by 55% of respondents indicating they 
‘agree’ and 19% of respondents indicating they ‘strongly agree’ with the 
statement ‘I rely on the local water company to provide water in all circumstances’ 
(Figure 5.13).  This would suggest a high level of confidence and trust in the WSP. 
 
This was explored in greater depth through a series of questions asking 
respondents to indicate how confident they were receiving a reliable, continuous 
and safe supply of water from their local water company (Figure 5.14). 
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Figure 5.14: Perceived confidence of respondents receiving a reliable, 
continuous and safe supply of water. 
 
The majority of respondents are ‘extremely confident’ (49%) receiving a reliable 
supply of water from the local water service provider and this was supported by 
45% of respondents indicating they were ‘very confident’.  A high response was 
provided with regard to the perceived level of confidence receiving a continuous 
(49% ‘extremely confident’) and safe supply of water (47% ‘extremely confident’).  
 
These results demonstrate that respondents have a high level of confidence in 
the provision of a reliable, continuous and safe supply of water.  In the event of 
water supply failure, a high proportion of respondents perceive the WSP will be 
able to provide an alternative supply of water and respondents rely on the WSP 
to provide water in all circumstances.  These perceptions are also reinforced by 
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a lack of experience of water supply failure for the majority of respondents and 
may influence a respondent’s perception of water supply failure as ‘low risk’. 
 
While the majority of respondents within table 5.2 have no experience of water 
supply failure, 13% expressed how they did have experience of water supply 
failure but they also perceive the risk of water supply failure to be low.  In order 
to understand why this had not resulted in a greater perception of risk, it is 
necessary to explore the response provided within another question (Appendix 
2, question 7).  Respondents were requested to provide further information 
regarding their personal experience of any of the hazards presented in question 
6 (Appendix 2) and included water supply failure. This question asked 
respondents to include a brief description of what happened, who was involved 
and how the emergency situation was resolved?  Of the 13% of respondents that 
had experienced water supply failure, there were 11 responses regarding water 
supply failure with some respondents providing a detailed account of the incident 
and other respondents providing more general information. 
 
The first respondent (YWHX002) currently resides in Halifax in the North East of 
England and provided a brief account of water supply failure as a result of 
drought. The information provided corresponds very closely with the drought 
experienced during 1995, where the reservoirs levels were so low, water was 
transported by a convoy of tankers to provide the affected population with a 
centralised water supply.  Although the respondent had direct experience of an 
event where there was the potential to lose the water supply, the risk of water 
supply failure was still considered to be low.  The respondent (male, 65 years of 
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age) had lived in his property for over 45 years and did not mention experiencing 
water supply failure at any other time.  It is therefore possible this was his only 
experience of water supply failure in over 45 years.  
“Drought in the 70’s due to a heatwave on top of our Council selling water 
abroad.  This was resolved by having water transported from other parts 
of the country at a very high cost financially.” – Respondent YWHX002  
 
There were a few respondents that provided very limited information, for instance: 
 
“Suppliers of electricity and water which were cut off contacted households 
and then dealt with the problem” – Respondent SWEX009 
 
“Burst water main in the road led to water failure, 10 yrs or so ago.  
Repaired by [Name].” – Respondent WWBW003 
 
“Mains water pipe burst” – Respondent UUYE008 
 
“Water supply failure – water given out in village by [Name]” – 
Respondent UUYE004 
 
These examples did not provide any indication of the amount of time the 
respondents were without a water supply.  However, some of the responses did 
provide an indication that the matter was resolved by the WSP either through 
repair or by providing respondents with an alternative supply.   
 
The remaining respondents provided further information regarding the amount of 
time they were without a water supply.  In these examples the water supply failure 
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did not exceed a 24hr period with 2 respondents stating the situation was 
resolved and they were able to continue as normal.   
 
“There have been odd occasions when we have been without water for 
hours but that’s been due to a burst pipe so it’s resolved soon enough.” – 
Respondent UUYE006 
 
“Water supply was not accessible for a 10 hour period [Name] resolved 
the situation and carried on as normal.” – Respondent UUYE003 
 
“No gas for 48hrs due to excavator at local development damaging main 
2017. No water for 24hrs.” – Respondent WWBW005 
 
There was no indication in any of these examples that the experience of water 
supply failure was a negative one.  Respondents indicated that the matter had 
been resolved quickly or that an alternative supply of water had been provided.  
It is possible that this may have influenced each respondent’s perception of water 
supply failure as ‘low risk’ because it was resolved quickly and was not perceived 
to be a negative experience. 
 
The following respondents experienced a loss of the centralised water supply for 
a greater period of time as a result of the flooding of Mythe water treatment works 
during the 2007 floods.   
“We lost our water supply for a couple of days due to a problem at a 
pumping station.  Arrangements for an alternative were poor initially as 
was communication.” – Respondent AWPD004 
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While the respondent stated a loss of water supply for a ‘couple of days’ the 
respondent did not provide any further information regarding their ability to cope.  
However, the respondent did perceive the provision of information from the WSP 
regarding an alternative supply of water during the initial stages of the incident as 
‘poor’.  It is possible this respondent may perceive water supply failure as ‘low 
risk’ because they have not encountered a problem of this scale since 2007 and 
the water supply was restored within a couple of days. 
 
The final two respondents experienced a loss of their centralised water supply for 
over two weeks.  However, they both found an alternative solution with one 
respondent going to live with their partner for a couple of days and the second 
respondent able to obtain an alternative supply of water.  Having the ability and 
resources to cope and overcome an adverse situation may have contributed to 
the perception that water supply failure was ‘low risk’. 
 
“Water supply cut off for two weeks – used bowsers spent part of the time 
with partner who lived in a village where water supply ok.  Bottled water 
supplied for use.” – Respondent STBC004 
 
“With water problems, I am referring to the summer floods in 
Gloucestershire due to heavy continuous rainfall for several days.  Mythe 
water works near Twekesbury was entirely flooded with river water leading 
to contamination of the domestic and sewerage water supplies.  Bottles of 
water and water tankers were soon disposed so that relief was soon 
provided.  I was glad I had an old fashioned heating and water system with 
water tanks in the loft, so that I had a reservoir of my own, plus 3 water 
butts in the garden from which I topped up the loft tanks on a daily basis.  
The water works has since been completely protected by high, efficient 
floodwalls.” – Respondent STBC006 
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Within table 5.2, there were also a small percentage of respondents (9%) that 
have no experience of water supply failure but perceive water supply failure to be 
‘medium risk’.  The majority of these respondents are over the age of 55 and have 
lived in their property for under 30 years.  There may be personal circumstances 
as to why these respondents perceive the risk to be medium.  For instance, within 
the pilot questionnaire a number of respondents expressed the importance of 
having a provision of water to assist with medication. 
 
Also, parents of young children and babies that require regular sterilisation of 
bottles emphasized the need for water to be able to perform these duties.  
However, it is not understood from the results of this questionnaire why these 
respondents perceive the risk to be medium because they did not provide any 
further information.     
 
Figure 5.15: Response to the question regarding whether respondents perceive 
it to be important to prepare for water supply failure. 
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The questionnaire also included questions to explore whether respondents 
perceived it to be important to prepare for water supply failure.  The results 
demonstrate that 32% of respondents perceive it to be ‘slightly important’ to 
prepare for water supply failure (Figure 5.15).  25%, of respondents perceived it 
to be ‘moderately important’ to prepare, 19%, perceived it to be ‘very important’, 
13%, perceived it to be ‘extremely important’ and 12%, perceived it to be ‘not at 
all important’ to prepare for water supply failure.   
 
Further analysis within SPSS reveal the majority of respondents that perceive it 
to be ‘slightly important’, ‘moderately important’ and ‘very important’ to prepare, 
also perceive the risk of water supply failure to be low (Table 5.2).   These 
respondents do not have experience of water supply failure (Table 5.3) and are 
confident the WSP will provide a reliable, continuous and safe supply of water 
(Table 5.4). 
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Importance of Preparing for Water Supply Failure (%) 
Extremely 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Not At All 
Important 
At Risk of Water 
Supply Failure 
High Risk 2 1 0 0 0 
Medium Risk 5 5 3 4 1 
Don't Know 2 2 4 2 0 
Low Risk 3 10 16 25 9 
No Risk 1 0 2 1 2 
 
Table 5.2: Comparison between respondent’s perception of risk and preparing 
for water supply failure 
 
 
 
Experience of Water Supply Failure (%) 
Yes No Don't Know 
Importance of Preparing for 
Water Supply Failure 
Extremely Important 5 8 0 
Very Important 5 13 0 
Moderately Important 4 20 1 
Slightly Important 7 22 2 
Not At All Important 3 9 0 
 
 
Table 5.3: Comparison of the importance of preparing for water supply failure 
and experience. 
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Table 5.4: Comparison of the importance of preparing for water supply failure 
and confidence of the WSP providing a reliable, continuous and safe supply of 
water. 
 
The results suggest that although respondents rely on the WSP to provide water 
in all circumstances and have a high level of confidence in the provision of a 
service, it is still perceived as important to prepare for water supply failure.  A 
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question was included within the questionnaire to explore whether this translates 
into a need for respondents to actively prepare and respondents were asked if 
they ‘actively prepared’ for water supply failure (Figure 5.16) 
 
 
Figure 5.16: Response regarding whether respondents actively prepare for 
water supply failure. 
 
67% of respondents ‘do not actively prepare’ for water supply failure. 19%, of 
respondents ‘do not think about it’ and only 15% of respondents ‘actively prepare’ 
(Figure 5.16).  Even though the majority of respondents perceive it to be important 
to prepare for water supply failure, they do not actively prepare (Table 5.5).  Again 
this could relate to the confidence respondents have in the provision of a service 
from the WSP and a perceived responsibility that the WSP will provide water if 
there is a failure of the water supply.  This may reinforce trust in the WSP to 
provide water in all circumstances. 
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Table 5.5: Comparison of response between whether respondents actively 
prepare for water supply failure and the importance of preparing for water 
supply failure 
 
As discussed within the literature review, the water sector financial regulator, 
Ofwat published ‘Resilience in the Round’ to encourage the development of 
innovative resilience based strategies to provide customers with a resilient 
service.  The guidance also encouraged the consideration of customers as active 
participants in the future delivery of water services.  To explore customer attitudes 
and perceptions to preparing for water supply failure, respondents were asked if 
they considered a failure of the water supply as a hazard they should prepare for 
now or a hazard they may have to prepare for in the future (Figure 5.17).   
 
The results demonstrate, 47% of respondents, do not consider water supply 
failure as a hazard they should prepare for now and 37% of respondents, ‘don’t 
think about it’.  However, 45% of respondents, do consider it to be a hazard they 
may have to prepare for in the future and 33%, ‘don’t think about it’.  This suggests 
that a greater understanding of customer attitudes and perceptions to water 
supply failure is required to enable the active participation of customers in water 
service delivery.  
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Figure 5.17: Response to the question, do you consider a failure of the water 
supply as a hazard you should prepare for now or in the future? 
 
To provide a greater understanding of preparing for water supply failure, 
respondents were asked, in the event of serious failure of the water supply.  How 
confident are you that the water company will provide you with a supply of water 
from an alternative source?  The majority of respondents were ‘moderately 
confident’ (38%) with the WSP.  With 29% and 19% of respondents ‘very 
confident’ and ’extremely confident’ the WSP will provide them with an alternative 
supply of water (Figure 5.18).   
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Figure 5.18: Perceived confidence in the water company providing an 
alternative supply of water. 
 
However, when respondents were asked, in the event of a serious failure of the 
water supply, how likely are you to purchase water from your local supermarket?  
A large proportion of respondents (44%) perceived it to be ‘extremely likely’.  With 
39% perceiving it to be ‘very likely’ and 13% perceiving it to be ‘moderately likely’ 
(Figure 5.19).  So while respondents have confidence in the WSP supplying them 
with an alternative supply of water during an emergency, they will also purchase 
a supply of water from the supermarket.   
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Figure 5.19: Perceived likelihood of purchasing water from the supermarket 
during a water supply failure incident. 
 
While the majority of respondents do not ‘actively prepare’ for water supply 
failure, they perceive they will actively respond in an emergency situation and 
purchase water from the supermarket.  It is interesting that these respondents will 
purchase water even though they are confident the water service provider will 
provide an alternative supply of water during a serious failure of the water supply. 
It is possible this anomaly is associated with the amount of time respondents 
perceive they could cope without a supply of water direct from the tap.   
 
Respondents were asked if there was a serious failure of the water supply, how 
long could they cope without a fresh supply of water direct from the tap? (Figure 
5.20).  21% of respondents perceive they would be able to cope for 24hrs.  The 
same proportion of respondents (16%) selected 7 to 12 hours and 48 hours.  With 
the response for 3 to 6 hours as 14%.   
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Figure 5.20: Perceived timescale that respondents could cope without a supply 
of water direct from the tap. 
 
There was a range of responses for this question and this may be related to a 
respondent’s individual need for water.  Four of the respondents provided extra 
information within the ‘other’ category for this question and each response was 
related to the timescale they had selected in response to the question. 
‘As long as water was available from bottles, containers or tankers.’- 
Respondent STBC006 (perceived ability to cope, 1 to 2 hours) 
 
‘Depends if there is water available in the shops.’  Respondent STCW005 
(perceived ability to cope, 7 to 12 hours) 
 
‘Not long, I have children.’ – Respondent STME010 (perceived ability to 
cope, 12 to 14 hours) 
 
‘As long as we had to.’ – Respondent UUYE001 (perceived ability to cope, 
2 to 6 hours) 
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Figure 5.21: Perception of an acceptable timescale to be without a supply of 
water direct from the tap. 
 
Respondents were also asked, what is an acceptable amount of time to be left 
without a fresh supply of water direct from the tap? (Figure 5.21).  While the 
majority of respondents perceived this to be 24 hours or less, many respondents 
perceive they are able to cope beyond 24 hours.  
 
Figure 5.22: Respondents perception of hazards that could cause a failure of 
the water supply. 
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In order to understand the perception of water supply failure, respondents were 
asked to determine the likelihood of a list of potential hazards that could cause 
failure of the water supply to their home (Figure 5.22).  For the majority of 
hazards, it was perceived ’unlikey’ they would cause a failure of the water supply.  
This is with the exception of extreme cold and ice, hot and dry weather, 
equipment failure, water contamination and accidental damage.  Many of the 
respondents perceived these hazards as ‘moderately likely’ to cause failure of the 
water supply to their homes. 
 
 
Figure 5.23: Response to statements reading the provision of information from 
the WSP and whether this is perceived to be trusted information. 
 
Another factor considered to influence risk perception is the availability of 
knowledge.  The sharing and exchange of information during an emergency will 
also have an influence on the ability of individuals to respond effectively achieve 
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resilience.  This was demonstrated within Chapter 1 (Section 1.3) with regard to 
customer behaviour during the flooding of Mythe water treatment works.  A lack 
of information regarding the provision of an alternative supply of water contributed 
to a negative reinforcing feedback loop (Figure 1.4) with regard to the ability of 
the WSP and the customers to achieve resilience.  To explore attitudes and 
perceptions to the availability of information, customers were asked to respond 
to the following statements: 
 
 ‘The water company will provide information during an emergency’ 
 ‘I trust the information provided by the water company’ 
 
 
 
Figure 5.24: Organisations perceived as an information source during water 
supply failure. 
 
The results demonstrate that the majority of respondents (66%) ‘agree’ the WSP 
will provide information if there is a failure of the water supply and 69% ‘agree’ 
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they trust the information provided (Figure 5.23).  This is supported by the 
response to the question, in the event of a serious failure of the water supply, 
how likely are you to obtain information from the following sources (Figure 5.24).  
The majority of respondents perceived it to be ‘extremely likely’ (50%) they would 
obtain information from the WSP.   Respondents also perceived it would be 
‘extremely likely’ they would obtain information from the TV, radio, friends and 
family and the Environment Agency.   
 
A large proportion of respondents also selected they would ‘never’ obtain 
information from Twitter, the gas company, the Electricity Company and 
Facebook.  The results for Twitter and Facebook are interesting because WSP’s 
are increasingly using social media platforms such as these to warn and inform 
customers of issues related to water supply.  This was supported by the results 
provided in Section 5.4 with regard to general hazards. 
 
5.6  SUMMARY 
The results of the individual home owner questionnaire present a partial 
contribution to the achievement of Objective 3 and is discussed in the context of 
the research questions presented within Section 5.1.   
 
5.6.1 How do respondents perceive water supply failure compared to other   
hazards? 
The majority of respondents within this questionnaire do not have experience of 
water supply failure and it is perceived to be ‘low risk’   Surface water flooding, 
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sewer flooding, drought, heatwaves, widespread electricity failure and pandemic 
influenza are also perceived to be ‘low risk’  hazards and most respondents do 
not have experience of these hazards.  Storms and gales, low temperatures and 
heavy snow have been experienced by a higher proportion of respondents with 
storms and gales perceived to be ‘high risk’ hazards partly because they 
represent one of the most prevalent hazards in the UK.   
 
In terms of preparedness, most of the respondents perceive water supply failure 
as ‘slightly important’ to prepare.  This is consistent with the majority of hazards 
with the exception of storms and gales and low temperatures.  Water supply 
failure also received the greatest response within the category of ‘extremely 
important’ and ‘very important’ to prepare.  However, the majority of respondents 
do not ‘actively prepare’ for water supply failure and again this is consistent with 
the response for the majority of hazards.   
 
5.6.2 What are the general attitudes and perceptions to water supply 
failure? 
Most of the respondents rely on the WSP to provide water in all circumstances 
and there is a great deal of confidence in the provision of a reliable, continuous 
and safe supply of water.  In the event of a failure of the water supply, the majority 
of respondents perceive they will be provided with an alternative supply of water 
from the WSP.  However, many respondents perceive it to be ‘extremely likely’ 
that they will purchase a supply of water from the supermarket.  While a large 
proportion of respondents perceive they would be able to cope for 24hrs without 
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a supply of water direct from the tap, they also perceived that less than 24hrs was 
an acceptable amount of time to be without a fresh supply of water. 
While respondents perceive it to be important to prepare for water supply failure, 
the majority of respondents do not ‘actively prepare’.  Respondents also, do not 
perceive water supply failure to be a hazard to prepare for now but a hazard to 
prepare for in the future.    
 
5.6.3 Where do respondents obtain information regarding hazards within 
their local area if there is a serious failure of the water supply? 
 
Many of the respondents within this questionnaire obtain information regarding 
hazards within their local area from the television, family and friends, radio and 
the Met Office.  They do not obtain information from the NRR, CRR’s or from 
social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. If there is a failure of the 
water supply, respondents will obtain information from the WSP, television, radio 
and friends and family.  The majority of respondents within this questionnaire do 
not use social media to obtain information regarding a failure of the water supply.  
However, social media is widely used by WSP’s to communicate information to 
the public during an emergency and this will be explored within the following 
Chapter.   
 
The individual homeowner questionnaire provided an opportunity to explore 
attitudes, perceptions and personal experience of water supply failure within the 
demographic identified within Section 5.2.  The following Chapter 6, explores 
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attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure during an actual incident from 
analysis of comments made on the social media platform, Facebook.  The 
application of a different research method (thematic analysis of Facebook 
comments) provides an opportunity to explore perceptions of water supply failure 
within a different cohort of people that use social media to obtain information 
about their water supply direct from the WSP Facebook page.   
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6 CHAPTER 6 – ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS TO WATER SUPPLY 
FAILURE DURING AN EMERGENCY 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter (Chapter 5), explored general attitudes and perceptions to 
water supply failure using the results of individual householder questionnaires. 
The majority of these respondents did not use social media to find out about 
hazards within their local area.  However, social media is increasingly being used 
by responder organisations and the WSP’s to provide information to the public 
during an emergency situation (Bunney et al, 2018). This only provided a partial 
contribution to the achievement of Objective 3.  This Chapter examines a different 
cohort of people who do use social media to share and exchange information with 
the WSP during an emergency. This Chapter builds upon the results of Chapter 
5 and explores attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure during an 
extreme event, the ‘Beast from the East’.   To enable this, a thematic analysis 
was conducted of the comments posted by the customers of three WSP’s on the 
company’s Facebook pages throughout a period of water supply failure; the full 
methodology is described within Chapter 3.  This provided an opportunity to 
understand individual perceptions, attitudes and behaviour to water supply failure 
during an emergency.  It also enabled the development of a profile into how 
customers and WSP’s engage during an emergency situation. Consequently, 
Chapter 6 answers the research questions presented in Chapter 1, (Section 1.4, 
Objective 3). 
 
To answer these questions this Chapter will proceed as follows: Section 6.2 will 
explore how individuals perceive information was communicated by the WSP 
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throughout the incident.  Section 6.3 examines the provision and distribution of 
alternative supplies of water and Section 6.4 investigates attitudes and 
perceptions to living without a water supply.  The provision of a service was 
explored within Section 6.5 and Section 6.6 sought to understand attitudes to 
compensation and bills. 
 
6.2 The communication of information 
 
There were over 485 comments relating to the communication of information from 
WSP 1 during the event, 268 comments for WSP 2 and 142 comments for WSP 
3.  In general the comments were of a similar nature.  Customers relied on the 
WSP to provide accurate information at regular intervals, regarding the location 
of water supply failure, the cause of the problem and an estimated timescale of 
when the water supply would be restored.  Further supporting quotes for each 
section within this Chapter are provided within Appendix 12. 
“It's the lack of information provided by [Name]. If you could give any 
indication of how long this would go on for this would help. Any indication 
would help people to make provisions. Just to ignore your customers is an 
example of a poor service. I'm sure if you sent out an FAQ to customers 
that would slightly appease people rather than being disregarded.” – 
Reference 11, WSP 1 2018 03 04 28 
 
There were many comments regarding a lack of information from the WSP.  The 
WSP’s were criticised for providing standard general replies, which created 
difficulties for customers attempting to obtain information regarding water supply 
failure within their local area.  However, analysis of the WSP posts demonstrated 
that while some posts did provide general information regarding the ongoing 
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situation, there were also notification posts containing location specific 
information, posts providing customers with advice and posts requesting 
information or action from customers to use water wisely: 
General information post 
“We're really sorry to those customers who are without water this morning. 
The severe weather has had an unprecedented impact on our business 
this week, including a big increase in the amount of leaks and bursts on 
our network of pipes and those in our customers' homes. Our teams have 
been working through the night to complete as many repairs as possible, 
as well as putting more volumes of water into our pipes. We're doing 
everything we can in extremely challenging circumstances to get everyone 
back to normal as fast as we can. We will post updates here and on our 
website as we get them. Our call centres will be very busy, with long call 
wait times. Please only call us if it is very urgent” – Reference WSP 1, 
2018 03 04 05 
 
Notification post 
“Huge apologies to customers in [Location] who may be having supply 
issues. We're working hard to move water around the network and get 
things back to normal as soon as possible. Please bear with us.” – 
Reference WSP 2, 2018 03 06 01 
 
Advice post 
“Be prepared for the thaw - as temperatures rise, we are likely to see a 
rise in the number of burst pipes both on our customers' own pipework 
and across the mains network. Check out what to do if you discover a 
problem: [Website].  Be prepared for the thaw What to do if you discover 
a problem” – Reference WSP 3, 2018 03 03 01 
 
Request for information 
“We want to say sorry to all of the people across our region who have no 
water or low pressure tonight. The thaw has caused unprecedented 
amounts of leaks & is causing problems across our network. We've got 
plenty of water and we're pushing it out into the network, but a lot of it is 
leaking out and not getting to customers. We were prepared for the thaw 
and so have lots of teams out finding and fixing leaks, but our big ask is 
for customers to help us out by reporting leaks to us as soon as possible 
at [Website address].  The sooner we know where the leaks are, the 
sooner we can fix them.  In the meantime we're working hard round the 
clock to get everyone back on supply but this is going to take some time.” 
302 
 
– WSP 2, 2018 03 05 02 
Request for action         
“We're asking customers to use water wisely as we continue to meet the 
challenges of the thaw. Please bear with us as we locate and repair an 
unprecedented number of burst water mains following the severest 
weather in the region for many years. We're sorry if it's taking longer than 
normal to contact us through the phone, for up to date information in your 
area please visit our website [website] Customers can help themselves 
and us by identifying whether the problem is inside their house or not. If 
the leak or burst is on your own pipes, the best thing to do is to call a 
plumber. However if you and your neighbours are out of water or losing 
pressure, that could be a sign of a burst or leaking mains pipe and we need 
to hear about it to start helping you.” – WSP 3, 2018 03 05 05 
 
The provision of specific information was perceived by customers as necessary 
to enable them to make alternative arrangements with regard to staying with 
relatives or purchasing an alternative supply of water from the supermarket.  
Customers provided the WSP with their location and the timescale of water 
supply failure in order to gain specific information for their local area however, 
they became increasingly frustrated with the WSP when this information was not 
provided.  While the majority of the Facebook posts provided by the WSP were 
notifications informing customers they were aware of a problem with the water 
supply at a specific location, the scale of the incident meant there were also other 
locations that were affected by water supply failure.  However, these were not 
mentioned in any of the posts provided by the WSP and this created frustration 
for customers because they were not being provided with information regarding 
their local area.  In response to this lack of information, customers posted 
comments requesting further information for their location within the original post 
even though this was relating to a different location. 
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“I agree [Name] This is outrageous, again with no water in [Location], and 
no way to get up to date information on expected time of resolution. Is 
anyone at [Name] actually reading these messages? Please can you let 
us know what is happening and when we can expect the water to be back 
on?” – Reference 8, WSP 1 2018 03 03 02 
 
An example of the WSP notification posts are provided below.  Many of the posts 
are location specific and include a brief description regarding the nature of the 
problem for instance repairing a burst pipe or there is fault at a booster station.   
“We're aware of a potential problem in the [Location] area affecting 
customers in the postcode [Location] and surrounding areas. We have a 
team en route to investigate as we speak. Sorry for the inconvenience 
caused.” – Reference WSP 1 2018 03 03 02 
 
“Our teams are still out working hard to fix as many leaks as possible 
following the rapid thaw we've experienced. If your water is affected, we're 
really sorry and we're doing everything we can to fix the leaks and get 
things back to normal as quickly as possible.” – Reference WSP 2, 2018 
03 05 07 
 
“We're aware that customers in the [Location] area are experiencing 
interruptions to their water supply. Thank you for your patience, we'd like 
to reassure you that we're doing everything we can in this situation. For 
updates [Website address]” – Reference WSP 3, 2018 03 02 13 
 
However, the majority of posts did not provide any indication of expected 
timescales.  When this information was provided, it was for specific locations and 
as indicated within the previous comments, this led to frustration because 
customers did not understand why they were not provided with information 
regarding all of the locations affected. 
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 WSP post 
“Customers in [Location] (and surrounding areas) who have been without 
water should see supply starting to come back. Pressure is rising, but we 
need to do it carefully so we don't cause any bursts. We expect all 
customers in these postcodes to have water back before 10pm” – 
Reference WSP 1, 2018 03 05 16 
  
 Customer response 
 “What about [Location]??????” 
 
The provision of timescales also created difficulties for the WSP managing the 
expectation of customers when the water supply was not restored within the 
timescale indicated and this is illustrated within the customer’s replies: 
“It's 10.40pm and NO WATER in [Location].. you expected to have water 
by now? Please update” – Reference WSP 1, 2018 03 05 16 
 
 “Well it's 2:30am and there's still none in [Location]!! 3 days and 
counting.......” – WSP 1, 2018 03 05 16 
 
The WSP provided an update within the thread of customer comments but this 
led to further negative comments from the customers.  Throughout the incident 
customers used Facebook to hold the WSP accountable for a failure of the water 
supply and a perceived failure to communicate accurate information regarding 
timescales: 
 WSP post 
“Our engineers are repairing another burst main that is affecting the water 
supply in your areas, our engineers are working hard to bring back your 
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water supply soon as possible. So sorry for the inconvenience” – WSP 1, 
2018 03 05 16 
 
Customer responses 
“Almost 60h since we've been without water. When are you finally adding 
water stations that are more convenient for people that live in [Location]? 
At the moment our nearest ones are all more than 2 miles away.” – WSP 
1, 2018 03 05 16 
 
“You know what I have had enough of your bloody apologies! We still don't 
have water, how is this even possible in 2018!!!! What the hell are you 
doing?? And frankly I don't have the time to go and pick up your bottled 
water as we need to go to work!!! And how about older people that can't 
carry water!!! You need to tell them exactly when the pipe will be fixed and 
deliver water door to door, you absolute clowns.” – WSP 1, 2018 03 05 16 
 
“Shouldn't this be a new public post rather than a comment a long way 
down on a previous public post ?” – WSP 1, 2018 03 05 16 
 
Additionally, when the WSP did not provide specific information regarding 
timescales there were also negative comments from customers: 
WSP post 
“We've done further work in the [Location] area and shut in a large pipe. 
Pressure is now building and we expect water to return over the next few 
hours.” – Reference WSP 1, 03 05 09 
 
Customer responses  
“Did you copy and paste this post from the same post 6 hours ago? Or the 
one 12 hours before that?” 
 
 “Define "FEW"!!!!!! 36 hrs and counting now....” 
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“I really hope you actually mean it this time. How many times are we going 
to be told that the problem is now fixed and the water will be back soon??!” 
 
This also led to conversations on Facebook between the WSP representative 
and the customers: 
Customer response 
“You said that at 6.30am this morning!!! Please please just be honest 
with us-id rather know if it's going to be 24/48 hours, then at least we can 
plan. What does a few hours mean?” 
 
WSP response 
“I'm sorry for the inconvenience this is causing. Our techs have repaired 
the pipe that was causing the issue however the pressure can take some 
time to build up throughout the network. 
  
 Customer response 
“Does this mean the repairs are actually completed now? At the same time 
as you posting this, I was speaking to one of your agents on the phone 
who said he had no idea of the timetable for the 12" main being repaired” 
 
 WSP response  
“Hi [Name], the burst pipe that was causing the no water/low pressure 
issue has been repaired. The pressure has started to build up throughout 
the network however this can take some time to reach you.” 
 
Throughout the event WSP’s also provided customers with information regarding 
the difficulties they were experiencing due to the adverse weather conditions.  
“[Location]: We're increasing the amount of water being fed into the 
system,but we are still not seeing pressure build up as much we'd like - 
but pressure is increasing. We believe that there is air trapped in the 
system and we're currently working to bleed the air out. We're also working 
to fix a number of leaks in the local area, which will help improve our 
position. We know this is frustrating, but we're working as quickly as we 
can to resolve this and return your water supply.” – Reference WSP 1, 
2018 03 05 01 
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However, as the incident progressed and the number of locations affected by 
water supply failure increased it became increasingly difficult for customers to 
access information direct from the WSP.  Each WSP experienced a large volume 
of calls to their call centre which left many customers frustrated because they 
could not get direct access to the WSP to either report a problem with the water 
supply or find out when the problem would be resolved: 
 “The communication from [Name] is utterly abysmal, I'm shocked how 
they can treat customers like this - I've tried to communicate via telephone, 
online chat and through social media and have been fobbed off, dismissed 
and guided to websites that are never updated. All I want to know is what 
they plan to do to help villages with no water for more than 15 hours now, 
people are panic buying so bottled water is running out in shops and some 
have babies and very young toddlers like myself but they are just not 
communicating whatsoever. This is ridiculous customer service.” – 
Reference 45, WSP 2 2018 03 05 07 
 
Customers also highlighted instances where there was a perceived lack of 
consistent information regarding whether the water supply had been restored.  
This is because in some instances the WSP issued conflicting information stating 
the problem had been fixed when customers were still experiencing water supply 
failure.  This created a great deal of confusion and angered many customers 
because the lack of information made it difficult to ascertain whether they should 
make their own preparations for continued water supply failure. The quotes 
provided below are illustrative of the confusion regarding the provision of 
conflicting information from the WSP. 
“It's not a potential problem. It's an REAL PROBLEM. [Location] here. 
What's the cause of the problems? Blocked roadside gullies? Electrical 
fault at a pumping station? Burst water main? We've not received any 
coherent information. No lead time on repairs! Do we rush to the 
supermarket for water to cook and make tea with? Do we arrange to go 
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out for dinner? Or do we wait for the water to come back on soon? Never 
mind the need to wash and flush toilets!! Comes on [Name] there are a lot 
of families, individuals and vulnerable people without water today - we 
need and DESERVE more of an update!  Should we start boiling snow?” 
– Reference 2, WSP 1 2018 03 03 02 
 
All of the WSP’s used a variety of different social media platforms to provide 
information to their customers.  These included Facebook, Twitter and the 
company webpage.  However, WSP 2, customers were left confused because 
there was a perceived lack of consistency in the information provided on each 
media platform.  Customers used Facebook to ensure the WSP was informed of 
conflicting information on social media.  They also informed the WSP that this 
was very confusing because they did not know which information source to 
believe and respond to. 
“I'm not sure who [Name] is but we are [Location]. Twitter says you "may" 
do a drop at some point but I have read so many contradicting posts on 
your website and social media it is difficult to work out what is going on 
now.” – Reference 25, WSP 2 2018 03 06 05 
 
“We have not water in [Location]. Used Twitter no response, your website 
shows no problems. Your news section has nothing. Your telephone lines 
ring engaged and I am number 33 on live chat. How do i know what the 
problem is or when I can expect resolution or how don The vulnerable old 
people in my village get looked after??” – Reference 2, WSP 2, 2018 03 
06 02 
 
Customers also mentioned conflicting information from WSP 1, regarding where 
information was to be posted.  WSP 1, had directed customers to the ‘main social 
media pages’ but customers were confused as to what these were because they 
had not been clearly defined.  
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“No one on this thread is reporting that they have water. Any further 
updates from [Name]? Isn't this a major health and safety issue? Your 
company website offers no updates and neither does your Twitter feed or 
Facebook page. Some of your people keep responding that we should 
check your "main social media" pages...if not Twitter or Facebook or even 
your own website, what are these "main social media" pages?” – 
Reference 2, WSP 1 2018 03 04 18 
 
There was a great deal of criticism for each WSP because customers were trying 
to access up to date information from the company website.  In many instances 
customers stated they were not able to obtain information regarding their local 
area from the website or the website did not contain up to date information.  
Customers also complained because they did not perceive the website was being 
updated regularly enough throughout the emerging situation.   
“Our street has been trying to get hold of [Name] this evening to report no 
water in [Location]. We've been kept on hold for nearly an hour. Their 
website still shows "no problem" in our area. This is disgraceful. Exactly 
the same lack of response we had last time the water went down last year. 
What are they allowed to get away with such poor customer service?” – 
Reference 3, WSP 1 2018 03 04 26  
 
“[Name], This is how [Name] customers are informed. On Facebook 
[Name] has been promising that supply would be back to normal by this 
evening. More than 48h without water supply now and still nothing. The 
latest update available from [Name] on their website is from 7.38 am this 
morning ("We are working on it. Sorry for the inconvenience"). [Name] this 
is abysmal beyond believe. People can accept that leaks/bursts happen. 
But we cannot accept how we are not proactively informed or not informed 
at all. SHOCKING! Management should not blame exceptional 
circumstances for not being able to cope, but take responsibility for not 
having adequate planning in place for their customer service to deal with 
these kind of situations.” – Reference 16, WSP 1 2018 03 05 16 
WSP 3 also experienced criticism from customers regarding posts informing 
customer’s they were unable to identify leaks or provide customers with bowsers 
because the ground was covered in snow and unsafe for travel.  However, 
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because the WSP had not specified the locations that were affected by the snow, 
customers assumed this applied to their local area.  This created a great deal of 
frustration because the snow had melted in their local area and customers 
perceived the WSP was using the snow and icy conditions as a reason not to 
provide an alternative supply of water or to repair leaks and burst pipes: 
WSP post 
“The snow and icy conditions in [Location] are making it difficult for us to 
get to some bursts. Our people have been working around the clock, often 
on foot, to identify where these burst are.” – WSP 3 2018 03 02 10 
 
Customer responses 
There is no snow! It all melted last night and if you don’t know that it means 
you haven’t been here to see.” – Reference 2, WSP 3 2018 03 02 10 
            
“you are all lying [obscenity] because all the snow melted overnight and 
was entirely gone by this am. Pleas stop blaming the snow THERE IS 
NONE!!!! It makes you look like lying idiots and stretches peoples patience 
to snapping point!!!” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 02 11 
 
Customers also provided WSP 1 and WSP 3 with suggestions for improvement 
with regard to their future communications during an emergency.  This included 
providing customers with relevant, up to date information using a variety of 
different methods of communication.  It was perceived that many people do not 
have access to the internet or have a reliable mobile signal in rural locations.  
Therefore, the WSP should consider providing customers with information via 
local radio.  There were many comments regarding timescales and how the WSP 
could improve their communications by including estimated timescales rather 
than a vague response of “some time”. 
“YOU NEED TO ISSUE TIME ESTIMATES FOR AFFECTED AREAS. 
"SOME TIME" DOES NOT CUT IT.” – Reference 32, WSP 1 2018 03 04 
12 
 
“I will await to see when it happens. WHY are we the customers forced to 
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contact you. As a commercial service supplier you should have a constant 
flow communication being sent out through all channels. Many people do 
not use social media. It really isn't acceptable. Tell you executives in their 
livory tower' to reinvest in infrastructure and not line their and your share 
holders pockets!” – Reference 21, WSP 2 PS 2018 03 05 07 
 
 
WSP 3 customers also mentioned how they had to join Facebook to gain access 
to regular updates because the company website did not contain the information 
customers required regarding an alternative supply of water. 
“Quite right. The [Location] site has been without water for 24 hours and 
there has been no instruction on how to get a bottled water supply. We do 
seem to have been forgotten. Also I have had to join Faceаche to get any 
news at all – why is the news not on the website?” – Reference 5, WSP 3 
2018 03 05 06 
 
Customers used the company websites to obtain up to date information regarding 
water supply issues within their local area.  This will be explored in greater detail 
within the next Section 6.21, the Provision of Information. 
 
6.2.1 The provision of information 
There were 1883 references related to the provision of information for WSP 1, 
793 references for WSP 2 and 705 references for WSP 3.  For WSP 1 and WSP 
2 (62%, 51% respectively) the majority of these references included the provision 
of information regarding water supply failure occurring at a particular location.  
This information was provided in the form of a postcode, road name or reference 
to a specific identifiable location related to the original post.  Many of the posts 
contained very limited information, only detailing location and water supply failure 
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as a statement.  Some of the comments included a timescale as to how long the 
water supply had been off and some of the comments requested further 
information regarding when the supply would be restored.   
 
 “No water in [Postcode]” – Reference 6, 2018 03 03 13 
 “[Postcode] No Water for 3 days!!!” – Reference 4, 2018 03 04 15  
 “No water here in [Postcode]” – Reference 11, 2018 03 04 24 
  
For WSP 3, only 30% of the references included information regarding location 
of water supply failure.  This was provided in the form of a postcode or place 
name.  However, the majority of posts did not contain any reference to location 
but provided the WSP with notification that the water supply had failed.  Analysis 
of the WSP 3 initial posts and the replies, indicate that customers posted replies 
within the specific post relating to their location.  This may be why these 
customers did not provide a postcode or location reference, whereas, WSP 1 and 
WSP 2 customers provided information regarding their local area, irrespective of 
the information contained within the original post. 
 “No water atm [Postcode] thanks” – Reference 6, WSP 3 2018 03 02 07 
 “We still have no water” – Reference 2, WSP 2018 03 02 07 
“No water now for 24 hours !! This is a joke” – Reference 29, WSP 2018 
03 02 07 
 
WSP 1 customers also used Facebook to inform the WSP of other locations that 
had been affected by water supply failure but had not been included within social 
media posts or on the company website.  There were many instances where 
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customers informed the WSP when the information they had posted regarding 
specific locations was not correct and when the website was not working properly.  
Within each of the comments, customers provided the location of water supply 
failure and detailed the exact nature of the problem so that it could be corrected 
by the WSP.  There were many examples where Facebook was used as the 
primary method to inform the WSP because customers were not able to contact 
the WSP direct by any other means.   
“This message is not accurate [Name]. Still nothing in [Location]. It would 
help us if you could say what you mean by a "few hours". Then we would 
know whether to continue to report no supply issues. Does it mean 1/2 
hours or that if i still dont have water by lunchtime or 4pm that is still within 
your self defined "few hours". This is a really poor level of information for 
a company the size of [Name] you really need to get a grip on your 
communications to your customers.” – Reference 32, WSP 1 2018 03 05 
02 
 
WSP customers were very active using Facebook as a method to provide 
information to the WSP regarding water supply failure, leaks or burst pipes, 
problems with the water pressure and to inform the WSP when the water supply 
was restored.  Within the majority of these comments, customers provided the 
location and information regarding the nature of the problem.  Further supporting 
quotes are provided in Appendix 12. 
“There seems to be a burst pipe between [Location], right off the main 
road.” – Reference 22, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
There were many examples where customers from each WSP provided 
information regarding their personal circumstances within the responding 
comments to the WSP.  These were used to reinforce the difficulties some 
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customers were experiencing with water supply failure and the difficulties 
accessing an alternative supply of water.  There were differences in how this 
information was presented to the WSP on Facebook.  Some customers provided 
very limited information consisting of a statement, for example:   
“No water pressure in [Location] either” – Reference 6, WSP 1 2018 03 
03 1 
 
 “[Location] has water” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 07 12 
Whereas other customers provided a more detailed account including location, 
timescales of water supply failure and how it was affecting their daily routines, for 
example: 
“NO WATER IN [Location] 7-disabled mother and baby, been on hold for 
1h 30 minutes - absolutely shocking! You should have a communal tap in 
the street operating or delivering water to vulnerable people like me who 
can't actually leave sleeping, sick children at home to get water.” – 
Reference 49, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
Customers became increasingly frustrated with the lack of information provided 
by the WSP.  Many of the customers had attempted to access information via the 
call centre, the company website, Twitter and Facebook hoping that at least one 
source would provide up to date information regarding the cause of water supply 
failure within their local area or when the water supply was to be restored.  
However, for many customers, this information was not provided by the WSP 
within any of these media.  This created a great deal of tension within the thread 
of comments directed towards the WSP.  This was also a particular frustration for 
customers that had been asked by the WSP to provide their phone numbers so 
they could receive up to date information via text.  When the WSP did not reply, 
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customers became increasingly frustrated with the perceived lack of information.  
The majority of customers wanted the WSP to provide information regarding 
when the water supply would be restored.  All of the customers provided their 
location so the WSP would know which area was affected and could respond with 
specific information for their local area. 
“Still no water in [Location]. No update from [Name]. Your website does 
not provide any details on my area. Terrible communication. Terrible 
service.” – Reference 109, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
Customers also provided information to the WSP regarding the availability of 
alternative water supplies.  Customer perceptions regarding an alternative supply 
of water will be discussed in greater detail in Section 6.3, the intention of this 
Section is to provide examples of the information customers provided to the WSP 
though the social media platform Facebook.  WSP 1 had provided information 
regarding the location of bottled water stations: 
“For customers impacted by no water in [Location] (and nearby) - we have 
set up a water station where you can come and pick up bottled water. It's 
located in the [Location] - we're very sorry for the disruption.” – Reference 
WSP 1, 2018 03 04 11 
 
However, when customers arrived to collect an alternative supply of water, they 
observed people had taken large quantities of water.  This resulted in some 
people leaving the bottled water location without an alternative supply of water 
because the alternative supply was depleted.  Customers used Facebook to 
inform WSP 1 of the perceived lack of restrictions regarding how much water 
each person was allowed and to inform the WSP they were still without an 
alternative supply.  This resulted in negative comments regarding an inadequate 
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provision of service to customers and an increased level of anxiety for customers 
unable to obtain water from the distribution centre or from their local supermarket.  
This also led to the perception that the WSP was not adequately prepared for a 
large scale failure of the water supply.  This demonstrated a lack of trust and 
confidence in the WSP to provide an alternative supply of water during an 
emergency with customers stating they could no longer rely on the WSP to 
provide a supply of water. 
“I went to your bottled water location at homebase twice yesterday - you'd 
run out both times. There were also people sitting on piles of water they'd 
'claimed' - you obviously weren't limting each person to any amount 
inciting a free for all mentality where most people got nothing. Shameful 
organisation. I was lucky to buy 2 litres in the shops before they ran out 
that saw my pregnant partner and my 2 year old daughter through the 
night. They've had to move out now to stay with a friend because we can't 
rely on your being able to supply water. What about the old people in the 
community who aren't on twitter and don't have mobility? Are you checking 
on them? I'm waiting for the first headline with hospital in the title. 
Shamefully underprepared in every way. There should be resignations and 
recriminations. FIX IT.“ – Reference 13, WSP 1, 2018 03 03 10 
 
Customers also informed the WSP where water restrictions had been put in place 
at water distribution centres.  However, these restrictions were not perceived to 
be acceptable because customers were only allowed 1 litre per person.  This 
created a great deal of contention because this was not perceived to be enough 
water to wash, prepare food or keep a person hydrated throughout the period of 
water supply failure.  
“Every time you post there is water at one of your collection points by the 
time we can get there I see a post to say that it's all gone and only 1 litre 
each, come on [Name] this is not good.” – Reference 5, WSP 1 2018 03 
05 04 
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There were also examples of customers sharing their experience and difficulties 
collecting water for their vulnerable neighbours.  While they had attempted to 
inform the WSP of the requirement for an alternative supply of water for 
vulnerable people, they were unable to contact the WSP directly due to a high 
volume of calls to the call centre.  Within these posts customers provided 
information of the location of the distribution centre and the help they received 
from the WSP representatives.  
“Went to [Location] last night to collect water asked for some for my 
neighbors as they didn't drive and was told"if they contacted [Name] they 
will deliver" I said I spent 2 hours on the phone with no answer how are 
they going to organise delivery?? Poor guy looked at me and said your 
joking and gave me extra to give to my neighbors” – Reference 7, WSP 1 
2018 03 05 03  
 
WSP 2 customers provided information informing the WSP of difficulties obtaining 
an alternative supply of water because the roads were gridlocked preventing 
access to the water distribution centre.  Customers also provided suggestions for 
a greater number of distribution sites because one centre was not adequate to 
provide enough water for the entire location affected.  While the majority of these 
comments were negative in their tone, implying the WSP could provide a better 
service, there were also positive comments thanking the WSP for their hard work. 
 
“It would have been helpful if you'd have had more than 1 water distribution 
centre in the [Location] area! It caused the roads to gridlock up to 
[Location] Sainsburys so that people could get free bottled water from you! 
Ridiculous and very bad organisation on your part [Name]!” – Reference 
1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 06  
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For each WSP, customers provided information regarding difficulties obtaining an 
alternative supply of water because the supermarkets and local shops had all 
sold out.  Customers expressed concern because they were unable to obtain an 
alternative supply of water and many had been without a supply of water for over 
24hrs.  The majority of these posts contained a reference to a location and a 
timeframe detailing how long customers had been without a supply of water.  
Within many of the comments customers had used multiple exclamation marks 
to reinforce the importance of the information provided within their post.   
“We are just up the road in [Location] and our local shops all sold out of 
water too. Luckily we managed to get our hands on some, but it's a worry 
how long this will continue for. [Name] should be supplying us with all these 
bottles of water. Hasn't [Location] been without for over 24hours?” – 
Reference 90, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
There were many examples where customers posted comments detailing how 
water supply failure was affecting their ability to conduct their daily routines.  This 
will be explored in greater detail within Section 6.4, Living without a Water Supply.  
However, it is interesting to understand how this information is presented to the 
WSP using Facebook.  Many customers provided very personal information 
regarding their health and the difficulties they were experiencing living without a 
supply of water.  Customers provided this information to enable the WSP to 
understand the consequences of water supply failure from the perspective of the 
customer. 
“Im currently on my way to my docters get more diazpam as this has really 
affected me I suffer with severe anxiety on the best of dsys.. I did get some 
water tgis morning but not enough to wash and now I have none again ;( I 
know yiur trying your best to sort this but the distress it's causing so many 
ppl.. sorry to moan I know there are ppl worse off I just really hope it's all 
sorted for tonight I need a shower or bath” – Reference 42, WSP 3 2018 
03 04 22 
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Customers also provided information regarding the inability to wash dishes or to 
shower for school and work.  There were also instances where customers 
informed the WSP that they were unable to provide adequate care for vulnerable 
family members who required water for medication or for hygiene and sanitation 
purposes.  There were also posts from parents who were unable to sterilise baby 
bottles and prepare formula.  For customers with anxiety, water supply failure 
contributed to greater levels of anxiety and a few customers informed the WSP 
they had to book appointments with their local doctor to request medication.  
Some customers informed the WSP that they would have to leave their homes 
and stay with friends and relatives because they were unable to live in their 
current property without a supply of water.  
“No water in [Location], nearly another hour has gone and after 3 day still 
the same situation. We need water, we can't stay without. We need to 
shower for work and school and so on. Could you please give us some 
accurate informations?! It is so frustrating, I had to wash dishes like my 
granny was used to do in 1915! That's a terrible situation.” – Reference 
20, WSP 1 2018 03 05 14 
 
The majority of these comments started with the name of the WSP making the 
comment more personal.  They also contained a reference to a specific location 
and the timescale of water supply failure.  The timescale was used to reinforce 
the difficulty customers were experiencing particularly if the customer had been 
left without a water supply for a considerable amount of time.  Within the majority 
of these posts customers also requested accurate information relating to the 
cause of the water supply failure and estimated timescales to allow them to 
prepare for water supply failure, make alternative plans regarding an alternative 
supply of water or to stay with friends and family.  However, as the timescale 
increased it became increasingly difficult for customers to obtain water from the 
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supermarkets because they were sold out. 
 
 
6.2.2 Requesting information 
 
 
For WSP 1, there were 850 comments requesting information.  Of these, 62% of 
these comments contained a reference requesting information about water 
supply failure.   For WSP 2, there were 325 comments and WSP 3, there were 
272 comments requesting information.  Of these, 80% and 76% respectively, 
contained a reference to water supply failure.  Each WSP experienced a great 
deal of criticism within the comments for not providing adequate information on 
Facebook, Twitter and the company website.   
“We need more frequent updates. The lack of updates is making it difficult 
for us to manage living without water in the short term. [Location] has not 
had water for almost 24 hours.”  - Reference 7, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
Customers required information to be provided at regular intervals detailing the 
locations affected, the cause of the problem, how the WSP was proposing to fix 
the problem and the approximate timescale they could expect their water supply 
to be restored.  This would enable customers to determine what preparations 
would be necessary if the situation were to persist.  Also, providing customers 
with information regarding the nature of the problems would help them to 
understand the difficulties experienced by the WSP in locating burst pipes, leaks 
and the potential difficulties fixing them.  However, the perceived lack of 
information from the WSP was contributing to negative comments regarding the 
provision of service by the WSP as illustrated within the following quotes. 
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“How about you actually tell us why it's taking so long, this 'few more hours' 
has been going on since Saturday. Did another pipe burst? You said the 
pressure was rising and would take a few hours, people like explanations, 
reasons, it's basic customer service. People might actually abuse you 
less... how do you not know this??” – Reference 14, WSP 1 2018 03 05 
17 
 
Once again customers provided the WSP with the location of water supply failure. 
Many customers used the WSP name to emphasize their disgust with the 
situation or to reinforce the need for up to date information. 
 
The requirement for specific information regarding timescales is presented within 
this example.  WSP 1, provided an update on Facebook stating that it would take 
‘some time’ before the reservoir levels would recover.  However, customers did 
not perceive this to be an adequate description of the timescale. 
“March 4. [Locations] Update: We've repaired a burst pipe which should 
help our reservoir levels recover but this will take some time. Meanwhile, 
bottled water is available from our station at [Location address]” –
Reference WSP 1 2018 03 04 20 
 
The response to this update suggests that customers wanted definite timescales 
and to be regularly updated regarding the situation.  Without this information it is 
very difficult for customers to make any preparations for continued water supply 
failure.   
“How much "some time" are we talking about? Hours or days? Cos this 
situation is becoming to much now. Like we can't even take a shower or 
flush the toilet! We can't keep going on with no water at all! Some of us (i 
am a student abroad just saying) don't even have a car to get the water 
bottles so..please make it work for at least tomorrow morning.” – 
Reference 1, WSP 1 03 04 20 
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“You already announced 10 hours ago that you repaired a burst pipe. Can 
you please provide an estimate when you expect water to return to 
[Location] Midnight, 7am, couple of days? It's been close to 24 hours, you 
must know by now the extent of the problem and when you can fix it. The 
lack of any meaningful communication has been appalling.” – Reference 
2, WSP 1 03 04 20 
 
Eventually, WSP 1, provided a response to the comments.  However, this 
occurred at the same time as the water supply was restored.   
“Hi, I'm really sorry we haven't got a timescale yet. We're working as 
quickly as we can to get this fixed. We have a bottled water location at 
[Location].”  - Reference WSP 1 2018 03 04 20 
 
This led to positive comments from customers thanking the WSP for restoring 
their water supply, even though they were without information throughout the 
majority of the period of water supply failure. 
“Water is back in [Location] Thank you.” – Reference 17, WSP 1 2018 03 
04 20  
 
 “Water is back in my flat too!!” – Reference 19, WSP 1 2018 03 04 20 
 
There was evidence within some of the comments that customers were using this 
information to determine whether they should remain at home or stay with friends 
and family.  There were also instances where customers stated they were 
requesting information to determine whether they should obtain alternative 
supplies of water from the shops and how much would be required depending on 
the estimated timescale.  While this provided evidence that customers were 
actively seeking information so they could effectively plan for water supply failure, 
323 
 
they became increasingly frustrated by a lack of information from the WSP.  The 
lack of information was making it difficult for customers to prepare. 
 “We have had no water for 26 hours. We reported the major burst main 
on [Location] at 7.30am on Friday, [Name] finally arrived to investigate on 
Sunday morning after many chaser calls where on hold for over an hour, 
and after many homes had lost water supply. Surely you can provide an 
estimate for repair time so we can try and make alternative arrangements 
in the meantime?” – Reference 18, WSP 1 2018 03 04 28 
 
Customers used the words “honest” and “realistic” when requesting information 
regarding timescales.  This suggests that customers do not trust the information 
provided by the WSP.  However, if the WSP provided customers with further 
information regarding the nature of the problem, regular updates and estimated 
timescales it would enable customers to understand the difficulties experienced 
by the WSP under these challenging conditions.  A lack of information prompted 
negative comments because customers were not able to plan or prepare for 
prolonged water supply failure. 
“What about [Location] we have not a drop coming out of our taps and I 
have two small children in the house. Please give us an honest timeline 
so we can decide whether or not to stay with friends/family.” – Reference 
25, WSP 1 2018 03 05 17 
 
There were also requests for information regarding alternative supplies of water.  
Some of these comments were related to posts made by the WSP notifying 
customers of locations where they could obtain bottled water.  However, there 
were also instances where customers were requesting information from the WSP 
as to why they weren’t providing an alternative supply of water in their location.  
Especially as some customers were without a water supply for over 24 hours and 
were not able to obtain an alternative supply from the local supermarkets because 
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they had sold out.  This was a particular problem for vulnerable customers who 
needed water to take medication or to prepare food. 
 
“My postcode [Location] In the two photos I have uploaded above, it says 
there should be a phone number we can ring, I've tried many times to ring 
for advice and not managed to actually speak to someone, it says you 
should be providing us with an alternative supply which we haven't heard 
or been told anything about, it also says if you need it for medical reasons 
you should talk to your supplier, how do we speak to you when it's just pre 
recorded messages, my child is registered disabled and has to medicated 
through day and night most medicines and special foods she is on has to 
mixed with water, which I haven't had any of for 26 hours now! And haven't 
been able to speak to anyone about just listen to pre recorded messages, 
I have been and bought bottled water from he shops which I am already 
running low on due to using the water to wash pots, wash my children, mix 
with medication etc and all the rest of our local shops are now out of water, 
I know burst pipes can't be helped but you should have something in place 
for when things like this happen to help, not leave people without water for 
26 hours especially vulnerable people like the elderly and disabled! Please 
update us and let us know where we can get our alternative supply from 
ASAP” – Reference 75, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
 
Customers requested further information regarding how to register as a 
vulnerable person and whether customers were considered to be vulnerable if 
they were elderly or infirm.  These requests included questions regarding how 
vulnerable customers were prioritised, why they were not receiving regular 
updates and why they were not provided with an alternative supply of water 
delivered direct to their homes. 
“Please can you advise what constitutes a vulnerable customer? We are 
in the same building as two very elderly and immobile people. We have 
delivered them water but they are still very concerned and I wonder how 
we get them prioritised? Who can I speak to?” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 
03 04 14 
 
325 
 
In many instances a representative from the WSP would post a comment within 
the thread of comments requesting customers send further details via a private 
message: 
“…..can you private messages the full address of these residents?” – WSP 
1, 2018 03 04 14 01  
 
“we're asking for any customer's who are vulnerable or their family 
members to contact us. We need full names, address's and contact 
number's and we'll be in contact with these customer's” – WSP 1, 2018 03 
05 07 
 
There were also examples where customers used Facebook to remind the WSP 
that despite sending a private message, they had not received a response.  This 
led to further conversations between customers and the WSP: 
Customer post 
“Sent a private message a couple of hours ago as requested, to get help 
to vulnerable clients in [Location], and [Name] have not even read it yet!” 
– WSP 1, 2018 03 05 07 
 WSP response 
“Hello [Name], Sorry for the delay in responding to you. We have separate 
teams working on the private messages and we have a lot people to 
communicate with. Your message will be read and responded to as soon 
as we can.” – WSP 1, 2018 03 05 07 
 
Customers also requested information regarding compensation from the WSP.  
In some instances it was perceived that the WSP had failed to provide customers 
with a water supply they had already paid to receive and they had also failed to 
provide an alternative supply of water.  This had resulted in customers having to 
purchase water from the supermarket.  This created a great deal of frustration 
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because customers perceived that the WSP should provide compensation for the 
failure to provide a service and reimburse customers for water they had to 
purchase from the supermarket. 
“Where should we send the bills for the water supply bought at local 
supermarkets [Name]? It's 2018 and we actually had to go buy water 
before it was even made available to do the simple tasks of flushing our 
toilets or 'showering' to be presentable at work. Please let us know as it's 
clear water won't be back on anytime soon! #[Location] 
#48hourswithoutwater” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 05 17 
 
The majority of these comments were of a negative tone with customers 
describing the service provided by the WSP as “disgraceful” and “pathetic”.  
 
6.2.3 Conversations between the WSP and the customer 
 
There were many examples where a representative of the WSP was engaged in 
the sharing and exchange of information with customers within the thread of 
comments on Facebook.  Some of the replies were in direct response to a 
question posed by a customer and resulted in the WSP representative asking the 
customer to provide further information via a direct message.  The information 
provided by the WSP included: a general update of the situation, notifying 
customers of the location of a water distribution station, explaining measures 
taken to restore the water supply, directing customers to other social media sites 
for further updates and requests for vulnerable people to register with the WSP.  
However, this exchange of information was intermittent with some posts 
containing a greater number of exchanges.  WSP 1 did not respond to as many 
customer requests for information compared to WSP 2 and WSP 3.  The following 
examples illustrate the exchange of information. 
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          Customer comment 1 
“They tried to tell us that everyone in our postcode now HAS water, which 
is not true, and the cause might be an airlock or grit.” 
 
 WSP response 1 
“….so sorry about this, we are still on site trying to get things resolved.  
Burst main has been fixed but we are now in route again as there has been 
a power outage and the water pump has tripped.  So sorry for the 
inconvenience again.” – Reference 6, WSP 3 2018 03 03 02  
 
 
Customer comment 2 
 “What about [Location]? I don't have any water at all.” 
 
 WSP response 2 
“I’m sorry to hear this.  Can you DM your full address, contact number 
and property type please so I can take a look into this for you?” – 
Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 05 08  
 
In general, customers responded positively to the comments provided by the 
WSP representative.    
  
 Customer comment  
“Water came back on and now gone again, update please, just outside 
[Location].” 
 
WSP response  
“We have repaired the mains in the area and have now experienced a 
power outage which has caused the water pumps to trip.  So sorry for this! 
We are on site trying to resolve this further issue. Thanks.” 
 
 Customer comments  
“[Name] thanks for replying.”  – Reference 12, WSP 3 2018 03 03 02  
 
“Another BIG THANK YOU from [Location] for getting us back on so 
quickly.” – Reference 7, WSP 2 2018 03 05 07 
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However, there were examples of customers responding negatively if the WSP 
was perceived to have replied to one customer and did not reply to another.  
There were also examples of negative comments if the WSP had requested a 
customer to provide the location of a particular problem and did not respond with 
either an update or a proposed solution.    
“[Name] can you stop picking and choosing who to reply to. We are all 
customers and all deserve acknowledgement!!” – Reference 1, WSP 1 
2018 03 05 04 
 
Customers responded negatively because they perceived they were being 
ignored by the WSP.  However, this could have been alleviated if the WSP had 
informed customers they were not able to respond individually to all requests for 
information because there were too many requests. 
 
6.2.4 Customers sharing information  
Customers were also very active sharing information they had obtained from 
other social media platforms, the company website or direct from the WSP.  The 
information they shared included updates provided by the WSP, conversations 
with the WSP or the Local Authority, requirements for alternative water supplies, 
location of supermarkets with supplies of bottled water and links to complaint 
procedure information. 
“I have just spoken to [Name]. For [Location] at least, there are still repairs 
ongoing (to a 12" main)and they do not know when they will be completed. 
I have pointed out that they are posting conflicting information and 
apparently they will resolve this, not at all impressed.” – Reference 6, 
WSP 1 2018 03 04 10 
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Customers shared information to provide support and information to others and 
to receive confirmation that they were not alone experiencing difficulties without 
a supply of water. 
 
6.3 Alternative supplies of water 
The provision of alternative supplies of water by the WSP created a great deal of 
contention and there were a number of reasons for this.  The locations of the 
bottled water distribution stations were perceived by many customers to be of 
great distance to travel.  Many did not have their own transport and were unable 
to carry large quantities of water either because they travelled on the bus or 
because they had to walk long distances with young children.  Customers used 
Facebook to inform the WSP’s of the need to provide more bottled water 
distribution stations in more accessible locations for those that were not able to 
travel long distances. 
“appreciate that these events will occur and take time to fix but having 
water collection points in far flung places is not satisfactory. I purchased 
water locally yesterday, but without a car it's hard work carrying back. We 
need a collection point for [Location] where upwards of 250 homes plus 
local flats have been without water for over 2 days. I have cancer/ chemo 
and the worry of infection risk is quite real when we have to reduce hygiene 
standards due to having to eke water supplies. Army bowsers?” – 
Reference 20, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
“Not much use for customers 9 miles away in [Location] is it really. Luckily 
the local community is looking after vulnerable residents for you but 
ignoring smaller villages is not really good enough.” – Reference 36, WSP 
2 2018 03 06 05  
 
Customers also threatened to call the emergency services in one location out of 
concern for vulnerable residents who were not able to obtain water from an 
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alternative source because they were unable to travel: 
“I rang and advised the customer advisor that [Location] was still without 
water and if they don’t act we will call the emergency services as we have 
quite a few pensioners that have No water and no way of travelling to get 
any, we bought all the bottled water Asda had and dished it out but not 
sure how long we have to self service ?” – Reference 2, WSP 3 2018 03 
02 13 
 
This contributed a lack of resilience for many of these customers because they 
were unable to obtain an alternative supply of water making it difficult to cope 
under circumstances of prolonged water supply failure.  As discussed within 
Section 6.2.1, as the incident progressed it became more difficult for customers 
to contact the WSP to inform them they were unable to obtain any water.  This 
will be discussed further within Section 6.3.3.  Difficulties were also experienced 
by customers who were able to travel long distances to the water distribution 
stations and these are presented in the following Section 6.3.1. 
 
6.3.1 Availability of alternative supplies of water 
Customers reported instances of arriving at the bottled water station to find they 
had run out of water or they were only allowed 1 litre each.  This was not 
considered an adequate volume of water for customers to drink, let alone fulfil 
their basic needs for flushing, washing and preparing food.  Customers that were 
experiencing difficulties attending the water distribution station expressed 
frustration when they finally arrived to find there was no water. 
[Name] parts of [Location] haven't had water since Saturday night. No 
water to wash, drink, or cook. You have finally added a Water Station at 
[Location], but how is 1 litre of water going to help after over 30 hours of 
no water? With no sign of water yet, and a family house hold, what is 1 
litre of water going to do? Especially when [Location] 1 1/2 miles from 
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where I am in [Location]. How are all the old age pensioners going to get 
down there?”  - Reference 7, WSP 1 2018 03 05 07 
 
There were also conflicting comments regarding chaos at the bottled water 
station and descriptions of it being a ‘horrible experience’.  It was perceived that 
some customers did not wait patiently or queue for a supply of bottled water but 
there was a great deal of pushing and shoving to get to the front of the queue.  
However, the lack of information provided by the WSP regarding timescales may 
have contributed to the chaos experienced because customers were unsure 
when their water supply would be restored.  The chaos described at the bottled 
water distribution station suggests that customers did not have confidence or trust 
in the ability of the WSP to provide an alternative supply of water if the situation 
persisted over a longer period of time. 
“You had a Manager on site and ten team members who stood around 
with their hands in their pockets. There was no protocol or organisation at 
all why? It turned into a Lord of the Flies scenario / almost riot, the Police 
then had to be called, all because your Manager and team did not marshal 
the crowds / use common sense, it was dangerous, badly handled and 
very irresponsible of you. If you are doing emergency distribution then you 
need to marshal people - you obviously thought of it, as you sent a team 
of 10, but they did ZERO. Do you not train them how to deal with such 
situations? Someone should be sacked / demoted for the 
incompetence....” – Reference 23, 2018 03 04 15 
 
Customers did not perceive the location of water distribution stations to be 
adequate.  This led to suggestions and requests for the WSP to provide bowsers 
or tankers in more convenient and accessible locations.  This would allow more 
customers access to an alternative supply of water.  It was also perceived that 
the WSP had access to a large provision of alternative water in the form of 
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tankers, bowsers and bottled water.  However, customers did not understand why 
the WSP’s were not actively distributing these to the locations that were affected. 
60 hours with no water. United Nations guideline for water is a minimum 
of 5 litres per person per day. So my household needs 20 litres a day 
(weighs 20 kilograms). How I am supposed to get that without a car? We 
need bowsers or standpipes every half mile, minimum.”  - Reference 4, 
2018 03 06 01  
 
6.3.2 Contingency planning 
There were also instances where customers expressed frustration at the 
perceived lack of contingency or emergency planning by the WSP:   
“Where are the water stations? I'm [Location], no water at all and no info 
on water stations that I can find, other than [Location] which is too far away, 
these need to be every couple of streets. Realistically I suspect [Name] 
have insufficient resources for that. No excuse though, surely there is a 
Crisis Management Plan for major incidents like this that kicks In? I see no 
evidence of this unfortunately”. – Reference 7, 2018 03 04 18 
 
“Tell the truth! What are your contingency plans? Will we have water 
tonight or not? How can anyone believe what you say? You said it was 
fixed earlier and surprise surprise it clearly wasn't! Putting aside I see you 
have run out of bottled water at your sites in [Location] and [Location], a 
few bottles is not enough when toilets are overflowing and we can't wash!” 
– Reference 1, 2018 03 05 09 
 
Customers did not understand why the WSP was not prepared for such an event.    
Customers wanted answers to their questions, particularly with regard to the 
provision of more water distribution stations.  There were even suggestions 
regarding a more effective method of distributing alternative supplies of water.  
The continued lack of information as the event progressed contributed to an 
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increasing lack of trust and confidence in the information provided by the WSP.  
This also led to customers to doubt the ability of the WSP to provide an alternative 
supply of water. 
“[Name] Do [Name] have a contingency plan in place to provide water 
bowsers to people in effected areas some people still can't get out due to 
the snow/Ice and shops are running out of bottled water plus it's expensive 
we have been without water for 24 hrs many people even longer families 
and elderly people.” – Reference 11, WSP 3 2018 03 02 07  
 
6.3.3 Altruistic behaviour 
There were many examples of altruism throughout the event with customers 
providing information to one another regarding which supermarkets still had a 
stock of water:  
“I managed to get some water from the [Name] in [Name] this morning. 
Also got some For my neighbour who is old and doesn't have a car (we 
live in [Name]). The guys were super nice and doing their best but not 
everything is within their power (I was quite upset how rude some people 
were towards them). Really hope it can be sorted soon; not having our 
daily shower is unpleasant but will not kill anyone.” – Reference 1, 2018 
03 04 15 
 
“Anyone in [Location] needing water I'm in [Location] and water is fine, so 
if you have bottles/buckets you're welcome to fill them up here” – 
Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 05 
 
A local sports centre was offering its facilities for people to shower for free, even 
though they were not members and there were many examples of customers 
obtaining alternative supplies of water for their elderly or disabled neighbours.  
There were also examples of conversations between friends offering water and 
showering facilities within their homes and there were some customers who still 
had a water supply offering to fill containers for those without a supply. 
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“We have bottled water as well as running water here at the leisure centre. 
You are more than welcome to come down to use our shower facilities as 
well as fill up any empty water bottles at our water fountians.” – Reference 
2, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
“I have water - if you still need it tomorrow come and get it from me. PM 
me” – Reference 3, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
While the failure of the water supply was a challenging and difficult experience 
for many customers, there were also examples of customers reusing water in an 
attempt to conserve as much as possible.  Customers mentioned using water 
from water butts to flush their toilets throughout this event providing examples of 
adaptation to achieve resilience to water supply failure.  
“Still not a drop of water in [Location]. More than 50 hours without water 
supply. Used the water butts for the loo and an awful lot of plastic bottles 
going out with this week's recycling. I can't blame the guys who're trying to 
fix the problem, but a bit more frequent and accurate information would be 
helpful.” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 05 17 
“We are OK - I have a tank with 300 gallons which I use water the plants 
in the loft. I'll just divert that.” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 05 04 
 
“Storing up dirty bath water back in to the empty bottles so I have some 
water to flush the toilet with. Come on [Name], i'm grateful for your hard 
work but how much longer do I have to live like this? Been 5 days now and 
not even a drop, [Location].” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 06 11 
 
 “Use water butt for flushing loo” – Reference 2, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
 
The freezing weather conditions had made it difficult for WSP 3 to provide 
customers in rural locations with an alternative supply of water because of the 
dangers transporting water on icy roads.  However, many customers did not 
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perceive this to be an adequate response because the weather warnings within 
their local area were no longer active.  These customers did not understand why 
the WSP could not deliver bowsers to their local area when their roads were free 
of ice. 
“Some of us have been told that the reason for the lack of water delivery 
by truck is that the inspectors can't get out to assess if the roads are safe. 
The roads in the area concerned have largely been clear since this 
morning, and will certainly be clear tomorrow, Sunday and Monday - using 
this as an excuse is an an extremely distasteful exploitation of the weather 
situation.” – Reference 15, WSP 3 2018 2018 03 02 14 
 
“……or telling people that you can't supply them with bowsers because 
the roads aren't safe, some 5 hours after all weather warnings in the area 
have ceased…” – Reference 7, WSP 3 2018 03 02 14 
 
All of the WSP’s were experiencing difficulties providing alternative supplies of 
water to all of the customers that were affected.  However, the WSP’s did not 
provide customers with any further information as to why.  It is possible from the 
information provided within the semi-structured interviews in Chapter 4, that the 
WSP’s did not have enough resources in terms of people to establish multiple 
water distribution points or deliver water to all of their vulnerable customers.  The 
following conversation between a customer and WSP 3 on Facebook provides 
an indication there were not enough people within the organisation to distribute 
an alternative supply of water to all of the customers affected. 
Customer post 
“[Name] ... aren't you supposed to provide alternative water (eg Bowser / 
Bottled water) after 12 hours????? “ 
WSP Response                                              
“……unfortunately due to the adverse weather conditions we have 
experienced and a number of issues our customers are currently 
experiencing with frozen pipes, low pressure, no water etc we are unable 
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to provide an alternative water resource to all those affected. We are 
encouraging customers who currently have water supplies to store some 
water so they can use until the usual supply is restored.” Reference 8, 
WSP 3 2018 03 03 02 
 
This is also supported through customer comments relating to the provision of 
water for vulnerable customers.  WSP 3 customers were sharing information from 
the WSP that only vulnerable customers would be receiving bottled water due to 
the large number of affected customers.  There were also examples of customers 
providing information to the WSP regarding the need for an alternative supply of 
water however, they had not received one.  
“Just had a message from [Name] and they are only supplying bottled 
water to vulnerable customers due to the vast amounts without water.” – 
Reference 4, WSP 3 2018 03 03 02  
“Over 24hrs still no water. I understand burst pipes and engineering 
problems on site but for you not to be able or capable to provide us with 
an alternative water supply is not acceptable in this day and age. So what 
are you going to do fix the pipe or alternate water supply..!!!” – Reference 
17, WSP 3 2018 03 03 02  
“You promised me a water delivery last night and it has not arrived. I am 
looking after a terminally ill Mum. WE HAVE NO WATER. [Name].” – 
Reference 28, WSP 3 2018 03 04 02  
 
While there was a great deal of frustration and negativity directed towards each 
of the WSP’s, however, there were also examples of positive comments and 
praise.  Customers posted comments in support of the WSP and they asked other 
customers to be more understanding and patient.  This was particularly evident 
within the customer comments for WSP 2.  They received a great deal of support 
from customers compared to WSP 1 and WSP 3.  However, these comments 
337 
 
were relatively few compared to the negative comments posted throughout the 
event.  
 “Well done to all the team working to get it fixed and provide alternative 
supplies” – Reference 1, WSP 3 PC 2018 03 04 24 
 
6.4 Living without a water supply  
Living without a water supply was extremely challenging for many customers and 
was exacerbated by a lack of information from the WSP.  This is because 
customers did not know how long they would be without a supply of water and 
were not able to prepare or adapt to a different way of living.  Customers with 
babies were struggling to prepare their bottles and customers wanted to know if 
they needed to purchase water on their way home from work.  Even if this was 
only a temporary situation.   
“Any news of [Location] live in [Location], need to know if I will come home 
to water or not, got work uniform to wash and need showers! Or will I need 
to stock up on water, stayed away last night, need to come back to my 
house!!” – Reference 7 WSP 1 2018 03 06 11 
“Wish they would have an update having to wash baby Freddie's bottles 
in shop bought water so | can sterilise them is proving expensive.” – 
Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 04 
 
The failure of the water supply created a great deal of frustration for customers 
particularly when there was no indication of the supply being restored after a 
couple of days.  Some customers had sent their children to stay with relatives but 
were left with no information regarding how long it would take to restore the water 
supply.  There were also examples were the water supply had been restored for 
a brief period of time and customers had missed the opportunity to obtain water. 
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“Still no water, I've had none since Saturday, haven't seen my daughter 
since Saturday, she's had to stay with her grandparents, because it's too 
unsanitary to keep her here!! Dishes and clothes piling up, boiling the kettle 
just to have some sort of wash... Oh and funny enough had a letter from 
my council today letting me know of the increases this year... your one of 
them” – Reference 25 WSP 1 AP 2018 03 05 16 
 
Customers used Facebook to post comments informing the WSP of the difficulties 
they were experiencing without the ability to wash themselves, wash dishes, 
clothes, preparing food for cooking and flushing the toilet.  Customers complained 
a lack of water had led to unsanitary conditions within their homes.  Customers 
also expressed distress because they were not able to wash and did not want to 
go to work feeling dirty or “smelly”.  
“Oh no. That's the thing that's getting to me most, being unable to clean 
things properly. I can wash myself in a small amount of water but what 
about the dishes, clothes... you can't clean a kitchen or bathroom properly 
with antibacterial wipes” – Reference 2, WSP 1 2018 03 06 03 
 
Not being able to flush the toilet was a particular concern because it was 
considered to be unsanitary, particularly for those who were unwell.  There were 
also concerns as to how a family would be able to cope: 
 “Any idea of how much longer? Water purchased today all ran out. With 
4 in house problems with pots and toilet. Thxs” – Reference 6, WSP 2 
2018 03 05 08 
 
This was a particular problem for customers that had to purchase an alternative 
supply of water from the supermarket because it was perceived to be expensive 
to flush the toilet and required too much water that customers were unable to 
carry. 
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“A pound for a bottle of water from the local shop at [Location], going to 
the loo is getting very expensive. Not water since Saturday eve.” – 
Reference 9, WSP 1 2018 03 05 17 
 
Many customers reported how their toilet had become blocked as a result of not 
being able to flush it properly.  In order to conserve as much bottled water as 
possible there were comments informing the WSP and other customers of the 
minimum amount of water required to adequately flush the toilet but customers 
also expressed concern that they were using bottled drinking water to flush the 
toilet. 
“toilet now blocked, no water for 26 hours and none in shops and no car, 
thanks [Name].” – Reference 2 WSP 1 2018 03 04 9 
 
Customers also provided information regarding the amount of water required to 
flush the toilet and the difficulties they experienced without a supply of water. 
 
“Bottled water is Ok to drink but quite difficult to shower / clean with. It 
takes 51 to flush a toilet and that weighs 5kg. A kettle holds about 21. You 
will be surprised at how much water you need per day for basics. I have 
taken a couple of days off work and have been ferrying water to residents 
in my area.” – Reference 9, WSP 1 2018 03 06 03  
 
This event did provide customers with a greater appreciation of the importance 
of water in their daily lives and how accessible it is under normal circumstances.  
Flushing the toilet with drinking water was a particular concern for some 
customers as they were pouring bottled water in the cistern or down the toilet.  
They had not previously considered the water they flush down the toilet was 
drinking water standard.  This event also provided customers with a greater 
understanding of how much water they use on a daily basis.  However, whether 
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experience of this event will change attitudes and behaviour to water use would 
require further research. 
 
6.5 The provision of a service  
Customer attitudes and perceptions of the provision of service were generally 
negative.  This was largely a result of the perceived lack of communication and 
information provided by the WSP throughout the whole event.  This had left 
customers frustrated and angry, especially as they were paying for a service that 
they considered to be inadequate.   
“Disgusting service! My poor disabled dad has been without water all day! 
I really hope it's all fixed ASAP and compensation is made.” – Reference 
2, WSP 1 2018 03 03 07 
 
There was also a perceived lack of contingency planning for severe weather 
events, which led many customers to lose confidence and trust in the ability of 
the WSP to provide an adequate service.  The lack of an adequate provision of 
an alternative supply of water reinforced the negativity directed towards the 
WSP’s.  Customers felt “disappointed”, “ignored”, “dismissed” and “disregarded” 
by the WSP.  This led to many customers describing the provision of a service by 
the WSP’s as “disgusting”, “abysmal”, “shocking” and an “absolute disgrace”.   
“The communication from [Name] is utterly abysmal, I'm shocked how they 
can treat customers like this - I've tried to communicate via telephone, 
online chat and through social media and have been fobbed off, dismissed 
and guided to websites that are never updated. All I want to know is what 
they plan to do to help villages with no water for more than 15 hours now, 
people are panic buying so bottled water is running out in shops and some 
have babies and very young toddlers like myself but they are just not 
communicating whatsoever. This is ridiculous customer service” – 
Reference 19, WSP 2 2018 03 05 07  
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Customers of WSP 2 and WSP 3, expressed their frustration on Facebook when 
they were asked to conserve water on the WSP website.  These customers did 
not have a supply of water and were therefore not able to conserve any.  There 
were also posts from WSP 1 requesting customers not to wash their cars 
throughout this period.  This was met with a great deal of criticism because 
customers were experiencing freezing conditions and did not have any water to 
be able to wash a car. 
“how can we save water if we don't have any??? [Postcode], last in cul-
de-ac to go without!! cannot believe it in 2018, shocking!!!!! do we ge a 
rebate????” – Reference 37 WSP 2 2018 03 05 08  
 
“We have no water in [Location] - honestly, I really don't think the problem 
is through people washing cars! Do you have any idea of the timescale for 
this? Also, is [Location] really the only place you're giving the water out? 
We're by [Location].” – Reference 1, WSP 1 WC 2018 03 04 12 
 
All of the WSP’s were criticised for not anticipating the consequences of the 
freezing cold weather and as already mentioned, not having adequate plans in 
place.  There was also a great deal of criticism regarding infrastructure.  It was 
perceived by some customers that part of the failure to supply water was the 
result of a failing or deteriorating infrastructure that was not being adequately 
maintained by the WSP.  Some customers perceived this was because the WSP 
was sharing profits with the shareholders rather than investing in an aging 
infrastructure. 
The situation has been caused by a lack of investment in the water supply 
infrastructure. The high profile investments, [Location] ring etc. give the 
illusion that all is well but in reality, the services which supply water to 
houses and businesses, which in effect tap into the main supply have not 
been updated in some considerable time. It is these that continue to 
fail…….”  - Reference 31, WSP 1 2018 03 06 03 
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However, there were some positive comments.  Previous employees posted 
comments in support of the WSP explaining how difficult it was to locate leaks 
and burst pipes and customers posted comments thanking the WSP for all their 
hard work.    
“Sometimes bursts happen and having previously worked for [Name] for 
14 years I understand the situation from both sides . Regrettably bursts 
may show themselves but the leak /burst may be coming from another 
section of pipework and it can be a process of elimination .. (quote finding 
a needle in a haystack) to locate the source. So just trying to say it is not 
always easy as with those with no water equally” – Reference 5, WSP 1 
2018 03 04 28 
 
“Trust me with over a decade of working in the water industry from 
replacing to leak repair I can honestly say new pipes or old pipes when the 
ground freezes and thaws out you have movement in the ground pipes 
expand and contract due to different weather conditions there will always 
be leaks. It is not ideal but the area that is to be searched to find such 
leaks is very large and takes many man hours then comes the repair of 
said bursts this could depend on timescale due to location and pipe size 
and material. The guys will have been working none stop throughout from 
the moment of the first call of no water. Everyone who has been working 
on these jobs to try and restore water asap to all affected areas have been 
working flat out and will still be be in work as per tomorrow. I know it's not 
easy and we all have to pay the bills even us who fix them. Please have 
patience it's hard for us all those without water and for those who are trying 
to restore that water for you.” – Reference 5, WSP 3 2018 03 04 24  
 
There were also comments thanking the WSP when the water supply was 
restored.  Although many of these comments also contained advice for the WSP 
to ensure they provide their customers with information during an emergency or 
upgrade and invest in their infrastructure. 
“Hurrah! Water is back on in [Location] - well at least where I am. I'm really 
grateful to the engineers who have probably been having an appalling time 
in these conditions. However as a company you should have been giving 
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us regular information and estimated times for repair especially given the 
road conditions in the affected areas.” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 03 
02  
Customers were very active reporting leaks and burst pipes on Facebook.  Within 
the comments, customers provided information regarding the location, timescales 
and any damage that had been caused.   
“Tried to report burst water main [Location] just up from [Location] junction. 
Coming up from under the tarmac next to the gutter. Not sure if anyone 
else has notified you. Totally appreciate how busy your emergency line is 
so hopefully you will be able to action this.” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 
03 05 01 
 
They were also very active commenting on leaks and burst pipes that had been 
reported with no evidence that the problem had been resolved by the WSP or if 
the problem had not been adequately dealt with. 
“The burst water main at the junction of [Location] and [Location] has been 
leaking for months. It was reported, nothing done about it so the council 
just resurfaced the road over it ! Total waste of time and money. To add 
insult to injury our water rates have just gone UP” – Reference 3, WSP 1 
2018 03 03 02 
 
Customers were using Facebook to report when they had seen WSP engineers 
working on site and also where there was a perceived lack of engineers working 
on a problem.   
“Thank you very much! Seen them from here”  - Reference 3, WSP 1 AP 
2018 03 03 01 
 
“[Location] also - no water at all, except from the gushing mains on 
[Location] and not a soul there repairing...” – Reference 4, WSP 1 AP 
2018 03 04 26 
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Customers also commented on the timescales involved with investigating and 
repairing leaks.  They did not perceive the WSP engineers were working with 
enough speed to rectify the situation.  This was of particular annoyance for 
customers without a water supply. 
“I wonder why it takes so long... on Sunday there were two [Name] workers 
in [Location] sitting in the van next to the leak. Repairing it - by the power 
of telepathy Finally few hours later the digger arrived! Speed of light 
repairs!! Wait wait wait.... Tuesday morning still no water. Completely 
unprepared for emergency situations!” – Reference 59, WSP 1 AP 2018 
03 06 03 
 
6.5.1 WSP customer service 
Customer service throughout the event was not favoured with many positive 
comments.  Customers complained of being held on hold for long periods of time 
and were not able to speak to someone from the WSP to report water supply 
failure, request further information or to register as a vulnerable person.   
“Your customer service is atrocious. I have messaged numberous times. 
We have had no water since Saturday night [Location]. Our water comes 
through [Location] so I can't register with priority service. I have a disabled 
person in the house!!!!!!” – Reference 30, WSP 1 2018 03 05 11 
 
The majority of customers were not able to speak directly with a representative 
from the WSP because they had been cut off by the WSP telephony system or 
they gave up waiting.  This also created difficulties for customers who were trying 
to register as vulnerable because they were not able to inform the WSP of their 
situation so they used Facebook instead.  There were also examples where 
customers had requested assistance online and were told the need to telephone 
the WSP direct but were unable to get through. 
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“I've been online to speak to someone who said they cnt help so l've got 
to ring up so I'm now on hold after an hour of trying to get through got put 
on hold and have been on hold for 30mins now! | bet I'll go to sleep and 
still wake up b4 they answer.” – Reference 3, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
Customers were also frustrated by the lack of response when they had left direct 
messages via Facebook.  On some of the Facebook posts the WSP requested a 
customer to direct message them and many customers expressed frustration 
when they had done this but did not receive a response to their query.  In some 
instances this prompted customers to contact the local MP and the local media.  
Customers also shared links to the website of the regulator Ofwat regarding 
standards of service to encourage others to complain. 
“[Name] my private messages have not been answered either its ok 
though i have contacted my local M.P who has written to [Name] C.E.O i 
am not holding my breath for a reply though” – Reference 26, WSP 1 AP 
2018 03 06 04  
 
 “OK when are you contacting me!! Pmd you as you asked 25 mins ago 
you’ve now had our phone no total 10 times “Oh someone will rig you 
back/be in touch???? Hahhhaaaa No one has and still NO water and no 
one from waterboard to bee seen anywhere, !!! No water delivered either 
being Disabled i need water asap!!!” – Reference 6, WSP 3 2018 03 04 
03 
 
When customers asked questions on Facebook they expected the WSP to reply. 
However, in many instances this did not occur because the WSP was inundated 
with requests and were not able to reply to everyone.  Customers experienced a 
similar situation when they telephoned customer service throughout the event.  
Customers were not happy about being placed on hold for long periods of time 
and then being cut off without an opportunity to speak directly to the WSP.  The 
majority of customers wanted to know when the water supply would be restored.  
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This was very difficult for vulnerable customers because they were not able to 
register with the WSP using any of the methods to contact the WSP.  
 
6.5.2 Vulnerable customers 
The majority of comments relating to vulnerable people were related to the 
provision of alternative supplies. Customers were requesting information 
regarding how vulnerable people could obtain an alternative supply of water if 
they were not able to travel to water distribution stations or carry water from the 
supermarket.  Customers made suggestions to the WSP to increase the water 
distribution stations or deliver water to each vulnerable customer.   
“Can someone at [Name] start using their common sense and supply the 
water in the [Location] are closest to those affected around [Location], and 
not 2 miles away. Most [Name] don't have cars, and there are many people 
unable to get there (elderly, disabled, those who can't carry water etc).” – 
Reference 1 WSP 1 2018 03 04 15 
 
Customers also informed the WSP where the local community had taken 
responsibility to ensure vulnerable customers had been provided for. 
“Not much use for customers 9 miles away in [Location] is it really. Luckily 
the local community is looking after vulnerable residents for you but 
ignoring smaller villages is not really good enough.” – Reference 5, WSP 
2 2018 03 06 05  
 
There were also examples where customers posted a comment on behalf of their 
neighbours or relatives to request an alternative supply of water from the WSP.  
Customers demonstrated a great deal of altruism particularly with regard to those 
perceived to be vulnerable. 
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“I have 2 severely disabled people at home that that cannot carry the water 
let alone get their can we please arrange someone to drop some off.” – 
Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 05 12 
 
“What about the elderly who can't get there? My neighbour has been 
locked in since Tuesday because of the weather, no way she'll make it 
there for any. Is this the only place? It's miles for us!” – Reference 1, WSP 
1 2018 03 04 11 
 
Vulnerable customers used Facebook to post individual requests for an 
alternative water supply if they did not receive water from the WSP or had not 
registered themselves as vulnerable.  Some of these comments also included 
personal information regarding a customer’s medical situation including their 
frustration and distress because they were unable to obtain an alternative supply 
of water.  This information was provided to ensure the WSP understood the 
importance of providing these customers with an alternative supply of water. 
Customers also suggested the WSP provide communal taps for the local 
community to access.  
 
“NO WATER IN [location]-disabled mother and baby, been on hold for 1h 
30 minutes - absolutely shocking! You should have a communal tap in the 
street operating or delivering water to vulnerable people like me who can't 
actually leave sleeping, sick children at home to get water.” – Reference 
2, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
“Weve had NO WATER since 2pm yesterday made 7 calls to you and all 
we get is fobbed off !! Surely it should be back on now. Were disgusted 
weve had no water to wash, shower, kettle wash machine wash machine 
!! I have a disability and this is so STRESSING me out. Please hurry up 
and tell us at least when to expect it to be back on!!!” – Reference 1, WSP 
3 2018 03 04 05  
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There were many instances where customers informed the WSP of the stress 
caused by not having a supply of water and no information to tell them when the 
supply would be restored. 
 
6.6 Compensation and bills  
All of the WSP were criticised for not providing customers with an adequate 
provision of service throughout the event.  This is because customers perceived 
the lack of information regarding water supply failure and poor communication 
did not allow them to make preparations for an alternative supply of water.  Not 
only that, poor communication meant that some customers did not perceive the 
need to find an alternative supply of water because they considered the water 
supply would be restored relatively quickly and the WSP would provide an 
alternative supply.    
Over 12 hours without water in [Location] No bottle water handed out. Had 
to buy bottled water. No updates on work on there web site can't get 
through on the phone just recorded message then cuts you off. They would 
soon come knocking on the door if we owed them money. What about a 
refund on our bill [Name]” – Reference 13, WSP 1 AP 2018 03 03 07 
 
However, it was difficult for many customers to travel to the bottled water stations, 
they were unable to carry enough water home and in many instances customers 
were forced to purchase their own supply of water.  This situation created a great 
deal of frustration for customers and as a result many demanded compensation 
and were not happy about paying for a service that did not meet their needs. 
“[Name] its been ALL day. Why isnt it sorted yet. For god sake its just a 
joke. Are you going to refund everyone thats had to go out and buy bottled 
water?” – Reference 49, WSP 1 AP 2018 03 03 02 
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“We have been running the water to clear it and the tap water is improving 
but the cistern is pretty disgusting. As we are on a meter is there going to 
be any reimbursement on our bill? This will, no doubt, apply to a great 
many people.” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 05 02   
 
6.6.1 Complaints to the regulator 
There was a perception that because customers have to pay for their water 
supply the WSP should ensure a provision of water at all times.  Even during an 
emergency.  Customers did not perceive it to be acceptable that they had to 
purchase water from the supermarket and they used Facebook to remind the 
WSP of their obligations to provide an alternative supply of water by attaching a 
link to the Ofwat website.   
“[Name], a gentle reminder of your legal obligations: 
https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/.../supply.../standards-ofservice/” – Reference 
1, WSP 1 2018 03 04 05 
 
“21 hours and still no water in [Location] - completely unacceptable and 
have reported to OFWAT” – Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
 
Customers also informed the WSP when they had decided to report the WSP to 
Ofwat because they were not provided with water and perceived the provision of 
service to be “unacceptable”. 
 
6.7 Summary 
This Chapter sought to explore the attitudes and perceptions of individual 
customers to water supply failure during an emergency, how information is 
shared between the WSP’s and their customers and what information is required 
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to enable resilience to an extreme event.  Chapter 8 will explore these attitudes 
and perceptions within the context of the academic literature discussed in 
Chapter 2, alongside the results of the semi-structured interviews with emergency 
managers from the LRFs and the WSPs (Chapter 4) and the individual 
homeowner questionnaires (Chapter 5).  However, to finalise this Chapter the 
findings are discussed in relation to the research questions posed at the 
beginning of this Chapter. 
 
6.7.1 What are the individual attitudes and perceptions to water supply 
failure during an extreme event? 
In general customer’s attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure were 
negative, which was largely a result of a lack of communication and information 
from the WSP.  Customers did not know how long they would have to cope 
without a supply of water and this made it very difficult for them to prepare. The 
supermarkets quickly sold out of water and the provision of alternative supplies 
by the WSP was not perceived to be adequate.  Customers within both rural and 
urban locations struggled to collect water from water distribution stations.  This 
was partly because the water distribution stations were located too far away and 
customers were not able to carry water home.  Some customers were not able to 
access an alternative supply because there was no water left when they arrived 
at the water distribution station or they were rationed to 1 litre per person.  
Vulnerable customers also struggled to inform the WSP if they needed water to 
be delivered and many had to rely on the assistance of family of members of the 
local community.  The WSP’s received a great deal of criticism for not providing 
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enough water distribution stations which customers perceived, would reduce the 
distance they would have to travel to obtain an alternative supply of water. 
 
Customers used Facebook to complain about the unsanitary conditions they were 
having to endure as a result of water supply failure and actively informed the WSP 
of the difficulties experienced because they could not shower or wash.  This was 
perceived to be a particular problem for customers because they did not want to 
go to work or school dirty or “smelly”.   
 
Customers also expressed concern because they were not able to flush the toilet 
and they perceived this to be very unsanitary.  There were also instances where 
customers reported their toilet was blocked as a result of not being able to flush 
it properly.  This was perceived to be unacceptable and customers complained 
because the WSP had not fixed the problem or provided them with an alternative 
supply.  Although, there were also instances where customers demonstrated an 
appreciation of the difficulties faced by the WSP. 
 
6.7.2 How is information shared between WSP’s and customers during an 
extreme event? 
The WSP’s shared information on Facebook, Twitter and the company website.  
Customers used Facebook and Twitter as the main methods of communicating 
with the WSP and were actively involved in providing information, requesting 
information from the WSP and sharing information with other customers. 
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The WSP’s provided customers with general information regarding the ongoing 
situation, notification posts containing location specific information and posts 
providing advice.  However, the scale of the incident meant there were also other 
locations that were affected by water supply failure that were not assigned a 
specific Facebook post by the WSP. 
 
All of the WSP’s were criticised for not providing customers with accurate and 
regular information throughout the event and many customers found it difficult to 
obtain any information regarding their local area.  Customers provided the WSP 
with the location and timescale of water supply failure within the Facebook 
comments to encourage the WSP to provide specific information regarding their 
local area.  However, the WSP was not able to respond to all of the requests for 
information and this generated a great deal of negativity toward the WSP’s.  
Customers complained because they perceived the WSP’s were responding to 
some customers and not others.  This made customers feel as though they were 
being “disregarded” and “ignored” by the WSP’s and there were comments from 
customers suggesting how improvements could be made with regard to future 
communication from the WSP. 
 
Customers also reported examples of conflicting information provided by the 
WSP on Facebook, Twitter and the company website.  This created a great deal 
of confusion because customers did not know which source of information was 
correct and made it very difficult for customers to prepare for water supply failure.   
Customers also reported a number of difficulties when attempting to telephone 
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the WSP to request further information or to inform the WSP of a problem.  Many 
customers complained they had been cut off or were on hold for long periods of 
time without being provided with the opportunity to speak directly with the WSP.  
This was a particular problem for vulnerable customers because they were not 
able to inform the WSP that they needed water to be delivered. 
 
Customers also actively shared the difficulties they were experiencing conducting 
their daily routines and living without a supply of water.  The majority of these 
comments also included a request for further information regarding the nature of 
the problem, how it was being fixed and estimated timescales when the water 
would be restored.  The majority of notification posts by the WSP did not provide 
timescales regarding when the water supply would be restored.  When this 
information was provided by the WSP, it was very difficult to manage customer 
expectations if further difficulties were experienced increasing the amount of time 
before the water supply could be restored. 
 
Customers used Facebook to request alternative water supplies in the form of 
bowsers, tankers and bottles.  All of the WSPs provided information regarding the 
location of water distribution stations and customers were very active on 
Facebook informing the WSPs of their experience visiting these locations.  This 
often included the difficulties customers experienced obtaining an alternative 
supply of water. 
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6.7.3 What information is required by customers and WSP’s to enable 
resilience during an extreme event? 
Analysis of the Facebook comments revealed how many of the customers 
demonstrated a propensity to achieve resilience to water supply failure by taking 
steps to actively prepare.  This included the purchase of alternative supplies of 
water from the local supermarket, travelling to obtain water from the water 
distribution station, staying with friends and relatives or arranging for the 
distribution of alternative supplies of water for vulnerable friends and family.  
However, in order to ascertain how much water would be necessary to sustain a 
prolonged period of water supply failure, customers required accurate, specific 
and timely information regarding the location, cause of the problem, what the 
WSP was doing to rectify the situation, estimated timescales when the water 
supply would be restored and whether an alternative supply of water was going 
to be provided.   
 
While many of the WSP’s did provide specific information regarding the location 
of water supply failure, this did not include all the locations that had been affected 
and the majority of posts did not include estimated timescales when the water 
supply would be restored.  This made it difficult for people to plan and prepare for 
prolonged water supply failure.  There were examples of adaptation and 
resilience where customers used water from water butts or storage tanks within 
the loft to flush their toilets but these were few and many customers did not have 
access to an alternative supply of water.   
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In order to increase resilience to water supply failure and determine necessary 
preparedness measures, customers provided the WSP with a great deal of 
information throughout the event.  This included information regarding the 
location and timescales of water supply failure.  They also informed the WSP if 
the information they provided was not accurate with regard to the locations of 
water supply failure, including leaks and burst pipes and if there were 
inconsistencies with the information they were providing to customers on different 
media platforms. 
 
Customers also required information regarding the provision of alternative 
supplies of water including, the location of water distribution stations, how much 
water was available per person and reassured there was adequate provision in 
place for all customers.  This information would enable customers to make 
informed decisions regarding the provision of alternative supplies of water related 
to their individual needs and requirements.  If customers are adequately informed 
regarding the availability of alternative supplies, this may reduce ‘chaos’ at the 
water distribution stations and the purchase of all available water within the local 
supermarkets.  As demonstrated within Chapter 1, (Section 1.3) while some 
customers are able to achieve resilience to water supply failure through the 
provision of alternative supplies, this may also reduce the ability of other 
customers to achieve resilience if supplies are rapidly depleted.  This was 
demonstrated at the water distribution stations when customers arrived to 
discover there was no water available. 
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There were many examples throughout the Facebook comment dataset of 
vulnerable customers that had not registered with the WSP.  Many of the WSP’s 
requested vulnerable customers to contact the WSP.  However, because of the 
scale of the event and a large volume of calls, vulnerable customers were unable 
to register.  Many of these customers were also unable to attend the water 
distribution station and were not able to purchase an alternative supply of water 
from the supermarket.  This resulted in a loss of resilience for these customers 
and highlighted the need for WSP’s to ensure there is greater awareness of the 
need for vulnerable customers to register prior to any event.  
 
Objective 3 sought to understand individual attitudes and perceptions of water 
supply failure.  This was achieved through the analysis of the individual 
householder questionnaire which explored general attitudes and perceptions to 
water supply failure (Chapter 5) and analysis of the Facebook comment dataset 
to explore attitudes and perceptions during an extreme event (Chapter 6). 
 
The results of the individual homeowner questionnaire demonstrate how the 
majority of respondents perceive water supply failure to be low risk.  This was 
partly due to a lack of experience of this hazard but also because respondents 
expressed a great deal of confidence in the ability of the WSP’s to provide a 
reliable, continuous and safe supply of water.  While many of the respondents did 
not perceive they actively prepare for water supply failure, it was perceived as 
‘extremely likely’ they would purchase water from the supermarket.  This was 
supported through the analysis of the Facebook comments where many of the 
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customers stated they had purchased an alternative supply of water from the 
supermarket.   
 
The results of Chapter 5 indicated a high level of trust in the provision of a service 
by the WSP.  However, the results of the Facebook comment analysis 
demonstrated negative attitudes and perceptions towards the WSP and the 
provision of a service.  This was largely the result of a perceived inability of the 
WSP to provide customers with accurate and timely information regarding the 
location of water supply failure, estimated timescales when the water supply 
would be restored and information regarding the provision of an alternative supply 
of water.  A failure to provide this information prevented customers from being 
able to achieve resilience to water supply failure and take adequate measures to 
prepare. 
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7 CHAPTER 7 – ACHIEVING RESILIENCE TO EXTREME EVENTS 
THROUGH COLLABORATIVE WORKING PARTNERSHIPS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 explored the relationship between LRF’s and local community groups.  
It was perceived that working collaboratively with local communities strengthens 
the process of emergency management through the development of strong 
relationships.  These allow for the sharing and exchange of local knowledge and 
information, the development of mutual trust, the provision of an additional 
resource and a shared perception of risk.  But how are these relationships formed 
and how can they be sustained over a long period of time? 
 
Within Chapter 5, customers perceived they were more likely to obtain 
information regarding hazards in their local area from friends or family and during 
an emergency (Chapter 6), there were many examples of altruism with friends, 
neighbours and the local community providing assistance to vulnerable 
customers.  Having a route into the community may provide WSP’s with access 
to additional resources during periods of water supply failure.  The local 
community may be able to provide information regarding access routes and 
suitable locations for water distribution stations, as well as provide assistance in 
the distribution of alternative supplies of water to vulnerable customers.   
 
The evolutionary development of an isolated rural, community-led Flood Group 
and a local authority-led Flood Board was explored through a series of semi-
structured interviews using the methodology described within Chapter 3 (Section 
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3.7.1).  Throughout the interview process it became evident the participant had 
developed an extensive social network.  This involved establishing connections 
with other isolated rural communities, local authorities and responder 
organisations to develop a sustainable collaborative working partnership 
focussed on the mitigation and alleviation of flooding.  Through participatory 
action research, the evolutionary development of the flood action group was 
documented through a series of social network graphs using the methodology 
described within Chapter 3 (Section 3.7.1).   
 
The social network graphs were developed from the perspective of one individual 
within the local community who had direct experience of establishing a network 
of connections with local authorities and responder organisations (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.7.1).  They were developed to understand how communities use 
relationships and connections with other organisations to build resilience to 
emergency situations. The social network graphs include a connection with the 
local WSP.  As discussed within Chapter 3, (Section 3.7.1), this relationship was 
developed so the local community could work together with the WSP to alleviate 
the consequences of surface water flooding.  The analysis of Facebook 
comments Chapter 6, (Section 6.3) highlighted the difficulties encountered by 
WSP’s in the distribution of alternative supplies of water.  This research explores 
whether these relationships could be used to support WSP’s during water supply 
failure incidents in the distribution of alternative supplies of water.   A greater 
understanding of how these networks are formed may also provide insights 
regarding the effective communication of information during a water supply failure 
incident.  
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This Chapter documents the development of a flood group to investigate how the 
bottom up approach to emergency management can help to achieve resilience 
to extreme events through collaborative working partnerships (Objective 4, 
Chapter 1) and whether these social networks can be utilised by WSP’s to 
improve resilience to water supply failure.  This will be explored using the 
research questions presented in Chapter 1, (Section 1.4, Objective 4).  
 
7.2 The development of a Social Network 
The development of a community-led Flood Group and a Local Authority-led 
Flood Board is documented within the following series of social network graphs.  
The graphs are in chronological order with each graph representing an action 
toward the establishment of the group.  The process of developing the Flood 
Group and the Flood Board is documented to understand the challenges 
integrating the community in the emergency management system.  
 
7.2.1 Phase 1 – Response to the postal questionnaire  
 
During February 2014, a Parish Councillor contacted Councillors within the 
County and District Local Authority to propose the development of a Flood Group.  
This was partly to ensure local Town and Parish councils at risk of flooding were 
actively involved in the flood risk management process but also to ensure 
adequate preparedness for future flood events.  It was proposed the Flood Group 
should comprise members of the County and District council together with 
representatives from the local Town and Parish Councils, the Environment 
Agency and Emergency Responders.  The group would be developed to share 
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knowledge and information regarding the cause of flooding within the local area 
and to collaborate in the decision making process regarding future flood risk 
management.  This would include working in partnership to campaign for 
government funding and share good practice in the development of flood plans 
and future flood groups.  It was perceived by the Parish Councillor that because 
flooding is location specific, flood risk management decisions need to be made 
at the local level involving the local community.  While the local community may 
not perceive themselves to be ‘experts’, they possess local knowledge and 
experience of flooding within their local area and should be involved within local 
flood risk management decisions: 
“..risk management needs to have a relationship with the location” 
 
“More important if you are looking at sets of civil disasters ….. public 
expectation of experts requires experts to have a link to it…. the 
community think experts are experts and don’t acknowledge themselves 
as experts….. key thing communities want is the organisation to have local 
knowledge” 
 
The ability to obtain government funding for local flood protection schemes was 
also discussed throughout the interview process.  In order to obtain funding for 
certain community schemes the participant was required to attend community 
workshops.  It was perceived this represented a standardised “one size fits all” 
approach to community preparedness and did not allow for the heterogeneity that 
exists between different community groups and the different challenges they may 
face in terms of flood risk. It was also discussed within the literature review 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.5) that communities are naturally heterogeneous and 
susceptible to different threats and hazards depending on location, community 
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structure, community cohesion and socio-economic status (Gilchrist, 2009; 
Paton, 2003; Paton et al, 2001).  It was perceived that through the development 
of collaborative working partnerships this may enable a greater understanding of 
the challenges faced by community groups. 
 
Recent flood events had also raised awareness at a national scale of the 
difficulties experienced by communities at risk of flooding.  Members of 
Parliament and the Prime Minister were visiting locations that had been affected 
by flooding and with widespread media attention were proposing measures to 
increase funding for flood mitigation.  This was perceived by the Parish Councillor 
as a good opportunity to highlight the difficulties within their local area. 
 
“Now that there is likely to be a national re-think on approaches to flood 
mitigation, it seems absolutely the right time to try and make the voice of 
[Location] heard and to influence the way in which funding is allocated to 
help protect our communities as far as we can from flooding.  However 
important major flood-defence schemes are for some areas, not least in 
our own county, flood-mitigation in [Location] depends far more on 
inspection and maintenance of main rivers and ordinary watercourses by 
the relevant authorities, on finding ways of dealing with run-off and 
surface-water into our rivers and onto our roads and on addressing the 
sewage and drainage infrastructure which cannot cope with current 
demands.  These may not be as exciting as major schemes but they would 
keep a lot of households in this area dry and free from the misery of 
flooding.” 
 
 
It was 7 months before a meeting was arranged to discuss the formation of the 
group.  During this period the Parish Councillor who resides within the local 
community TP008 (Figure 7.1), contacted all of the Town and Parish Councils 
within the district to request information regarding flood risk within their local area.  
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This was in the form of a postal questionnaire and included questions relating to 
whether the community had a local flood plan, the source of local flooding, current 
and future mitigation measures and the number of properties at risk.   The 
response to the questionnaire also included the organisations that each Town 
and Parish Council had a connection with regarding flood mitigation measures.  
This information provided the initial starting point of the social network analysis 
and defined the boundary for analysis (Figure 7.1).   
 
However, not all of the Town and Parish Councils responded to the questionnaire 
despite two follow up procedures including email and telephone.  There may be 
other connections and relationships between organisations and the Town and 
Parish Councils that have not been included because they are unknown.  From 
direct conversation with Clerks from the Town and Parish Council that did not 
respond, the participant stated within the interview that:  
 
“Some Clerks I didn’t get an answer from, some didn’t care and others 
didn’t think they had a problem” 
 
 
One Parish Council was very interested in resilience but did not want to be part 
of the Flood Group because they were already part of a Resilience Forum Group.  
It was perceived by the participant that Resilience Forum Groups were developed 
around a “command and control’ approach to emergency situations and were 
more effective during the actual emergency:   
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“Flood groups aren’t interested in this approach. They concentrate on 
flooding and helping people prepare.  They do all the prep and planning.  
A lot deploy before and go home before the river rises.  Other types of 
resilience concentrate on during the emergency whereas flood groups are 
the before and after people.” 
 
The participant also perceived that Resilience Groups and Flood Groups 
attracted different types of people because they need to perform a different role: 
 
“Not about floods themselves, it is about the circumstances currently for 
flooding…..a lot more groups have to be lobbying groups and a different 
type of person is attracted to lobbying than action groups.  Because flood 
groups have had to lobby so much and people who are in resilience groups 
don’t necessarily have to do it, but flood groups live in locations at risk.” 
 
It was perceived that members of a Flood Group understand the risk of flooding 
to their property because they reside within locations at risk of flooding and may 
have had direct experience of a flood.  This may drive individuals to become 
actively involved in ‘lobbying’ for flood mitigation within their local areas. 
 
The social network graph presented in Figure 7.1, represents the initial stage in 
the development of the Flood Group and is loosely representative of the local 
government structure within the UK.  OR003 and LA002 are directly connected 
to the local Town and Parish Councils because they represent local authorities at 
the district level and LA001 represents the County Council.  The social network 
also includes connections that have been established between local Town and 
Parish Councils and other organisations involved in flood risk management as 
indicated in response to the questionnaires.  The local community TP008 is 
included within a cluster of Town and Parish Councils within the centre of the 
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social network graph and connected to organisations involved in flood risk 
management through the sharing and exchange of knowledge, information and 
advice related to flood mitigation.  However, these connections have resulted in 
a loose and sparsely connected network with large structural holes where Town 
and Parish Councils act as bridging connections between the district local 
authorities (OR003, LA002), the County Council (LA001) and organisations 
involved in flood risk management (OR001, OR004)  There was no evidence 
within the questionnaires of a local community working together with a group of 
organisations or local authorities, instead each community indicated they worked 
together with one organisation to alleviate a specific flood related matter for which 
that organisation is responsible.  It is not possible to assess whether these 
organisations work together to discuss the requirements for each individual 
community as this information was not available within the questionnaires. 
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Figure 7.1: Social network graph showing the connections between local Towns 
and Parish Councils, Local Authorities and organisations involved in flood risk 
management. 
 
The social network graph can be used to present a visual representation of the 
connections that exist between local Town and Parish Councils and the 
organisations involved in flood risk management.  However, they do not provide 
any indication of the difficulties that were experienced by local communities when 
working together in collaboration with these organisations.  How these 
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relationships develop and the strength of the relationship can have a strong 
influence on how the social network develops over time and the ability of a 
community to access resources (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015: Murphy, 2007: Dynes, 
2002).  Community representatives have established strong and trusted 
relationships with members of the Local Authority and responder organisations.  
However, organisational changes have affected these relationships to the 
detriment of the local community.  For instance, there were examples where the 
responsibility for particular flood risk management issues were moved to different 
departments and although they were within the same organisation, this was very 
confusing for the local communities.  This was because they did know who they 
needed to contact regarding specific issues within their community.   
 
Difficulties were also experienced when a technical representative from an 
organisation was promoted and ceased to be the point of contact for the local 
community.  It was very difficult for the local community to establish a new 
relationship within the organisation because the promotion also resulted in an 
organisational change and it was not confirmed if there would be a replacement.  
The local community felt they were being ignored by the organisation because 
there was no longer a point of contact to assist with technical flood risk 
management advice and information.  This was further reinforced when the local 
community attempted to contact the organisation and were informed community 
engagement was no longer considered to be a top priority.  The local community 
had invested a great deal of time establishing what they perceived to be, a strong 
and trusted collaborative working relationship and were left confused and 
disappointed with this response.  When the local community were eventually 
provided with a point of contact into the organisation, this was no longer a 
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technical representative but a post that had been specifically created for 
community engagement.  This was perceived as a lost opportunity because it 
was the technical aspects of flood risk management that the local community 
required assistance with.  In order to gain technical information the local 
community perceive they now have to go through many different departments 
which requires a great deal of time and resource both for the local community 
and the responder organisation.  Aside from the difficulties that were experienced 
there were also examples where relationships between different organisations 
were re-established:   
 
“When [Name] heard [Name] was involved, she asked to come as well 
because it worked so well in the 90’s she remembered and invited [Name] 
to rekindle the relationship.” 
 
Representatives from different organisations were eager to re-establish 
collaborative working relationships they perceived to be very effective in the past.  
This demonstrated the importance and effectiveness of these relationships 
despite an organisational re-structure resulting in their decline. 
 
The returned questionnaires did not provide information regarding whether 
Towns and Parish Councils were connected to each other.  This information was 
provided within the semi structured interview from the perspective of the 
participant and is therefore subject to confirmation bias.  There may be other 
connections and relationships that were not included because they are unknown.   
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7.2.2 Phase 2 – post questionnaire  
 
The provision of information from Town and Parish Councils allowed the 
participant to understand how many communities were affected by flooding and 
were involved in measures to actively prepare.  It also allowed the participant to 
assess the need for a community driven flood group.  The majority of communities 
that responded had developed a community flood plan for their local area.  They 
were aware of the source of flooding, the approximate number of properties at 
risk and were actively engaged in flood mitigation with local authorities and 
responder organisations.  This indicated that awareness of flood risk was high 
among these communities. 
 
The Town and Parish Council’s that did respond to the questionnaire are 
perceived within the social network graph (Figure 7.2) as weak connections to 
TP008.  This is because the connection represents the sharing of information in 
response to a questionnaire and does not assume that a relationship has been 
formed at this stage.  The act of responding to the questionnaire has resulted in 
a more connected network reducing the presence of large structural holes and 
increasing the density of the network (0.080).   
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Figure 7.2: Social network graph showing connections with local Towns and 
Parish Councils that responded to the questionnaire. 
 
The structure of the network has changed as a result of the distribution of the 
questionnaires and the resultant response.  This initiated the development of 
weak connections between TP008 and many of the Town and Parish Councils 
within the local area.  The connection was based on the sharing and exchange 
of information related to flood risk management.  This resulted in an increase in 
prominence of TP008 who now occupies a more central position within the 
371 
 
network.  The presence of bridging Town and Parish Councils are no longer as 
prominent within the visual representation of the social network graph because 
these are now also connected to TP008. 
 
7.2.3 Phase 3 – Formation of the Flood Group  
 
Figure 7.3: Social network graph showing connections developed during the 
formation of the Flood Group. 
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Following the return of the questionnaires, all of the local Town and Parish 
Councils were invited by TP008, to a meeting to discuss the formation of the 
Flood Group (Figure 7.3).  It was intended that volunteers from each Town and 
Parish Council would represent their community regarding flood risk 
management decisions within their local area.  However, not all of the Town and 
Parish Councils responded and many did not attend.  Of those that did attend, 
there was an agreement to continue with the formation of the Flood Group.  
 
During June 2014, the intention of the Flood Group was developed into a 
discussion document which contained information regarding the purpose of the 
group, the cause of flooding within the local area, the results of all of all of the 
returned questionnaires, the current approach to flood risk mitigation and future 
requirements for flood mitigation.  This was developed by the Town and Parish 
Councils that agreed to participate in the Flood Group. 
 
The Town and Parish Councils that participated in formation of the Flood Group 
are perceived as strong connections within the social network graph (Figure 7.3).  
These represent the development of relationships because they agreed the aims 
and objectives of the Flood Group and worked together in the formation of the 
discussion document. The local Towns and Parish Councils that did not respond 
are still connected but are represented as satellites on the edge of the network.  
Although these communities were invited to attend the discussion group, they did 
not respond.   
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The Flood Group is evident in the visual representation of the social network 
graph as a dense cluster of highly connected Town and Parish Councils (Figure 
7.3).  These connections contribute to an increase in the density of the network 
(0.125) and start to occupy a more central position.  The Town and Parish 
Councils that did respond to the questionnaire but did not wish to participate in 
the formation of the Flood Group are perceived as weaker connections to TP008.  
These communities remain connected because it was perceived by the 
participant that these communities could also be requested to assist the Flood 
Group even though they did want to become active members.  Organisations 
such as LA003, OR005 and OR006 have been pushed toward the periphery of 
the network because they are only connected to one or two local communities.   
 
7.2.4 Phase 4 – Establishing relationships between the Flood Group, Flood 
Board and local communities 
During September 2014, the Local Authority invited the Town and Parish Councils 
to discuss the formation of a local authority-led Flood Board.  This would comprise 
local authorities, responder organisations, the WSP for the local area and 
representatives from the Flood Group.  In order for the Flood Group and the Flood 
Board to work together in partnership, it was necessary for both of these groups 
to become a formal entity.  During October 2014, the Flood group held its first 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) with elected members designated formal roles 
and responsibilities.  This also provided a strategic direction to the group in the 
form of an agreed schedule of regular meetings and agreed representatives to 
attend the Flood Group with matters requiring discussion and attention from the 
local communities.     
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Figure 7.4: Social network graph showing connections between the Flood 
Group and the Flood Board 
 
The formation of the Flood Board and the Flood Group is represented as a highly 
connected cluster of local authorities, organisations involved in flood risk 
management and Local Town and Parish Councils (Figure 7.4).  While this part 
of the network has become more highly connected, it was perceived by the 
participant that connections also exist with the local communities on the periphery 
of the network and they can be called upon for assistance if it is required in the 
future.  The formation of the Flood Group and Flood Board provides an example 
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of how a local community may become partially integrated within the emergency 
management system through the development of a collaborative working 
partnership that requires both a ‘bottom up’ and a ‘top down’ approach. 
 
The evolutionary development of the social network demonstrates how an active 
member of the local community can strategically influence the development of an 
effective network, increasing access to resources providing the local community 
with the opportunity to participate in decisions relating to flood risk management.  
The formalisation of relationships between the local Town and Parish Councils 
and the Local Authority and responder organisations through the development of 
a Flood Group and a Flood Board provides an opportunity to develop a network 
that is sustainable throughout periods of organisational change and changes 
within the local community.  The development of collaborative working 
partnerships also demonstrates the application of a ‘bottom up’ and a ‘top down’ 
approach to achieving resilience within the emergency management system. 
 
It could be argued that this represents an ego centric network that relies on the 
presence of one individual to ensure the network remains active.  However, the 
process of making the Flood Group a formal entity with a terms of reference, 
strategic integration and inclusion within the Flood Board and the requirement of 
an AGM ensures sustainability of the group over a period of time.   
  
Having a community representative present on the Flood Board provides an 
opportunity for the community to discuss the challenges involved with effective 
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emergency management within their local area.  These may result from the 
physical dynamics and characteristics of their natural environment.  For instance, 
there is the potential for main arterial roads to be flooded which could result in 
the isolation of communities during periods of heavy rainfall and prevent access 
to emergency vehicles.  The sharing of this information within a collaborative 
partnership may help in the development of practical solutions and allows the 
local community to actively participate in decisions relating to flood risk 
management within their local area.   
 
Working collaboratively with the local community, allows the organisations 
involved in flood risk management to discuss the challenges they face during 
periods of high activity.  This contributes to managing expectations through a 
greater understanding of roles and responsibilities and a shared perception of 
risk which is of particular benefit during an emergency. 
 
7.3 The evolution of actor prominence within the network 
As discussed within Chapter 3 (Section 3.7.1) social network analysis may also 
be used to understand actor prominence through the centrality measures of 
betweenness centrality and degree centrality.  These were also calculated 
throughout the development of the social graphs using the social network 
package, igraph and used to demonstrate the change in actor prominence 
throughout the development of the Flood Group and the Flood Board (Table 7.1).   
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Table 7.1: Results of degree and betweenness centrality calculations 
throughout the development of the Flood Group and the Flood Board 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Graph demonstrating the change in degree centrality of Town and 
Parish Councils throughout the development of the Flood Group and the Flood 
Board. 
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Figure 7.6: Graph demonstrating the change in betweenness centrality of Town 
and Parish Councils throughout the development of the Flood Group and the 
Flood Board. 
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During the initial phase (Phase 1) and prior to the development of the Flood 
Group it is evident that the Local Authorities had the greatest degree centrality 
(OR003, 54; LA002, 34 and LA001, 18) and betweeness centrality (OR003, 1559; 
LA002, 1056 and LA001, 155).  Whereas, the local community TP008 had a 
relatively low degree centrality of 8 and a betweenness centrality of 26 
 
It is evident (Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.7) that throughout the development of the 
Flood Group and the Flood Board there was an increase in the degree centrality 
and betweennness centrality of many of the local Town and Parish Councils.  This 
increased as they became part of the Flood Group and worked as part of a 
collaborative working partnership. 
 
As a prominent actor throughout the process, TP008 demonstrates a rapid 
increase in degree centrality (Figure 7.6) following the distribution of the 
questionnaires and the formation of the Flood Group.  A high degree centrality 
would suggest that TP008 is very influential within the network because they are 
able to share information with a large number of actors within the network.   
 
Although there was an increase in the betweenness centrality of TP008 
throughout the development of the Flood Group, it is the Local Authorities OR003 
and LA002 that have the greatest betweenness.  This is because they are directly 
connected to a greater number of Town and Parish Councils within the network.  
This suggests that the Local Authorities have a greater influence within the 
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network from a structural perspective and occupy a more central position 
enabling control over the flow of information within the network. 
 
7.4  Application to Water Supply Failure 
This case study represents the partial integration of local community groups 
within the emergency management system and was analysed to understand how 
these networks may be used to strengthen resilience during periods of water 
supply failure.  This may be through the sharing and exchange of information 
between the WSP and an affected community or to support the distribution of 
alternative supplies of water.   
 
However, while the local community groups are in contact with the Local 
Authorities and responder organisations there is no evidence within the case 
study of how these relationships can be integrated within the wider system of 
emergency management at the level of the LRF’s.  If the Local Authority is 
represented at the LRF this may provide the opportunity for the existence of these 
relationships to be known.  
 
There was a great deal of discussion within Chapter 4 relating to the difficulties 
sharing information between organisations regarding vulnerable customers. 
During events of water supply failure this information is vital to ensure vulnerable 
customers who are unable to attend a water distribution station are able to receive 
an alternative supply of water.  It was perceived that many of the organisations 
had the same information but were not able to share this because of data 
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protection.  This is detrimental to effective emergency management and has the 
potential to prevent assistance being provided to people that need it the most. 
 
Within Chapter 6 (Section 6.5.2), customers posted examples on Facebook of 
local community groups that were providing assistance to vulnerable members of 
the community.  However, this information was being provided by the local 
community to the WSP’s.  If the WSP’s had access to established links within the 
local community either through the LRF, or the Local Authority, this would enable 
WSP’s to work together with the local community to provide an alternative supply 
of water to those affected.  The local community would be able to provide the 
WSP with information regarding access routes and provide an additional 
resource in the distribution of alternative water supplies.  Within this case study 
the WSP is represented within the Flood Group and this is partly the result of 
relationships that had been established direct with the local community to 
alleviate problems of drainage and surface water flooding.  These relationships 
are not necessarily present within other community flood groups. 
 
Rural communities have an identifiable structure in the form of a local Town or 
Parish Council and it is arguable as to whether there is a greater sense of 
community within rural locations.  There were also examples within the Facebook 
comment dataset provided by customers (Chapter 6) of a sense of community 
within urban locations.  However, this case study demonstrates there are also 
difficulties establishing links between the local community, local authorities and 
responder organisations.  Particularly during periods of organisational restructure 
and when representatives become promoted within their organisation.  When 
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established relationships cease to exist, it can become difficult for community 
groups to re-connect with the organisation.  It is also difficult for local authorities 
and other organisations involved in flood risk management to establish a 
relationship with a local community in a flood risk area if they do not perceive their 
community to be at risk because they have not experienced flooding and 
perceived their community is protected by a flood defence.  This reinforces the 
importance of having an engaged local community (‘bottom up’) and an engaged 
local authority (‘top down’).  
 
While it may be more difficult to identify urban community groups, it is important 
that these are explored because they may also provide access to a wider 
resource, particularly with regard to the distribution of alternative supplies of water 
to vulnerable customers.  There were many examples of altruism during the 
March 2018 water supply failure event with WSP customers offering to deliver 
alternative supplies of water to those in need. 
 
Another difficulty encountered by customers during the March 2018 event 
(Chapter 6) was a lack of information regarding the cause of water supply failure 
and when the water supply would be restored.  While this research focussed on 
the attitudes and perceptions of customers throughout this event, there were also 
many examples of misinformation being posted by customers on Facebook.  If 
WSP’s have access into the local community this may provide an opportunity to 
control the spread of misinformation more effectively.  This is important because 
there are many customers who do not have access to social media and as evident 
from the response to the individual householder questionnaire (Chapter 5), will 
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seek information from family or friends.  If this information is obtained direct from 
the WSP, it will reduce the opportunity for misinformation to spread. 
 
7.5 SUMMARY 
This case study has highlighted the benefits of local communities working 
together with local authorities, and organisations involved in flood risk 
management.  While the development of these relationships require a great deal 
of time and resource they provide a source of additional resource and allow the 
sharing and exchange of information and knowledge.  These relationships also 
allow for collective decision making and building trust between local communities, 
local authorities and responder organisations.  
 
7.5.1 How did the local community within the case study develop and 
establish relationships with the Local Authorities, Responder 
Organisations and the WSP? 
 
The development of relationships between the Local Authority and the local Town 
and Parish Councils were originally an example of a ‘bottom up’ approach, 
initiated by a highly motivated group of volunteers within the local Town and 
Parish Councils.  However, the Local Authority formalised these relationships 
integrating representatives of the Flood Group within the flood risk management 
system, through the establishment of a Flood Board.  This provided an example 
of a ‘top down’ approach and demonstrates the successful integration of local 
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communities within the emergency management system requires both a ‘top 
down’ and a ‘bottom up’ approach.   
 
A highly connected network of Local Town and Parish Councils, local authorities 
and organisations involved in flood risk management was established throughout 
the development of the Flood Group and the Flood Board.  These relationships 
have the potential to increase social capital and collective action towards the 
alleviation and mitigation of flooding within the local area.  However, difficulties 
were also experienced when established relationships were lost as a result of 
organisational restructure and within organisation promotion.  This resulted in the 
loss of expertise required for effective flood mitigation and left community groups 
feeling isolated and ignored.  Strong and established relationships promoted the 
development of trust between the local community and organisations involved in 
flood risk management.  However, this is very easily lost if these relationships are 
not maintained.   
 
7.5.2 How does the process of building collaborative working partnerships 
contribute to improving resilience for local communities? 
 
The ability to provide an effective emergency response during extreme events 
required the collaboration and cooperation between multiple different agencies 
including local community groups, local authorities and responder organisations.  
This can be achieved through the process of building collaborative working 
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partnerships and provides an opportunity to combine local knowledge and 
technical expertise to develop innovative solutions to complex problems.  
 
Throughout the development of the social network the increase in connections 
and relationships provided additional support through the sharing of knowledge 
and information.  Support was also provided between the local Town and Parish 
Councils through the development of the Flood Group.  This increased the 
potential access to resources in the form of assistance during a flood situation 
depending on the extent of the flood and how many communities were affected.  
Also, the act of meeting regularly and sharing information and knowledge related 
to their local area enhances the ability to offer and provide assistance if it is 
required during an emergency. 
 
Local community groups required technical expertise from Local Authorities and 
other organisations to initiate flood mitigation strategies within their local 
community.  In return they were able to share local information and knowledge 
regarding the flood characteristics of their local environment.  This sharing and 
exchange of knowledge and information promoted the development of strong and 
trusted relationships.  These encourage a shared perception of risk because the 
Local Authorities, the organisations involved in flood risk management and the 
local Town and Parish Councils have a greater understanding of roles and 
responsibilities, resources available and the local environment.  There is the 
potential to perform collective ‘lobbying’ for increase flood mitigation funding and 
less attribution of blame if everyone is working collaboratively towards a common 
386 
 
goal.  However, in order to build resilience, this process must be dynamic and 
sustainable.   
 
7.5.3 What are the challenges integrating the community into the 
emergency management process? 
 
For any community driven or local authority-led group, it is important to ensure 
sustainability over time.  This was achieved within this case study through the 
formalisation of the Flood Group and the Flood Board.  However, the 
development of these groups was resource intensive and required the motivation 
and determination of individuals within the community supported by the Local 
Authority.  This is relatively easy to achieve where good relationships exist and 
would be difficult to achieve if relationships are strained.  The ability to work 
together collaboratively towards a common goal is very important and must be 
clearly defined within the terms of reference for Flood Groups.  This would 
encourage collective action and prevent the breakdown of relationships.  Also as 
this case study demonstrated, in order to effectively integrate the community 
within the emergency management process requires both a ‘bottom up’ and a 
‘top down’ approach. 
 
Establishing integrated social networks prior to an emergency, increasing social 
capital, provides many advantages for both the community and the responder 
organisations (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015; Murphy, 2007; Dynes, 2002).  The 
process of attending regular meetings and establishing relationships helps to 
387 
 
build trust, strengthen relationships and allows for the development of a shared 
perception of risk.  This is enhanced through a greater understanding of the roles 
and responsibilities of the responder organisations and the ability of the 
community to cope without external support.  This helps to manage realistic 
expectations of what is achievable during an extreme emergency situation by 
promoting more effective collective action before, during and after an emergency.    
 
Establishing a network through a collaborative and participatory approach may 
also allow for more effective communication of information before, during and 
after an emergency.  If used effectively this can be used to improve situational 
awareness particularly in situations where there is considerable strain on 
resources available for emergency management.  The ability to share resources 
is more accessible through a collaborative and coordinated network and if WSP’s 
are able to access this network this may strengthen emergency response during 
periods of water supply failure. 
 
This Chapter sought to investigate how the bottom up approach to emergency 
management can help to achieve resilience to extreme events through 
collaborative working partnerships.  This was achieved through the process of 
participatory action research to understand the evolutionary development of a 
community-led Flood Group and its integration with a local authority-led Flood 
Board. 
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The following Chapter will explore how resilience can be achieved within the 
wider context of the emergency management system in the UK through the 
triangulation of results obtained within this Chapter and Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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8 CHAPTER 8 – A SYSTEMS BASED APPROACH TO EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The concept of resilience is a complex and dynamic process that operates on 
many different levels within society from the resilience of the individual (Paton, 
2006; Luthar et al, 2000), community resilience (Patel et al, 2017; Gilchrist, 2009), 
inter-organisational resilience (Boin and McConnell, 2007; Smith and Dowell, 
2000), and institutional resilience at the level of government (Djalante, 2012; Aoki, 
2016).  This categorisation of resilience demonstrates that resilience is often 
interpreted within the contextual confines of one particular element of society and 
the relationship between different categorisations of resilience is rarely explored.  
However, this approach may create difficulties with the practical application of 
resilience and the ability to achieve societal resilience to extreme events.   
 
It was proposed by Carpenter et al, (2001), that in order to achieve resilience it is 
necessary to contextualise resilience in terms of ‘resilience of what … to what’.  
This approach is useful when attempting to understand resilience within the 
context of a particular problem for instance, the resilience of a local community 
to water supply failure.  However, this only explores the context of resilience 
within one particular part of a system.  It is also necessary to explore resilience 
within a wider context to understand whether achieving resilience in one part of 
the system will influence the ability to achieve resilience within another.  Chapter 
1, (Section 1.3) demonstrated how a lack of understanding with regard to the 
consequences of water supply failure within the context of a wider system led to 
a negative reinforcing feedback loop and the perpetuation of water system failure. 
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This reinforces the complexities associated with applying the concept of 
resilience and because it operates on different levels within society, it is 
necessary to explore and understand these complexities if societal resilience to 
extreme events is to be effectively applied in practice. This requires an integrated 
approach involving individuals and communities, organisations, industry and 
government institutions.  However, in order to develop an integrated approach a 
greater understanding of the system structure is required (Pagano et al, 2017; 
Franchin 2018).  This involves understanding how each element of the system is 
connected and the influence these connections have on achieving the overall 
function or purpose of the system (Meadows, 2008). 
 
Figure 8.1: Simplified system of emergency management in the UK and the 
Objectives used to examine each element of the system. (The colour scheme 
will also be applied within Chapter 9, Section 9.3: Recommendations) 
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This research sought to explore how improved resilience to water supply failure 
can be achieved through effective emergency management.  A simplified 
structure of the UK emergency management system was proposed within 
Chapter 1, (Section 1.3, Figure 8.1) and resilience within and between each 
structural element of the system was explored using qualitative and quantitative 
social research methods through a series of objectives as defined within Chapter 
1, (Section 1.4). 
 
Chapter 1 and 2 explored the academic and empirical literature to understand the 
concept of resilience, the traditional risk based approach to emergency 
management and how the UK emergency management system integrates the 
concept of resilience within the legislative framework of the CCA, 2004.  This is 
operationalised through a multi-agency approach to emergency management at 
the local level.  
 
Chapter 4 explored the multi-agency approach to emergency management in 
greater detail through semi-structured interviews with emergency management 
professionals from WSP’s, LRF’s and the Fire and Rescue Service.  Participants 
discussed how building strong collaborative working relationships strengthened 
the process of emergency management.  However, this approach was not 
supported within the framework of the existing legislation.  This is because 
organisations that operate over wide geographical areas were not able to develop 
strong working relationships with multiple LRF’s with different operational working 
practices. 
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Chapter 5 explored individual homeowner’s general attitudes and perceptions to 
water supply failure.  The majority of respondents had a high level of confidence 
in the ability of the WSP to provide a safe, continuous and reliable supply of water 
at all times.  They did not have experience of water supply failure and perceived 
it to be ‘low risk’ and only ‘slightly important to prepare’.  While the majority of 
respondents did not actively prepare for water supply failure, it was perceived 
that during a water supply failure incident, they would take actions to purchase a 
supply of water from the local supermarket.  This was reinforced in Chapter 6, 
which explored attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure during an actual 
emergency.  It was demonstrated that customers were prepared to take action to 
increase their resilience to water supply failure.  This included the purchase of 
alternative supplies of water from the local supermarket or staying with friends 
and relatives.  However, the ability to achieve individual resilience required the 
provision of specific, accurate and timely information from the WSP. 
 
In Chapter 7 the integration of communities within the emergency management 
system was explored to understand how resilience is enhanced through 
collaborative working partnerships. It was recognised that the active process of 
building social networks between responder organisations and the local 
community strengthens emergency management at a local level.  The sharing 
and exchange of information and expertise helps to build trust and a shared 
perception of risk.  However, these relationships take a great deal of time to 
develop and are vulnerable to organisational change. 
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This Chapter presents a systems based approach to investigate the impact of the 
failure state to assess where vulnerabilities exist within the socio-ecological-
technical system and how resilience can be achieved through effective 
emergency management as detailed within Objective 5 (Chapter 1, Section 1.4).  
This will be achieved through the triangulation of quantitative and qualitative 
results presented within Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 to understand how the system of 
emergency management is connected and how this contributes to achieving 
resilience to water supply failure.  This will be conducted using the methodology 
presented within Chapter 3, Section 3.8.   
 
8.2 Understanding how the system of emergency management is 
connected 
 
8.2.1 Exploring resilience within the institutional element of the 
emergency management system 
As discussed within the literature review (Chapter 2, Section 2.5) the process of 
emergency management is traditionally defined by the stages categorised within 
the emergency management cycle.  While there are many different 
interpretations of this (NGA, 1979; Neal, 1997; Alexander, 2002b; Cabinet Office, 
2011), each stage is driven by the prior anticipation of known threats and hazards 
and the assessment of risk through the cyclical transition of mitigation, planning, 
response and recovery.  While this approach may be effective to determine the 
resources and capabilities required for effective emergency response to known 
threats and hazards, it is difficult to determine for low probability, high 
consequence events (Meyer, 2005; Boin and Hart, 2010; Paltrinieri  et al, 2011). 
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As discussed within Chapter 1, (Section 1.1) these events are typically 
characterised by a rapidly changing dynamic situation where many of the threats 
and hazards are unknown (Park et al, 2013; Linkov et al, 2014; Butler et al, 2014).  
This requires the application of a resilient based approach (Comfort et al, 2010; 
Boin and McConnell, 2007) to understand the dynamic processes that contribute 
to achieving resilience within the overall context of the emergency management 
system.  This involves understanding the structural elements of the emergency 
management system, how it is connected and the influence of these connections 
on the ability to achieve or inhibit resilience. Continually defining the process of 
emergency management into a series of cyclical actions or stages may contribute 
to the over simplification of a complex process that is not defined by a set of 
actions but the operational process relating to how they are delivered.   
 
Examination of the empirical literature demonstrates how a system based 
approach provides an opportunity to understand how the physical and social 
system is connected (Bruneau et al,  2003; Pagano, et al, 2017; Franchin, 2018).  
However, as demonstrated within Chapter 2, (Section 2.3) there are limitations 
with this approach because many of these models do not fully explore how 
resilience operates as a complex dynamic process within the emergency 
management system.  This is because many of these models concentrate on 
understanding the physical structure of the system (Bruneu et al, 2001;  Pagano 
et al, 2017; Franchin, 2018) or the interactions within one part of the system (Kim 
et al, 2012; O’Sullivan et al, 2015).  To understand resilience as a complex 
dynamic process also requires understanding the complex social interactions 
between organisations, individuals and communities and how these contribute to 
achieving resilience within and between the structural elements of the emergency 
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management system.  This research applies a systems based approach to 
identify the structural elements of the system with the application of qualitative 
and quantitative social research methods to understand and explore the complex 
social interactions within and between each element of the system and how these 
contribute to achieving resilience to water supply failure (Figure 8.1). 
 
8.2.2 Exploring resilience within the operational element of the emergency 
management system and the connection with the institutional 
element 
Chapter 4 explored the relationships between LRF’s and WSP’s in the multi-
agency approach to emergency management in the UK and how this is supported 
through the delivery of the CCA, 2004.  The multi-agency approach is designed 
to strengthen the process of emergency management by encouraging 
collaboration and the sharing of information between the responder organisations 
(CCA, 2004; Cabinet Office, 2011).  This contributes to the delivery of effective 
emergency response because all of the responder organisations have a shared 
perception of risk and understand the roles and responsibilities of each responder 
organisation (Perry and Lindell, 2004; Boin and McConnell, 2007).  As discussed 
within Chapter 1, (Section 1.1 and Section 1.3) a lack of collaboration and an 
inability to share information regarding the failure of critical infrastructure may 
result in serious consequences for society (Luiijf and Klaver, 2005; Boin and 
McConnell, 2007; Pitt, 2008; Ofwat, 2018).  
 
The results of the semi-structured interviews (Chapter 4) support these findings.  
Throughout the semi-structured interviews, WSP and LRF managers recognised 
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the importance of working in collaboration to share and exchange information 
required for effective emergency management.  Participants discussed how the 
development of trust and building strong working relationships was enhanced 
though the process of emergency planning.  This is through active participation 
in the multi-agency assessment of risk, collaboration in the development of 
emergency plans, attendance at multi-agency exercises and during emergency 
response and recovery.  Throughout this process participants were able to gain 
a greater understanding of the complex interdependencies that exist between 
different sectors at an operational level.  This in turn contributed to a shared 
understanding of risk, reinforced the roles and responsibilities of each operating 
organisation and enhanced collaboration through the building of trust.  It was 
recognised by participants that these contribute to building inter-organisational 
resilience and the effective delivery of emergency response (Perry and Lindell, 
2004; Boin and McConnell, 2007).  However, lessons learned reports and multi-
agency exercises have demonstrated persistent difficulties in the development of 
effective multi-agency collaboration and the sharing of information required for 
effective emergency response (Pitt, 2008; Watermark, 2011; Environment 
Agency, 2016; HM Government 2016; Ofwat 2018).  The results of the semi-
structured interviews (Chapter 4) support these understandings by exploring how 
current working practices within the framework of the existing legislation influence 
the ability to achieve effective collaboration and the sharing of information.   
 
Within the semi-structured interviews, many of the respondents perceived there 
had been many changes with regard to understanding and applying the concept 
of resilience since the introduction of the CCA, 2004.  However, because there 
were no defined performance measures or standards it was difficult for 
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respondents to assess whether resilience was being achieved.  The increased 
use of social media by the public was also perceived as a challenge for 
respondents and because the legislation has remained static, there is no 
provision or guidance for how respondents should manage the challenges 
presented by social media use.  While the legislation was perceived to drive the 
process of achieving resilience through a multi-agency approach to emergency 
management by bringing responder organisations together, a lack of support, 
direction and guidance regarding good practice was creating difficulties in the 
ability to achieve this.  
 
As demonstrated within Chapter 4, effective collaboration is difficult for WSP’s to 
achieve within the framework of the CCA, 2004.  While the legislation allows for 
autonomy at the local level this has resulted in each LRF interpreting the 
legislation within the context of their existing organisational structure and taking 
an idiosyncratic approach to emergency preparedness.  This has created 
difficulties for organisations expected to engage with multiple LRF’s because they 
are not able to accommodate multiple different ways of working.  To overcome 
the difficulties associated with multiple different ways of operating, many of the 
WSP’s engage with the LRF’s on a regional scale rather than locally.  The WSP’s 
invite all of the LRF’s operating within their region to ‘LRF days’ where the WSP 
will provide information to all of the LRF’s at the same time regarding their 
emergency operational procedures.  This was perceived as an effective approach 
to enable WSP’s to engage with multiple LRF’s. 
 
398 
 
A focus on improving inter-operability between the Category 1 responders with 
the introduction of JESIP may alleviate some of these difficulties but problems 
still persist regarding the sharing and exchange of information with Category 2 
responders (JESIP, 2016)  This is because they are expected to engage with 
multiple LRF’s and the focus is on understanding the command and control 
approach to emergency response rather than developing an integrated approach 
incorporating the culture of the Category 2 responders to facilitate the sharing of 
technical information during an extreme event.   
 
Category 1 emergency responders typically operate within a command and 
control structure with an established hierarchy of command and designated roles 
and responsibilities.  This approach is very different to the daily operational 
culture of critical infrastructure owners and operators.  The integration of different 
organisational cultures has the potential to create difficulties during the multi-
agency emergency response if each organisation is operating differently and 
does not understand how another organisation delivers emergency response 
(Curnin et al, 2015). 
 
The command and control approach is extremely effective for routine 
emergencies but it has been demonstrated that this approach is not so effective 
when dealing with extreme events that may require an innovative approach to 
solve a complex problem (Alexander, 2002a; Anderson and Adey, 2012; Boin 
and Bynander 2015).  While it is necessary to have a designated operational 
structure to multi-agency emergency response, it is also necessary to have 
flexibility to identify where a new approach or innovation may be required to 
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improve the operational delivery of emergency response.  Participation in multi-
agency exercises provides the opportunity to explore these complexities in a safe 
environment where an alternative approach can be developed and tested.  
According to participants, this also provides the opportunity to share examples of 
good practice and establish a common method of working that recognises how 
different organisations apply their expertise to resolve complex problems during 
emergency situations.  This enhances the process of shared organisational 
learning, the development of trust and also contributes to a greater understanding 
of roles and responsibilities. 
 
A lack of awareness and understanding by WSP’s in the incident management 
process was identified as a problem within the Pitt report, (2008).  This has 
encouraged many WSP’s to develop a greater awareness of Category 1 
operational processes and where they can be incorporated within emergency 
management procedures.  However, as demonstrated within the ‘Beast from the 
East’ example, this is not a consistent approach applied by all of the WSP’s 
(Ofwat, 2018).  The principles of JESIP were developed to encourage greater 
cooperation, collaboration and improve the sharing of information between the 
Category 1 responders (Chapter 2, Section 2.6).  However, this did not include 
the Category 2 responders and while they are able to incorporate the principles 
within their emergency response procedures, it does not provide an opportunity 
to understand how emergency response is delivered within the context of their 
organisational culture.  It was identified within the semi-structured interviews that 
difficulties persist regarding the sharing of information that is considered to be 
sensitive in terms of security.  A greater understanding of the challenges 
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regarding the roles and responsibilities of Category 2 responders may provide 
opportunities to develop an innovative solution.  
 
While the command and control approach enables the provision of a strategic 
direction to the operational delivery of emergency response, it is also necessary 
to recognise the importance of incorporating specialist knowledge and expertise 
to respond effectively to complex socio-ecological-technical issues involving the 
failure of essential services.  This may require a flexible operational approach 
that incorporates both the principles of command and control to provide strategic 
direction while allowing collective innovative decision making using multi-agency 
expert knowledge.    
 
Many of the respondents also discussed the loss of regional government offices.  
Representatives from these offices would attend LRF meetings and act as a 
conduit of information between the LRF’s and the government.  According to 
respondents this provided a strong connection allowing the two way flow of 
information between the LRF’s and the Government.  It also provided an 
opportunity to share and learn about good practice from other LRF’s via the 
regional office representative.  However, since these have been replaced by the 
DCLG RED (now the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government) 
it was perceived that the flow of information back to government from the LRF is 
now weak.   
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Legislation, policies and supporting guidance need to be developed within the 
context of how the system actually operates under normal and extreme conditions 
to support multi-agency collaboration and the sharing of information (Perry and 
Lindell, 2004; Boin and McConnell, 2007).     However, in order to achieve this 
requires identifying and developing a more complete understanding regarding the 
complex inter-connections operating within the system of emergency 
management and not relying on the simplistic approach provided within the 
emergency management cycle.  The application of a systems based approach 
and systems dynamic modelling demonstrate a transition toward this approach 
(Bruneau et al 2003; Pagano et al, 2017; Franchin, 2018).  However, as 
demonstrated within Chapter 2, (Section 2.3) these models do not explore the 
influence of legislation and social interactions to understand how these may 
influence the ability to achieve resilience within the system.  
 
This research demonstrates (Chapter 1, Section 1.1; Chapter 4) that effective 
multi-agency emergency response relies on the sharing and exchange of 
information throughout the emergency management process to encourage the 
building of strong relationships, development of trust and a greater understanding 
of organisational roles and responsibilities.  All of these contribute to effective 
multi-agency collaboration and the development of resilience within the 
operational element of the system.  However, it is difficult for this to be achieved 
within the confines of the current legislation. 
 
This would suggest the institutional element and the operational multi-agency 
element are connected through the ‘top down’ delivery of information in the form 
of legislation, policies and guidance documents.  These may have a negative 
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influence on the ability to achieve resilience within the system if these are not in 
accordance with current operational practices and there is no process to allow 
lessons learned or good practice to be fed back into the system. 
 
8.2.3 Exploring how individual people can achieve resilience within the 
emergency management system.  
It was demonstrated within the literature review (Chapter 2, Section 2.4) that the 
ability to achieve individual, personal resilience to critical infrastructure failure 
requires a greater understanding of the relationship between an individual’s 
perception of risk and the factors that influence preparedness (Paton 2003; 
Dobbie et al, 2016).  This would enable the development of effective 
communication and knowledge provision strategies to encourage preparedness 
before an emergency and effective action during an emergency situation (Levac 
et al, 2012; Paton, 2003; Shrubsole, 2000).   
 
The individual householder questionnaire (Chapter 5) was designed to explore 
individual perception and attitudes to water supply failure under normal 
circumstances and whether this influenced an individual to actively prepare as 
discussed within Chapter 2, (Section 2.4).  While this provided an indication of 
general attitudes and perceptions it was also necessary to understand attitudes 
and perceptions in response to an actual event.  This would provide a greater 
understanding of the relationship between individual attitudes and perceptions to 
water supply failure and whether they actively respond during an emergency. 
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It was discussed within Chapter 2, (Section 2.4), that attributed responsibility and 
societal expectations of governments, utility providers and responder 
organisations may influence whether an individual perceives it necessary to 
prepare for a hazard such as water supply failure (Levac et al, 2012; Paton, 2003; 
Shrubsole, 2000).  This was supported by the results of the individual homeowner 
questionnaire.  It was demonstrated that the majority of respondents perceive 
water supply failure to be ‘low risk’ and ‘slightly important’ to prepare.  The 
majority of individuals have a high level of confidence in the WSP’s ability to 
provide a reliable and continuous supply of water in all circumstances.  It was 
also perceived that during an emergency situation the WSP would provide an 
alternative supply of water.  This perception of attributed responsibility combined 
with a societal expectation of the WSP to provide water may have influenced the 
perception that water supply failure was ‘low risk’ and therefore perceived as only 
‘slightly important’ to prepare (Levac et al, 2012; Paton, 2003; Shrubsole, 2000). 
 
It was also discussed within Chapter 2, (Section 2.4) that an individual’s 
perception of their surrounding environment is influenced by societal interactions 
and hazards (Dobbie et al, 2016; Paton, 2006; Paton, 2013; Donahue et al, 2014). 
This was supported by the results of the individual homeowner questionnaire 
(Chapter 5).  The majority of respondents did not have experience of water supply 
failure and for those that did, the incident was reflected upon positively.  This is 
because the situation was resolved relatively quickly and an alternative supply of 
water had been provided.  This may also have contributed to the perception that 
water supply failure was ‘low risk’ and only ‘slightly important to prepare’.  
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Although the expectation of the WSP to provide an alternative supply of water 
was high, a large proportion of respondents perceive they would obtain water 
from a supermarket in the event of water supply failure.  While respondents do 
not perceive they ‘actively prepare’ for water supply failure by storing alternative 
supplies of water, this response demonstrates a perceptual and attitudinal 
change from a passive to reactive response during an actual emergency.  The 
transition from risk perception to taking action is complex and was examined 
within Chapter 2 (Section 2.4) using the framework provided by Dobbie et al, 
(2016) and the social cognitive preparation model developed by Paton, (2003).  
While risk perception may be influenced by an awareness of hazards within the 
local environment, experience, and perceptions of attributed responsibility, this 
does not necessarily result in the transition to take action (Paton, 2003).  
However, within the context of water supply failure, the results of the individual 
questionnaire challenge this theory because during an emergency the majority of 
individuals perceived that they would seek to increase their resilience to water 
supply failure through the purchase of alternative supplies of water.  This was 
also supported in the analysis of Facebook comments in Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 6 explored attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure during an 
actual event, the ‘Beast from the East’.  Customers from all three WSP areas 
demonstrated a desire to take action to alleviate their situation and become more 
resilient to the potential consequences of prolonged water supply failure.  This 
included the purchase of water from the local supermarket, obtaining water from 
the water distribution station, staying with friends and relatives or obtaining water 
for vulnerable friends and neighbours.  It was demonstrated within Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6, the perceived responsibility to respond to water supply failure was 
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attributed to the WSP.  However, where resources were available, individuals 
perceived they would take action to obtain an alternative supply of water.  This 
was supported by the purchase of alternative supplies of water during a water 
supply failure incident (Chapter 6).  According to Paton (2003) the intention to 
prepare is partly determined by an individual’s perception regarding the 
availability of resources enabling them to respond and this is partly supported by 
the results of Chapters 5 and 6.   While the perceived responsibility for providing 
an alternative supply of water is attributed to the WSP, the ability to purchase an 
alternative supply of water from the local supermarket increased the intention to 
prepare while resources are available.  Once these resources became depleted 
or were no longer available, the intention to prepare shifted from being a 
responsibility of the individual to that of the WSP.  This demonstrates a complex 
relationship between the intention to prepare and the perceived availability of 
resources. 
 
However, it was not just the availability of resources that influenced an individual’s 
intention to prepare.  Individual resilience to water supply failure was difficult for 
many customers to achieve during the ‘Beast from the East’ event because they 
required accurate, specific and timely information from the WSP regarding the 
location of water supply failure, estimated timescales when the water supply 
would be restored, whether an alternative supply of water was to be provided and 
how this would be distributed.  This information would enable customers to make 
decisions regarding the preparations required for prolonged water supply failure 
and the lack of information prevented customers from being able to achieve 
resilience.  It was demonstrated within this research that the availability of 
information was an important contributory factor influencing the ability to achieve 
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individual resilience.  This was not included within the social cognitive preparation 
model developed by Paton, (2003) and yet, as demonstrated within this research, 
was an important requirement to achieve individual resilience to water supply 
failure. 
 
8.2.4 Exploring resilience within the community element of the emergency 
management system  
It was discussed within Chapter 2, (Section 2.5) how a consensus regarding 
community resilience was difficult to achieve (Patel et al, 2017; Ostadtaghizadeh  
et al, 2015; Norris et al, 2008) and how this may have created difficulties in the 
operationalisation of resilience by practitioners.  The systems based approach 
taken by Bruneu et al, (2003) may provide a methodology for practitioners to 
measure resilience against performance based targets.  However, this takes a 
homogenous approach to the measurement of community resilience and may not 
be in accordance with how a community perceives their level of resilience.  To 
contribute to this debate, it was highlighted within Chapter 2 how communities 
are heterogeneous and subject to many different challenges in terms of their 
location, structure, connectivity and socio-economic status (Gilchrist, 2009; Paton 
2003; Norris et al, 2008).  Therefore the application of a homogenous set of 
performance based targets may not be applicable to understand resilience within 
and between different communities (Patel et al, 2017).  O’Sullivan et al, (2015) 
applied the structured interview matrix approach to explore community resilience 
through the process of building collaborative working partnerships.  This 
approach demonstrated how improved engagement between responder 
organisations and the local community can enhance the development of 
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resilience and strengthen emergency management through sharing local 
knowledge and information during the formation of social networks (Gilchrist, 
2009; Norris et al, 2008).  The results of Chapter 7, support these understandings 
and is discussed in the following section. 
 
Chapter 7 explored the development of relationships between a community led 
Flood Group and a local authority led Flood Board to understand how community 
resilience could be enhanced through collaborative working partnerships.  It was 
recognised within the semi-structured interviews that working collaboratively with 
local communities strengthens the emergency management process through the 
sharing and exchange of information, sharing local knowledge, the development 
of mutual trust and a shared perception of risk (Chapter 4).  This also provided 
an opportunity for local communities to understand the roles and responsibilities 
of responder organisations and the capabilities available for effective emergency 
response.    
 
An exploration of the literature (Chapter 2, Section 2.4) highlighted how 
community resilience is the collective ability of a community to cope, adapt and 
recover from an adverse situation (Faas and Jones, 2017; Cox and Hamlen, 
2015; Cutter et al, 2008).  However, the ability of a community to achieve this 
requires the support of external organisations to share and exchange information, 
knowledge, expertise and provide support through access to resources (Aldrich 
and Meyer, 2005; Murphy, 2007; Lin et al, 2001).  This increases the collective 
ability of communities to achieve resilience to extreme events. 
 
408 
 
The results of Chapter 7 support these understandings, but also demonstrate 
how the successful integration of community groups within the UK emergency 
management system is a complex process requiring a great deal of time and a 
high level of engagement from the local community and responder organisations 
to develop and establish strong relationships.  This was also highlighted in the 
approach taken by O’Sullivan et al (2015).   While a great deal of time was 
invested in the development of these relationships, they were difficult to sustain 
through organisational restructures, if the organisation representative was 
promoted or if the representative left the organisation.  This demonstrated the 
fragility of these relationships when built around individual personalities.   
 
It was demonstrated within this research that in order to develop sustainable 
relationships, it was necessary to formalise the relationships within an integrated 
framework.  This required a clearly defined structure, terms of reference and 
regular meetings chaired by an elected representative from the local community 
and Local Authority.  This ensured the continuity of collaborative working 
partnerships despite organisational restructures and individuals moving away 
from the local community. 
 
A greater awareness of the development of these relationships with local 
communities within the extended LRF may provide the potential to explore how 
these networks could be used to strengthen resilience within the wider 
emergency management system.  For instance, WSP’s may be able to access 
these networks to work collaboratively with local communities in the 
determination of locations for water distribution stations, the identification of 
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vulnerable people within the community and potentially assist in the distribution 
of water within the community during water supply failure incidents. 
 
8.2.5 Exploring the connection between government, individuals and 
communities 
The connection between government and the public relies on the provision of 
information regarding potential threats and hazards.  These may be provided 
through educational awareness programmes, campaigns, guidance documents, 
and the NRR and at a local level through the CRR. 
 
During 2004, the government distributed the ‘Preparing for Emergencies’ booklet 
to each home within the UK.  The document contained information regarding what 
individual homeowners should do in the event of an emergency and actions they 
could take to prepare for an emergency.   While a reprint of the booklet has not 
been provided to the public since its original distribution in 2004, this information 
is now available on the government website (Cabinet Office, 2018).  This includes 
links to the NRR, CRR’s and guidance documents relating to increasing individual 
resilience through community involvement.  The website provides access to 
guidance on developing community emergency plans and a framework for 
developing community preparedness.  However, the guidance represents a 
general approach to the provision of information and as discussed within the 
previous section, this does not allow for the heterogeneity that exists between 
different communities. 
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The results of the individual homeowner questionnaire (Chapter 5, Section 5.4, 
Figure 5.10) highlighted a lack of awareness regarding the existence of the LRF, 
the NRR and the CRR.  The majority of respondents indicated they did not obtain 
information from any of these sources regarding potential hazards within their 
local area.  
 
The guidance provided by the Government on the “Preparing for Emergencies” 
website encourages individuals and communities to prepare for emergencies.  A 
greater understanding of known threats and hazards within the local environment, 
working in partnership with responder organisations and using local knowledge 
and resources to “prepare for, and deal with, the consequences of emergencies” 
(Cabinet Office, 2016) may improve the ability to achieve resilience to 
emergencies.  However, this is based on a risk management approach and while 
the ultimate aim is to achieve resilience to emergencies, resilience is about 
preparing for the unknown.   
 
The connection between government and individuals is based on the ‘top down’ 
approach to the provision of information to encourage individual emergency 
preparedness and response to known threats and hazards.  This approach is 
dependent on individuals knowing where to obtain information and using this 
information to increase preparedness.  However, it was demonstrated within 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.4) that it cannot be assumed this ‘top-down’ approach will 
translate into action in the form of preparedness (Donahue et al, 2014; Brodie et 
al, 2006).  This research supports these understandings and demonstrates how 
an individual’s perception of attributed responsibility may also influence whether 
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they consider it necessary to prepare (Levac et al, 2010).  A greater 
understanding is required regarding individual attitudes and perceptions to 
hazards in general to explore whether these encourage effective action in the 
form of preparedness.   
 
8.2.6 Exploring the connection between the operational multi-agency 
element and individuals and communities 
The connection between the operational multi-agency element of the emergency 
management system and individuals and communities is quite complex.  Within 
the semi-structured interviews (Chapter 4) and the context of this research, 
WSP’s demonstrated a tendency to communicate information to individual 
customers rather than adopting collaborative working partnerships with local 
communities (Chapter 6).  However, within the structure of the multi-agency 
approach of the LRF, a connection does exist through local authority involvement 
with local community groups (Chapter 7).  As discussed within Chapter 2, 
(Section 2.5) establishing relationships through building social networks between 
community groups and responder organisations may provide access to resources 
and encourage collective action (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015; Norris  et al, 2008; 
Murphy, 2007; Dynes, 2002).  This was supported by the analysis conducted 
within Chapter 7. If WSP’s were integrated within collaborative working 
partnerships this would increase the opportunity of the WSP’s to understand the 
complex relationship between the provision of information by the WSP and how 
this may influence the behavioural intention of the customer.  This may also 
support WSP’s during an extreme event because it may provide access to an 
extended network of resources and capabilities by working collaboratively with 
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local communities in the determination of locations for water distribution stations, 
the identification of vulnerable people within the community and potentially assist 
in the distribution of water within the community during water supply failure 
incidents. 
 
Within the semi-structured interviews (Chapter 4, Section 4.8), while all of the 
LRF’s agreed working collaboratively with local communities strengthened the 
emergency management process, it was generally regarded that this connection 
would be provided through the Local Authorities rather than directly through the 
LRF.  This was supported by the analysis of community structure within Chapter 
7.  This is largely a result of resources in terms of finances and personnel, 
because in many locations the LRF is strategically operated by a single LRF 
manager.  However, government guidance relating to the development of 
community resilience encourages communities to contact the LRF for further 
information relating to community preparedness and response (Cabinet Office, 
2016).  This highlights an inconsistency in the approach determined within the 
guidance, the actual capabilities of the LRF manager to be able to provide this 
resource and how the system operates in reality. 
 
It was demonstrated within Chapter 2, (Section 2.4) that there is a complex 
relationship between individual risk perception and whether this translates to an 
intention to prepare.  Even in locations where hazards frequently occur, 
individuals do not always actively engage in preparedness activities (Donahue et 
al, 2014; Levac et al, 2012; Eiser et al, 2012; Johnson et al, 2014; Lane et al, 
2003; King, 2000; Ballantyne, 2000).  As demonstrated in Chapter 6, during an 
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emergency individuals may change from passive to active participants to 
increase their resilience and having access to ‘at risk’ communities through the 
extended network of the LRF may provide an opportunity for WSP’s to access 
these communities during periods of water supply failure. 
 
It was demonstrated within Chapter 7 that collaborative working partnerships 
between local responder organisations and local community groups were an 
effective approach to understanding and achieving resilience to local threats and 
hazards.  However, in order for this to be effective, active engagement is required 
between personnel within the responder organisations and members of the local 
community.  Within the semi-structured interviews participants discussed how 
resources in term of finance and personnel within local emergency management 
teams were being significantly reduced.  It was perceived that at a local level 
emergency managers were expected to ‘achieve more with less’, with regard to 
providing the same level of service with reduced personnel and government 
funding (Chapter 4, Section 4.7.1).  This will limit the ability to provide community 
support through the development of collaborative working partnerships which 
naturally require a great deal of resource in terms of personnel, time and funding.  
The government guidance encourages individuals and local communities to 
prepare for emergencies and develop resilience through developing networks 
and working together with local responder organisations (Cabinet Office, 2016).  
However, the government is also reducing the funding available at a local level 
to enable this to be achieved (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2).   
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The final connection in the system is influenced by the availability of government 
funding to enable resilience to be achieved at a local level. It was demonstrated 
within Chapter 2, Section 2.5 that working collaboratively with local communities 
strengthens the emergency management process and encourages the 
development of resilience at a local level (Aldrich and Meyer, 2005; Murphy, 
2007).  However, this is constrained by a lack of available funding from the 
Government to develop collaborative working partnerships between responder 
organisations and the local community (Chapter 4, Section 4.7.1). The application 
of legislation that is not consistent with actual operational working practices will 
also reduce the ability to achieve resilience between the multi-agency operational 
level and the individuals and communities affected by an emergency. 
 
As discussed within Chapter 2, (Section 2.3) systems thinking and systems based 
models are effective methods to understand how the physical and social systems 
are connected.  However, these models do not explore the complex interactions 
between organisations, individuals and communities. This research 
demonstrates how taking a systems based approach to understand the structural 
elements of the emergency management system, combined with a pragmatic 
approach incorporating action research, participant observation methods and 
social research methods, can be used to explore these relationships and 
understand resilience as a dynamic process operating within a complex socio-
ecological-technical system. 
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8.3 Applying the Safe and SuRe Intervention Framework to the UK 
Emergency Management System. 
The previous Section used the empirical research presented in this thesis to 
explore how the emergency management system is connected and how this 
influences the ability to achieve resilience to water supply failure within the UK 
emergency management system.  Within this Section, resilience of the UK 
emergency management system is explored using the Safe and SuRe 
intervention framework.  This will enable the identification of the main threats to 
the system and how the impact and consequences of these threats may affect 
the ability to achieve resilience to water supply failure.  The use of intervention 
measures including mitigation, adaptation, coping and learning will also be 
explored to understand how these can be applied within the system of emergency 
management to achieve system resilience to water supply failure. 
 
The Safe and SuRe approach has traditionally been applied to explore the 
resilience of physical systems (Mugame et al, 2015; Butler et al, 2016).  This 
research explores the use of the Safe and SuRe Intervention Framework within 
the context of a social system, the UK emergency management system (Figure 
8.2).  This framework has not previously been applied to an emergency 
management system.   
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Figure 8.2: Applying the Safe and SuRe Intervention Framework to the UK 
Emergency Management System (Adapted from Butler et al, 2016). 
 
 
The Safe and SuRe approach defines resilience as “the degree to which the 
system minimises level of service failure magnitude and duration over its design 
life when subject to exceptional conditions”.  As discussed within Chapter 2, 
(Section 2.3) it is not the intention of this research to develop further definitions 
of resilience because there are hundreds of definitions within the academic 
literature (Patel et al, 2017).  However, in order to understand how the Safe and 
SuRe intervention framework can be applied within the context of an emergency 
management system, it is necessary to examine how this definition can be 
applied to the process of emergency management.  The main principles of 
emergency planning are to reduce the severity of an event (Figure 8.3) through 
adequate preparedness and mitigation and to minimise the event duration 
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through effective emergency response and recovery.  Within the Safe and SuRe 
definition, failure magnitude is synonymous with incident severity (Figure 8.3) and 
‘the duration over its design life’ is synonymous with the event duration.   
 
 
Figure 8.3:  System performance relating to emergency planning.  Adapted from 
McDaniels et al, 2002 and Mugame et al, 2015.  
As discussed within Chapter 1 (Section 1.2) and Chapter 2 (Section 2.3) the Safe 
and SuRe Intervention Framework is one approach that can be used to explore 
how the resilience of a system can be improved through the application of 
intervention measures.  These include mitigation, adaptation, coping and learning 
(Butler et al, 2016).    However, to develop this approach required understanding 
the structural elements that comprise the emergency management system, how 
the system is connected and what these connections mean in terms of achieving 
resilience to water supply failure.  A holistic understanding of the system will allow 
a more accurate determination of the impact and consequence of threats to the 
system and how these may influence the ability to achieve resilience.    
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The framework can be evaluated in four different ways, these are described within 
Chapter 1, (Section 1.2).  The traditional ‘top down’ approach relies on the same 
methodology as the traditional risk management approach and this is one 
approach taken within this research.  The analysis is conducted clockwise 
through the framework and starts with the identification of known threats that may 
cause a failure of the system.  Within the context of this research, it is the 
identification of threats to building resilience within the emergency management 
system.  The next element of the framework involves analysis of the ‘impact’ of 
system failure and the resultant societal or environmental ‘consequence’.  At the 
intersection of each element are the intervention measures, mitigation, 
adaptation, coping and learning.  Mitigation involves the application of strategies 
to reduce the ‘frequency, magnitude or duration of a threat’ (Butler et al, 2016).  
Adaptation measures include specific actions taken in response to a threat and 
are applied when actions to mitigate the threat cannot be applied.  When 
mitigation and adaptation measures cannot be applied to reduce the impact of 
the threat, coping strategies are applied. According to Butler et al, (2016) coping 
includes “any preparation or action taken to reduce the frequency, magnitude or 
duration of the effects of an impact on a recipient.”  The final intervention measure 
of learning is applied to ensure lessons are learned from past experience. 
 
As discussed within this Chapter and Chapter 4, (Section 4.2) the main threats 
regarding the ability to achieve resilience within the emergency management 
system are legislation, the availability of adequate funding and differences in 
organisational culture.  These are institutional and social threats as opposed to 
physical threats such as pipe failure (Butler et al, 2016).  Within the framework of 
the legislation (CCA, 2004), it is considered that resilience is achieved through 
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multi-agency cooperation and collaboration in the assessment of threats and 
hazards, emergency preparedness, mitigation and response.  However, the 
legislation is creating a constraint in the ability of WSP’s to manage risk and 
resilience within the context of a multi-agency framework defined by LRF’s 
because it is difficult for WSP’s to engage effectively on a local level with multiple 
LRF’s and multiple ways of operating.  A lack of government funding has also 
resulted in a reduction in emergency management personnel, the resources 
available for multi-agency training and exercising and the ability to deliver 
resilience building initiatives within the local community.  Differences in 
organisation culture also influence the operational delivery of emergency 
management.  The ‘command and control’ approach is effective for routine 
emergencies but is not necessarily effective in extreme events where a flexible 
approach to complex decision making is required. 
 
The potential impact of these threats may include a reduced ability to provide 
effective emergency response and an increase in the incident severity (Figure 
8.3).  The consequences may also contribute to an increase in the event duration 
and an increase in the time taken to recover.  However, in the context of social 
systems there is a possibility that the system may not recover depending on the 
incident severity.  Without the application of intervention measures, it is possible 
there may be recurrent problems within the system.  This has been demonstrated 
with the difficulties experienced between WSP’s and LRF’s in the sharing and 
exchange of information during the flooding of Mythe water treatment works and 
the recent ‘Beast from the East’.  As discussed within Chapter 1 (Section 1.2) the 
intervention measures include, mitigation, adaptation, coping and learning. 
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It was demonstrated within Section 8.2.2, that effective emergency response and 
the ability to achieve resilience to unknown threats and hazards is enhanced 
through the process of multi-agency collaboration.  Building relationships and the 
sharing and exchange of information all contribute to a greater understanding of 
the roles and responsibilities of each operating organisation, the development of 
trust, good practice, the assessment of resources and capabilities required for 
effective emergency response and an increased awareness of the 
interdependence between each operating organisation (Perry and Lindell, 2004; 
Boin and McConnell, 2007).    
 
Many of the WSP’s have developed an alternative method of operating by 
applying the intervention measure of mitigation to overcome the difficulties 
associated with applying the legislation (CCA, 2004) within the multi-agency 
framework of the LRF.  This includes working together with LRF’s at a regional 
level through the development of LRF days.  This approach has also applied 
intervention measures of adaptation where current working practices have been 
adapted to enable WSP’s to share information more effectively during emergency 
response through applying the principles of JESIP (JESIP, 2016).  However, the 
legislation has remained static and the system itself is still constrained within the 
confines of the legislation.  In order to achieve resilience within the system, there 
needs to be a review of legislation to incorporate current working practices.  
 
The intervention measure of coping may be applied at the local level to build and 
achieve resilience to extreme events within individuals and local communities at 
risk. Within Section 8.2.3, it was demonstrated how individual customers may 
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change from passive to active response during an extreme event.  While this is 
also a form of adaptation, in order to be able to cope and achieve resilience 
required the provision of accurate and timely information regarding the nature of 
the hazard, estimated timescales when the water supply was to be restored, 
whether a provision of alternative water was to be provided and where it would 
be distributed.  However, this information was not adequately provided during the 
flooding of Mythe water treatment works or during the recent ‘Beast from the East’ 
event (Pitt, 2008; Ofwat, 2018).  This places a responsibility on the WSP to 
assess how this information should be effectively delivered throughout a water 
supply failure event to enable customers to make decisions regarding the 
preparations required for prolonged water supply failure.  Another approach that 
could be taken to improve the ability of the WSP to cope with the distribution of 
alternative supplies of water, could be through the utilisation of local community 
networks or established collaborative working partnerships within the extended 
LRF.   
 
There have been many examples where learning has occurred throughout the 
system of emergency management.  Traditionally, following an event there will 
be a period of reflection and the development of a lessons learned report.  
Examples include the Pitt report (Pitt, 2008) following the 2007 flood event and 
the lessons learned following the ‘Beast from the East’ (Ofwat, 2018).  However, 
while these reports provide recommendations for improvement, it is also 
necessary to take a holistic approach to understand whether the difficulties 
experienced during an incident are a consequence of interdependencies within 
the wider context of the system.  
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The application of the principles of JESIP by some of the WSP’s also provided 
evidence of learning with regard to the adoption of the command and control 
approach to emergency response (JESIP, 2016).  This enables a consistent 
approach to be applied to multi-agency emergency response following the 
difficulties experienced during the flooding of Mythe water treatment works (Pitt, 
2008). 
 
Within Chapter 1, (Section 1.2) the application of a middle-based analysis was 
discussed.  This approach recognises that it is impossible to identify every 
possible threat to the system and focuses on the impact and consequences of 
failure modes.  This approach also acknowledges how different threats may result 
in the same failure of the system so the analysis commences at the system 
element of the intervention framework (Chapter 1, Figure 1.3).  The application 
of the middle-based analysis was applied to the emergency management system 
to identify failure modes contributing to water supply failure.   
 
In the context of emergency management, failure modes may include a lack of 
participation in the multi-agency anticipation of threats and hazards and 
assessment of risk.  This may impact the system because there will be a lack of 
understanding regarding resources and capabilities required for effective multi-
agency emergency response for an extreme event.  A failure to provide accurate 
and timely information to the public and a lack of understanding regarding the 
behavioural intentions of customers also represent potential failure modes in the 
ability to achieve effective emergency response during an extreme event.  This 
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is demonstrated within Chapter 1 (Section 1.4) when the consequences resulted 
in a negative reinforcing feedback loop. 
 
8.4 Summary 
Objective 5 sought to apply a systems based approach to investigate the impact 
of the failure state to assess where vulnerabilities exist within the socio-technical 
system and how resilience can be achieved through effective emergency 
planning.  This was achieved within this chapter through the triangulation of 
results presented within Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7.  Each of these Chapters 
explored the perception and application of resilience at different levels within the 
emergency management system.  This information was used to identify the main 
structural elements that comprise the system and how they are connected to 
understand where resilience intervention measures should be applied.  
 
Within the context of this research, the main structural elements of the UK 
emergency management system comprise an institutional element at the level of 
government where legislation, policy and guidance documents are developed to 
ensure the operation of the system in the delivery of effective emergency 
management.  This is delivered through the operational multi-agency element in 
the development of LRF’s at the local level through the introduction of the CCA, 
2004.  Individuals and communities affected by an extreme event represent the 
final element of the system.   
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Within the multi-agency operational element, resilience is achieved through the 
sharing and exchange of information.  This is facilitated through the development 
of relationships between responder organisations that enable a greater 
understanding of organisational structure and roles and responsibilities to ensure 
effective multi-agency collaboration in the delivery of emergency response.  This 
is supported through multi-agency training and exercising to reinforce how each 
organisation operates during an emergency situation and contributes to a greater 
understanding regarding the inter-dependencies between each operating 
organisation. 
 
This is connected to the institutional element at the level of government through 
the ‘top down’ delivery of legislation in the form of the CCA, 2004.  However, it 
was demonstrated that the legislation is being applied within a framework that is 
inconsistent with the way in which the system operates.  WSP’s may not be able 
to engage effectively with multiple LRF’s that have different ways of working.  In 
order to be able to fulfil their obligations with respect to the CCA, 2004, many of 
the WSP’s have developed a regional approach to multi-agency collaboration.   
 
The results of the individual homeowner questionnaire (Chapter 5) demonstrated 
a great deal of confidence in the ability of the WSP to provide a safe, reliable and 
continuous supply of water in all circumstances and this may influence the 
perception of water supply failure and whether an individual will perceive it 
necessary to take action to prepare.  While the majority of respondents did not 
actively prepare for water supply failure they did perceive they would obtain a 
supply of water from the local supermarket if there was a failure of the water 
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supply.   The results of the Facebook analysis from the ‘Beast from the East’ 
event (Chapter 6), demonstrated the ability to achieve individual resilience to 
water supply failure was dependent on the ability of the WSP to provide accurate, 
timely information regarding the location of water supply failure, estimated 
timescales when the water supply would be restored and the distribution and 
location of an alternative supply of water.   
 
The connection between the government, individuals and communities is through 
the ‘top down’ delivery of information and guidance on the government website 
to encourage resilience.  It is recognised that information regarding hazards and 
how to achieve resilience is required by individuals and communities.  However, 
this also requires a great deal of understanding regarding individual attitudes and 
perceptions to hazards, responder organisations and the provision of essential 
services.  A greater understanding of these relationships will enable a more 
accurate determination of the information required by individuals to encourage 
preparedness and effective action during an emergency.  This can be achieved 
though collaborative working partnerships connecting the multi-agency 
operational element with individuals and communities.  This combination of a ‘top 
down’, ‘bottom up’ approach requires the support of legislation to encourage the 
sharing and exchange of information within the multi-agency operational level 
and funding to develop collaborative working partnerships at the community level.   
 
It has been demonstrated throughout the development of this research that the 
application of a systems based approach allows for the identification of the main 
elements of a system and a greater understanding of how they are connected.  
426 
 
Systems thinking and systems dynamic models are effective methods to 
understand how the physical and social systems are connected.  However, the 
emergency management system is complex and relies heavily on the social 
interactions between organisations, individuals and communities. This research 
demonstrates how taking a systems based approach to understand the structural 
elements of the emergency management system, combined with social research 
methods can be used to explore these relationships to develop a greater 
understanding of how resilience operates as a dynamic process within a complex 
socio-ecological-technical system.  A summary of the findings is provided within 
the following Chapter 9 – Conclusions and Recommendations 
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9 CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
9.1 Thesis summary 
A review of lessons learned reports following widespread flood events in the UK, 
demonstrated how the failure of critical infrastructure and the resultant loss of 
essential services seriously challenged the ability of infrastructure operators, 
emergency responders and the affected population to achieve resilience to 
extreme events (Pitt, 2008; Watermark, 2011; Environment Agency, 2016; HM 
Government 2016; Ofwat 2018).  
 
The aim of this PhD was to explore how improved resilience to water supply 
failure can be achieved through effective emergency management.    This was 
achieved by exploring how WSP’s manage risk and resilience as part of a multi-
agency approach within the context of the UK emergency management system.  
Each structural element of the UK emergency management system was defined 
and explored through a series of objectives (Chapter 1, Section 1.5) to explore 
and understand the characteristics of resilience operating within each structural 
element of the system, how each element is connected and the influence of these 
connections on the ability to achieve resilience to water supply failure.   
 
This Chapter presents a summary of the research conducted to explore how 
resilience operates within and across the emergency management system and 
will proceed with a summary of the findings in relation to each objective.  This will 
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be followed by a review of the contributions of this research, recommendations 
and future proposals. 
 
9.1.1 Objective 1:  Critically analyse the traditional risk based approach to 
emergency management and its application towards achieving 
resilience. 
 
This objective was achieved throughout the development of the literature review, 
analysis of lessons learned reports, government guidance, reports, legislation 
and through attendance at conferences to understand the wider context and 
application of resilience within the UK emergency management system.  All of 
this information provided the foundation for the development of objectives to 
understand how resilience is applied within the UK emergency management 
system.  A summary of the findings is presented below. 
 
Traditionally, the process of emergency management is defined by the stages 
within the emergency management cycle and include prevention, preparedness, 
response and recovery (NGA, 1979; Dynes, 1982; Quarentelli, 1986; Neal, 1997; 
Alexander, 2002a). This cycle is largely driven by the application of a risk 
management approach.  The process usually starts with preparedness and 
includes the anticipation of threats and hazards and the assessment of risk.  For 
instance, within the UK emergency management system this represents the 
development of the NRR and the CRR’s at a local level (Cabinet Office, 2011).  
The assessment of risk enables emergency responders to determine the 
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resources and capabilities required for effective emergency response and 
recovery for known threats and hazards.  This also enables the determination of 
mitigation methods depending on the assigned level of risk.   
 
A review of the literature and lessons learned reports demonstrated the 
consequences of extreme events are very difficult to determine (Chapter 1, 
Section 1.1, Section 1.3.  This is because these events are characterised by a 
rapidly changing dynamic environment where many of threats and hazards are 
unknown (Park et al, 2013; Linkov et al, 2014; Butler et al, 2014).  Therefore it is 
exceedingly difficult to make an accurate assessment of potential risk.  Not only 
that, the complex inter-dependencies within the socio-ecological-technical 
environment may result in known threats and hazards escalating into a series of 
cascading events increasing the potential for unknown threats and hazards (Boin 
and McConnell, 2007; Crichton et al, 2009; Vespignani, 2010).  This makes the 
anticipation of threats and hazards and the assessment of risk an impossible task 
for low probability, high consequence events.   
 
The risk management approach to emergency management is extremely 
successful when applied to known threats and hazards that may occur on a daily 
basis and is successfully applied within the determination of the resources and 
capabilities required for routine emergency response and recovery procedures.  
However, in order to be able to respond effectively to extreme events requires a 
resilience-based approach that supports the risk management approach applied 
for day to day emergencies and enables resilience to unknown threats and 
hazards. 
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Within the UK emergency management system, the concept of resilience is 
integrated within the legislative framework of the CCA, 2004 and operationalised 
through the development of a multi-agency approach to emergency management 
at the local level with LRF’s (Cabinet Office, 2011).  However, the flooding of 
Mythe water treatment works demonstrated difficulties with the ability to manage 
risk and resilience as part of a multi-agency approach (Pitt, 2008). This was 
explored in greater detail within Objective 2. 
 
9.1.2 Objective 2: Investigate the multi-agency approach to emergency 
management. 
This objective was achieved through a comparative content analysis to 
understand the multi-agency assessment of risk and through semi-structured 
interviews with emergency managers from the LRF, WSP’s and the Fire Rescue 
Service (Chapter 4).  These were conducted to explore the inconsistencies 
identified within the content analysis and to develop a deeper understanding of 
how resilience can be achieved through the multi-agency approach to emergency 
management. 
 
It was demonstrated within Chapter 8, (Section 8.2.2) how the multi-agency 
approach to emergency management is fundamentally driven by a complex 
system of processes in order to achieve effective emergency preparedness and 
response. These include sharing information through the building of relationships 
to develop a greater understanding of organisational structure, roles and 
responsibilities and the active process of multi-agency training and exercising to 
encourage multi-agency collaboration.  This contributes to the delivery of 
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effective emergency response because all of the responder organisations have 
a shared perception of risk and understand the roles and responsibilities of each 
responder organisation (Perry and Lindell, 2004; Boin and McConnell, 2007).  
This also contributes to the sharing of good practice, lessons learned, the 
anticipation and assessment of threats and hazards and the development of a 
multi-agency emergency plan.   All of these activities enhance the process of 
achieving resilience through the accurate assessment of available resources and 
capabilities for effective emergency response and the opportunity to develop a 
greater understanding of the inter-dependencies that exist between different 
organisations.  The development of trust between organisations also strengthens 
the ability to develop innovative solutions to complex problems under pressurised 
conditions during an emergency.    
 
However, within the UK emergency management system, there are a number of 
factors influencing the ability to develop these processes.  The CCA, 2004 was 
introduced to enhance resilience within the emergency management system 
through the development of LRF’s and the multi-agency approach to emergency 
management (Cabinet Office, 2011).  The results of the semi-structured 
interviews suggest the legislation is applied within a framework that is 
inconsistent with the way in which the system operates.  WSP’s operate over a 
wide geographical area and are expected to engage with multiple LRF’s that each 
operate slightly differently.  This has created difficulties in the sharing and 
exchange of information regarding the assessment of threats and hazards and 
the ability to regularly attend LRF meetings to build and establish relationships.  
These were perceived to be important facilitating the process of achieving 
resilience.  The building of relationships has also been difficult to maintain due to 
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a reduction of funding available for developing multi-agency training exercises 
and to establish effective working practices within emergency management 
teams.  A decrease in the number of personnel available to deliver emergency 
management at the local level also contributes a negative influence.  
 
9.1.3 Objective 3: Understand individual attitudes and perceptions of 
water supply failure 
This objective was achieved through the results of the individual homeowner 
questionnaire and the analysis of Facebook comments throughout a water supply 
failure incident known as the ‘Beast from the East’ event. 
 
Attributed responsibility (Shrubsole, 2000; Paton, 2003; Levac et al, 2012; 
Donahue et al, 2014), societal perceptions (Dobbie et al, 2016; Paton et al, 2008; 
Paton et al, 2013) and expectations (Dobbie et al, 2016; Paton, 2003) of utility 
providers and responder organisations may influence whether an individual 
perceives it necessary to prepare for a hazard such as water supply failure.  The 
results of the individual questionnaire demonstrated that the majority of 
respondents have not had experience of water supply failure and perceive it to 
be ‘low risk’ compared to other hazards.  It was perceived as ‘slightly important’ 
to prepare for with the majority of respondents indicating that they do not ‘actively 
prepare’ for water supply failure.  Respondents expressed a great deal of 
confidence in the WSP’s ability to provide a reliable, continuous and safe supply 
of water and However, they also perceived in the event of water supply failure, it 
would be ‘extremely likely’ that they would purchase water from the local 
supermarket. 
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Analysis of the Facebook comments during the ‘Beast from the East’ demonstrate 
customer attitudes and perceptions toward water supply failure and the response 
of WSP’s to be negative.  Customers required accurate and timely information 
from the WSP regarding the location of water supply failure, estimated timescales 
when the water supply would be restored, whether an alternative supply of water 
was being provided and how it was being distributed.  This information was 
necessary to enable customers to assess their individual requirements and 
determine how to actively respond either through the purchase of an alternative 
supply of water or to stay with relatives.  However, a failure of the WSP’s to 
provide consistent and timely information to their customers prevented customers 
from being able to achieve resilience to water supply failure.  Customers were 
also not able to contact the WSP direct which created further difficulties for 
vulnerable customers who were not able to inform the WSP of the need for 
assistance if they could not attend one of the water distribution stations. 
 
9.1.4 Objective 4: Investigate how the bottom up approach to emergency 
management can help to achieve resilience to extreme events 
through collaborative working relationships. 
It was demonstrated within Chapter 2 (Section 2.3) how improved engagement 
between responder organisations and the local community can strengthen the 
emergency management process through sharing local knowledge, expertise 
and information during the formation of social networks (Gilchrist, 2009; Norris et 
al, 2008; O’Sullivan et al, 2015).  
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This objective was achieved through the process of participatory action research 
to understand how resilience to extreme events can be achieved through the 
development of collaborative working partnerships between a local authority and 
a group of Town and Parish Councils.  
 
The successful integration of community groups within the emergency 
management system is a complex process requiring a high level of engagement 
from both the local community and the responder organisations to develop and 
establish a collaborative working partnership.  It was recognised within the semi-
structured interviews that the partnership approach strengthens the emergency 
management process through the sharing and exchange of local information, the 
development of trust, a shared perception of risk and the opportunity for collective 
decision making.  It also contributed to the development of a shared 
understanding of the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities available for effective 
emergency response.  This enables both local communities and responder 
organisations to manage realistic and achievable expectations with regard to 
emergency response. 
 
It was also identified that these relationships are fragile and difficult to sustain 
with regard to organisational restructures and the loss of representatives either 
within the local community or from the responder organisations.  
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9.1.5 Objective 5: Taking a systems based approach, investigate the 
impact of the failure state to assess where vulnerabilities exist within 
the socio-technical system and how resilience can be achieved 
through effective emergency planning. 
 
This objective was achieved through the triangulation of quantitative and 
qualitative results achieved within Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4 and the application of 
the Safe and SuRe intervention framework.  The results obtained from achieving 
each objective were used to explore and understand how resilience operates 
within and across each structural element of the UK emergency management 
system. 
 
The main elements of the emergency management system were considered to 
comprise an institutional element identified at the national level of government, 
an operational multi-agency level identified at the local level and the individuals 
and communities affected by an emergency.  The connections between each 
element were defined as follows: 
 
 The institutional element and the operational multi-agency element are 
connected through the top down delivery of legislation, government 
policies and guidance documents. 
 The operational multi-agency element and the individual and 
community element are connected through the provision and 
436 
 
availability of government funding to support collaborative working 
partnership schemes and local resilience strategies. 
 The institutional element and the individual and community element are 
connected through the provision of information relating to effective 
emergency preparedness and response. 
 
The resilience of the UK emergency management system was explored using the 
Safe and SuRe intervention framework to identify the main threats to the system 
and how the impact and consequences of these threats may affect the ability to 
achieve resilience to water supply failure.   
 
The main threats regarding the ability to achieve resilience within the emergency 
management system are legislation, the availability of adequate funding and the 
difference in organisational culture between the Category 1 and the Category 2 
responders.  The legislation constrains the ability to achieve effective multi-
agency cooperation and collaboration in the anticipation and assessment of 
threats and hazards and the ability to determine resources and capabilities 
required for effective emergency response.  A lack of government funding has 
contributed to a loss of emergency management personnel, the ability to develop 
multi-agency training and exercising and the ability to develop collaborative 
working partnerships with local communities.  The difference in organisational 
culture between the Category 1 and the Category 2 responders created tension 
regarding the different approach taken in response to emergency management.  
The command and control approach taken by the Category 1 responders 
provides an effective and structured emergency response to known threats and 
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hazards.  However, a more flexible approach is required in order to achieve 
resilience to unknown threats and hazards during extreme events and facilitate 
the development of innovative solutions to complex technical problems. 
 
The Safe and SuRe middle-based analysis was applied to the emergency 
management system to identify the failure modes contributing to water supply 
failure.  These include a failure to participate in the multi-agency anticipation of 
hazards and assessment of risk, a failure of the WSP’s to provide accurate and 
timely information to the public, a failure to accurately assess and identify the 
resources and capabilities to provide an alternative supply of water, a failure to 
understand the behavioural intention of the customers.  The application of 
intervention measures to reduce the impact of failure may include:  
 
 A greater understanding the multi-agency approach to emergency 
management within the framework of the CCA, 2004,  
 Understanding the consequences of water supply failure and the 
resources and capabilities required for effective emergency response,  
 Developing a greater understanding of customer attitudes and 
perceptions to water supply failure and the information they require to 
respond to water supply failure. 
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9.2 Summary of contributions 
 
9.2.1 Elucidation of a systems based approach to resilience-led 
emergency management  
Systems thinking and systems dynamic models are effective methods to 
understand how the physical and social systems are connected (Bruneau et al, 
2003; Pagano et al, 2017: Franchin, 2018).  However, these models do not 
explore the complex social interactions between organisations, individuals and 
communities. This research demonstrates how taking a systems based approach 
to understand the structural elements of the emergency management system, 
combined with a pragmatic approach incorporating action research, participant 
observation methods and social research methods can be used to explore these 
relationships and understand resilience as a dynamic process operating within a 
complex socio-ecological-technical system 
 
This research has also demonstrated the importance of taking a systems based 
approach to assess where vulnerabilities exist within the socio-ecological-
technical system and how resilience can be achieved through effective 
emergency management.  This requires a shift away from conceptualising 
emergency management within the framework of the emergency management 
cycle and acknowledging resilience as a process that operates within a complex 
dynamic system of interconnecting elements that may include legislation, 
operational practices and individuals affected by an emergency. 
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Throughout the literature the concept of resilience has been explored and defined 
within the context of the specific discipline under investigation.  This has 
contributed to the development of many different applications of resilience, for 
instance individual resilience, community resilience, infrastructure resilience, 
multi-agency resilience and institutional resilience.  However, the complex inter-
relationships between the different applications of resilience are rarely explored 
and has contributed to confusion regarding the practical application of resilience. 
In order to be able to achieve resilience to extreme events, the concept must be 
explored within the context of the wider system within which it operates.   
 
This research demonstrates there is a requirement to understand the inter-
dependencies between the different applications of resilience rather than a 
continuation of understanding the concept within the context of a specific 
discipline.  It is hoped this research will stimulate debate and initiate a change 
towards an interdisciplinary approach to studying resilience combining a systems 
based approach with the application of social research. 
 
9.2.2 Development of a contribution for the Resilience in the Round 
initiative.  
It was demonstrated within Chapter 1, (Section 1.4) that a lack of understanding 
with regard to the influence of customer behaviour during water supply failure 
may result in a negative reinforcing feedback loop.  The ability to achieve 
individual resilience to critical infrastructure failure requires a greater 
understanding of the relationship between an individual’s perception of risk and 
the factors that influence preparedness (Paton 2003; Dobbie et al, 2016).  The 
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results of the individual homeowner questionnaire (Chapter 5) and the analysis 
of Facebook comments during a water supply failure incident (Chapter 6), 
demonstrate the importance of understanding customer attitudes and 
perceptions with regard to water supply failure and how the provision or lack of 
information may influence customer behaviour.  The approach developed within 
this research may support WSP’s in the delivery of ‘Resilience in the Round’ 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.7) and contribute to the development of effective 
communication and knowledge provision strategies to encourage preparedness 
before an emergency and effective action during an emergency situation (Levac 
et al, 2012; Paton, 2003; Shrubsole, 2000).  If customers are to be considered as 
active participants in the emergency management process than it is necessary to 
understand how their behaviour may influence the ability of the WSP to achieve 
resilience in an extreme event. 
 
9.2.3 Demonstrating the complexity of collaborative working partnerships 
O’Sullivan et al, (2015) applied the structured interview matrix approach to 
explore community resilience through the process of building collaborative 
working partnerships.  This approach demonstrated how improved engagement 
between responder organisations and the local community can strengthen the 
emergency management process through sharing local knowledge, expertise 
and information.  This process also contributes to the development of resilience 
during the formation of social networks (Gilchrist, 2009; Norris et al, 2008). 
However, there is limited research relating to the process of achieving resilience 
through the development of collaborative working partnerships and how the 
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development of these contribute to achieving resilience within the emergency 
management system. 
 
The social network graphs developed in partnership with the local community 
representative were presented at the Environment Agency Flood and Coast 
Conference, 2018 and at local Environment Agency community workshops.  
These were used to stimulate debate, inspire change and demonstrate the 
importance of collaborative working partnerships to improve future flood risk 
management.  This research demonstrates how these relationships can also be 
developed to increase understanding between responder organisations and the 
local community to achieve resilience to extreme events. 
 
9.2.4 Inter-organisational application of the Safe and SuRe Framework 
As discussed within Chapter 1, (Section 1.2) this research was developed to 
support the Safe and SuRe integrated socio-ecological-technical approach to 
resilience within the urban water management sector.  The Safe and SuRe 
approach has traditionally been applied to explore the resilience of physical 
systems (Mugame et al, 2015; Butler et al, 2016).  Whereas this research 
explores the use of the Safe and SuRe Intervention Framework within the context 
of a social system, the UK emergency management system.  This research 
demonstrates how the Safe and SuRe intervention framework can be applied 
within the context of the UK emergency management system demonstrating the 
diversity of this approach.  
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9.3 Recommendations  
The colour coding applied within Figure 8.1 has been used to identify 
recommendations that relate to a particular structural element of the emergency 
management system. Recommendations that apply to the whole system are 
represented within a black box. 
 
1: The emergency management system  
To effectively integrate the concept of resilience within emergency management, 
requires a shift away from defining the process of emergency management within 
the context of the emergency management cycle.  The cycle reinforces the 
application of a risk management approach to emergency management and may 
prevent the identification of complex inter-dependencies within the socio-
ecological-technical system. 
 
Recommendation: 
To promote the development of resilience based strategies to extreme 
events, academics and practitioners should encourage a shift away from 
defining emergency management within the context of the emergency 
management cycle and seek to develop research to understand how 
resilience operates within a socio-ecological-technical system. 
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2:  A systems based approach 
In order to develop effective resilience based strategies requires a greater 
understanding of the relationships between applications of resilience within the 
wider context of the system within which it operates and include legislation, 
operational practices and those considered to be at risk.  This will encourage and 
promote the development of innovative strategies to achieve resilience. 
 
Recommendation:  
The process of emergency management should be understood within the 
context of the wider system within which it operates and include legislation, 
operational practices and individuals and communities considered at risk. 
 
Recommendation: 
Ofwat should encourage the development of innovative resilience based 
strategies to include effective emergency preparedness and response to 
water supply failure.  
 
Recommendation:  
To develop effective resilience based strategies it is necessary to 
understand the complex inter-dependencies that exist between different 
elements of the emergency management system.  This will prevent 
situations where building resilience in one part of the system will reduce 
resilience in another. 
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3:  A review of the CCA, 2004 
Within Chapter 6 and 8, it was demonstrated that the CCA, 2004 requires review 
to ensure it is aligned with current working practices and incorporate the 
application of new technologies.   
 
The UK Government needs to conduct a thorough review of current 
operational practices between Category 1 and Category 2 responders 
within the framework of the LRF. 
 
Recommendation:  
The CCA, 2004 requires review to ensure the legislation is aligned with 
current operational practices to promote the development of resilience and 
incorporate the application of new technologies. 
 
4: A review of interoperability between Category 1 and Category 
2 responders 
While many of the WSP’s have incorporated the principles of JESIP within their 
emergency operational procedures, a greater understanding is required by the 
Category 1 responders regarding the organisational structure adopted by the 
Category 2 responders.  This will facilitate a greater understanding of 
organisational roles and responsibilities to enable an accurate determination of 
available resources and capabilities for effective emergency response and to 
achieve resilience. 
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Recommendation:  
The Government needs to conduct a review to establish how to improve 
inter-operability between the Category 1 and the Category 2 responders to 
enhance multi-agency resilience to extreme events. 
 
5:  Increase investment in emergency management 
A lack of funding available at the local level has led to a reduction of emergency 
management personnel available for effective emergency response.  This has 
also contributed to a lack of resources and capabilities required to develop multi-
agency emergency training exercises which contribute to achieving resilience 
through the development of strong working relationships. 
 
Recommendation:  
The Government needs to increase investment in emergency management 
at the local level to ensure the provision of resources and capabilities for 
effective emergency management to extreme events. 
 
6:  A greater understanding of individual householder attitudes 
and perceptions to water supply failure 
 
Within the context of this research, individual homeowners perceived water 
supply failure to be ‘low risk’.  While there was an understanding of the many 
different ways in which water supply failure could occur, the majority of individual 
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homeowners that responded within this research did not perceive water supply 
failure as a hazard to prepare for now but a hazard to prepare for in the future.  
The majority of respondents did not have experience of water supply failure and 
did not actively prepare. 
 
Recommendations:  
WSP’s should conduct an independent householder questionnaire to 
understand individual attitudes and perceptions to water supply failure. 
 
7:  Investigating the communication of emergency information 
Customers required consistent, accurate and timely information from the WSP 
regarding the location of water supply failure, estimated timescales when the 
water supply would be restored, whether an alternative supply of water was being 
provided and how it was being distributed.   
 
Recommendation: 
WSP’s should conduct an investigation into the appropriate methods of 
communicating information to customers during a water supply failure 
incident to ensure the information provided is accurate, consistent and 
timely. 
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Recommendation: 
WSP’s should conduct an independent investigation regarding the 
information required by customers during an incident to encourage 
effective action by customers and enhance individual resilience. 
 
8: Promote collaborative working partnerships 
It was identified from the semi-structured interviews and the results of the 
participatory action research conducted within Chapter 7, that collaborative 
working partnerships strengthen the process of emergency management.  This 
is through the sharing and exchange of local knowledge and information to 
develop a shared perception of risk and encourage collective decision making.  
However, these relationships are difficult to sustain and require formal integration 
within the emergency management system.  This requires financial support from 
the Government to enable the recruitment of specialised community engagement 
officers within local emergency management departments to encourage 
resilience to extreme events within local communities. 
 
Recommendation: 
The Government needs to support the development of collaborative 
working partnerships at the local level through financial investment and the 
provision of community engagement officers within local emergency 
management departments. 
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Recommendation: 
There needs to be a greater awareness and identification of opportunities 
to engage both Category 1 and Category 2 responders within collaborative 
working partnerships with local communities through the LRF. 
 
Recommendation: 
Formalise collaborative working partnerships within the framework of 
Resilience Direct so they are accessible by other responders during an 
emergency. 
 
Recommendation: 
Community groups should be encouraged to incorporate the failure of 
essential services within their community emergency response plans. 
 
9.4 Future work 
This research has provided the foundation for further study to explore the 
application of resilience within the emergency management system.  It has been 
demonstrated that the concept of resilience is complex, dynamic and operates on 
many different levels within society.  It is a continuous process that requires 
constant evaluation as new challenges emerge as a result of the complex inter-
dependencies within socio-ecological-technical environment.   
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9.4.1 Resilience in the Round 
The approach taken within this PhD demonstrates the importance of exploring 
how resilience operates within the system of emergency management.  Ofwat’s 
‘Resilience in the Round’ proposes the application of a systems based approach 
to understand the interdependencies and relationships between financial, 
corporate and operational resilience.  However, it is also necessary to understand 
how to build resilience within the operational delivery of emergency management 
to ensure there are resources and capabilities in place for effective emergency 
response and recovery.  This requires greater investment in the development of 
emergency management teams throughout the water industry to increase the 
ability to develop collaborative working partnerships within the structure of the 
LRF and identify opportunities for improvement. 
 
9.4.2 Exploring resilience within other sectors 
This research focussed on building resilience to system failure within the UK 
water sector. However, this could also be applied to develop a greater 
understanding of how resilience is applied within other sectors in the context of 
the UK emergency management system.  This information could be used to 
compare and contrast the ability to achieve resilience within different sectors and 
facilitate the sharing and exchange of cross-organisational lessons learned. 
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9.4.3 Understanding relationships between different applications of 
resilience 
This research demonstrated how there is a tendency to explore the concept of 
resilience within the context of a specific discipline.  However, in order to be able 
to effectively apply the concept with real world situations, it is necessary to 
develop a deeper understanding regarding how resilience operates within the 
system under investigation.  This information could be incorporated within 
systems dynamic modelling to develop a greater understanding of causative 
effects of building resilience in one part of the system and whether this influences 
the ability to achieve resilience in another part of the system.  The results could 
be incorporated within resilience based strategies. 
 
9.4.4 Integrating communities within the emergency management system 
The social network analysis demonstrated the potential benefits of integrating 
local community’s collaborative partnership schemes within the local emergency 
management system.  These networks are not currently formalised using this 
approach.  However, this could be developed to understand the flow of 
information and communication within the network to identify and establish 
effective links between local communities and the local responders.  If these 
networks were formalised and possibly integrated within Resilience Direct, they 
would be available for other sectors to access during an emergency.  
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9.5 Concluding statement 
This research demonstrated that in order to be able to achieve resilience within 
the water sector to extreme events, the concept must be explored within the 
context of the wider system within which it operates.  A lack of understanding 
regarding how the emergency management system operates may result in 
resilience strategies being applied within one part of the system that increase the 
chance of failure within another part of the system and contribute to an overall 
loss of resilience.  Systems are dynamic and constantly changing in response to 
the complex inter-dependencies that exist between critical infrastructure, society, 
economics, politics and the natural environment and therefore resilience must not 
be considered as an outcome but a dynamic process operating within a complex 
socio-ecological-technical system. 
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APPENDIX 1 – APPLICATION TO ETHICS COMMITTEE 
COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING, MATHEMATICS, AND PHYSICAL 
SCIENCES 
Ethical Guidelines Approval Form 
Title of Project: Emergency Planning in the Water Sector 
Names of Researchers: Sarah Bunney 
Applicants E-mail: sb734@exeter.ac.uk 
Estimated Start Date: 
 (DD/MM/YY)          13/02/2017 
Research Group: Safe and SuRe 
Supervisors: Professor David 
Butler and Dr Sarah Ward 
    
Lay Summary (max 400 words): 
 
This PhD forms part of the Centre for Water Systems, Safe and SuRe research project 
looking at the impact of system failure in the water sector and how improved resilience 
to extreme events can be achieved through effective emergency planning.  Within the 
framework of the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004 the UK takes a multi-agency approach 
to the anticipation and assessment of threats and hazards at a local level.  Local 
Authorities, the Emergency Services and the Utility Companies are expected to work 
in partnership to identify risks to critical infrastructure.  This information is then used 
to inform future planning and contingency capabilities.  However, recent events have 
demonstrated a weakness in this approach and the ability to achieve resilience of critical 
infrastructure to flooding. 
 
This PhD will investigate how emergency management is conducted within the UK 
from a number of different perspectives including: 
 
 Top down approach – understanding how legislation, government policies and 
lessons learned reports influence current working practices and whether they 
help to achieve resilience. 
 Organisational approach – analysing how the different responder organisations 
work together before, during and after an emergency.  Research has identified 
that effective emergency response occurs where strong relationships have been 
formed during the emergency planning process. This PhD will investigate how 
these organisations communicate, transfer knowledge and share situational 
awareness before, during and after an emergency and whether this has improved 
following the 2007 flood event.  
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 Bottom up approach – assessing whether local communities and individuals 
understand the threats and hazards that may lead to a failure of the water supply, 
where to obtain information, assessing how reliant people are on receiving a 
fresh supply of water direct from the tap, whether people know what to do in 
the event of a serious failure of the water supply and if they prepare for such an 
emergency. 
 
The methodology to explore each approach and gain an in depth knowledge of how 
emergency management is conducted within the UK will involve semi-structured 
interviews, postal questionnaires and focus groups.  Semi-structured interviews will be 
conducted with Local Authority Emergency Planners, the Police, Fire Brigade and 
Water Company representatives to investigate the effectiveness of the ‘top down’ and 
the organisational approach.  Questionnaires will be sent to individual householders 
and Parish Councils to investigate the ‘bottom up’ approach.  Depending on the 
information provided and the interest of participants, further investigation may be 
conducted through community focus groups. 
    
Please mark (x) as appropriate Yes No n/a 
Does your study involve work with animals? 
 
X 
 
Does this study involve human tissue? 
 
X 
 
 
Track A: No significant ethical implications                      Please mark (x)as 
appropriate   
Yes No 
n
/
a 
I consider that this project has no significant ethical implications to be 
brought before the Departmental Ethics Committee. 
X  
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Briefly, what are the details 
of the experiment including 
the number and type of 
participants, methods and 
tests to be used (i.e. the 
procedure). 
 
To understand and investigate attitudes and 
perceptions to preparing for a civil emergency 
involving the possible loss of a centralised water 
supply, the sample will be taken from 3 Water 
Service Provider areas.   
 
The participants consist of approximately 300 
individual home owners, 250 Parish 
Councils/Community Action Groups and 50 
Category 1 and 2 responders.  These include 
Local Authority emergency planners, the Police, 
Fire Brigade, Lead Government Departments and 
Water Company representatives.   
 
Individual home owners and the Parish 
Councils/Community Action Groups will be sent 
questionnaires by post.  This will include a 
covering letter explaining the purpose of the 
research, how to complete the questionnaire, 
where to obtain further information and a 
statement informing participants that their 
participation is voluntary, the information they 
provide is confidential and they will not be 
identified from any of the answers they provide. 
 
Category 1 and Category 2 responders will be 
invited to participate in semi-structured 
interviews to understand how organisations work 
together during an emergency that may involve a 
loss of the water supply.  They will also be invited 
to participate in a Delphi analysis to understand 
how effectively organisations to work together 
before, during and after an emergency and where 
improvements can be made. 
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Track B: Possibility of ethical implications                       Please mark 
(x)as appropriate   
Yes No n/a 
I consider that this project may have ethical implications that 
should be brought before the Departmental Ethics Committee, 
and/or it will be carried out with children or other vulnerable 
populations. 
 X 
 
 
 
Purpose of project and its 
academic rationale. 
 
  
Brief description of methods 
and measurements. 
 
  
A clear but concise statement 
of the ethical considerations 
raised by the project and how 
you intend to deal with them. 
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Participants 
Human research 
 Recruitment methods 
 Number 
 Age 
 Gender 
 Exclusion/inclusion 
criteria 
 
Animal research 
 Location of study site 
 Method of obtaining/ 
marking/identifying 
subjects 
 Handling procedures 
for field experiments  
 
 
  
Consent and participant 
information arrangements. 
(Not relevant for animal 
research) Please attach 
intended information and 
consent forms. 
 
  
Consent and participant 
debriefing. (Not relevant for 
animal research) Please 
attach intended debriefing 
information. 
 
 
 
Consent                                                                         Please mark (x) 
as appropriate 
Yes No n/a 
Will you describe the main experimental procedures to the participants 
in advance, so that they are informed in advance what to expect? 
X 
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Will you tell the participants that their participation is voluntary? X   
Will you obtain a written consent for participation? X 
  
Will you tell the participants that they may withdraw from the research 
at any time and for any reason? 
X 
  
Will you tell participants that their data will be treated with full 
confidentiality, and that, if the results are published, it will not be 
identifiable as theirs? 
X 
  
Will you debrief participants at the end of their participation (i.e. give 
them a brief explanation of the study)? 
X 
  
 
   
If you have ticked No 
to any of the questions 
in the section above 
and you consider that 
your project has no 
significant ethical 
implications, please 
give an explanation 
here  
 
    
Vulnerable Groups                                                                           Please mark(x) 
as appropriate   
Yes No n/a 
Do participants fall 
into the following 
categories?                                     
School children (under 18 years of age)  X  
People with learning or communication 
difficulties 
 X  
Those at risk of psychological distress or 
otherwise vulnerable 
 X  
People in custody  X  
People engaged in illegal activities (e.g. drug 
taking) 
 X  
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Projects involving human samples                                    Please mark (x) 
as appropriate 
 
The project will use DNA 
from: 
Stock (anonymous) 
 
Newly recruited participants 
 
  
 
Please mark (x) as appropriate 
Yes No n/a 
Subjects will be informed of the aims and implications of the 
study procedure/information attached).    
Subjects will be notified of the results on request or automatically    
Participants will be advised on the legal and medical implications 
following from knowledge of their own results 
   
Tissue samples from the study will be destroyed upon completion    
If not, for how many years will tissue samples from the study 
kept? 
 
Years 
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Risk Assessments 
The study has been assessed for risk and the following risk assessments are 
relevant (please attach any new Risk Assessment and COSHH forms on this 
page or enter the title of any existing relevant forms below). 
 
Risk Assessment is attached below 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed:  Sarah Bunney   Date:  13th January 2017 
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APPENDIX 2: FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Preparing for an Emergency 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. The information that 
you provide will be used as part of a research project by the University of Exeter to 
understand attitudes and opinions to preparing for an emergency.  This is defined 
as ‘an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare, the 
environment or the security of the United Kingdom.’  This may also include an event 
or situation where there is widespread and severe disruption to essential services 
such as transport, water, electricity and gas.   
 
Data Protection Notice 
The information that you provide will be used for the purpose of this research study 
and any personal data you provide will be processed in the strictest confidence in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act.  It will not be disclosed to any third parties.  
Personal data and the original questionnaires will be stored securely in a locked 
cabinet at all times and data used for analysis will be saved securely on a password 
protected and encrypted computer.   All of the data used for analysis and the results 
of the research will be published in anonymised form. 
 
  Completing the survey online 
       You are more than welcome to complete the questionnaire online at:     
http://www.smartsurvey.co.uk/s/bishops/                                                                                
To do this, you will need to enter the Password: water01 
 
Instructions 
Please answer all the questions and return the questionnaire in the pre-paid envelope  
provided. For each question, please place a tick in the box that matches your answer.  For 
example, if your answer is yes:  
Yes      
No 
Please don’t worry if you make a mistake.  Just cross it out and tick the box that matches  
your answer. 
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Section 1: Thinking about your local area. 
 
The next few questions are about the local village, town or city where this questionnaire 
was delivered.  
Q1 
When thinking about your local area, do you think any of the following hazards are a 
risk to you? 
Please tick ONE box on each line 
 High Risk 
Medium 
Risk  
Don’t 
know 
Low Risk No Risk 
River flooding      
Coastal flooding      
Surface water flooding      
Sewer flooding      
Drought      
Heatwaves      
Low temperatures      
Heavy snow      
Storms and gales      
Pandemic influenza      
Widespread electricity 
failure 
     
Failure of the water 
supply 
     
Failure of the gas supply      
Other (please specify):  
 
Q2 
What do you understand by a 1 in a 100 year event? 
Please tick ONE option 
An event that statistically can only happen once in every 100 years  
An event that statistically has a 1% chance of occurring in any given year  
An event that statistically has a 1% chance of occurring once in every 100 
years 
 
An event that statistically happens every 100 years  
 
Q3 
Do you think it is important for you to prepare for civil emergency events that have a 
low chance of occurring?  
Please tick ONE option 
Yes  Other (please specify): 
No  
Don’t know  
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Q5 
When thinking about your local area, do you actively prepare for any of the 
following? 
Please tick ONE box on each line. 
 Yes No Don’t think about it 
River flooding    
Coastal flooding    
Surface water flooding    
Sewer Flooding    
Drought    
Heatwaves    
Low temperatures    
Heavy snow    
Storms and gales    
Pandemic influenza    
Widespread electricity 
failure 
   
Failure of the water 
supply 
   
Failure of the gas supply    
Q4 
Do you think it is important for you to prepare for the following hazards? 
Please circle ONE number on each line 
 
Extremely 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Not at all 
Important 
River flooding 1 2 3 4 5 
Coastal flooding 1 2 3 4 5 
Surface water 
flooding 
1 2 3 4 5 
Sewer flooding 1 2 3 4 5 
Drought 1 2 3 4 5 
Heatwaves 1 2 3 4 5 
Low temperatures 1 2 3 4 5 
Heavy snow 1 2 3 4 5 
Storms and gales 1 2 3 4 5 
Pandemic influenza 1 2 3 4 5 
Widespread 
electricity failure 
1 2 3 4 5 
Failure of the water 
supply 
1 2 3 4 5 
Failure of the gas 
supply 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q6 
When thinking about your local area, have you experienced any of the following? 
Please tick ONE box on each line. 
 Yes No Don’t Know 
River flooding    
Coastal flooding    
Surface water flooding    
Sewer flooding    
Drought    
Heatwaves    
Low temperatures    
Heavy snow    
Storms and gales    
Pandemic influenza    
Widespread electricity 
failure 
   
Failure of the water 
supply 
   
Failure of the gas supply    
 
Q7 
If you have experienced any of the hazards stated in question 6, we would be interested 
to know more.  For instance, briefly describe what happened, who was involved and 
how was the emergency situation resolved? 
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Q8 
Do you use any of the following sources of information to find out what hazards exist in your 
local area? 
Please tick ONE box on each line 
 Yes No Don’t think about it 
Local Authority    
Local Resilience Forum    
National Risk Register    
Community Risk Register    
Radio     
Television    
Government Website    
Parish Council    
Water Company Website    
Electricity Company 
Website 
   
Family and Friends    
Facebook    
Twitter    
Google or other search 
engines 
   
The Environment Agency     
Met Office    
Other (please specify):  
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Q9 
Do you use any of the following sources of information to find out how to prepare for 
a hazard in your local area? 
Please tick ONE box on each line 
 Yes No Don’t think about it 
Local Authority    
Local Resilience Forum    
National Risk Register    
Community Risk Register    
Radio     
Television    
Government Website    
Parish Council    
Water Company Website    
Electricity Company 
Website 
   
Family and Friends    
Facebook    
Twitter    
Google or other search 
engines 
   
The Environment Agency     
Met Office    
Other (please specify):  
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Section 2: Thinking about your local water supply. 
 
These questions are about understanding your attitudes and perceptions to your water 
supply and what would happen if there was a failure to provide you with a supply of 
water direct to your tap. 
 
Q1 Who is your local water company? 
Please specify:  
 
Q2 Do you know the source of your water supply? 
Yes  If your answer was Yes, please specify: 
No  
Don’t think about it  
 
Q3 
When thinking about your local water supply, how important are the following issues 
to you? 
Please circle ONE number  on each line 
 
Extremely 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Not at all 
Important 
Colour of the water 1 2 3 4 5 
Taste of the water 1 2 3 4 5 
Smell of the water 1 2 3 4 5 
Clear drinking water 1 2 3 4 5 
Reliable supply of 
water 
1 2 3 4 5 
Continuous supply of 
water 
1 2 3 4 5 
Sufficient water 
pressure 
1 2 3 4 5 
Safe drinking water 1 2 3 4 5 
Effect on the 
environment 
1 2 3 4 5 
Cost of the water 
supply 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q4 Are you on a water meter? 
Yes  Other (please specify): 
No  
Don’t know  
 
Q5 
Do you take any of the following steps to save water in your home or garden? 
Please tick ONE box on each line 
 Always Sometimes 
Don’t 
think 
about it 
Rarely  Never 
Turn off the tap when 
cleaning teeth 
     
Only boil the kettle 
with the amount 
needed 
     
Use a device in the 
toilet cistern  
     
Use water butts to 
collect rainwater 
     
Wash dishes in a bowl      
Install a water meter      
Only use the 
dishwasher on a full 
load 
     
Only use the washing 
machine on a full load 
     
Choose water efficient 
appliances when 
replacing old ones 
     
Other (please specify):  
 
Q6 
How confident are you in receiving the following services from your local water 
company? 
Please circle ONE number  on each line 
 
Extremely 
Confident 
Very 
Confident 
Moderately 
Confident 
Slightly 
Confident 
Not at all 
Confident 
A reliable supply of 
water 
1 2 3 4 5 
A continuous supply 
of water 
1 2 3 4 5 
A safe supply of 
water 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q7 
In your opinion, what is the likelihood that any of the following could cause a failure 
of the water supply to your home? 
Please tick ONE box on each line 
 
Extremely 
Likely 
Very 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Unlikely Never 
River flooding      
Surface water flooding      
Coastal flooding      
Storms and gales       
Extreme cold and ice      
Prolonged hot and dry 
weather 
     
Power failure      
Fire      
Equipment failure      
Water contamination 
incident 
     
Accidental damage      
Malicious attack       
 
Q8 
Do you consider a failure of the water supply: 
Please tick  ONE box  on each line 
 Yes No Don’t think about it 
A hazard you should 
prepare for now?  
   
A hazard you may have 
to prepare for in the 
future? 
   
 
Q9 
In your opinion, what is the likelihood that your future water supply will be affected 
by: 
Please tick  ONE box  on each line 
 
Extremely 
Likely 
Very Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Unlikely Never 
Climate change      
Increasing population      
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Q10 
In the event of a serious failure of your water supply, how likely are you to obtain 
information from any of the following sources? 
Please tick ONE box on each line 
 
Extremely 
Likely 
Very 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Unlikely Never 
Local Radio      
Television      
Local Authority      
Water Company       
Government Website      
Parish Council      
Local Community      
Family and friends      
Facebook      
Twitter      
Electricity company      
Gas Company      
Environment Agency      
Other (please specify):  
 
Q11 
In the event of a serious failure of the water supply.  How confident are you that the 
water company will provide you with a supply of water from an alternative source? 
 
Extremely 
Confident 
Very 
Confident 
Moderately 
Confident 
Slightly 
Confident 
Not at all 
confident 
Please circle ONE 
number 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q12 
In the event of a serious failure of the water supply.  How likely are you to purchase 
water from your local supermarket? 
 
Extremely 
Likely 
Very Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Unlikely Never 
Please tick ONE box      
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Q13 
If there was a serious failure of the water supply.  How long could you cope without a 
fresh supply of water direct from the tap? 
Please tick ONE box  
1 to 2 hours  
 
Other (please specify): 
3 to 6 hours  
7 to 12 hours  
12 to 14 hours  
24 hours  
48 hours  
72 hours  
1 week  
2 weeks  
3 weeks  
 
Q14 
If there was a serious failure of the water supply.  What is an acceptable amount of 
time to be left without a fresh supply of water direct from the tap? 
Please tick ONE box  
1 to 2 hours  
 
Other (please specify): 
3 to 6 hours  
7 to 12 hours  
12 to 14 hours  
24 hours  
48 hours  
72 hours  
1 week  
2 weeks  
3 weeks  
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Section 3: Preparing for an emergency 
 
The questions in this section are about understanding attitudes and opinions to 
preparing for an emergency and whether you prepare individually, as part of a 
community or both.  Community preparation includes flood warden schemes. 
 
Q1 
Do you take the following steps to prepare for an emergency? 
Please tick  ONE box  on each line 
 Yes No Don’t think about it 
Make a household 
emergency plan 
   
Prepare an emergency 
contacts list 
   
Prepare an emergency 
kit 
   
Store an emergency 
supply of water 
   
Keep an emergency food 
supply  
   
Ensure you have 
adequate insurance 
   
Signed up to receive 
flood warnings from the 
Environment Agency 
   
Use flood protection 
products to protect your 
home from flooding 
   
 
Other (please specify): 
 
 
 
Q2 
Do you participate in any community schemes to prepare for an emergency? 
Please tick  ONE box  
Yes  
If yes, please specify the type of scheme and 
whether you have a role: 
No  
Don’t think about it  
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Q3 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Please tick  ONE box  on each line 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Don’t 
know 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
I have a responsibility to prepare for 
an emergency 
     
I have been provided with 
information about how I can prepare 
for an emergency 
     
I think about how to prepare for the 
risks in my local area 
     
I know where to obtain information 
about how I can prepare for an 
emergency 
     
I take actions to prepare for an 
emergency 
     
The local authority has a 
responsibility to prepare for an 
emergency  
     
I am aware of my local authority 
emergency plans 
     
The local authority provides 
information about how to prepare 
for an emergency 
     
I rely on the local authority to 
provide me with information during 
an emergency 
     
I rely on the emergency services to 
provide me with assistance during an 
emergency 
     
The emergency services will arrive 
quickly during an emergency 
     
The water company will provide 
water if there is a failure of the water 
supply 
     
I rely on the local water company to 
provide water in all circumstances 
     
The water company will provide me 
with information if there is a failure 
of the water supply 
     
I trust the information provided by 
the water company during an 
emergency 
     
The Government provides 
information about how to prepare 
for an emergency 
     
I trust the information provided by 
the Government during an 
emergency 
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The questions in this section are optional but they will help us to categorise your 
answers.  The answers you provide are confidential and you will not be identified from 
the answers you give.  If you prefer not to answer a particular question, please feel free 
to leave it blank. 
Q1 Please tick ONE box 
Male  Female  
Prefer not to 
say 
 
 
Q2 
Which age bracket applies to you? 
Please tick  ONE box 
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
      
 
Q3 How many people, including children live in your household?  
Q4 How many children live in your household?  
Q5 
How long have you lived at this address (Please state in years and 
months) 
 
 
Q6 
Is your property: 
Please tick  ONE box 
Owned outright  
Other (please specify): 
Owned with a mortgage 
or loan  
 
Rented from the Local 
Authority/Housing 
Association 
 
Privately rented  
 
Q7 Approximately how far do you have to travel to work each day?  
 
I trust the information provided by 
the media during an emergency 
     
I trust the information provided by 
the local authority during an 
emergency 
     
Section 4: About you 
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Q8 
What type of property do you live in? 
Please tick ONE box 
Semi-detached  
Other (please specify): 
Terraced  
Detached  
Bungalow  
Flat/Maisonette  
 
 
Q9 
What is your current working status? 
Please tick the relevant box 
Employed full-time  
Other (please specify): 
Employed part-time  
Unemployed looking for 
work 
 
Unemployed not looking 
for work 
 
House-wife/House-
husband 
 
Student  
Retired  
 
Q10 
Which of the following qualifications do you have? 
Please tick ALL that apply 
O levels, CSE's, GCSE's  
Other (please specify): 
NVQ, GNVQ, ONC, OND, HNC, HND  
Other qualifications City and Guilds, RSA, BTEC  
Apprenticeship, vocational or work related   
A levels, VCE’s, AS levels, Higher School 
Certificate, Welsh Baccalaureate Advanced 
Diploma 
 
Degree (BA, BSc) or Higher Degree (MA, PhD, 
PGCE) 
 
Professional Qualifications (for example, 
teaching, nursing, accountancy) 
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Q11 Please choose one option that best describes your ethnicity. 
White  
Other Ethnic Groups  (please specify): 
British, English, Northern Irish, 
Scottish or Welsh 
 
Irish  
Other  
Mixed or multiple ethnic group 
White and Black Caribbean  
White and Black African  
White and Asian   
Other   
Asian or Asian British  
Indian  
Pakistani  
Bangladeshi  
Chinese  
Other  
Black, African, Caribbean or Black British 
Caribbean  
African  
Other  
Other Ethnic Group 
Arab  
Other  
Prefer not to say  
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Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.  Please return the survey 
in the pre-paid envelope provided. 
 
If you would like to participate in any further research or would like to be provided 
with the findings of the research, please provide your details below. 
 
Would you be interested in participating in further research? 
Yes  
No  
Would you be interested in receiving a copy of the research 
findings? 
Yes  
No  
Name: 
 
Address: 
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APPENDIX 3: COVERING LETTER AND INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENGINEERING 
 
College of Engineering,  
Mathematics and Physical  
Sciences 
 
Sarah Bunney 
Harrison Building 
North Park Road 
Exeter 
EX4 4QF 
 
T: +44 (0)1392 723600 
E: sb734@exeter.ac.uk 
W: www.exeter.ac.uk 
 
19th  April 2017 
 
Dear Resident, 
 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in a research study conducted by the University 
of Exeter to understand attitudes and opinions to preparing for an emergency.  This is 
defined by the UK Cabinet Office as ‘an event or situation which threatens serious 
damage to human welfare, the environment or the security of the United Kingdom’.  An 
emergency may cause illness, loss of life, homelessness, damage to property or serious 
interruption of essential services such as water, energy or fuel and examples include 
flooding, water contamination and drought.  It is hoped that the study will provide useful 
information to help inform the future delivery of emergency management in the UK. 
 
While your contribution to the research study would be very valuable, it is entirely 
voluntary and I completely understand if you do not wish to participate.  Before you make 
that decision, please take a few moments to read the following information.  If you have 
any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me using the contact details at the top of 
this letter.   
 
What will I have to do if I agree to participate? 
 
Please either complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it to me in the pre-paid 
envelope provided or alternatively you can complete the questionnaire online at 
http://www.smartsurvey.co.uk/s/bishops/  using the password: water01 
    
The questionnaire should take no longer than 20 minutes to complete. 
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Anonymity and Confidentiality 
 
All of the information you provide in the questionnaire will be anonymised and will be 
strictly confidential.  The questionnaire does not require you to provide any details of 
your name or address unless you wish to participate in further research or you want to 
request a copy of the research findings.  If you provide your details to request further 
information they will be removed from the original questionnaire so that you cannot be 
identified from the answers you have given. 
 
 
The information you provide in response to the questionnaire will only be used for the 
purpose of this research study and no-one other than the lead researcher will have access 
to the original questionnaires and the data.  Your data will be held in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act. 
 
Data Protection Notice 
 
The information you provide will be used for the purpose of this research study and any 
personal data you provide will be processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act.  
Your data will be treated in the strictest confidence and will not be disclosed to any third 
parties.  Personal data and the original questionnaires will be stored securely in a locked 
cabinet at all times and data used for analysis will be saved securely on a password 
protected and encrypted computer. All of the data used for analysis and the results of the 
research will be published in anonymised form. 
 
 
I would like to thank you in advance for taking the time to participate in this research 
study. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarah Bunney 
PhD Researcher 
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INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH STUDY 
EMERGENCY PLANNING IN THE WATER SECTOR 
Details of Project 
I would like to invite you to participate in a research project conducted by the University 
of Exeter to determine how we can achieve resilience to extreme events through 
effective emergency planning in the water sector.  It is hoped that the study will 
provide useful information to help inform the future delivery of emergency management 
in the UK.  
 
While your contribution to the research study would be very valuable, it is entirely 
voluntary and I completely understand if you do not wish to participate.  Before you make 
that decision, please take a few moments to read the following information.  If you have 
any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me using the contact details below. 
Primary Researcher Supervisors 
Sarah Bunney 
College of Engineering, Mathematics and 
Physical Sciences 
University of Exeter 
Harrison Building  
North Park Road 
Exeter 
EX4 4QF 
 
Email: sb734@exeter.ac.uk 
Telephone: 01392 723600 
Professor David Butler and Dr Sarah 
Ward 
 
College of Engineering, Mathematics 
and Physical Sciences 
University of Exeter 
Harrison Building  
North Park Road 
Exeter 
EX4 4QF 
 
 
How will the study be conducted? 
If you agree to participate, the researcher will conduct an interview with you over the 
telephone.  This should take approximately 40 minutes to complete. The researcher will 
record your responses in writing unless you have agreed for the interview to be recorded.  
Upon completion of the interview, the researcher will ask if you would like to participate 
in further research in the form of a Delphi survey.  This is where the responses to all of 
the interviews between different organisations will be collated and a series of questions 
will be developed to explore attitudes and opinions to the multi-agency approach to 
emergency management in greater detail. 
 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
All of the information that you provide in the telephone interview and the Delphi survey 
will be strictly confidential and anonymised.   Interview transcripts will be held in 
confidence and will not be used other than for the purposes of this research study.  Third 
parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be required by law).  However, 
if you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that you 
can comment on and edit it as you see fit.  Your data will be held in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act. 
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Data Protection Notice 
 
The information you provide will be used for the purpose of this research study and any 
personal data you provide will be processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act.  
Your data will be treated in the strictest confidence and will not be disclosed to any third 
parties.  Personal data and the original transcripts will be stored securely in a locked 
cabinet at all times and data used for analysis will be saved securely on a password 
protected and encrypted computer. All of the data used for analysis and the results of the 
research will be published in anonymised form. 
 
Consent 
I have been fully informed about the aims and purpose of the project and I understand 
that: 
 there is no compulsion for me to participate in this research study and, if I choose 
to participate, I may withdraw at any stage; 
 all the information I provide will be treated as confidential; 
 the researcher will ensure the information I provide is anonymous and I will not 
be identified from any of the answers I give; 
 any information I provide will be used solely for the purposes of this research 
project, which may include publications or academic conference or seminar 
presentations; 
 if applicable, the information I provide, may be shared between any of the other 
researchers participating in this project in anonymised form. 
 
 
 
Signature of Participant Date 
 
 
 
Printed name of Participant Email address for transcript 
 
 
 
Signature of Researcher Printed name of Researcher 
 
One copy of this form will be kept by the participant; a second copy will be kept by the 
researcher.  Your contact details will be kept separate from your interview data. 
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APPENDIX 4: CONFERENCES ATTENDED 
A number of conferences were attended at the start of the PhD to gain a clear 
understanding of the main issues that were relevant to emergency management 
within the UK and the protection of critical infrastructure.  The information 
obtained from attending the conferences was used to support the information 
obtained as part of the literature review and through the process of networking a 
number of issues were identified that helped to structure the initial aim and 
objectives of this PhD.  The following section highlights the information obtained 
from each conference and how it was used within the research aims and 
objectives. 
 
1 Water, Water, Everywhere …. 
The first conference attended was the Water, Water, everywhere conference on 
the 20th November 2015.  This involved a series of talks to demonstrate how 
Bristol City Council is attempting to prepare for the challenges they face in terms 
of climate change and how they are preparing for the threat of tidal and surface 
water flooding.  They introduced a scheme to create and maintain a Local Flood 
Risk Management Strategy with Wessex Water and the Environment Agency 
highlighting the need to encourage resilience because flood levels within the City 
of Bristol are expected to exceed 1.5m depth with the projected figures for climate 
change.   
 
It was evident that there was a very strong relationship between Bristol City 
Council and Wessex Water.  Both organisations giving a joint presentation with 
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jokes and banter between the two representatives.  However, there was no 
involvement from Bristol Water or even a representative presenting at the 
conference.  This was interesting because many of the pilot schemes proposed 
as examples of reducing flood risk and achieving resilience at the community 
level were developed within the City Centre and should have involved Bristol 
Water.  The information presented by the Wessex Water representative was very 
general and concerned the area surrounding Bristol.   
 
A conversation with an Environment Agency representative regarding a recent 
multi-agency emergency exercise relating to a tidal flood event along the Bristol 
Channel also revealed some interesting questions.  The event was conducted in 
Carlisle and involved all of the organisations that would be involved in the multi-
agency response to an extreme tidal event along the Bristol Channel.  However, 
it wasn’t until the last minute that the organisers realised that they had only 
included representatives from the Welsh side of the Bristol Channel when in 
reality the flood event would place an extreme strain on emergency services on 
both sides of the channel. An interview with the Emergency Planning Manager of 
North Somerset Council revealed that they had not been involved in the exercise 
and did not have any knowledge that it had been conducted.  It was also revealed 
that despite discovering a number of inadequacies as a result of the emergency 
exercise the Environment Agency representative had not received any further 
notification of lessons learned or recommendations following the exercise.    
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2 Flood Resilient Communities: Evaluating the Defra Flood Resilience 
Community Pathfinder Project 
This conference was attended on the 3rd of December 2015.  It was organised by 
the National Flood Forum as an opportunity to introduce and evaluate the Defra 
Community Pathfinder Project.  The conference consisted of a number of 
presentations from local community groups and Local Authorities that had been 
involved in the scheme and was an opportunity for them to present the results of 
their experience.  The presentations were varied, each was followed by a 
question and answer session and there was an opportunity to talk in depth with 
the presenters during break-out sessions. 
 
This conference was invaluable in demonstrating how very little had changed 
over the last 15 years in developing resilience to flood risk at a local level.  As 
part of my career I worked for the Environment Agency as a Flood Risk 
Management Officer and was actively involved in establishing and developing 
Flood Warden Schemes.  These were promoted as a partnership approach to 
encourage the communities at risk of flooding to take action to prepare.  The 
scheme was abandoned after a couple of years due to worries regarding liability 
should an individual become harmed whilst protecting their property from 
flooding.  Yet, 14 years later I am being introduced to a new but incredibly similar 
scheme under the new branding of ‘resilient communities.’   
 
From watching the presentations it was perceived that schemes developed and 
run by community groups were far more effective than those run by the Local 
Authority.  Yet, from talking avidly with Paul Cobbing, Chief Executive of the 
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National Flood Forum it was discovered that this was not necessarily the case.  
Community groups that have been formed through the Local Authority via the ‘top 
down’ approach were much more ‘engaged’ than those that have been formed 
through the ‘bottom up’ approach.   
 
A number of issues were identified as a result of attending this conference.  Even 
after 14 years there were still difficulties encouraging those at risk of flooding to 
prepare.  While the Defra Pathfinder project was involved in the implementation 
of a diverse number of different schemes to achieve and demonstrate resilience, 
it is not entirely evident that they understood why many communities at risk of 
flooding were not engaged with the process of preparing for a flood.  This 
information would help to overcome many of the challenges faced with 
encouraging communities to become more resilient.  Although, it wasn’t clearly 
defined as to what they meant by community resilience and what will happen in 
the future to the schemes that were established?  Will they still be provided with 
support or will they become abandoned?   
 
Finally, there was also an example of a brilliant website that had been designed 
by a Local Authority with the help of a Consultant as a portal of information for 
community groups detailing what to do before, during and after a flood event, 
relevant contact details and the area at risk of flooding. However, all of this 
information is available on the Government website.  Prior to the introduction of 
the Water Management Act, 2010, there used to be a ‘one stop shop’ for 
information regarding all aspects of flooding on the Environment Agency website.  
This had been promoted extensively through national and local public awareness 
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campaigns, largely as a result of the Bye Report (1999) that identified there was 
a great deal of confusion over who was responsible for flood related issues.  
Following the introduction of the Water Management Act, 2010 the responsibility 
for flood related issues was handed over to the Local Authority.  All of the public 
awareness campaigns designed to promote the Environment Agency as the lead 
organisation for flood related issues were abandoned.  However, with Local 
Authorities being designated this role it is unclear if they have adequate funding 
to be able to promote themselves as the lead organisation for flood related issues.  
Are the public being left in confusion once again over who is responsible for what?  
This takes us straight back to the problems identified within the Bye Report (1998) 
following the Easter Floods 1998.  Is this an example of going round in circles 
rather than addressing the real issue of why communities are not preparing for 
flooding?  
 
3 Making our Nation More Resilient to Flooding 
This was a relatively small event and included a number of presentation from both 
academics and practitioners regarding the challenges being faced with the threat 
of climate change and the actions that should be taken to encourage a greater 
resilience to the threat of flooding.  It was concluded that with all the academic 
research, Government and Environment Agency reports, everyone knew what 
needed to be done to achieve greater resilience but no-one was actually 
operationalising it. 
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4 Major Incident and Emergency Planning 
In September 2016, I attended the Major Incident and Emergency Planning 
conference in London.  This was a useful conference to attend because it was 
attended by emergency management professionals giving me the opportunity to 
network and it gave me an insight into the challenges experienced by the 
emergency response sector.   
 
There is a new situational awareness tool that is being rolled out throughout the 
country called Resilience Direct.  One of the keynote sessions was presented by 
Luana Avigliano the Head of Resilience Direct and this was the perfect 
opportunity to understand how this system works and how it will contribute to a 
greater working relationship between different organisations during emergency 
response.  Luana presented an overview of the system during one of the 
networking breaks and I was able to see how the system worked directly and ask 
her a few questions.  She was very positive about the multi-agency approach to 
emergency management and gave me the contact details for the Local Resilience 
Forum Manager in the South West.  Luana also accepted me as a friend on 
LinkedIn so I would be able to access her contacts. 
 
I also spoke about my research to Tony Thompson, Chair of the Emergency 
Planning College.  He was very positive and thought my research was valuable 
because he didn’t think there was anyone doing this type of research.  We spoke 
at length about how effective emergency management is in the UK and he has 
given me his card so I can contact him as part of my research project. 
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8.2 CIWEM: Beyond the National Resilience Review  
During December 2016 I attended CIWEM’s Beyond the National Resilience 
Review: Building resilient infrastructure and community’s event.  This conference 
was particularly relevant to my research with the majority of the presentations 
conducted by owners and operators of the UK’s critical infrastructure.  It was very 
interesting to understand the different interpretations of the review and the 
different approach taken by similar organisations.  The information obtained from 
attending this conference was presented at the Safe and SuRe reading group in 
the National Flood Resilience Review presentation. 
 
5 Cabinet Office Emergency Ambition Conference – Feb 2018 
This was a really useful conference and very relevant to my PhD.  There has 
been a review of the collaborative working relationships between CAT 1 
responders (first responders) in the UK.  Although I haven’t gone through my 
interview transcripts in great detail, answers to a couple of my interview questions 
led me to believe there are still difficulties between organisations sharing 
information.  This is something that was highlighted from the review.  Also, this 
review is only looking at CAT 1 responders.  There isn’t currently a review looking 
at inter-operability between CAT 1 and CAT 2 (Utility providers).   
 
I also spoke with the Emergency Planning College who are very interested for me 
to keep in touch and let them know how my research is progressing.  They were 
also very keen to help put me in touch with Emergency Managers as part of my 
semi-structured interviews. 
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6 Environment Agency Flood and Coast 2018 – Resilience 
I have been working in partnership with a community representative to develop a 
series of social network graphs to understand the development of a community 
flood group and a local authority flood board.  The local community representative 
presented the social network graphs at the conference to demonstrate the 
complex relationships involved in building collaborative working partnership 
schemes at a local level.  The conference  was dedicated to understanding how 
to achieve greaer resilience to flood events and it was a good opportunity to 
understand community resilience from the perspective of people at risk.  There 
was a great deal of discussion about resilience and what resilience means not 
just for an organisation but also for the people who are being affected.   
 
I made a lot of contacts at this event and it would be brilliant to follow them all up 
and develop further social networks however, I am at a stage in my PhD where I 
recognise that I have enough data.  I need to focus on developing and analysing 
my data sets.   
 
7 Delivering Resilience in PR19 and Beyond 
This was a very interesting conference examining resilience from the perspective 
of the WSP.  There was a presentation by a representative from Ofwat regarding 
‘Resilience in the Round’ and how the water sector should aim to include 
resilience within PR19 with customers at the heart of each resilience based 
strategy.  However, this guidance document does not contain any reference to 
how this can be achieved through effective emergency management.  Extreme 
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events require an effective emergency response involving the utility companies, 
emergency responders and the individuals affected so it is interesting why 
emergency management is not considered to be important as part of the process 
to achieving resilience.  
 
The afternoon session included presentations from other sectors and this was 
also interesting because Highways have identified the need to collaborate more 
with responder organisations and other sectors during their normal daily to day 
operations.  This is because road closures can significantly affect the response 
times of emergency response vehicles. 
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APPENDIX 5: SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
 
Preparing for an Emergency – A multi-agency 
Approach 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this semi-structured interview. The 
information that you provide will be used as part of a research project by the 
University of Exeter to determine how we can achieve resilience to extreme events 
through effective emergency planning in the water sector. 
Emergency is defined as ‘an event or situation which threatens serious damage to 
human welfare, the environment or the security of the United Kingdom.’  This may also 
include an event or situation where there is widespread and severe disruption to 
essential services such as transport, water, electricity and gas.   
 
My PhD is looking at how organisations can achieve resilience as part of a multi-agency 
approach.  I am looking at the emergency management system in the UK to identify areas 
of best practice and how this can be shared effectively but also exploring where there are 
limitations in the system and how these can be improved.  My focus is on the water sector 
and the flooding of critical infrastructure, water contamination, drought and the potential 
Dam failure as these are defined within the National Risk Register as specific risks to the 
water sector. 
 
I would like to assure you the answers you provide are confidential and you 
will not be identified from the answers you give. 
 
Before we start, please take a few moments to read and sign the information and 
consent form for research study.  If you have any questions, please do not hesitate 
to ask. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this research project. 
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Section 1: About You 
 
Q1 Name 
 
 
Q2 Organisation 
 
 
Q3 What is your role within the organisation? 
 
 
Q4 How long have you worked here? 
 
 
Q5 
Would you mind if I were to record the interview?  
 
Reinforce that the process is entirely confidential and anonymous.    All of the 
information that you provide will be strictly confidential and anonymised.   
Interview transcripts will be held in confidence and will not be used other than 
for the purposes of this research study.  Third parties will not be allowed access 
to them (except as may be required by law).  If you request it, you will be supplied 
with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it 
as you see fit.  Your data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
 
 
Section 2: Organisational Systems 
 
The next few questions are designed to understand your organisation and how it 
prepares for an emergency.  I am interviewing people from different organisations and 
this helps me to put your answers into the correct context.  For instance a government 
organisation may have a different perspective on resilience compared to a profit making 
organisation. 
Q1 
How would you describe the organisational structure within your organisation? 
 Hierarchical top down/rigid/command and control 
 Flat structure 
 Bottom up approach 
 People centred v process oriented 
 
……… and how does this influence the culture within your organisation? 
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Q2 
What do you perceive to be the main threats and hazards that would affect your 
organisations ability to respond to an emergency? 
 
 How does this align with your company’s business plan/mission statement? 
 How are these incorporated within your organisations business plan? 
 
Q3 
How is information transferred within your organisation? 
 
 Top down or bottom up 
 If there is a mixture of the two, what is the dominant approach 
 Is information fed down through government/regulator policies and plans and 
how is information fed back up through the system 
 
Q4 
How would you define resilience and what does it mean for your organisation?   
 
 Is this something that you are constantly working towards?  
  Is it driving the organisation business plan and delivery? 
 Is this something that is integral to the organisation? 
 Do people understand how performance within their role may contribute to the 
overall resilience of the organisation? 
 Is there integration between different departments working towards achieving 
resilience or do departments have defined roles and work independently? 
  
Q5 
Do you think that current legislation, policies and guidance produced by the 
government and the regulators contribute effectively toward building and achieving 
resilience to emergencies for your organisation?  Why? 
 Does it help to facilitate decision making within your organisation 
 Does it help to encourage ideas and innovation 
 Have you encountered any problems 
 
Does this approach allow for discussion, the incorporation of lessons learned and the 
sharing of best practice? 
 
 Do you consider yourself to be part of a two way process of sharing 
information? 
 
Q6 
How do you assess or determine the resilience of your organisation to a low 
probability/high consequence event? 
 
 Capabilities and resources to respond to an extreme event 
 Duty rotas/staff availability etc  
 How do you prepare for unknown threats and hazards 
 Are they incorporated within your business plan 
Q7 
What would you consider to be an effective measure of organisational resilience in 
response to a low probability/high consequence event? 
 
 For instance – recovery time/trained staff/multi-agency collaboration 
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Q8 
Do you monitor the effectiveness of response to small scale events to assess the 
likelihood of a bigger failure occurring? 
 
Section 3: Planning for Emergencies 
 
This section of the questionnaire is to understand how your organisation prepares for 
an emergency and works together as part of a multi-agency approach. 
Q9 
How do you assess risk to your organisation?   
 
For Instance do you analyse all the accidents and incidents that occurred or you 
responded to last year and develop a risk assessment on the most probable events …. Or 
it is based entirely on information provided in the LRAG and the NRR? 
 
 Do you take an all hazards approach? 
 Do you consider unknown threats and hazards as well as unknown 
 Do you involve other organisations in the development of the plan. 
 Who are those organisations … rank them in terms of importance 
  
Q10 
What do you consider to be the purpose of an emergency plan? 
 
 For instance structure and coordinated approach 
 How do you plan for low probability/high consequence events? 
 
Q11 
How often is the plan updated and reviewed? 
 
 Is it reviewed in line with the business plan? 
 How do you allocate funds and resources to low probability/high consequence 
events? 
 
Q12 
Do you develop your emergency plan together with other organisations that may be 
involved in emergency preparedness and response?   
 
If not why not? 
 
 
Q13 
If the answer is yes …. Explore …. How do you share information with other 
organisations? 
 
 What information do you share 
 What do you perceive to be the barriers/constraints that make the sharing of 
information between organisation more difficult 
 Do you think there is adequate sharing of information between organisations 
 How could this be improved for effective emergency management 
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 When is information shared is it before, during or after an event … how could 
this be improved 
 
Q14 
Do you share the details of your plan with other organisations that may be affected or 
involved in the emergency response 
 
 If not why not 
 What kind of organisations do you share your plan with  
 How would you rank them in them of their importance within the emergency 
response 
 
Q15 
How do you plan and prepare for low probability/high consequence events?  Do you 
consider the emergency plan to be an effective approach for low probability/high 
consequence events? 
 
 Explore flexibility and adaptability 
 
Q16 
Do you develop any training exercises related to the emergency plan?  What is the 
purpose of these? 
 
 Are these to develop and test the emergency plan 
 To ensure everyone involved in the emergency response understands what 
they have to do  
 Are they used to assess the resilience of the organisation to an emergency?  Or 
the resilience of the multi-organisational approach? 
 
Q17 
Do you provide training within your organisation of how emergency management is 
conducted in the UK? 
 
 Does this include how this operates within the framework of a multi-agency 
approach? 
 Or is this provided as part of an external training exercise with other 
organisations? 
 
Q18 
Is the information obtained from any training exercises developed into a lessons 
learned report or document? 
 
Q19 
How do you apply lessons learned within your organisation? 
 
 Are they incorporated within the business plan? 
 Do they result in changes to operational procedures? 
 Is this met with a positive or negative attitude to change? 
 How are lessons learned incorporated within the organisational culture? 
 
Q20 
What would you consider to be the barriers to organisational learning within your 
organisation? 
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What would you consider to be examples of best practice? 
 
Q21 
As an organisation do you participate in multi-agency exercises? 
 
 Who develops and designs the exercises  
 Are you involved in the initial planning stage 
 Is there a good response in terms of attendance 
 Do you consider the exercises to be a realistic interpretation of what could 
occur 
 How do you measure the effectiveness of the exercise 
 How is information regarding the effectiveness of the exercise disseminated to 
other organisations 
 Is there a good response 
 Is this information then used to develop the plan further 
 
Q22 
Do you share best practice with other organisations? 
 
 Why 
 What do you perceive to be the barriers with sharing best practice with other 
organisations 
 Could organisations use the LRF as a place to share best practice in terms of 
effective emergency management and response 
 
Section 5: The role of your organisation in the Local Resilience Forum 
The next few questions are to explore the role of your organisation in the Local 
Resilience Forum. 
Q23 
Are you a member of the LRF? 
 What is your role and how long have you been a member? 
 How often do you attend the meetings? 
 What do you consider to be the role or aim of the LRF 
 What do you consider to be the advantages of the LRF 
 What do you consider to be the constraints 
 
Q24 
Please describe the structure of your Local Resilience Forum? 
 
 Who is the Chair of the Local Resilience Forum? 
 Who attends the Local Resilience Forum Meetings? 
 How often do you meet? 
 Are there any sub committees? 
 Are you a member of any sub-committees? 
 Rank members in terms of influence? 
 
Q25 
In your opinion, what is the level of collaboration between the Category 1 and the 
Category 2 responders in the multi-agency assessment of risk? 
 
 Is the current approach effective? 
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 How could it be improved? 
 Are there strong working relationships between organisations 
 
Q26 
In your opinion, what is the level of collaboration between the Category 1 and the 
Category 2 responders before, during and after an emergency? 
 
 
Q27 
In your opinion, what is the level of information sharing between the Category 1 and 
Category 2 responders before, during and after an emergency? 
 
 Where does this work well? 
 How can this be improved? 
 What are the current issues? 
 
Q28 
Are there any tools/technology that you use during an incident to improve multi-
agency situational awareness? 
 
Do you use Resilience Direct?  
 
 Do all of the organisations use RD 
 Has it been used by the LRF for any incidents 
 Is it used during emergency exercises 
 
Q29 
What measures do you see as contributing to effective collaboration before, during 
and after an emergency? 
 
Q30 
Have you been involved in the production of the Community Risk Register? 
 
 What was your role? 
 Are you a lead assessor for the hazards relevant to your organisation? 
 If you are not the lead assessor, do you agree with the information provided 
by the nominated person? 
 How much did you contribute? 
 Do you think this is a useful/good approach 
Q31 
How is the risk assessment conducted? 
 
 In your opinion, do you think this is the best approach? 
 What would you consider to be the advantages of this approach? 
 What would you consider to be the disadvantages of this approach? 
 Are the results published on Resilience Direct? 
 
Q32 How often is the Community Risk Register updated? 
 
Q33 
How do the risk ratings within the community risk register correlate with those of 
similar hazards within your organisation? 
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Q34 
Do you use the risk ratings as defined within the Community Risk Register to inform 
any local contingency decision making within your organisation? 
 
 Please explain why? 
 
Q35 
In your opinion, does the Local Resilience Forum gain enough support from Central 
Government? 
 
What could be done to improve this 
 
Q36 
Do you share information and collaborate with any other Local Resilience Forums? 
 
 Particularly in the development of the Community Risk Register 
 How closely do you work together  
 Are you familiar with the people in the LRF 
 Is there a good rapport 
 Are you familiar with the roles and responsibilities of each organisation 
 Do you think other organisations understand the roles and responsibilities of 
your organisation 
 Is there anything that make/constrains your relationship with other 
organisations 
 Is there a good working relationship  
 Is there mutual trust and respect 
 
Q37 
Have you held a joint exercise with another Local Resilience Forum?  Or been involved 
in an event with another LRF? 
 
 What was the purpose of this? 
 Did it enable the allocation and distribution of resources? 
 
Section 6: Community Involvement 
 
Q38 
Do you work together with the local community in the development of emergency 
plans? 
 
 How and to what benefit does it bring 
 What are the advantages of working together with the local community 
 Does it strengthen or weaken the emergency response 
 Should they be integrated within the LRF’s  
 Who provides the link between the LRF and the community, is this effective 
 Is there an opportunity for organisations to share information and utilise each 
other’s connections into the community for effective emergency management 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this research project. 
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APPENDIX 6: DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE 
Local Community Questionnaire 
 
1 Name: 
 _____________________________________________________ 
 
2 Address: 
 _____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
3 How many people live in your property? _______________________ 
 
 
Age Ranges:     1-16 17-35 36-50 51-70 71+ 
  
 
 
4 Are you on a water meter?    Yes: 
        No: 
 
5 Do you have a washing machine?   Yes: 
        No: 
 
 How often do you use it?   
 _______________________ 
 
6 Do you have a dishwasher?    Yes: 
        No: 
  
How often do you use it?    ______________ 
 If not, how often do you wash the dishes?  ______________ 
 
 Do you wash the dishes in a bowl or under a running tap?  
__________________ 
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7 On average, how often do you and the members of your family use the shower?  
____________________________________________ 
 
8 On average, how often do you and the members of your family use the bath?  
 
____________________________________________ 
9 Do you regularly wash your car?   Yes: 
        No: 
 
If you have more than one car, please provide details as to how often you wash 
these? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
10 Do you water your garden?    Yes: 
        No: 
  
 If yes, approximately how often and for how long?    
  
________________________________________________________________ 
  
 Do you use a hose or a watering can? 
 ___________________________ 
 
11 Do you use water for any other purposes not previously mentioned?  
          Yes: 
        No: 
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Please provide details: 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
  
12 Do you take any measures to save water in your home or garden?   
Yes: 
         No: 
 
 Please provide details of measures taken:  
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 
13 Who is your local water service provider? 
 ___________________________ 
 
14 Has there ever been a problem with the water supply to your property?  
 
Yes:  
         No: 
 
If yes, please provide details: 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
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15 Have you ever had to contact your water service provider regarding any issues 
with your water supply? 
 
How soon did they respond? 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 Was the issue resolved? 
 _______________________________________ 
 
 Any further comments:  
 _______________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
16 On a scale of 1 to 5, how confident are you in receiving a fresh and safe supply of 
water from your water service provider? 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Least Confident      Very Confident 
 
17 On a scale of 1 to 5, how confident are you in receiving a reliable and 
uninterrupted supply of water from your water service provider? 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Least Confident      Very Confident 
 
18 Have you ever been issued with a ‘boil water’ notice at this address? 
 
 Yes: 
 No: 
 
 How did you find out about the ‘boil water’ notice?
 ___________________________ 
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 How long did it last for? 
 _______________________________________ 
 
 
19 What would you do if there was no cold water or very low pressure when you turn 
on the tap? 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
20 Do you know how your local water service provider would contact you regarding 
a failure of the water supply? 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 
21 In the event of an emergency, if there was a serious failure to provide a water 
supply to your property, whose responsibility is it to provide you with a safe 
supply of water? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 
22 Do you consider that you have a responsibility to prepare for an emergency by 
storing  a supply of water in your property? 
  
Yes: 
 No: 
 
If yes, why? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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If no, why? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
23 On a scale of 1 to 5, how confident are you that your local water service provider 
will provide you with water if there was a serious problem with the water supply 
to your village/town? 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Least Confident      Very Confident 
 
 
24 In the event of an emergency and a failure to supply water to your town/village, 
do you know how much water should be provided per person per day? 
  
Yes:  Approximately how much?  ____________________ 
 No: 
 
 In your opinion, how much water should be provided per person, per day? 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
25 How long could you cope without a fresh, clean supply of water to your property? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
26 In your opinion what would be an acceptable amount of time to be left without a 
supply of fresh water direct from the tap? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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27 Would you rely on the water service provider to provide you with a supply of 
water in the event of a serious failure? 
  
Yes: 
 No: 
  
 Why? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
28 Would you consider providing your own supply of water? 
 
Yes: 
 No: 
 
 If yes, where would you obtain your own supply of water? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
29 Do you have any concerns regarding the future safety or reliability of your water 
supply? 
 
Yes: 
 No: 
 
If yes, why? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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If no, why? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
30 Do you keep a supply of water in your premises for emergency? 
  
 Yes: 
 No: 
 
If yes, why? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
  
If no, why? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
31 Are you aware of any local or national risks that you, as a householder should 
prepare for in the case of an emergency?  
 
Yes: 
 No: 
 
 If yes, please provide details: 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
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32 Are you aware of any resources that can help you to understand risks within your 
local area? 
 
Yes: 
 No: 
 
 If yes, please provide details: 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
33 Are you aware of the Community Risk Register for your local area? 
 
Yes: 
 No: 
 
 If yes, have you read the Community Risk Register for your local area? 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
34 Are you aware of your Local Resilience Forum? 
 
Yes: 
 No: 
 
 
If yes, please provide details of how you know about the Local Resilience Forum: 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
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35 Are you aware of your local council’s emergency plans and services? 
 
Yes: 
 No: 
 
 If yes, please provide details: 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
36 What do you understand by the meaning of the word resilient? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
  
545 
 
APPENDIX 7: EXAMPLE OF A FOLLOW UP LETTER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENGINEERING 
 
College of Engineering,  
Mathematics and  
Physical Sciences 
 
Sarah Bunney 
Harrison Building 
North Park Road 
Exeter 
EX4 4QF 
 
T: +44 (0)1392 723600 
E: sb734@exeter.ac.uk 
W: www.exeter.ac.uk 
 
        19th June 2017 
 
Dear Resident, 
I contacted you on the 19th April, inviting you to participate in a research study conducted by the 
University of Exeter to understand attitudes and opinions to preparing for an emergency.  Thank 
you very much if you have already completed the questionnaire and sent it back to me in the 
pre-paid envelope.   Your contribution to my research project is very valuable and I appreciate 
you taking the time to assist me with this.  If you have offered to participate in further research, 
thank you very much and I will be in contact with you within the next few months. 
 
Don’t worry if you haven’t had time to return a completed questionnaire.  There is still time and 
I would really appreciate if you could spare a few moments to complete the questionnaire and 
return it to me.  It is hoped that the research project will provide useful information to help 
inform the future delivery of emergency management in the UK.  The questionnaire can also be 
completed online at http://www.smartsurvey.co.uk/s/bishops/  using the password: water01 
 
The questionnaire should take no longer than 20 minutes to complete. 
 
While your contribution to the research study would be very valuable, it is entirely voluntary 
and I completely understand if you do not wish to participate.  Before you make that decision, 
please take a few moments to read the following information.  If you have any questions or 
require a paper copy of the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to contact me using the contact 
details at the top of this letter.   
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Anonymity and Confidentiality 
All of the information you provide in the questionnaire will be anonymised and will be strictly 
confidential.  The questionnaire does not require you to provide any details of your name or 
address unless you wish to participate in further research or you want to request a copy of the 
research findings.  If you provide your details to request further information they will be 
removed from the original questionnaire so that you cannot be identified from the answers you 
have given. 
 
The information you provide in response to the questionnaire will only be used for the purpose 
of this research study and no-one other than the lead researcher will have access to the original 
questionnaires and the data.  Your data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
 
Data Protection Notice 
The information you provide will be used for the purpose of this research study and any personal 
data you provide will be processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act.  Your data will 
be treated in the strictest confidence and will not be disclosed to any third parties.  Personal 
data and the original questionnaires will be stored securely in a locked cabinet at all times and 
data used for analysis will be saved securely on a password protected and encrypted computer. 
All of the data used for analysis and the results of the research will be published in anonymised 
form. 
 
I would like to thank you in advance for taking the time to participate in this research study. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarah Bunney 
PhD Researcher 
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APPENDIX 8: RADIO GLOUCESTERSHIRE CONTENT ANALYSIS 
RESULTS 
 
 
Results of the content analysis performed on BBC Radio Gloucestershire 
throughout the duration of the Mythe Water Treatments Works flooding 
incident 2007. 
 
 
Accessed via online article created on the 23/07/2007  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/gloucestershire/content/articles/2007/07/23/flood_news_lat
est_feature.shtml 
Categories  Number of Responses 
Request for 
information 
About people 2 
Travel 1 
Timescales 10 
Bowser deployment 34 
Locations flooded 8 
Loss of water supply 18 
Still have water 0 
Bowser refilling 1 
Local businesses 1 
General 2 
Advice regarding 
Flushing toilet 8 
Boiling water 2 
Water use 27 
Severn Trent website 3 
Gain water 20 
Water back on 28 
Praise 
Severn Trent website 0 
Radio Station 6 
Severn Trent 4 
Emergency services 10 
Others inc friends 26 
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Categories  Number of Responses 
Raising Questions 
Emergency services/operational 2 
Extreme situations 1 
Defences 3 
Normal business operations 4 
Providing help 23 
Suggestions for hygiene 6 
Bowser deployment and levels 8 
Severn Trent operations 24 
Compensation 26 
Other 11 
Volunteers  3 
Climate Change  1 
Other/random  89 
Providing 
Information 
Still have water 11 
Supply reinstated 0 
Boiling water 5 
Loss of water supply 0 
Bowser deployment 4 
Flooded locations 1 
Empty bowser 1 
General information 5 
Support 
For Severn Trent 2 
For those affected 19 
Complaints 
Political  12 
Floodplain development 7 
Panic buying/taking bowser 
water 
16 
Flood protection of Mythe 
WTW 
3 
Dredging the Severn 1 
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Inadequate communication 15 
Bowsers empty 3 
Bowsers location 1 
Vandalism 8 
Lack of emergency plan 8 
Severn Trent 29 
Improper use of water 7 
Authorities 3 
550 
 
APPENDIX 9: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T TEST  
 
Null Hypothesis: The means of both samples taken from the individual 
householder questionnaire are equal 
Alternative Hypothesis: The means of both samples taken from the individual 
householder questionnaire are different. 
 
Independent samples T Test 
 
 
 
Sample 1 is a sample taken from the original individual householder 
questionnaire. 
Sample 2 is a sample taken from the questionnaire following multiple imputation 
_ 
X1 The mean of sample 1 taken from the original individual householder 
questionnaire  
 
X2 The mean of sample 2 following the multiple imputation  
 
Sp2 Standard deviation  
 
SS1 Sum of squares for sample 1 
 
SS2 Sum of squares for sample 2 
 
df1 Degrees of freedom for sample 1 
 
df2 Degrees of freedom for sample 2 
 
n1 Number of questions sampled from sample 1 
 
n2 Number of questions sampled from sample 2 
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SD SS1 SP2 Tmeans T
4.029888336 64.96 16.24 0 0
14.20422472 807.04 203.16 0.6 0.084190317
8.720091743 304.16 77.34 1 0.227419611
14.85429231 882.6 220.65 1 0.134641217
5.123475383 105 26.93 0.2 0.077080019
4.029888336 64.96
14.30244734 818.24
8.867919711 314.56
14.85429231 882.6
5.254521862 110.44
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APPENDIX 10: ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY RISK REGISTERS  
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APPENDIX 11: SUPPORTING QUOTES FROM CHAPTER 4  
 
4.2 Legislation and Governance 
4.2.1 Practitioner interpretations of applying the principles of the Civil 
Contingencies Act, 2004  
 “So yes it’s effective bringing everyone together and you know that in itself 
is a benefit certainly”. – 10 Participant 
 
“I think they are, they require us to engage with the LRFs and yes so I think 
and the SEMD legislation requires us to have security and emergency 
measures in place, we’re audited every year so we’ve got an external view 
on what we do which I think obviously always encourages you to do stuff.  
So at the moment to me it feels adequate but I’m not sure if that’s a view, 
I just don’t know if that’s a view shared across all of our team if you like.” 
– 11 Participant 
 
“The advantages in particular are as I see it is that we do a lot of work 
together in what I would call peace time i.e. when there are no 
emergencies and we plan in peace time and that enables us to stand up 
together when there is an emergency because we’ve already met each 
other, we know what our roles are, we develop plans together and we’re 
better connected than we would be if we weren’t doing those things in 
peace time.” – 15 Participant 
 
“I think that’s the reason why LRFs have done it differently because 
everyone interprets things differently when you see it on a piece of paper.” 
– 01 Participant 
 
“It’s been an add-on to there used to be a role emergency planning officer 
and it’s stood alone, then when the Civil Contingencies Act came in there 
were so many discussions about right, how do we put this in place and it 
was decided that within (Location) it would go to a particular emergency 
planning officer who’d provide a management function.  A number of areas 
have an LRF co-ordinator function and I think that’s maybe one of the 
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issues for the water industry is every single LRF does things entirely 
differently.” – 02 Participant 
 
“The Civil Contingencies Act was written in 2001/2 and came into being in 
2004.  In thirteen years the resilience world has changed immeasurably so 
I think the core is there you know people need to get together but what it 
needs to do is to have an overview and someone needs to look at it and 
like I’m saying about responding to an emergency or responding to 
something that’s going to impact they need to redefine, clarify, steer.  It 
wouldn’t be completely new legislation or a new act but the CCA needs to 
be updated because at the moment you’re struggling dealing with 
incidents.” – 07 Participant 
 
“So kind of the legislation really to some degree perhaps needs a bit of 
reviewing in light of the way agencies now operate you know I mean 
they’re talking about bringing in professional standards within emergency 
planning.  Well that’s fine but who’s going to enforce them when you can't 
even enforce agencies to turn up to an LRF meeting twice a year.” – 14 
Participant 
 
“Well I guess we’ve just, just recently Ofwat who’s our Ofwat’s water 
services is our regulator so they have just been recently I supposed tasked 
with the new Water Act have responsibility for resilience for the water 
industry so I guess I suppose things like the Civil Contingencies Act and 
other sort of legislation is probably getting a bit old now and probably isn’t 
certainly in the cyber world particularly relative and current.” – 09 
Participant 
 
“All we have to do is we have to share information and we have to work 
with partners.  Well we’re doing that in other areas of the business so we 
can evidence that, you don’t have to do it, stop doing it.” – 13 Participant 
 
4.2.2 Government support and guidance  
 
“ …… because we don’t get a tremendous lot from central government 
we realise that actually we’ve got to find the solutions locally” – 08 
Participant 
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“We don’t have an audit, we don’t have people unless you do it you know, 
you do like a peer one so we do one you know blah-blah with for example 
[place], there’s no way of measuring yourself how good or bad you are 
based on what’s happening now.” – 06 Participant 
 
“We’re practitioners we know what the problems are and it’s getting that 
mix between you don’t want the government to say you can only do 
something one way but you do want them to have embraced best practice 
and almost signposted it and say oh this is working in this area how about 
you consider that and they’ve started to do that in this last year whereas 
previously they probably didn't and I’m a bit sceptical about where the 
expertise sit you know I think it’s at the practitioner level…..” – 07 
Participant 
 
“ ….and also there’s no performance measures on it, there’s no 
accountability on it and you know I think the government now are thinking 
oh yes I’ve done it now and that’s great and let’s move on.”  – 06 
Participant 
 
“I think the challenge is that Department for Communities and Local 
Government locally again they’re struggling with funding and personnel 
and in many ways yes I get the support I need but I think a lot of the times 
we’re setting the agenda and they’re not.” – 07 Participant 
 
“And they have done a very good job over the last several years but 
unfortunately in these times of austerity they’ve been badly hit with cuts 
and because of that they’ve become less efficient so our reach back to 
central government through them has been somewhat diluted.” – 15 
Participant 
 
4.3.2 Building relationships 
 
“…… so I think you know it’s just getting to know people getting to know 
where your help is getting to know where your additional resources is and 
how that can be put together you know in you know the response and 
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recovery phases and think about the pre-planning and how each 
organisation can dovetail into that planning” – 04 Participant 
 
4.3.3 Regional collaboration 
“…….and that brings all the sort of Cat 2 responders together who cover 
that sort of area so that covers I think about seven or eight LRFs and the 
LRF co-ordinators are present as well at that meeting.” – 09 Participant 
 
“….so there’s a little bit of me that says you know have they got the 
structure of the LRFs working or correct because one of the things that 
we’re doing within the [name] at the moment is we’re looking at working 
and developing regional packages …… “– 13 Participant 
 
“And so whether the next step moving forward would be for a regionalised 
local resilience or regional resilience forum rather than the local resilience 
forum but it has its advantages and its disadvantages because you’d lose 
that local ownership of your own hazards and your planning and your own 
communities within the areas in which you work but actually it gives you a 
bigger pool of resources to work together ….” – 13 Participant 
 
4.4 Sharing information – sensitivities and timing 
“….it’s just basically a call that is about sharing information, sharing it so 
that everyone has the same common picture of what’s going on …” – 01 
Participant 
 
“We share when there’s a need to share but you need a framework so that 
data protection is in place and we need to work to that framework but that 
framework shouldn’t be used as an excuse for not sharing data where it’s 
required and I’ve not seen anything that counters that.”  – 07 Participant 
 
“So if there’s an incident they would get we send out a standardised email 
it’s about that shared situational awareness that’s what we’re trying to 
achieve so you would share information for, across all agencies, all of our 
partners if we think it’s going to have an impact on a community.” – 07 
Participant 
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“I think it’s good, I think we don’t have any problem with getting information 
and sharing information when we require it and as I say before knowing 
people within the organisation certainly breaks down barriers so we don’t 
have the same issues.” – 06 Participant 
 
4.4.1 Resilience Direct 
“And Resilience Direct is probably one of the best tools for sharing 
information, I think it’s so much easier so it’s a great tool. One of the best 
tools that I’ve seen ever, I think to create, just to share information, to share 
plans, but also to share knowledge and just using the tool to interact.” – 01 
Participant 
 
“ … we have all our documents and our files on it and people can share 
information and when we’re doing planning it’s better just to put it on 
Resilience Direct and they can make changes and suggest things.  We 
also are starting to use it in response now which we haven't done in the 
past so in other words we send out alerts when people have got stuff that’s 
going on that may have a multiagency approach and they did, so we give 
people the heads-up.” – 06 Participant  
 
“And we don’t want to take people away from the incident just to sit and 
upload information but we’re going to need to so it’s an area where need 
to improve our capability if you like.” – 12 Participant 
 
“Yes exactly you’re not going to pick up and use something that you’re not 
familiar with for the benefit of others when actually all the benefit that you 
need as a company is in the systems that you’re using on a day to day 
basis.” – 13 Participant 
 
4.4.2 Good practice and lessons learned using Resilience Direct 
“Yes I mean we have a, we have a forum for the water industry and we 
share information so we have a specific [name] group that we share 
information and best practice with, we meet regularly on that so probably 
three times a year and then we have a [Name] as well for emergency 
planners and again we meet twice a year and again sort of shared 
learnings, practice, knowledge and we tend to get individual requests as 
well so the thing I mentioned earlier about cyber for example so we ran a 
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[name] exercise towards the end of 2016 that’s quite well known in the 
industry now so everybody’s coming asking about how we performed, 
what learnings we had and looking at running similar exercises in their 
businesses.” – 09 Participant 
 
“It’s not always a hundred percent but at least it gets somewhere and if 
there’s any joint organisational learning that’s identified then that goes up 
through JESIP, Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles blah 
for them to publicise across the UK.” – 03 Participant 
 
“We talk quite a lot with [Name], obviously we are aware of when other 
[Name] have big issues we do find out, so we often chat to them and find 
out what they do and we will go an visit other [Name] incident rooms.” – 
01 Participant 
 
 
“Yes I mean it opened our eyes a lot, I know the discussions we had with 
sort of [name] after the event they had a plan to respond to a sort of a 
certain number that we’re all obliged to respond to, population loss and the 
intention was that you would just then replicate that and multiple that a 
number of times depending on how severe the scenario was and they said 
it just that didn't work you couldn’t just multiple your response up ten times 
sort of thing it just became a completely different sort of response 
requirement.  So I think that was one of the big learnings for a lot of the 
[Name] that came out of that.” – 09 Participant 
 
4.5.1 The purpose of the emergency plan 
“And I think a lot of plans can be very information plans and for me they’re 
great, it gives you background information, but they don’t help you when 
you come into incidents …… It needs us to say what we’d do, how we are 
going to do it, how we are going to manage the situation.” – 01 Participant 
 
”...that’s all I need to worry about now, the rest of the plan I’ve used in 
advance or I’ve used as the structure for training and it’s there as a 
reference document so there’s a few there but it’s that process of planning 
I think is, it gives you that framework on which you can start to pin other 
things.” – 02 Participant 
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“Well one is to provide a frame, a general framework to allow response so 
identify the key resources, how to contact the organisation, how to initiate 
a response, where that response can be managed.” – 03 Participant 
 
“The plan’s important, don’t get me wrong, a planned approach is very 
necessary having command and control sort of thing but people are more 
important than a plan.” – 06 Participant 
 
“So again we train people so that their competencies mean that they 
should be doing all the right things in the early stages, we’re saying give 
them time later on to check through the plan and say OK have I done what 
I need to do and if I was running an incident I would give somebody the 
job of reading the plan and coming back to me later on and saying have I 
done everything I need to do or is there anything I’ve missed.  So I think 
it’s a good checklist in an incident to make sure that you’ve done the right 
things.” – 12 Participant 
 
4.5.2 The Multi-Agency Assessment of Risk  
“Now it’s one thing to do the risk assessment you know that they’re 
responsible for each LRF but it’s another thing to then have to do it in a 
different format for every LRF.  So what we’ve managed to do is to 
persuade them to sort of go to a single format that then makes it much 
easier for us when we’re replicating if you like risk assessment as an 
example.” – 09 Participant 
 
“So if you take something like the risk register at one point we’ve got three 
LRFs within the north east, one was using Access, one was using Word 
and one was using Excel, completely different formats in terms of the way 
the risk register was undertaken.” – 02 Participant 
 
“I think there’ll always be some where some of the more unusual ones 
where you think oh I’m not quite sure if anyone locally sort of is an expert 
on solar flares or volcanic ash but I suppose that’s why the national stuff’s 
there to sort of provide guidance but yes it forces us to look collectively at 
pretty much all of the major risks, all the things that could go wrong and 
even if some of them if we don’t think they’re relevant then at least we’ve 
sort of gone through that process and sort of at least sort of considered 
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them and documented them why they’re not very relevant so yes I think 
it’s useful.” – 10 Participant 
 
4.5.3 Working collaboratively in the development of a multi-agency 
emergency plan  
“…we’re an [Name] with three [Name] whereas they’re a {name] with you 
know [Name] so what I was saying is we don’t really want discrepancy 
between how you’re going to deal with it and how [Name] are going to deal 
with it otherwise it’ll confuse the hell out of us so it was quite an interesting 
you know I’m happy with what they’ve got and it’s broadly the same so we 
can respond to that.” – 08 Participant 
 
“So I think where we know we’re going to have to work with an external 
agency collaboratively in an incident we would work, we would try and put 
the plans together, together.  For the big water ones I know that we’ve 
looked at what we would need and how we would want to respond and 
then we’ve shared those with the LRFs where we can and we’ve shared 
the principles with them.  Having said that the development of the 
principles document was with two LRFs together, well one main one, 
[Name] so we worked very closely with them so that we understood what 
all their questions were, what their concerns were, how the document 
worked for them so although it’s our document it’s for them to be able to 
read and interpret and to then go away and make a plan from.” – 11 
Participant 
 
“Yes, yes so our general approach is to get a working group together of 
key members that are going to be there and it’s a collective, a collective 
input over a number of meetings and different people pitching in what they 
think needs to be in there as a discussion and then I do the writing initially 
and then put it back out again for consultation and it gets tweaked again…” 
- 05 Participant 
 
4.6.2 Multi-agency exercising and training 
“It means the ability to recognise and assess the risks that we face and to 
make preparations to deal with examples where we face emergencies 
based around those risks so it’s environmentally scanning, it’s looking 
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forwards, it’s anticipating, it’s making preparations, it’s practising and 
rehearsing and being prepared for the real event when they come along 
as they do every so often.”  - 15 Participant 
 
 “….but what we need to do is invest in people and make sure they 
understand what’s in the plan because it’s pointless picking a plan up when 
you’re on your way to a flood and you haven't got a clue but what you need 
to do is make sure people are aware of what their responsibility is, what 
the expectations of a chair, of a tactical or a strategic co-ordinating group 
is of that organisation when they attend that meeting and that’s the sort of 
thing we’ve been doing the last twelve months now investing in people.” – 
06 Participant 
 
“…..if there’s an opportunity to get involved during an exercise we will 
because that’s when we’re going , incidents is where we’re going to need 
them most so the more familiar we are with them and they are with us in 
those situations the better we think.  So we’ve invited them onto our 
exercising programme internally as well so when we’ve had major 
exercises we’ve had two or three representatives from the LRFs involved.” 
– 11 Participant 
 
“Yes I mean all our LRF exercises are multiagency I mean it’s not but what 
we have found again and part of this sort of trying to work smarter is and I 
talked about finance because if you set up a big live exercise you know 
that can be quite costly so what we’re finding we’re doing much more of 
now is piggybacking an LRF exercise on the back of other exercises.” – 
16 Participant 
 
“It’s two sides, one it gives you a chance to assess the plan that you have 
available so you run through your plan and it gives you a chance to assess 
whether that plan’s effective or does it need modifying but then it also gives 
the individuals and the people some, as close as you can, experience of a 
real event and prepares them ready for the real thing rather than the first 
time they are doing it is a real event rather than an exercise.” – 09 
Participant 
 
“we will sort of run an exercise and see whether that, see whether all the 
aspects of that plan you know are valid and appropriate for an appropriate 
response to that sort of event.” – 09 Participant 
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4.7 Achieving effective emergency response 
“Lack of staff or inability of staff to communicate.  The key aspect is always 
whether to communicate it doesn't matter how many plans you have if you 
can't actually contact people nothing’s going to happen so 
communications are the key and we take a lot of it for granted.” – 03 
Participant 
 
4.7.1 Resources and availability of personnel 
“…it’s around that ability to get staff out and doing the job they need to do 
in an emergency response, that’s probably the biggest risk to our ability to 
respond.” – 02 Participant 
 
“I suppose it’s getting a little bit political now but it’s resources and it’s the 
ability of people to be able to contribute staff to the centre.” – 05 
Participant 
 
“I know that certain parts of the local authority have gone from X number 
of planning down to about half in five years so the number of people in 
planning now is less, the number of people responding is less and I think 
that’s right across the piece so in other words there’ll be an issue regarding 
anything that goes on more than twenty-four hours may be an issue 
regarding capability.” – 06 Participant  
 
“That’s a good question.  In terms of response I mean size and scale-wise 
if there’s a really big, a really big incident it’s resources and numbers of 
sort of people within the business so we would be reliant on mutual aid 
both from a multiagency point of view and other water company point of 
view.  So it’s when you get to that Mythe type size and scale we certainly 
wouldn't be able to respond to something like that on our own.” – 09 
Participant 
 
“So I’d say if we were short of staff that would probably be a big impact on 
our ability and the second one would probably be the loss of IT so if we 
had centrally we rely on a lot of monitoring and what have you in order to 
view the network and to get information to help us with decision making, 
some of the plans and things like that are also on our systems …” – 11 
Participant 
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4.8.1 Social Media  
“…social media is such a powerful tool now for and against you that you 
have to make, manage it somehow and I think most people are trying to 
but you know [Name] definitely set a standard there, a benchmark that you 
should be achieving that you know because they really did manage the 
media and social media very, very well.” – 06 Participant  
 
“The problem with social media they want instantaneous results don’t they 
they're not, you can't get there fast enough to be able to do that and people 
are going look at this, it’s going worse, it’s going worse and you know it’s 
been thirty seconds since and you know unfortunately that’s life isn’t it 
today the modern world’s full of these expectations that you can't live up 
to I’m afraid.” – 06 Participant 
 
“Social media has changed absolutely everything about how we respond 
because you need to be proactive and if like [Location] you don’t say 
anything the gap will be filled by whatever and you lose control of the 
agenda.” – 07 Participant 
 
“We had responses in place but it’s I guess the new environment is the 
social media and we put a lot of social media injections into that exercise 
and it showed a few holes in our response plan so again we’re now 
amending our response plan to, we already had social media response in 
there but I guess it’s just moved on again since we sort of updated the plan 
previously in terms of the numbers and scale of social media and how it 
operates these days.” – 09 Participant 
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APPENDIX 12:  SUPPORTING QUOTES FROM CHAPTER 6  
 
6.2 The communication of information 
“And what about [Location]? No water for about 15 hours and no word 
about progress to rectify the situation. [Name], what is going on???” – 
Reference 4, WSP 1 2018 03 04 11 
“Can you PLEASE PLEASE. Give us in [Location] some specific 
information. Do you have anyone, yet, looking into this local problem? If 
not why not, after ten hours. If so, what progress? Of course you are under 
lots of pressure (unlike your water!) But you must surely be able to inform 
us now in something more than generalities. You have several hundred 
village customers, and a had-to-be closed primary school needing to know 
so they can plan at least how to deal with matters in the short term.  Last 
night you told me in a tweet 'you were on it'. Please prove it.” – Reference 
6, WSP 2 2018 03 05 05 
“[Name] I think a lot of us would prefer a bit more than this standard reply! 
Like if the problem is identified? If yes is it likely to be long or short term? 
Surely your inspectors are feeding something back? Else we will run out 
of what bottles we have and Sunday so shops are shut. Planning is needed 
if long term issue. P.s please don’t bother to reply to this with a standard 
response! Better to not reply at all!” – Reference 3, WSP 3 2018 03 03 01 
 
 
General information posts: 
 
“Beastfromthe East - please see below for up to date information.  
For updates about any disruption to service please visit 'In Your Area' on 
our website [Website] For frozen pipes please follow these steps on our 
website [Website}“  WSP 3 
 
“After the freezing temperatures and sudden thaw caused supply issues 
for many, we will be paying compensation to any customers who were 
without water for more than 12 continuous hours, or for more than 15 hours 
of intermittent supply. The payment of £30, will be deducted automatically 
so domestic customers don't need to do anything. You can read more 
about the compensation here: [Website]” WSP 2 
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Notification post: 
“We're sorry to customers in [Location] who may be experiencing no 
water/low pressure. Bottled water is on its way and we'll update you on 
when it's available as soon as we can.” WSP 1 
 
“[Location]: We're increasing the amount of water being fed into the 
system,but we are still not seeing pressure build up as much we'd like - 
but pressure is increasing. We believe that there is air trapped in the 
system and we're currently working to bleed the air out. We're also working 
to fix a number of leaks in the local area, which will help improve our 
position. We know this is frustrating, but we're working as quickly as we 
can to resolve this and return your water supply.” WSP 1 
 
“We have temporarily closed our Billing and Accounts helpline so that as 
many staff as possible are able to answer emergency calls to the Services 
helpline. [Website]” WSP 3  
  
“People in [Location]  will see our tankers out and about today as the 
thaw's causing problems with our sewage treatment works that we're trying 
to work through together with [Name]. Apologies if this causes any issues.” 
WSP 2 
 
Advice post: 
“It's starting to thaw out across our region – which is good news! However 
we'd like to ask our customers to please check their outside taps and taps 
in vacant properties. If you attempted to turn these taps on during the cold 
spell, but couldn't as they were frozen, they could now be thawed out but 
still in the on position and risk flooding your property.” WSP 1 
 
“Be prepared for the thaw - as temperatures rise, we are likely to see a 
rise in the number of burst pipes both on our customers' own pipework and 
across the mains network. Check out what to do if you discover a problem: 
[Website] 
Be prepared for the thaw What to do if you discover a problem”  WSP 3  
 
 
Request for information: 
“We're asking for any vulnerable customer's or their family members to 
contact us with their names, address and a contact number.” WSP 1 
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“we're asking for any customer's who are vulnerable or their family 
members to contact us. We need full names, address's and contact 
number's and we'll be in contact with these customer's” WSP 1 
 
Request for action: 
“Alongside [Name] we're all asking customers who have water, to use as 
little as possible this morning Following the recent freeze and rapid thaw, 
water companies across [Location] are experiencing exceptionally high 
levels of demand for water due to multiple bursts on networks and an 
increase in leaks in and on customer properties.” WSP 1 
 
“We are asking customers to check that their garden taps are turned off 
and not using water following the freezing pipes and taps over the past two 
days. [Location] [Website]” WSP 3 
 
“Customers in the [Location] areas may experience interruptions to their 
water supply. We encourage customers to use water wisely and suggest 
water is stored for use overnight and into tomorrow. For updates, visit 
[Website]” WSP 3 
 
The communication of information 
“4th day with no water! No communication either which is the most 
frustrating part! Nothing even recorded on your website!” – Reference 13, 
WSP 1 2018 03 06 01 
 
“Communication fail. These updates are far too infrequent and far too 
inaccurate. You need to be far more transparent - people need to make 
plans” – Reference 7, WSP 1 EP 2018 03 05 17 
 
“Shall I go take my washing to the laundrette? Shall I go to my mums for 
a shower? Shall I buy Oltr of water or 600? Surely they know how broken 
it is!” – Reference 13, WSP 2, 2018 03 05 07 
 
“I just want to know whether it's going to be days or hours! Simple really!” 
– Reference 21, WSP 2 2018 03 05 07 
“[Location] Now back on but stubborn refusal to keep us informed. Keep 
saying see website for updates but our area had no updates all 2nd until 
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sometime late evening when it just disappeared from the fault map. Water 
came back on some time after 1:00 this morning but yesterday the 
switchboard just kept telling us the inspector was still looking for the fault 
and check the website for updates. Evidentially at some time he found the 
fault and it was subsequently repaired but why not tell us! 30 seconds for 
an update that would save a lot of grief and let us know work is in hand 
even if you were still looking for the fault. Time after time we see this 
companies just do not understand the importance of keeping their 
customers informed. Most of us are perfectly reasonable, we understand 
the problems but want to be kept in the loop ignoring us until we complain 
or you send out the next bill does the image of [Name] no favours when 
the magnificent effort your teams in the field do should be getting high 
praise” – Reference 7, WSP 3 2018 03 02 14 
 Examples of WSP notification posts 
 
“Update: Customers in [Locations] who are without water. Our team are 
working on repairs to restore supply as quickly as possible. We are really 
sorry we don't have a timescale at this point. As soon as we do we will 
post it here. Thank you for your patience.” – Reference WSP 1, 2018 03 
04 10 
 
“Our repairs on many burst pipes in [Locations] will continue into next 
week. Customers in [Location] are starting to see water return to their taps 
after work on a 18" burst main but we know there are other burst pipes in 
the area which we're working hard to fix. Customers in [Location] may 
experience low pressure whilst we rezone the system to return water to 
[Location].” – Reference WSP 1, 2018 03 04 23 
Lack of Information regarding the provision of timescales 
“Well you got that wrong its 10:50 and still nothing” – WSP 1, 2018 03 05 
16 
 
 “It's 22:50 and there is still no water in [Location]” – WSP 1, 2018 03 05 16 
 
“So your 10pm line was a complete lie! SHOCK!!!! We are now on day 
3!!!!!! Still no water!!!! STILL no information! Can you let me know when I 
can have a shower and go to work!” – WSP 1, 2018 03 05 16 
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Example of a supporting quote for the WSP providing customers of 
the difficulties they were experiencing  
 
“The rapid thaw has seen our teams called out to an unprecedented 
number of burst pipes. To put that into perspective, we've had an increase 
in burst pipe alarms of nearly 4000%. When water freezes within a pipe it 
expands, putting more pressure on it and causing it to split or the joints to 
pull apart. When the temperature starts to increase again, the water will 
start to leak out. 
 
This has put pressure on our network and meant small pockets of it 
experienced low pressure or periodic interruptions to supply during 
Sunday evening.  Our teams have worked tirelessly throughout the night 
to fix many of the bursts, and as a result we have managed to restore 
supplies to everyone who was impacted. 
 
Overnight there have been a further series of bursts though, and so as we 
enter peak demand this morning, there may still be poor pressure or 
intermittent supplies in pockets again as we fix these.  We have teams 
deployed to deal with these and can reassure customers that we are doing 
everything we can to restore supplies as soon as possible.  We would like 
to offer a huge apology to these customers for any disruption to their 
Monday mornings.  We know just how hard it is to be without water and 
we hugely appreciate everyone’s patience as our teams work around the 
clock to mend the bursts and reduce any impact to our customers. 
 
Customers can get all the latest updates via our website here [Website]” – 
Reference WSP 2, 2018 03 05 05 
 
 Difficulties accessing information from the WSP 
“Thank you! We have been on hold for 1 hour trying to report this. To 
confirm NO Water on [Location]. And your website is not updated!” – 
Reference 2, WSP 1 2018 03 03 10 
 
“We certainly can't get through on the phone!!!” - Reference 1, WSP 1 
2018 03 04 12 
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“Well [Name] are a waste of time not answering any questions or 
messages then get through to them and I'm 269 in the que because we all 
have 6months to wait to talk to anyone.” – Reference 9, WSP 2 2018 03 
05 02 
 
“I've checked your website and tried calling several time but getting no 
information...” – Reference 15, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
“[Name] should by now be getting water bowsers to all affected areas their 
website hasn't been updated since yesterday I've tried phoning again this 
morning and all I got was an answering service!!” – Reference 5, WSP 3 
2018 03 02 07  
 
 Supporting quotes regarding a lack of consistent information from 
the WSP 
“If you are sorry please provide proper updates that are accurate. 3 times 
today you have given the messgae out that [Location] is fixed and it will be 
a few hours before the water is back on. If people had followed your 
updates they would not have gone to get water but waited for it to come 
back on. They would be dehydrated by now. We havent had water in 
[Location] for 48 hours. Please give realistic information. How about the 
same information that you are giving to our local schools? They say you 
wont update them til 10pm. So why have you said something completely 
different on FB. Clearly they are being given different information than us. 
– Reference 22, WSP 1 2018 03 05 15 
  
“You need to change the post. Then people have the right information. It 
is not right to have a post up that says you have fixed it when it isnt fixed 
and the water is still not on. People dont know whether they need to go to 
the water stations again or not. Your post says a few hours but the reality 
is the post is now hours old. It needs updating. You are misleading people.” 
– Reference 8, WSP 1 2018 03 04 23 
 
“Still No water at [Location]. No water since Saturday. How much longer 
so I can decide to make alternative plans!” – Reference 8, WSP 1 2018 
03 06 03 
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“No supply in [Location], according to your website the leak is fixed but 
whole street is without water. I have an autistic child who doesn't 
understand why he can't have a shower. Any idea when it will be back on 
please?” – Reference 3, WSP 2 2018 03 05 05 
 
“Make sure the updates are realistic though yesterday you promised we 
would get water back at three different times...woke up this morning with 
no water. Just be honest and realistic and tell us when we will get the 
water...still can't believe [Location] is without water for 3 days...” – 
Reference 3, WSP 1 2018 03 03 13 
 
Your communications are not accurate at all and you are endangering 
peoples health.” – Reference 22, WSP 1 2018 03 05 15 
 
“[Name]- you're putting conflicting information on this thread- [Name] is 
saying that there is still work that needs to be done and there is no 
timescale. [Name] is saying that the problem is fixed but it may take a while 
for pressure to return. Which is it please??” – Reference 9, WSP 1 2018 
03 05 02 
 
“It does seem a bit confusing…. The text in the post refers to [Location], 
which is wrong – your link on the [Name] website in the original post 
specifies [Location] which is correct and is the exact location.   My father 
rang your organisation earlier AGAIN explaining that they were almost out 
of water.  The reply he got was “go to a supermarket”.  Given the recent 
snow, I don’t think that’s an acceptable response to give to [Name] 
customers who are in their late 70’s and be forced to go out in low 
temperatures.  I hope that their supply can be restored ASAP.” – 
Reference 01, WSP 3 2018 03 03 08 
“Why are you still investigating when you told us this morning it was all 
sorted? We are constantly getting conflicting information.” – Reference 
11, WSP 3 2018 03 04 24 
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 Problems accessing the WSP website  
  
“How is it possible that [Name] are unable to communcate to us effectively. 
The [Name] website is useless for trying to obtain info. No water in 
[Location] and no idea how long we can expect this to continue. 
RENATIONALISE THE WATER COMPANIES.” – Reference 5, WSP 1 
2018 03 04 08 
  
“Any chance of updating website to highlight the areas you're working on?” 
– Reference 4, WSP 2 2018 03 05 07 
 
“[Name] should by now be getting water bowsers to all affected areas their 
website hasn’t been updated since yesterday I’ve tried phoning again this 
morning and all I got was an answering service!!” – Reference 5, WSP 3 
2018 03 02 07 
“For those if us in [Name] (and I guess [Name]) i have just been told they 
are still working in the area and have no indication of when supplies will 
be restored to us. They have promised to update website etc but I don't 
hold out much hope!” – Reference 6, WSP 3 2018 03 03 24 
“Yeah their communication is appalling! They said they were updating their 
website but no new information has actually gone up! No idea when it’s 
supposed to be restored.” – Reference 9, WSP 3 2018 03 03 02  
 
“How about an update for [Location]? Been without water since Monday 
afternoon, was told it would be back on yesterday afternoon. Spent hours 
in queue for on-line chat & operator cut me off once! Emergency phone 
lines useless, just giving a recorded message about [Location] - nowhere 
near us - then hanging up. Check My Area on website does not work under 
any browser I've tried. No response to messages left via Facebook as web 
site suggests as means of contact. Job reference numbers come up with 
error messages when you try to check them on web site. Social media / 
web site info hugely lacking. Other folks without water - I feel your pain - 
I've been told there's a second burst pipe in the [Location] this morning, 
but no info about that elsewhere - some of you may find that nugget of 
information useful.” – Reference 5, WSP 2 2018 03 07 02 
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Quote providing suggestions for improvement 
 
“And to the delivery driver who came up from [Location] with more bottled 
water for the village yesterdat afternoon and turned up on Dad's doorstep 
with some more for him. I think issue has been as [Name] said earlier, it 
has been insufficient and slow communications. I found the website 
particularly unhelpful. Suggest that when [Name] have their SEA 
(significant event audit) in response to this major incident they look at the 
speed of the comms responses by the likes of Police and NHS 
organisations and use their website home page to get key messages out 
as soon with clear links to detailed information. Not everyone has FB or 
twitter and many in rural areas do not have Internet or mobile signals. More 
information through traditional comms such as local radio for the elderly?” 
– Reference 39, WSP 3 2018 03 04 23 
 
 
WSP 3 Communication of information regarding snow 
 
“Please don’t blame the NON EXISTANT SNOW!!!” – Reference 4, WSP 
3 2018 03 02 10 
 
 
“….Fobbing people off with faux excuses and fake facts is not acceptable. 
For example telling people that you can't find the leak because the ground 
is covered in snow - as your website announcement for this area said 
yesterday evening - an announcement made some 8 hours after the snow 
had cleared; or telling people that you can't supply them with bowsers 
because the roads aren't safe, some 5 hours after all weather warnings in 
the area have ceased; or telling them that it is their neighbor's burst pipe 
that is causing the problem etc etc. The people who you are reading your 
posts and talking to you on the phone live in these areas - so they kind of 
know that they are being lied to. It makes [Name] look very bad.” – 
Reference 3, WSP 3 2018 03 02 14 
 
“Disruptions!!! There has been no water supply over a very large area for 
nearly 24 hours!! Why are you leaving people in remote areas of 
[Location], who have already been cut off due to snow for 2 days, without 
water with no information on when they might expect their water supply to 
resume? There are some basic human rights and heath issues here. 
Supermarkets sold out of bottled water around lunch time. There are many 
poor, elderly and vulnerable people in the area without cars, without 
internet, who have been coping with exceptionally cold weather, and who 
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now have no water to drink, flush toilets or to even wash their hands in? 
When residents have called [Name] to ask if they have any idea when the 
situation will be resolved the answer has been a resounding 'no'. When we 
ask them if there are plans to use water bowsers the answer has again 
been a resounding 'no'.... not today, not tomorrow, not Sunday, not at any 
point does there seem to be a plan to supply people with water during the 
outage. Some of us have been told that the reason for the lack of water 
delivery by truck is that the inspectors can't get out to assess if the roads 
are safe. The roads in the area concerned have largely been clear since 
this morning, and will certainly be clear tomorrow, Sunday and Monday - 
using this as an excuse is an an extremely distasteful exploitation of the 
weather situation.” – Reference 6, WSP 3 2018 03 02 14  
 
  
6.2.1 The provision of information 
 “No water in [Postcode] either.” – Reference 7, WSP 2, 2018 03 04 02  
“We have no water at all [Postcode]”- Reference 9, WSP 2, 2018 03 05 
04 
“What about [Postcode] we've still no water?” – Reference 12, 2018 03 
05 09 
“we're still without water is there any update? Thanks.” – Reference 2, 
WSP 3 2018 03 03 02 
 
“Ok I'm reporting an area outside of those you've got on your website and 
on here, we have NO WATER now on the [Location], please respond to 
one of the messages I've left for you and let us know what's going on?” – 
Reference 2, WSP 1 2018 03 04 14 
 
 Facebook as the primary method of communication 
 
“No mention of [Location] on your updates, people have been reporting no 
water again all morning. After being off all yesterday came on for about 2 
hours then off again.what do we do to get a response from you?” – 
Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
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“[Name] what's happening with the water supply to [Location] according to 
your website there's no issues in this area but clearly there is as so many 
people are with low pressure water atacan we have update please.” – 
Reference 7, WSP 1 2018 03 04 02 
 
“No water in [Location] since 8:30. Map to check leaks no longer working” 
– Reference 18, WSP 1 2018 03 04 27 
 
“Still no water [Location]. Your twitter account said the problem had been 
fixed at 5.45 this morning but clearly not. We understand the problems that 
you are having and the hard work you are putting in but all we ask is to be 
given the proper information to keep us updated so we can plan properly 
too. Many thanks” – Reference 73, WSP 1 2018 03 04 18  
 
“FB is not one of your main social media page? As I don't know where to 
check more. At least could you let us know when in [Location] the problem 
will be fixed? Could be today? My baby has a nursery tomo in [Location] 
and without water it won't be impossible to attend and hence I won't be 
able to go to work” – Reference 15, WSP 1 2018 03 04 11 
 
“On Twitter you say check our social media page and on Facebook the 
same. Could you please confirm where to check and let us know when the 
problem will be fixed? Thanks.” – Reference 3, WSP 1 2018 03 04 14 
 
 
“If neither FB nor Twitter is your main social media page then what is? 
Instagram? MySpace?!” – Reference 4, WSP 1 2018 03 04 15 
“[Name] we haven't had any update all day. The website hasn't been 
updated since 6am.” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 04 18 
 
“The website doesn't give any information at all. Can you at least give 
updates as to what time [Location] will get water? I was told it would be 
1pm and now it's after 2pm. I'd really like to be able to have a hot drink 
today.” – Reference 5, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
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“We went to use our water at 2am this morning to discover that we have 
no running water. Our postcode area is not mentioned on your website 
and I've tried to call for 30 minutes in the early hours without getting 
through. Our postcode is [Postcode]. Lots of other postcode areas nearby 
are listed. If the wider area is affected, then parts of [Location] may be 
affected too.” – Reference 45, WSP 1 2018 03 04 29 
 
“No mention of [Location]. We have had no clean water since Friday! 
Despite reporting it to [Name] and [Name].” – Reference 24, 2018 WSP 1 
03 04 12 
 
Using Facebook to report leaks and burst pipes 
 
“I know you've been busy and working very hard for us. But I need to let 
you know that we don't have water in [Location]. Sorry for adding up to 
your problem.” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 03 01 
 
“…leaking pipe next door to me but no one is home.please can someone 
look into this as it has been a good 5 hours & no one knows their contact 
details. postcode is [Location].” – Reference 8, WSP 1 2018 03 03 07  
 
“I'm in [Location] and my water is now finally back to normal” – Reference 
4, WSP 1 2018 03 04 29. 
 
 “[Location] has water” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 07 12 
 
“I tried to report a burst pipe this morning online but it would not submit. 
It's on [Location].” – Reference 24, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
“Water is leaking from a place you've dug up the road, at corner where 
[Location]. Looks like the masking tape didn't hold!!” – Reference 4, WSP 
2 2018 03 05 04 
“We are without water again. Pressure was awful all day but has now gone 
again” – Reference 4, WSP 3 2018 03 02 13 
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“Are you guys aware there's a burst pipe on [Location], it's been running 
like the [Location] for days, the communal bin cupboards both [Location] 
there is water coming from them the water is flowing like a waterfall on the 
back walls. It may be the water containers on the roof or a major pipe has 
gone in the blocks.” – Reference 14, WSP 1 2018 03 05 10 
 
“Same [Location] has gone again, we had very low pressure what I got 
home from work. There is a leak on [Location] - that is not being looked at, 
it was pretty bad early when I walked in.” – Reference 6, WSP 1 2018 03 
05 06 
 
 “Finally have my water back in [Location] after a looooog wait please don't 
let it ever go again.” – Reference 2, WSP 1 2018 03 07 02 
 
 Customers providing detailed information regarding water supply 
failure 
“Any update for [Location] please, we have only had 10ltrs so far, two 
young children and no water for 34 hours is getting very tough and 
unhygienic ! Thank you.” – Reference 9, WP 3 2018 03 02 13 
“Still nothing, not a drop, I have children, my neighbour is 102 years old, 
I've been buying her water the past 2 days. Really unfair on the elderly.” – 
Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 04 09 
“We have twin babies, told that we were on a priority list today for supplies 
but nothing yet. Spent about 20 quid on water and most shops are out. 
How can there be just one” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 05 04 
“..my 4 year old has been up allnight being sick. desperately need some 
water” – Reference 3, WSP 1 2018 03 04 09 
“Still nothing in [Location]! I have a severely disabled elderly woman here.” 
– Reference 37, WSP 1 2018 03 04 29 
“No response from [Name] by phone or email - two 97 year olds with 
dementia at risk. No water [Location].” – Reference 10, WSP 2 2018 03 
04 02 
“We haven't had water now for over 30hrs!! live the in at a boarding 
kennels for cats and dogs. And we MUST have water supply at all times. 
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What can we do? As [Name] have been far from helpful and haven't even 
offered us emergency water!!!” – Reference 77, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
“[Location], from my personal experience today even the vulnerable 
customers are not getting water . I have a disabled son with incontinence 
and yet we still have no water. We have been told three times that we are 
a priority but still no water.” – Reference 26, WSP 3 2018 03 02 07 
 
“[Name] I understand that but I have 2 young children in my house I need 
to wash bottles for my youngest which I can not do so now when he wakes 
for his milk I can not give it to him. Also after 12 hours your meant to 
provide us with water in some form being bottled or in a tank outside on 
the road which hasn't happened! My water has been off for 28 and a half 
hours now and all local shops have now sold out of water! This is not just 
for me but for other people within the area.”- Reference 14, WSP 2 2018 
03 05 02 
 
Perceived lack of information from the WSP 
 
“no water in parts of [Location] - an hour on the phone, listening to weird 
music and being told that "one adviser will be with me soon" - yeah right - 
some information somewhere? - when is water back?” – Reference 27, 
WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
“[Location] without water for several hours now - I've been on hold for over 
an hour! Nothing on the website, nothing on social media. Please tell us 
what is going on!!!” – Reference 81, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
“Tried to reach the via fb, twitter and phone - no information at all about 
water supply in [Location]” – Reference 4, WSP 1 2018 03 05 08 
 
“You asked us to DM you the other day with our numbers so you could 
keep us updated with sms messages but you never did? My messages 
haven't even been read let alone responded to. I have have been without 
water since Saturday, it came back on last night for the first time but 
nothing again this morning. [Location]. You have my number so please call 
me!” – Reference 10, WSP 1 2018 03 07 01 
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“I have been waiting for your response on the phone for a long time and 
can't find any explanation for the problem for water supply in [Location] nor 
an offered solution for your customers. When the problem will be resolved 
and if not what alternative will be.” – Reference 9, WSP 1 ALT 2018 03 
04 29 
 
Difficulties obtaining an alternative supply of water 
 
“[Name] - customer service not great at present. Your SM updates need 
to be more regular and specific, to provide reassurance. Providing one 
location to collect water in a city the size of [Location] is not acceptable. 
This is not a situation you have created but a situation thatviscwithin your 
gift to improve.” – Reference 15, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
 
“Everyone appreciates the workload you have. But set up more places for 
people to pick up water. The situation in [Location] is appalling you cannot 
even get to the car park at Sainsbury's !!” – Reference 16, WSP 2 2018 
03 05 08 
 
“Not even water at the supermarkets !!!!” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 
04 14 
 
“No water still at [Location]! None since Saturday at 7pm. Shops are sold 
out of water.” – Reference 3, WSP 1 2018 03 05 17 
 
“Is there any water stations planned for [Location]? Over 26hrs with 
nothing now and local supermarkets have sold out of bottled water 
today...” – Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 04 
 
“[Location] still have no water. Text said to be resolved by 1pm. NOomost 
5 pm....any idea of whats happening? No water to buy in local 
supermarkets, all sold out whilst I've been at work !.” – Reference 3, WSP 
2 2018 03 05 04 
 
“Shops in [Location] sold out of water!” – Reference 10, WSP 2 2018 03 
05 07 
“We have now been without water for nearly 30 hours!!! I know it's not your 
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fault and you are probably getting grief from every angle but this is now 
becoming ridiculous. We are now down to our last bottle of water. All shops 
have sold out!! Was promised some and apparently a request for some 
was put through bout 2.15. It is now 7 nearly 5 hours later!!!!!” – Reference 
2, WSP 3, 2018 03 02 07 
“Any updates [Name]? No water and shops all sold out of bottled water, 
rest of the shops are shut.” – Reference 18, WSP 3 2018 03 04 19 
“Any chance of some water as the shops have ran out. Please” – 
Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 04 05 
 
Difficulties customers experienced without a supply of water  
 
“[Name] - I am in [Location] and like everyone else here, still obviously 
without water. I saw your updated post that the works will be continuing 
into "next week", but do you have some kind of more detailed idea of when 
the issues will be resolved and for what areas? I have two children, one a 
newborn on formula, which can't be made without water. I've seen you're 
setting up areas to collect water, but we were unable to get any. We went 
to a few super markets, stores, petrol stations etc tonight to try and get 
some water and literally everywhere is sold out. I appreciate you're 
receiving god knows how many complaints and messages like this, but we 
just want some kind of estimated timeframe so we can get water into our 
homes. My main concern is my children” – Reference 36, WSP 1 2018 03 
04 23 
 
“[Name] I understand that but I have 2 young children in my house I need 
to wash bottles for my youngest which I can not do so now when he wakes 
for his milk I can not give it to him. Also after 12 hours your meant to 
provide us with water in some form being bottled or in a tank outside on 
the road which hasn't happened! My water has been off for 28 and a half 
hours now and all local shops have now sold out of water! This is not just 
for me but for other people within the area.” – Reference 14, WSP 2 2018 
03 05 02 
“[Name], from my personal experience today even the vulnerable 
customers are not getting water. I have a disabled son with incontinence 
and yet we still have no water. We have been told three times that we are 
a priority but still no water.” – Reference 42, WSP 3 2018 03 02 07 
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“[Name] are they still working on it as my partner leaves at 10 tonight he 
can't get his washing done when away as he works from 7 am to 7 pm and 
gets his food and then goes to sleep in his van at 9 pm also bungalow 
smelling bad now, dogs are out of water, i know i am not the only one that 
has no water.” – Reference 3, WSP 3 2018 03 03 01 
“[Name] with all due respect I have been with out water for 3 days [Name] 
are aware of that they are also aware that I have two children I am having 
to move out of my home today to live with my friend because we can not 
live !! I pay a fortune for water and I expect to get what I pay for !! The 
weather is no longer bad here so all u need to do is turn the pressure up?! 
When will it be sorted ?!” – Reference 7, WSP 3 2018 03 05 06 
 
6.2.2 Requesting information 
 
“[Location] without water for several hours now - I've been on hold for over 
an hour! Nothing on the website, nothing on social media. Please tell us 
what is going on!!!” – Reference 104, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
“Do you know what the status is for [Location] area please? Not getting 
any joy via Twitter or FBDM.” – Reference 14, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
“We have not water in [Location]. Used Twitter no response, your website 
shows no problems. Your news section has nothing. Your telephone lines 
ring engaged and I am number 33 on live chat. How do i know what the 
problem is or when I can expect resolution or how don The vulnerable old 
people in my village get looked after??” – Reference 2, WSP 2 2018 03 
06 02 
 
 
 Negative comments regarding the provision of service 
“Is there any news for [Location]? Or at least when approximatly we will 
have the water back?? We have no water since this early morning and this 
is kinda of a problem now...” – Reference 8, WSP 1 2018 03 04 08 
“[Location] i have no water. Do you know what the problem is/when it will 
be resolved?” – Reference 14, WSP 1 2018 03 04 18 
“[Location] gone off again after coming back on all day? why?”  - 
Reference 6, WSP 1 2018 03 05 10 
586 
 
“No water at [Location] either... can we please get an update on when this 
issue will be fixed?” – Reference 8, WSP 1 2018 03 04 25 
 
“Hi [Name], so rather than post a generic reply why not answer the 
question? So my postcode is [Location], what is the update with our water 
supply as the link you keep directing me to tells my your coming out on the 
13th March? I have had no water since approximately 19:30 last night.” – 
Reference 2, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
“No water in [Location] so this is not accurate information. Can you tell us 
when you intend to fix the problem by? The total lack of information is 
appalling. What a disgrace [Name].” – Reference 23, WSP 1 2018 03 04 
23 
 
“[Location]..2 days without having a shower at home, being able to use a 
toilet, washing up or drinking anything other than overpriced bottled water. 
Still no sign from [Name] regarding a timeline on these so called 
"investigations in to the matter /repairs" and when I can expect to get 
running water back. You need to be more informative [Name], you need to 
give people some kind of idea on how long this is going to take, even if it's 
bad news, we need to know!” – Reference 5, WSP 1 2018 03 06 11 
 
Examples of customers needing information to determine how to 
prepare 
“Any updates on [Location] [Name] your website is showing nothing! Even 
if you could give us a rough time of when it's due on as if it's off all day 
again we won't be able to stay indoors with no toilet and no way to wash 
anything up. Thank you.” – Reference 8, WSP 1 2018 03 04 02 
 
“I appreciate that this is because of the recent weather and cannot be 
helped, but can you give a rough idea on how long it will be before water 
is back on in [Location]? I have a 9 week old bottle fed baby and need to 
prepare if it's going to be a while before it's back on, the website isn't very 
helpful.” – Reference 4, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
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“I'm so fed up - not so much being without water (although that's a pain - I 
do understand there's a countrywide problem after the big freeze) but the 
lack of information and clarity is staggering. I have a job raised - it says 
"investigation completed". What does that mean? I still have no water. And 
I also have no explanation as to what the next step will be, or when it might 
happen! The email I received says "There are full updates for each area 
in our news section of our website." But this isn't true - there are only 5 
entries for 5th May 2018 and my area isn't one of them. I also checked out 
jobs in my area using the map tool. Guess what? Nothing there either. I 
rang [Name] and got told to call another number. I called. I held on for 45 
minutes then gave up. Tunderstand that it's busy, but I only want to know 
how long | need to prepare for having no water! I could bulk buy water if I 
knew it was going to be days. I'd go to the leisure centre and have a 
shower. But if the water is coming back on tomorrow I can wait. Please 
can I have some proper information??.” – Reference 45, WSP 2 2018 03 
05 08 
“No we are in a temporary build, we have procedures in place to close if 
necessary just want a clear indication of timescales of when the water will 
be back on and drinkable. We need to give parents as much notice as 
possible to make childcare plans for their children.” – Reference 14,  WSP 
3 03 03 01 
 
 Requesting information about timescales 
 “Do not make promises you can't keep. Give realistic timescales so 
that people can make plans. 22:00 been and gone and not a droplet from 
my tap. So. That's multiple days now.” – Reference 10, WSP 1 2018 03 
05 17 
“Could you at least have the decency to let us know when are we gonna 
get water so at least we can plan ahead and bother friends and family to 
beg for a shower? As long as they don't leave in [Location] that is...” – 
Reference 33, WSP 1 2018 03 05 17 
 
 Requests for information regarding alternative supplies 
“Where's [Location] bottled water?! Are we expected to travel to [Location] 
to get our bottled water - this has been 24hours now!!” – Reference 1, 
WSP 1 2018 03 04 27 
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“Where do we get drinking water from in [Location]?” – Reference 17, 
WSP 1 2018 03 04 28 
 
“Is there any chance you'll be sending out an alternative water supply at 
all? (Bottled/Bowsers) I bought some bottled water last night when it 
started but nearly all gone! In [Location] - no water since around 7pm...” – 
Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 04 05 
“So [Name] - where is the bottled water oh bowsers for [Location]? No 
water in the taps, no water in the shops and no water supplies from you 
[Name] .... compensation!!” – Reference 16, WSP 1 2018 03 04 09 
 
“[Name] No point publishing an update which is factually incorrect. And 
why have thousands of bottles of water been sent to schools which haven't 
had their water cut off - when we are fast approaching 24 hours with not 
even a murmur from you about providing an alternative supply.” – 
Reference 21, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
“[Name] ... aren't you supposed to provide alternative water (eg Bowser / 
Bottled water) after 12 hours?????” – Reference 10, WSP 3 2018 03 03 
02 
 
“So 2 questions, how do we go about compensation, as we're almost at 
the 24 hour mark. And why has an alternative not been provided as its 
been over 12 hours? The shops locally are running out of bottled water.” 
– Reference 7, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
“I have no water all the shops in the area are sold out of water ... where 
can we get water??? been holding on your helpline for over 3hrs no one 
is answering.” – Reference 7, WSP 1 2018 03 04 29 
“[Name] absolutely disgusting, still no water at [Location], you've done 
absolutely nothing to source alternative water for us, all the shops are out, 
can you please sort us out some water.” – Reference 21, WSP 3 2018 
03 03 02 
“Over 24hrs still no water. I understand burst pipes and engineering 
problems on site but for you not to be able or capable to provide us with 
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an alternative water supply is not acceptable in this day and age. So what 
are you going to do fix the pipe or alternate water supply..!!!” – Reference 
25, WSP 3 2018 03 03 02  
 
 Requests regarding how to register as vulnerable 
“How exactly are you prioritising people? Are you driving around the 
affected areas and dropping off water on our streets? Because that's what 
you should be doing. Do you really think 'vulnerable people can hop in a 
car and drive across [Location] to pick up water, not even knowing if there 
will be any left when they get there? Your attitude to your customers is 
disgraceful.”- Reference 4, WSP 1 2018 03 04 14 
 
“I spent over 3 hours trying to call you yesterday. I'm a vulnerable person, 
whose registered disabled and also has Ulcerative Colitis. Why are we not 
getting any proper updates?” – Reference 24, WSP 1 2018 03 04 18 
 
“Just wondering why some customers have had text messages from 
[Name] & we (presumably others too) haven't? Also, heard they are 
supposed to be contacting the vulnerable themselves? How do they know 
who's vunerable & what qualifies you as this?” – Reference 10, WSP 2 
2018 03 05 06 
 
“The latest update for [Location] (8.20am) states [Name] will continue to 
deliver water to the vulnerable throughout today. How do we get in touch 
to arrange that? I have vulnerable clients in [Location] town centre and in 
[Location].” – Reference 51, WSP 2 2018 03 05 07 
 
“How can I register someone as vulnerable and needs their water 
delivered please?” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 05 02 
 
“Desparately trying to find out when water being restored to [Location], my 
elderly frail father living alone with mobility issues and chronic health 
conditions has had no water for over 24 hours.. What are [Name] doing 
about vulnerable and elderly customers who do not use the Internet? 
Found the website less than helpful as nothing about help for the 
vulnerable and spoke to Customer Services late last night with my 
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concerns, they took his details and mine and promised if extended beyond 
this morning they get back to me, we have heard nothing since.” – 
Reference 5, WSP 3 2018 03 03 05  
 
Requests for compensation 
“Hi Now entering day 4 with zero running water in [Location]. Please advise 
your compensation procedures.” – Reference 37, WSP 1 2018 03 05 17   
 
“This is disgraceful. No water since Sam! Are you kidding me. Please 
advise on how we will be compensated. Your lines don't even work and 
your 'water stations' have no water your not only encouraging vulnerable 
people to leave there homes in the night for nothing but also not providing 
clear timelines as to when this f mess will be sorted. Pathetic.” – 
Reference 20, WSP 1 2018 03 04 10 
 
“Hope you have made compensation available for your customers??”  - 
Reference 29, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
 
“Does this mean customers who have been without water since Sunday 
night still only receive the same compensation as those who have only 
been without for 12 hours?” – Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 03 06 
 
“How and where do we apply for compensation plz” – Reference 21, WSP 
3 2018 03 04 24 
 
6.2.3 Conversations between the WSP and the customer 
 
 Customer comment 3 
“We’ve got no water in [Location] any idea of how long it will be off. Thank 
you.” 
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 WSP response 3 
“Hi, I’m really sorry we haven’t got a timescale yet.  We’re workingas 
quickly as we can to get this fixed.  We have a bottled water location at 
[Location]” – Reference 3, WSP 1 2018 03 05 07 
 
 Customer comment 4 
“There is still no supply to [Location] not even a dribble tho told is back on.
  
 WSP response 4 
“The damaged pipes in your area are now repaired but we have airlocks 
that are preventing the water from flowing freely.  We are working hard to 
clear the airlocks and to get your water supply back to normal as soon as 
possible. For more information please go to [Website].” – Reference 17, 
WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
 Customer comment 5 
“What about the old, sick, disabled and mothers with small children? Not 
everyone can travel” 
  
 WSP response 5 
 “….. we're asking for any customer's who are vulnerable or their family 
members to contact us. We need full names, address's and contact 
number's and we'll be in contact with these customer's” – Reference 4, 
WSP 1 2018 03 05 07  
 
Negative response to WSP replies to customers 
“I'm still waiting for my DM to be answered their colleague told me to 
message about receiving bottled water without a car and no reply.” – 
Reference 20, WSP 1 2018 03 05 17 
“It's great when certain people get a reply and some get ignored so not 
only do we have no water it seems some people aren't good enough for a 
response ...welldone excellent customer service.” – Reference 5, WSP 3 
2018 03 04 24  
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6.2.4 Customers sharing information  
“I just spoke to the council. [Name] have confirmed there is an issue at 
[Location] and are onsite to check the problem.” – Reference 1, WSP 1 
2018 03 03 11 
 
“This was posted to the [Name] twitter feed: "We've now completed our 
work to repair a large leaking water pipe, which has been causing low 
pressure or no water in [Locations]  Pressure is now building and we 
expect water to return over the next few hours (1/2)". Is this correct 
information?” – Reference 6, WSP 1 2018 03 04 18 
“Now the website says "We're aware that customers may currently be 
experiencing disruptions to their supplies. We have despatched a team to 
the area and will provide further updates as soon as they become 
available. We ask that our customers conserve water whilst we work to 
identify the cause of the disruption in the area." I love the way they say 
"may" be experiencing difficulties. So we are now supposed to conserve 
the water we don't have.” – Reference 13, WSP 3 2018 03 02 07  
“Contrary to what [Name] says (yet again) the contractor from [Name] 
providing water had 5l plastic water bags emblazoned with [Name] logo, 
at least he did first thing this morning. Best to take your own just in case 
though.” – Reference 13, WSP 3 2018 03 04 02 
“We were at the [Name] local near a [Location] an hour ago, there was 
water there and in the shop on the corner by [Location]” – Reference 1, 
WSP 1 2018 03 04 05  
 
“Here is a link to [Name] complaints procedure. Just in case anyone else 
wishes to lodge a complaint about either or both the lack of water or 
[Name] shoddy customer service in dealing with this failure to supply 
water. [Website]“ – Reference 27, WSP 3 2018 03 03 02 
 
“It says on the citizens advice website that after 12 hours we should be 
providing with water somehow... Well, we haven't been! I remember last 
summer on one of the hottest days of the year the water was off for almost 
a full day... Got nothing then so I'm not hopeful now!” – Reference 8, WSP 
2 2018 03 05 02 
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6.3 Alternative supplies of water 
 
 Difficulties with the location of water distribution stations  
“Can someone at [Name] start using their common sense and supply the 
water in the Streatham are closest to those affected around [Location], and 
not 2 miles away. Most [Location] don't have cars, and there are many 
people unable to get there (elderly, disabled, those who can't carry water 
etc).” – Reference 10, WSP 1 2018 03 04 14 
 
“Where's [Location] bottled water?! Are we expected to travel to [Location] 
to get our bottled water - this has been 24hours now!!” – Reference 1, 
WSP 1 2018 03 04 27 
 
“Told nearest water station is [Location]... That's a joke - how do we get 
there from [Location] .... [Location].” – Reference 18, WSP 1 2018 03 04 
29 
 
“What about the ones that can't collect !!!!!” – Reference 8, WSP 2 2018 
03 06 05 
“Where is our supply of bottled water - we are a small village [Location]. 
This is our 2nd without water.” – Reference 76, WSP 2 2018 03 06 05 
 
“It's great that you are handing out free water, but when you don't have 
access to a car it's a bit difficult to reach, pick up and transport the water 
back to where it is needed. Can there not be multiple distribution points so 
everyone can reach one easily?” – Reference 3, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
 
“Cant we get a delivery of water in [Location]? some people who live here 
don't have cars so how are they surposed to bring water back.” – 
Reference 8, WSP 3 2018 03 04 03 
 
  “I'm not driving and I got a small kids on a buggy we are on 
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[Location] how can I carry water for more then 30 min walking ? You should 
provide the upper part of [Location] as well with water!” – Reference 3, 
WSP 1 2018 03 04 13 
 
“they could have atleast offered us water bottles as it says on the website 
there is a station in [Location] or something.” – Reference 4, WSP 1 2018 
03 04 29 
 
“Amazing effort [Name]! The water station at [Location] was fab. Thank 
you.” – Reference 56, WSP 2 2018 03 06 05 
 
“Do they provide containers? Our closest pick up point is 5 miles away!”  - 
Reference 12, WSP 3 2018 03 04 02  
 
“Dear [Name] There is also issues in [Location] and there are residents 
that are unable to get to your locations you have set in [Location] only. I 
think a collection point in the village centre would be advisable to enable 
these residents to access bottled water. Many thanks.” – Reference 36, 
WSP 3 2018 03 05 02 
 
6.3.1 Availability of alternative supplies of water 
“Having had problems trying to buy water in [Location] supermarkets I was 
surprised to find out [Name] was giving out drinking water,however it was 
all gone,and by the way it was nowhere near [Location]. Still without water, 
let's hope we can believe them, a statement at 5 am informed us we would 
have a supply in 2 hours.” – Reference 5, WSP 1 2018 03 05 14  
 
“52 hours without so much as a dribble of water!! And not so much as a 
text or email from my water supplier with information! Why should I have 
to check social media for updates, you should be updating your paying 
customers directly! Every time I arrive I arrive at a water distribution stop, 
they have run out of supplies! Also distribution points are nowhere near to 
where I live [Location] so have to drag my 3year old and 5month old out in 
the car. I can almost forgive the ageing infrastructure but your handling of 
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the situation in the aftermath has definitely fallen short! Provide your 
customers with more information, and start delivering water to those who 
need it!” – Reference 6, WSP 1 2018 03 05 16 
 
“Every time you post there is water at one of your collection points by the 
time we can get there I see a post to say that it's all gone and only 1 litre 
each, come on [Name] this is not good.” – Reference 7, WSP 1 2018 03 
05 04.  
 
“At the Sainsbury's [Location] water station they are saying one litre per 
person. People are naturally arguing but equally not the fault of the person 
manning the station. They are just doing what they've been told to do. 
Whole thing is being managed so badly. Where are the senior 
stakeholders hiding right now?” – Reference 6, WSP 1 2018 03 05 06 
 
“I drove to the village square and you said I could only have a few litres 
which is no good with a family to look after, then the water ran out anyway. 
Why can't you tell us exactly what is wrong and be more realistic about 
when it will be fixed? at least then we will know the extent to which we 
need to prepare. Your efforts at supplying us with emergency water are 
completely inadequate. Your communication with your customers is 
laughable. You have one job ffs.” – Reference 1 WSP 3, 2018 03 04 08 
 
 Chaos at the water distribution station 
“We were there this afternoon .... it was a horrible experience .... utter 
chaos & a complete 'bun fight. Nobody knows how to queue anymore!!!“ – 
Reference 21, WSP 1 2018 03 04 15 
“If you are referring to those at [Location], to be fair, the [Name] people I 
spoke to were drafted in at short notice, drainage workers, lorry drivers 
etc. They were not trained in crowd control and it wasn't them who chose 
to almost riot. There was plenty of water and people just had to be patient. 
The guys at [Location] were there to help. they didn't cause the problem.I 
heard several people say they were there for "free" water and didn't have 
a water issue. These contributed to the problem. I waited for over an hour 
to get water for the elderly residents of my road and will probably have to 
go back tomorrow for more. The biggest concern is the lack of comms and 
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sheer size of the problem. All of [Location] appears to have spung a leak. 
It's not new btw [Website]” – Reference 24, 2018 03 04 15 
 
When I went it was like Armageddon. Traffic was truly crazy and then to 
make matters worse when [Name] closed for the day they locked their car 
park gate...... mean really [Name] REALLY these are desperate times, 
what is wrong with mankind sometimes. Yea so after that things got 
worse.” – Reference 29, 2018 03 04 11 
 
 Location of water distribution stations 
“Is there any chance you'll be sending out an alternative water supply at 
all? (Bottled/Bowsers) I bought some bottled water last night when it 
started but nearly all gone! In [Location] - no water since around 7pm...” – 
Reference 1, 2018 03 04 05 
 
So [Name] - where is the bottled water oh bowsers for [Location]? No water 
in the taps, no water in the shops and no water supplies from you [Name] 
.... compensation!!” – Reference 25, 2018 03 04 09 
 
“When can we expect water bowsers on street corners? [Location]” – 
Reference 13, 2018 03 05 12 
 
Serious health risk. We need standpipes or bowsers every half-mile so we 
can get enough water to wash. Not Facebook posts with no info or 
incorrect info.”  - Reference 1, 2018 03 06 03  
 
“[Name] Why will you not put water bowsers on street this is a joke what 
about people with no cars.” – Reference 5, 2018 03 06 03 
 
You need to bring water tankers on the streets!!Bottled water is not good 
enough and not everyone can reach it.It's been 5 days without any water. 
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People need to flush their toilets,wash or shower.” – Reference 19, 2018 
03 06 03 
 
6.3.2 Contingency planning 
“Not good enough [Name], only two sites for the whole of [Location]? Why 
are you not distributing water bottles to schools, set up water station's near 
each [Location]. Not everyone has transport to get to your two designated 
water station's and not everyone physically able or even financially able to 
travel to these areas. What are you doing to help the elderly, disabled and 
single parent families with babies & small children who probably cannot 
afford to get there? Not acceptable, no helpline available & no real 
estimated timeframe given of when this will be resolved. No real plan has 
been actioned and no real reassurance has been given.” – Reference 13, 
2018 03 05 03 
“Still no water, it's been over 24 hours now. No emergency water delivered, 
no regular updates. [Name] you need to sort this !!!” – Reference 7, WSP 
3 2018 03 03 02 
“There are several people who cannot get out of the village needing water 
in [Location]. When are you planning on helping all those residents. Small 
bowsers in neighbouring villages completely insufficient.” – Reference 21, 
WSP 3 2018 03 04 08 
 
6.3.3 Altruistic behaviour 
“My local leisure centre let me use their showers if you have one near by 
that's easy enough to get to it's worth giving them a call to see if they can 
help.” – Reference 3, WSP 1 2018 03 06 03 
 
“if you still don't have water tomorrow and need a shower you're welcome 
to come and use mine, just drop me a message.” – Reference 1, WSP 2 
2018 03 05 12 
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“Thank you for keeping us informed. [Location].my kind neighbour 
collected some water for me.” – Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 14 
 
“Not a problem sweet I'll drop u some down I was on the phone crying to 
them it's been quite stress full xx” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 05 01 
 
 “..you’re all more than welcome to come over to ours if you need to 
shower xx” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 05 02  
 
 Quotes supporting the WSP 
“you pay for the amount of water you use whithin your property. Be flexible 
and understanding. They're doing as much as they can to get this sorted 
by also providing bottles of water in [Location].” – Reference 1, WSP 1 
2018 03 04 16 
 
“Well done [Name] for all your hard work trying to get the matter resolved 
and I agree that it's not your fault but unfortunately your just picking up the 
pieces after the whole mess! Well done and thank you for providing water 
in local store car parks!” – Reference 2, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
“[Name] have just delivered an emergency supply of water. Which we are 
very grateful for during this difficult time. Our thanks also to [Name] on the 
emergency desk who rang us through out the day to assess our position. 
Thank you.., also to [Name] for all your help today., you are all our heroes 
this evening.” – Reference 2, WSP 3 2018 03 02 11 
 
“Awesome, thanks to all your staff. Some of which i am sure have been 
out in some very cold and challenging conditions to try and find the cause. 
Now off to search for some vessels to fill!” – Reference 6, WSP 3 PC 2018 
03 04 02 
“A BIG THANK YOU!!! TO [NAME]!!! Ive just had 3 Bottles of water 
delivered to [Location]. A lovely man who couldn’t apologise enough! He 
has no idea when we will have WATER but told me it was because we 
lived high up and the reservoir at [Location] is causing problems. So will 
sit down and have a nice cuppa now! Thank you to the team on 
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FACEBOOK you acted with it in a matter of 25 mins where calling 10 times 
got us nowhere. I really do appreciate it! Thanks to all!!” – Reference 2, 
WSP 3 2018 03 04 03 
6.4 Living without a water supply  
 
“I could cry! Last thing you want with a toddler – can’t shower, nothing to 
drink, can’t wash hands or flush the loo!! Going to have to take over Mum’s 
for the day.” – Reference 3, WSP 2 2018 03 05 03  
 
“Still no water in [Location] I must have missed the 2 hours it came back 
on. Am distressed cannot go to work this smelly” – Reference 3, WSP 1 
2018 03 04 20  
 
 Difficulties living without a water supply 
“I understand it is not your fault, but it is not ours either. No water to cook, 
no water to even use the toilet or take a simple shower. Yeah shops do 
sell water, but it is not the same thing.” – Reference 63, WSP 1 AP 2018 
03 04 12 
 
“Compensation?? Pretty annoying now [Location], I've got a kitchen full of 
dirty washing up, haven't been able to shower or flush the toilet for three 
days. [Location].” – Reference 5, WSP 1 2018 03 05 16 
 
“Ahh the toilet issue is annoying but trying to recycle water and using the 
bottle water supplies from [Location] I have to wash the dishes in a basin 
then throw the dirty water down the loo after. Worst part for me is I keep 
going to the tap to wash my hands then remember there's no water. After 
72hrs you would have thought I would catch on lol but hopefully one day 
I'll be surprised and see water is back.” – Reference 25 WSP 1 AP 2018 
03 05 16 
 
“I'm more bothered about no being able to have a wash really it's just 
crazy” – Reference 3, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
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“lv had to take my kids to live at my friends I'm so stressed it's unreal I cnt 
when wash my cloths.” – Reference 2, WSP 3 2018 03 04 24 
 
 Difficulties living without water to flush the toilet 
“No water in [Location] yet, how can a family share a toilet like this for over 
24hours.” – Reference 17, WSP 1 2018 03 04 23 
“You know, having a load of wee in the toilet is actually bothering me more 
than anything” – Reference 2, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
“..thanks very much, ok at the mo. Biggest problem kids and the loo!” – 
Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 03 02 
 
“not a single drip since Saturday at 6pm 2 under 5s and water pick up point 
a 30min walk. water is not light its not possible to carry it.. ive bought 
40bottles since Sunday afternoon, it takes 3 bottles for 1 flush, 2bottles for 
the smallest bit of washing up, my son was throwing up early hours sunday 
and i still can't wash hes bedding which is covered in vomit, i appreciate 
your doing all you can but we need more than that.” – Reference 9, WSP 
1 2018 03 06 11   
“We all need water, not just vulnerable people. Obviously drinking water is 
vital, but we still need to wash and flush our toilets. This is getting on for 
30 hours and is ridiculous.” – Reference 3, WSP 3 2018 03 03 02  
“[Name] Not good enough. I don't have a car and I have two kids. How can 
I get enough water to flush the loo and keep us all clean? (Getting enough 
to drink has been hard enough!).” – Reference 2, WSP 1 2018 03 05 12 
 
“My husband went and bought loads of bottles of water last night, so we 
were OK... My 2 are a bit older so they are OK.... But yknow... Can't flush 
the toilet!! Flipping grim!! it's getting to the point where I'm going to have 
to use a couple of bottles of water to flush the loo! We're at the point now 
where they should be providing an alternative water supply.” – Reference 
2, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
“[Name] any news in [Location]. We've had no water or toilet use since 
8pm yesterday and no news/updates from [Name]. Can you please let us 
have an update this is now becoming a nightmare. Gone thru 8 large 
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halons type waters for washing etc. No update for water collection in 
[Location] either” – Reference 13, WSP 1 2018 03 04 25 
 
Still no water in [Location]. Our toilets are blocked by now. Can you please 
work harder to resolve this chaotic situation. This is unacceptable.” – 
Reference 4, WSP 1 2018 03 04 28 
 
“[Name] [Location] no water since Saturday afternoon almost 48 hours, 
toilet block, [Location] water supply only one bottle per person it's not 
enough even to drink or flush toilet, can you please let me when water will 
be back since ham you posted in few hours been 7 hours since then. 
Thank you” – Reference 13, WSP 1 2018 03 04 18 
 
“You have to buy water and fill the toilet tank. We had to do it on Sunday 
and it uses like 6ltrs + of water for one flush.” – Reference 2, WSP 1 2018 
03 05 17 
 
6.5 The provision of a service  
 Negative comments regarding the provision of service 
“There zero water being supplied so none available for washing cars or for 
essential uses like toilets, showers, washing, drinking etc. You blame a 
'sudden demand for water however its the same demand as every 
weekend. Zero customer service or response” – Reference 5, WSP 1 
2018 03 04 12 
 
“Come on [Name]! No water for 4 days now! This surely should be illegal 
to leave tenants without water! If it's not back by tomorrow you can put me 
and my family up in a hotel until it's fixed, and my water bill for this month 
I am not paying for a service I'm not using! Bloody joke! Where are your 
engineers at!!????”  - Reference 14, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12  
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“Now 20-00hrs Sunday night, still no water and only water station is 4 miles 
away, which is difficult to get to for those without transport, reported in no 
water early this morning, told would receive phone call later that day, still 
nothing...... We pay our water bills but [Name] don't deliver the service 
required..... “ they are no longer fit for purpose needs to be renationalised 
and take back into public hands and all profits recovered from 
shareholders....” – Reference 3, WSP 1 2018 03 04 23 
 
“STILL NO WATER [Location].. NO UPDATES.. NOTHING!! DISGUSTED 
WITH THE LEVEL OF SERVICE. I REPORTED IT FOR 3RD TIME 
TODAY YO BE TOLD ITS THE FIRST [NAME] HAVE HEARD NO NEWS 
OF MY POSTCODE I TOLD YOU ON SUNDAY!!! UNACCEPTABLE!!!” – 
Reference 14, WSP 1 2018 03 06 11 
 
 
“Your service is absolutely awful! We still have no water [Location] & still 
no contact from you! I don't drive, I have a baby & this is all the water I 
have left... thanks for all your help, NOT!! Absolutely disgusting!” – 
Reference 2, WSP 2 2018 03 06 01 
 
 “It's a disgusting service” – Reference 25, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
 
Will you be refunding customers in those areas as you are currently unable 
to provide adequate service?” – Reference 6, WSP 1 2018 03 03 10 
 
“Still no water in [Location]. No update from [Name]. Your website does 
not provide any details on my area. Terrible communication. Terrible 
service.”  - Reference 17, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
“This is getting ridiculous! I commented yesterday on your post about our 
area. Still not good enough! As a pregnant woman I NEED WATER! Just 
like everyone in this effected area. This is absolutely Appalling service” – 
Reference 3, WSP 1 2018 03 04 02 
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“It's the lack of information provided by [Name]. If you could give any 
indication of how long this would go on for this would help. Any indication 
would help people to make provisions. Just to ignore your customers is an 
example of a poor service. I'm sure if you sent out an FAQ to customers 
that would slightly appease people rather than being disregarded.” – 
Reference 8, WSP 1 2018 03 04 28 
 
“I am sorry is not being spoiled but is paying for a service in one of the 
most evolved city on the planet, a service that should deal with this in a 
different way. There must be a back up plan for any emergency” – 
Reference 4, WSP 1 2018 03 04 11  
 
“Disgusting service! [Name] treating their customers YES CUSTOMERS 
so poorly!!!!” – Reference 9, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
Still no water [Location]!!!!!! Any update??? Your service is shocking!” – 
Reference 7, WSP 1 2018 03 04 23 
 
“How very disappointing from [Name] to leave us without water for such a 
long time It is more than disappointing not to be able to wash and flush the 
toilet” – Reference 9, WSP 1 2018 03 04 10 
 
“Again another [Location] resident here with 2 young children no water 
since 8pm last night can't get through to anyone absolute disgraceful 
service so far” – Reference 8, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
 
 Quotes relating to the WSP suggestion to conserve water  
“Now the website says "We're aware that customers may currently be 
experiencing disruptions to their supplies. We have despatched a team to 
the area and will provide further updates as soon as they become 
available. We ask that our customers conserve water whilst we work to 
identify the cause of the disruption in the area." I love the way they say 
"may" be experiencing difficulties. So we are now supposed to conserve 
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the water we don't have.“ – Reference 14, WSP 3 2018 03 02 07 
“[Location] Same comment how are we meant to store water when there 
is none. Could [Name] please let consumers know the exact postcodes 
affected, what is causing it in each post code and rectification times now 
the roads are open and we are above.” – Reference 9, WSP 3 2018 03 
02 14 
“Very difficult to conserve water when you haven’t had a supply all day.  
Trying to run a pub and can’t wash glasses or flush toilets. Food service 
had to be cancelled. Also personally I have a medical condition requiring 
water. Any chance of getting us some bottled water or a bowser.?” – 
Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 02 17 
 
“Washing the car. I haven't been able to flash the toilet since last night. In 
[Location].” – Reference 4, WSP 1 WC 2018 03 04 12 
 
 Customer criticism regarding infrastructure 
“Why the hell should we be patient and understanding of a company who 
chooses profit over reinvestment into infrastructure.“ – Reference 7, WSP 
1 2018 03 04 28 
 
“That would make sense. I wish [Name] had referred to it as 'leakage due 
to bad infrastructure' instead of 'demand', which makes it seem like it's 
down to the customers.” – Reference 3, WSP 1 2018 03 05 01 
 
“Your hollow apologies aren't worth anything... We ALL knew the snow 
was coming - so it seems every industry prepared for the consequences 
except [Name] - simple not acceptable.” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 
03 10 
 
“From my professional experience [Name] don't want to put too much 
strain on the pipe work because it's so old and fragile. It's time more money 
was put back into upgrading the antiquated system. I've every respect for 
the guys out there repairing the pipes but none for the fat cat cat 
shareholders creaming the profits! Still no water on [Location].” – 
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Reference 3, WSP 2 2018 03 06 03 
“Dnt get me wrong the workers do a brilliant job its not their fault I too thank 
them and applaud them. Its the shareholders and fat cats at the top 
creaming off the money which should be ploughed back into the 
infrastructure so that these workmen and their families arent put under 
such stress under these condition. I whole heartedly apologise if I have 
upset anyone.” – Reference 20, WSP 3 2018 03 04  
 
“Stop blaming the cold weather - if your infrastructure was fit for purpose 
these incidents wouldn't exist.” – Reference 2, WSP 1 2018 03 04 25 
Ridiculous situation. It's about time the water companies started a 
methodical upgrade of the old and deteriorating systems rather than trying 
to patch them up all the time. They are a service provider so it's high time 
they put service before profits!” – Reference 5, WSP 1 2018 03 05 01 
 
“Every year we have a cold snap, yet the water companies are never 
prepared. Taking customers money to feed shareholders and pay 
dividends. No investment, no planning. First World problems, I know, but 
water is a basic right.” – Reference 33, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
 
“[Name] make enough out of us so this should never happen in the first 
place the consumer is paying highly for a service they are not getting. 
Shareholders getting priority over updating and replacing old pipelines etc. 
I know the weather has been a contributory factor but in the summer you 
dnt see thm working on replacing or checking potential supply problems 
they wait until something happens.” – Reference 6, WSP 3 2018 03 04 24 
 
 Comments thanking the WSP  
“Well done [Name] ... [Location] up and running ok now. What a relief. 
Feels so good to have water back on. Ty to all you hardworking [Name] 
employees working throughout the night to get it fixed. Yippee” – 
Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 04 07 
 
“I have flushed the loo for the first time since Saturday - thank you very 
much to all your staff for working so hard on our behalf. And it's ok to say 
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"We don't know" and keep customers up to date. False hope is what is so 
damaging!!” – Reference 81, WSP 1 AP 2018 03 06 11 
 
“Thank you for all your hard work because i know for certain you will be 
working around the clock inside the call centre and out in the field.” – 
Reference 3, WSP 2 2018 03 05 04  
  
“Personally I think [Name] do an amazing job. They always try to fix 
problems as soon as possible and I regularly hear of stories where they 
hand out FREE bottled water in some instances. Can you imagine if our 
gas or electric supplies went off for long periods...... Not sure we'd get free 
candles or gas bottles.” – Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
 
“I'm gunna thank [Name] engineers on the ground who've clearly worked 
all hours to get things moving again. It's not perfect and there are major 
issues here - but instead of complaining incessantly, let's actually thank 
those workers who worked all wknd to help.” – Reference 14, WSP 1 AP 
2018 03 05 02 
“Thanks guys for getting my water back to what passes for normal. Many 
thanks, still need an infrastructure upgrade in the area to cater for the 
increased demand since the original infrastructure was put in. [Location] 
back as it was.” – Reference 6, WSP 1 AP 2018 03 07 06 
 
Customers reporting leaks and burst pipes 
“Water coming out of the 'water' drain covering on bottom of [Location] just 
now. Our water has been normal for hours but just seen this walking the 
dog.” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 05 01  
 
“There's a substantial leak at the top of [Location], just off the [Location] 
between [Location] Think it's been attended to before.” – Reference 2, 
WSP 2 2018 03 06 07 
 
“I'm amazed at [Name] actually trying to fix a leak, there's been one on 
[Location] for at least a year now reported several times they came 2 
weeks ago dug a hole filled it in and it's still pouring water onto the road 
and into the gutter.......” – Reference 29, WSP 1 AP 2018 03 04 23 
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“perhaps someone could fix the leak I reported in December that has now 
fractured to pathway and is losing gallons every day” – Reference 11, 
WSP 1 2018 03 04 28 
 
“You have a burst main running all down [Location] for the last week. 
Visible to everybody passing by. It's not a good advert when you have the 
problems you have in the rest of the county. Stuff the the Council and get 
it repaired Sunday esrly when there is no traffic about.” – Reference 1, 
WSP 2 2018 03 07 03 
 
Customer providing evidence of engineers on site 
 
Looks like all the carnage is happening down [Location]. Road closed and 
lots guy's in orange overalls scratching their heads.” – Reference 53, WSP 
1 2018 03 03 02 
 
“[Name] are round on [Location] now I've just drive past but they are just 
stood looking around” – Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
Customers comments regarding the timescale of repairs 
 
“[Name] but that's not true. We just went out to the engineers on our road 
who said they can't find the leak to our area and so can't fix anything until 
they can find the leak!!!!!!!??? Who's telling the truth exactly!???” – 
Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 07  
 
“Nearly 24hrs now in [Location] and still nothing, you've dug a hole up near 
us, barriered it off and left it, right on a cross roads with traffic lights causing 
bedlam for traffic and the website says someone will get to sort it on the 
25/3, that's 3 weeks away ......” – Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 08 
“Can assure you was a huge team out all night. “ – Reference 3, WSP 3 
2018 03 03 01 
 
6.5.1 WSP customer service 
“no water in parts of [Location] - an hour on the phone, listening to weird 
music and being told that "one adviser will be with me soon" - yeah right - 
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some information somewhere? - when is water back?” – Reference 73, 
WSP 1 AP 2018 03 04 12 
 
“No water [Location] been on phone for 2 hours tweeted them loads and 
guess what...nothing” – Reference 125, WSP 1 AP 2018 03 04 12 
 
“I have contacted you today as I am registered disabled and have 
Ulcerative Colitis. But heard nothing yet. I tried calling yesterday but hung 
on for over 3 hours until the battery on my phone died. Quite shocked no 
one answered.” – Reference 134 WSP 1 AP 2018 03 04 18 
 
“No water in [Location] can't even get anyone on the phone!” – Reference 
13, WSP 1 AP 2018 03 04 27 
 
“Over 2 hours spent on hold trying to talk to someone! Emailed, tweeted, 
facebooked-now your bloody website is down. What is going on? When 
will the water be back on!? [Location].” – Reference 35, WSP 1 AP 2018 
03 04 29 
“[Name] I've tried and so have others we get cut off! Or get an automated 
message and live chat cuts you off!!!” – Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 
01 
 
“But you are keeping people waiting for 3 hours+ for a response on live 
chat.” – Reference 6, WSP 2 2018 03 05 07 
 
“You didn't miss anything. I stayed on for 22 minutes then lost the will to 
live. The website info hasn't been updated since 6:21 p.m. yesterday. I am 
thinking about taking two buckets and walking a mile to a stream and filling 
up. It's a bit Mediaeval but needs must.” – Reference 3, WSP 3 2018 03 
02 07 
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Customers comments regarding direct messaging the WSP 
 
“I DM'd you this morning. No response so far” – Reference 24, WSP 1 AP 
2018 03 07 01. 
 
“I've sent 3 private messages since Sunday morning because I can't get 
through on the phones and they haven't even been looked at let alone 
responded to.” – Reference 24, WSP 1 AP 2018 03 06 04  
 
“I've had low pressure for 6 and a half days. I've sent a DM as advised - 
do you know how long it will take to get a response?“ – Reference 01, 
WSP 1 2018 03 07 09 
 
“has anyone received their compensation yet for loss of service? I was 
without water from 3rd March to 7th March and apparently am due 
compensation which [Name] said they would pay, but oddly the link to that 
page on their website no longer works. Have they changed their minds? 
Wonder what Ofwat will have to say about this?” – Reference 19, WSP 1 
AP 2018 03 04 10 
 
“https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/.../supply.../standards-of-service/ “- Reference 
08, WSP 1 AP 2018 03 04 10 
 
 
“Sent a private message a couple of hours ago as requested, to get help 
to vulnerable clients in [Location], and [Name] have not even read it yet!” 
– Reference 14, WSP 2 2018 03 05 07 
 
6.5.2 Vulnerable customers 
“DISTRIBUTE ThEm on the roads affected please.....imagine the elderly 
?single mums at home with kids? the sick?....can they really travel to 
collect the water?.....Actually even better distribute them door to door 
Imagine if ur 80 years old stuck in a flat?Please ppl check if your elderly 
neighbours are ok and need water.” – Reference 1 WSP 1 2018 03 05 03 
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“Not good enough [name], only two sites for the whole of [Location]? Why 
are you not distributing water bottles to schools, set up water station's near 
each [Location]. Not everyone has transport to get to your two designated 
water station's and not everyone physically able or even financially able to 
travel to these areas. What are you doing to help the elderly, disabled and 
single parent families with babies & small children who probably cannot 
afford to get there? Not acceptable, no helpline available & no real 
estimated timeframe given of when this will be resolved. No real plan has 
been actioned and no real reassurance has been given” – Reference 2 
WSP 1, 2018 03 05 03 
 
“An appalling response [Name]. Why aren't you delivering water to the 
streets effected? Some homes have been 48hrs without water now. How 
is an elderly or disabled person supposed to get to [Location] [Name] 
(miles away from the worst effected areas) to carry litres of water?” – 
Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 05 01 
 
“What about the ones that can't collect !!!!!” – Reference 2, WSP 2 2018 
03 06 05  
 
“Are you delivering to those who are elderly & housebound? My Grandad 
is 90 and lives in [Location}!!” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 04 02  
 
 
“[Location] what about [Location]. Elderly frail lady no water no heating 5 
days ?????” – Reference 1, WSP 1 2018 03 03 06 
 
“Still nothing in [Location]! I have a severely disabled elderly woman here.”  
- Reference 4, WSP 1 2018 03 04 29 
 
“My neighbour is 84 and house bound living on state pension even if he 
could get out he could not afford bottled water. This country is going to hell 
in a hand.” – Reference 3, WSP 1 2018 03 05 03 
“Desparately trying to find out when water being restored to [Location], my 
elderly frail father living alone with mobility issues and chronic health 
conditions has had no water for over 24 hours.. What are [Name] doing 
about vulnerable and elderly customers who do not use the Internet? 
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Found the website less than helpful as nothing about help for the 
vulnerable and spoke to Customer Services late last night with my 
concerns, they took his details and mine and promised if extended beyond 
this morning they get back to me, we have heard nothing since.” – 
Reference 5, WSP 3 03 03 01 
 
 
Vulnerable customers request for information and assistance 
 
“how do we get water if we are disabled? as can find no info on this, i live 
[Location] area.” – Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 09 
 
“[Location] baby and disabled person. Any news would be great.” – 
Reference 3, WSP 2 2018 03 05 07 
 
“Well you are supplying free water in [Name] in [Location] but i live 
[Location] why are u not supplying water to those of us affected here. Our 
water is filthy i also have kids with disabilities and am a type 1 diabetic with 
low immune system” – Reference 2, WSP 2, 2018 03 05 06 
 
 
“We are 2 OAPs living in a very small hamlet in [Location] area we have 
thanks to you some cold water supply but at much reduced pressure this 
means that there is not enough pressure to run our unvented hot water 
cylinder system so we have no hot water and must boil kettles all the time. 
Can you please tell us if and when the pressure we had before the outage 
will be restored, we are concerned about doing damage to the expensive 
unvented hot water cylinder system since we cannot re-pressurise it. 
Thanks for all your help.” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 04 24 
 
6.6 Compensation and bills  
“Come on [Name]! No water for 4 days now! This surely should be illegal 
to leave tenants without water! If it's not back by tomorrow you can put me 
and my family up in a hotel until it's fixed, and my water bill for this month 
I am not paying for a service I'm not using! Bloody joke! Where are your 
engineers at!!????” – Reference 30, WSP 1 2018 03 04 12 
 
“Understandable that these things happened, but I have to say your 
customer service is shocking! You left me without running water for 30+ 
and I never got any email, text money back for all the money I spend on 
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bottled water and ready made milk for my son. Instead you still take £40 
off me even though your website stated that you would reimburse me £30.” 
– Reference 1, WSP 02 2018 03 05 07  
 
“Hi Now entering day 4 with zero running water in [Location].  Please 
advise your compensation procedures.” – Reference 158, WSP 1 AP 
2018 03 05 17 
 
“Come on [Name] bosses show some compassion & give all those affected 
a rebate for all the inconvenience & stress these people have suffered & 
still are suffering!” – Reference 1, WSP 3 2018 03 04 02 
 
 “We should all have a refund on our bills you can't have a bath or shower 
with bottled and how about disabled or people that couldn't get out one 
place to get water disgusting.” – Reference 2, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
6.6.1 Complaints to the regulator 
“[Name], report this to Ofwat - one badlyplaced distribution point is not 
good enough. [Name], you could work with the [Location] and the voluntary 
sector to help get water out there, if resources is the issue.” – Reference 
1, WSP 1 2018 03 05 09 
 
“has anyone received their compensation yet for loss of service? I was 
without water from 3rd March to 7th March and apparently am due 
compensation which [Name] said they would pay, but oddly the link to that 
page on their website no longer works. Have they changed their minds? 
Wonder what Ofwat will have to say about this?”  - Reference 1, WSP 1, 
2018 03 03 10 
 
“Doesn't seem that posts here get meaningful answer from [Name]. Time 
to remind you of your obligations under the OfWat regime? EG about 
keeping public properly and specifically informed, within certain time 
limit.... “ – Reference 1, WSP 2 2018 03 05 02 
 
 
